JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) THIS revision petition is directed against the order dated 21-5-1984 passed by the Special Judge, Mandsaur in Special Case No. 1 of 1980 whereby when the case was progressing at evidence stage the prosecutions application for permission for production of sanction for prosecution required under the Prevention of Corruption act, 1947 (for short the Act) has been allowed. ( 2. ) IN the instant case the alleged offence was committed on 16-6-1979. Challan was ready on 30-6-1979 but was filed in January 1980. Charges were framed on 7-4-1980 and the application in question was filed on 25-11-1980 stating that sanction had already been accorded in 1979 prior to the challan having been filed and due to over-Sight it could not be filed along with the challen. ( 3. ) REFERRING to the decision in State of Rajasthan vs. Daulatram ( AIR 1980 SC 1314 ) and the decisions in Mohd Iqbal Ahmed vs. State of A. P. ( AIR 1979 SC 677 )and state of Rajasthan vs. Tarachand Jain ( AIR 1973 SC 2131 ), the learned Special Judge holding that sanction was in fact in existence on the date the challan was filed, passed the impugned order. ( 4. ) THE contention sought to be canvassed by the petitioners learned counsel is that as the sanction under section 6 of the Act was not on record when the Court took cognizance, the proceedings are rendered void ab initio and in the circumstances the impugned order deserves to be set aside. . ( 5. ) LEARNED counsel appearing for the State contends that as the sanction was anterior to the Court taking cognizance of the offence, the proceedings cannot be characterised as void ab initio and the impugned order is proper. ( 6. ) THE point for decision whether the impugned order deserves to be interfered with in exercise of the discretionary revisional jurisdiction of this Court. ( 7. ) FOR prosecution of the sort sanction under Section 197 of the Criminal procedure Code, 1973 (for short the Code) is not required. ( 6. ) THE point for decision whether the impugned order deserves to be interfered with in exercise of the discretionary revisional jurisdiction of this Court. ( 7. ) FOR prosecution of the sort sanction under Section 197 of the Criminal procedure Code, 1973 (for short the Code) is not required. Section 6 of the Act bears the Court from taking cognizance of an offence punishable under Section 161 or section 164 or Section 165 of the Indian Penal Code, or under sub-section (2) or sub-section (3-A) of Section 5 of the Act alleged to have been committed by a public servant except with the previous sanction of the competent authority empowered to grant the requisite sanction. ( 8. ) IN the decision in Gadhiya B. Vallabhdas vs. State AIR 1954 Saurashtra 132 with reference to Section 5 (3) of the Act it has been pointed out that rule of law laid down therein is a departure from the normal law of the land that no person car, be convicted on a mere presumption of his having committed an offence. In paragraph 7 of the decision it has further been pointed out that in order that an accused can be tried on specific charge, a sanction has to be given at the outset. The decision further points out that it is the duty of the Judge and the Lawyers to take up the question of sanction at the earliest stage whenever public servants are charged to obtain decision thereon before proceeding to deal with the merits of the prosecution case. ( 9. ) IN the decision in R. S. Nayak vs. A. R. Antulay AIR 1984 SC 684 it has been pointed out in paragraph 19 that taking of cognizance of an offence without sanction renders the proceedings void ab initio. In the aforesaid decision it has been pointed out that the object underlying the provision regarding sanction is to save the public servant from the harassment of frivolous or unsubstantiated allegation. The terminus a quo for the requirement of valid sanction is the time when the Court is called upon to take cognizance of the offence. If by then the accused has ceased to be a public servant no sanction is necessary. A trial without a valid sanction where one is necessary under Section 6 of the Act would be trial without jurisdiction. If by then the accused has ceased to be a public servant no sanction is necessary. A trial without a valid sanction where one is necessary under Section 6 of the Act would be trial without jurisdiction. According to the decision a valid sanction ought to be available when the Court is called upon to take cognizance of the offence. ( 10. ) IN the instant case, the sanction in question is of a date anterior to the date when the Court took cognizance of the offence. The sanction was thus in factual existence and available but was not on the record of the case when cognizance of the offence was taken by the Court. The crucial question for consideration is whether even in such a situation, the trial can be said to be without jurisdiction. ( 11. ) IT may be pointed out that Courts exist to do justice. No doubt this they have to do according to law. But the ends of justice are certainly higher than those of law. It is well settled that procedure is the hand maid of justice and must be interpreted so as to subserve its ends. For this purpose Courts can even devise a procedure which of course must not be inconsistent with the one prescribed Then Section 311 of the Code is also designed to empower the Court and to make it even obligatory on it to summon witnesses essential to the just decision of the case. Further the High Courts inherent powers as provided under Section 482 of the Code are also designed to secure the ends of justice. ( 12. ) IN my view the decision in R. S Naiks case (supra) is certainly not an authority for the proposition that sanction pre-existing on the date the Court takes cognizance of the offence, if not on record, cannot be permitted to be filed at any later stage of the trial and that the proceedings are void ab initio. ( 13. ) ON giving my anxious consideration to the question, I am of opinion that there is no justification in law for the view that sanction though pre-existing on the date of the Court taking cognizance of the offence, once it is not on the record of the case at that point of time, the proceeding before the trial court is rendered without jurisdication. As the sanction is pre-existing it cannot be held that there is inherent lack of jurisdiction. It cannot certainly be said that there was no sanction as such when the Court took cognizance of the offence. ( 14. ) THE demand of justice also dictates that production of such pre-existing sanction must be permitted during the trial and more when the prosecution evidence is still in progress and has not been closed. This interpretation also furthers the object with which the Act has been brought on the statute book. In this connection the decisions in Shyamlals case 1982 WN 417 and Raghvendrasings case 1981 MPLJ 664 = 1982 JLJ 19 are pertinent. ( 15. ) FOR the foregoing reasons, I hold that the impugned order does not suffer from infirmity of any sort and any interference with it in exercise of revisional jurisdiction will clearly be unwarranted. ( 16. ) IN the ultimate analysis I find that the revision petition is without merit and must fall. It is consequently dismissed. Revision dismissed.