Judgment A. P. Sinha, J. 1. This application is directed against the impugned order by which the complaint of the petitioner has been dismissed under Sec.203 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter called the Code ). 2. The complainant petitioner had filed a complaint naming the members of the opposite party as accused for an offence of murder. Opposite Party No.1 was at the relevant point of time Sub-Inspector of Police at Mansi Out Post, opposite party No.2 was the Inspector of Police Khagaria and petitioner No.3 bashir Ahmad was the ASI (Jamadar) at Khagaria Police Station. According to the case of the complainant, on 31-5-1980 at about 3.30 p. m. , the complainant alongwith one Sharan Yadav was returning to his village on a horse back from nawadah where they had gone to the house of cousin of Sharan Yadav. When they had reached near village Garhiya, they saw the police officers, namely the opposite party alongwith few other constables approaching towards them. When the police party saw the complainant and Sharan Yadav, someone amongst them shouted from the jeep. Out of fear the complainant and Sharan Yadav tried to run away through fields. They had been chased by the police party. The complainant and Sharan Yadav stopped their horses and got down. The opposite party enquired about the names of the complainant and Sharan Yadav. When it was disclosed to the police party and also when it was made known to them that they belonged to village Chukti, the opposite party began to assault Sharan Yadav with stick. Opposite Party No.2 Sheo Shankar Prasad spoke that the complainant and Sharan Yadav were men of Ram Sharan Yadav (M. L. A.) and further said that it was the order of the Assistant Superintendent of Police to shoot the men of Ram Sharan Yadav wherever they could be found. On hearing this, the petitioner and Sharan Yadav tried to run away, but a constable caught hold of the petitioner and when Sharan Yadav tried to fleed away, opposite party No.1 fired five rounds at him as a result of which he fell down and died. The petitioner and the dead body of Sharan Yadav were brought to the Khagaria Police Station on the said police jeep and the complainant petitioner was sent to jail. The petitioner and the dead body of Sharan Yadav were brought to the Khagaria Police Station on the said police jeep and the complainant petitioner was sent to jail. Further according to the allegations, a criminal case was going on between Ram Sharan Yadav and the Assistant Superintendent of Police, khagaria-Shafi Alam, as Shafi Alam had shot dead Har Ballav Yadav the younger brother of Kam Sharan Yadav, and at the time of the occurrence the said case was still pending. The complainant was confined to jail and could not file the complaint then, but the same was filed on 11-6-1980. After filing of the complaint, the complainant was examined on solemn affirmation and two witnesses were also examined. Thereafter the impugned order has been passed. 3. It appears that the complainant had raised an objection that the complaint was dismissed behind his back, and also motivatedly two of his witnesses had not been examined. Learned Counsel for the complainant has contended that it would appear that the complainant had supported the case and that being so the dismissal of the complaint was contrary to law. Further it has been stated that the Court below has committed an error in holding that sanction for prosecution as contemplated under Sec.173 of the Code of the opposite party had not been obtained. 4. So far as the allegation that the complaint had been dismissed behind the back of the complainant and also that one or two witnesses were not examined motivatedly there is absolutely no indication whatsoever from the existing facts and circumstances of the case and also the ordersheet justifying these allegations. Two witnesses had already been examined and thereafter when the third witness in spite of adjournments did not appear the impugned order had been passed and as such the question of passing the order at the back of the complainant did not arise at all. There is absolutely no indication whatsoever nor it has been mentioned in the petition in this Court that any grievance had been made that the witnesses had not been examined by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate. In addition it appears from perusal of the order that the complaint petition has not been dismissed mechanically but that has been done by a speaking order. Further the learned Magistrate has tried to appreciate the evidence within permissible limits. In addition it appears from perusal of the order that the complaint petition has not been dismissed mechanically but that has been done by a speaking order. Further the learned Magistrate has tried to appreciate the evidence within permissible limits. It cannot be said that the consideration of the evidence and also the reasonings derived are absolutely of full dress trial; rather the Court below has simply picked up those witnesses which can be said to be very relevant for disposal of the complaint petition. In that view of the matter the order independent of the question of sanction is a valid order justifying the dismissal of the complaint petition. 5. It has also to be considered that a court is permitted at least to derive the conclusion on the accumulative effect based on the evidence as to whether the facts disclosed can be said to be quite close to the normal state of affairs and not contrary to such facts which can be rejected on its very face. In other words in order to succeed, to have an order of cognizance of an offence, there ought to be presentable allegations, acceptable and not indicating that the statements had been made for creating a case for certain reasons lying behind the entire allegations. In the instant case, it is apparent that some enmity with the police officers has been indicated and, therefore, the filing of complaint cannot be overruled. Of course, this conclusion has to be derived keeping in mind that the overt acts attributed can also be on account of enmity and that being so after balancing both the situations, the Magistrate has to give his verdict on the basis of the normal and acceptable conclusion derived by the cumulative effect of the statements made in the complaint petition, the solemn affirmation of the complainant and also the type of evidence adduced on behalf of the complainant. On these aspects of the case also the dismissal of the complaint cannot be said to be unjustified. 6. Now coming to the question of sanction absolutely there is no hesitation in mind to say that the act done, not in the course of discharge of official duties but covered by such duties can seek the protection against the prosecution under section 197 of the Code. 6. Now coming to the question of sanction absolutely there is no hesitation in mind to say that the act done, not in the course of discharge of official duties but covered by such duties can seek the protection against the prosecution under section 197 of the Code. In the intant case it is apparent that there was a police party and whatever the conduct has been attributed was purely by the police officers who were to be on duty. Therefore, it is absolutely necessary to understand as to what that type of duty can be said to be in discharge of official duty. I would like to discussion various decisions involving this issue. 7. In the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Matajog Dubey V/s. H. C, Bhari, AIR 1956 SC 44 , the question of sanction as contemplated under section 197 of the Code has been considered. In this case the Officers of the income Tax Department had searched two premises and had taken copies and also seized certain documents. Consequently a warrant of arrest had been issued against the accused persons. As a matter of fact, when the searching party had gone to the premises, Matajog Dubey the darwan of Kashi Ram Agrawal, had alleged that the officers had forcibly broken open the entrance door of the flat. As a matter of fact, he had asked them not to do so. The raiding party had gone inside and interfered with some boxes and drawers of tables. The darwan was tied with a rope and assaulted causing injuries. Consequently, the darwan filed a complaint against H. C. Bhari and three others under Sections 323, 341, 342 and 109 of the Indian Penal Code. Further it appears that those four officials with some police men also raided another premises wherein Nandram Agrawal the father of Kashi Ram Agrawal was living, and when Nandram Agrawal came to the place he found that the raiding party had entered the premises after breaking open the lock of the door of the room and were collecting and packing into bemdles several books and papers for removal. Nandram Agrawal protested and had also demanded for the search list. However, he was held by two police men and was assaulted mercilessly. He was dragged downstairs and was put in a police van. Nandram Agrawal protested and had also demanded for the search list. However, he was held by two police men and was assaulted mercilessly. He was dragged downstairs and was put in a police van. He was thereafter taken to Burra Bazar Police-station and there also he was assaulted before sending him to hospital. Thereafter he was again brought to the police station and was kept in the lock up till midnight when he was released on bail. Nandram Agrawal also filed a complaint against the four officials and other persons. Both the complaints were sent for judicial enquiry to two different Magistrates. It was held on Agarwalas complaint that a prima facie case had been made out under Sec.323 of the Indian Penal Code against all the four accused and under Sec.342 of the Indian Penal Code as against the two police men. On this report summons were directed to be issued under section 323 of the Indian Penal Code against all the accused persons In the matajog Dubeys complaint after termination of enquiry process was issued only against Bhari under Sections 323 and 342 of the Indian Penal Code. After some stage of trial a plea of sanction as provided under Sec.197 of the Code had been taken. The Presidency Magistrate on the ground of want of sanctionunder section 197 of the Code had discharged the accused, and when a revision had been filed before the Calcutta High Court, the same was dismissed and the order of the Magistrate discharging the accused had been confirmed. 8. The following findings appear to be quite relevant for the purpose of this case : "the offence alleged to have been committed must have something to do, or must be related in some manner, with the discharge of official duty. No question of sanction can arise under Sec.197, unless the act complaint of is an offence ; the only point to determine is whether it was committed in the discharge of official duty. There must be a reasonable connection between the act and the official duty. It does not matter even if the act exceeds what is extictly necessary for the discharge of the duty, as this question will arise only at a latter stage when the trial proceeds on the merits. There must be a reasonable connection between the act and the official duty. It does not matter even if the act exceeds what is extictly necessary for the discharge of the duty, as this question will arise only at a latter stage when the trial proceeds on the merits. What we must find out is whether the act and the official duty are so inter-related that one can postulate reasonably that it was done by the accused in the performance of the official duty, though possibly in excess of the needs and requirements of the situation. Where a power is conferred or a duty imposed by statute or otherwise, and there is nothing said expressly inhibiting the exercise of the powers, or the performance of the duty by any limitations or restrictions, it is reasonable to hold that it carries with it the power of doing all such acts or employing such means as are reasonably necessary for such execution. If in the exercise of the power or the performance of the official duty, improper or unlawful obstruction or resistance is encountered there must be the right to use reasonable means to remove the obstruction or overcome the resistance. This accords with common sense and does not seem contrary to and principle of law. Another decision of the Supreme Court is the decision in the case of s. B. Saha and others V/s. M. S. Kocher, AIR 1979 SC 1841 wherein it has been held that the question whether an offence was committed in the course of official duty of under the colour of official duty depends upon the fact of each case. The test laid down appears to be, as to whether a public servant, if challenged, can presentably claim that what he did, he did in virtue of his office. Jn the case giving rise to the aforesaid decision, a complaint had been filed in the court of the Sub-divisional Magistrate, Delhi against certain persons who happened to be officers of the Custom Department that they had committed offences under sections 120-B, 166 and 409 of the Indian Penal Code. The complainant Kocher had filed the complaint stating that he was a representative in India of various manufacturing concerns in West Germany and he was having a Firm known as "house of German Machinery". The complainant Kocher had filed the complaint stating that he was a representative in India of various manufacturing concerns in West Germany and he was having a Firm known as "house of German Machinery". Certain machineries had been imported in november, 1961, during the International Industries Fair held in New Delhi. It was alleged that he had violated the customs and clearance permit for the import. However, the custom authorities prevented him from clearing the goods from the railway station and ultimately the complainant succeeded in getting the clearance after obtaining permission from the Government. However, he was directed to retain the imported goods with him till 1-7-1962. The goods were to be re-exported from India thereafter. The complainant had applied for extension of the period, but his request was declined. In June, 1962 the accused persons, the officers of the Custom Department, raided the premises of the complainant and seized some of those imported goods which were meant for display in the International Industries Fair. The said officers had also seized certain other goods kept by the complainant at the site of the Fair itself. Inventory of the goods were prepared by the police at the time of the seizure. The goods were then packed in boxes and sealed by the police officers as well as the complainant, and one copy was given to the complainant. In November, 1963, the complainant made an application before the Sub-divisional Magistrate for release of the goods, on Superdagi as they were likely to deteriorate unless kept safely under proper conditions. The Subdivisional Magistrate made an order in January 22, 1964, directing all the goods seized to be handed over to the complainant on Superdagi. The Custom Department went up in revision which had been admitted and there had been stay of the order of the Sub-divisional Officer, but ultimately the revision application had been dismissed. It appears that the Custom Department handed over to the complainant on Superdari only part of the goods seized, and in respect of the remaining goods, the Custom Authority went in further revision to the high Court and obtained an interim order of stay of the Additional Sessions judge. It appears that the Custom Department handed over to the complainant on Superdari only part of the goods seized, and in respect of the remaining goods, the Custom Authority went in further revision to the high Court and obtained an interim order of stay of the Additional Sessions judge. Ultimately, on 22nd August, 1966, the High Court made an order directing that all the goods which had been seized by the custom authorities from the complainant, including those which had been returned to him on Superdagi should be produced before the Sub-divisional Magistrate under Sec.5 of the imports and Exports (Control) Act and under Sec.166 (B1) of the Sea customs Act, regarding the goods pending against the complainant. The Sub-divisional Magistrate, thus prepared two inventories of the goods found therein and after noting the condition of the goods, he got the same repacked and sealed in proper boxes in the presence of the parties with a seal of the Court. Before recaling them, the Magistrate noted down the condition of the four packages, which were produced by the police and which remained in their possession since the seizure. It was found by the Magistrate that the seals of those boxes were tampered ; one wooden box was broken and the seal on it was also broken while the remaining three packages were completely empty but sealed. This gave bonafide apprehension to the complainant that the goods had been criminally misappropriated by the accused persons. The allegation was that the officers of the Custom Department had illegally tampered and broken the seals of the consignment seized by them and removed some of those goods and further abused their position in seizing some of the personal articles of the com-plainant under the colour of search warrant issued by the Sub-divisional magistrate, Karol Bagh, and thus committed offences under Sections 120-B, 166 and 409 of the Indian Penal Code. When the complaint was filed, the matter was enquired into under Sec.202 of the Code. The Magistrate found a prima facie case under Sections 120-B and 409 of the Indian Penal Code against three persons and ordered for issuance of summons. When the complaint was filed, the matter was enquired into under Sec.202 of the Code. The Magistrate found a prima facie case under Sections 120-B and 409 of the Indian Penal Code against three persons and ordered for issuance of summons. All the three accused persons thereafter appeared before the Magistrate and filed an application praying therein of their immediate discharge inter alia on the ground that the magistrate had no jurisdiction to take cognizance on the complaint in the absence of compliance of Sec.197 of the Code and under Sec.155 of the Customs act, 1962, for the prosecution of the accussd persons. The Magistrate had accepted this petition and discharged the accused persons. The revision preferred against the said order was also dismissed. Therefore, the complainant went in further revision to the High Court which was allowed and thereafter the matter went to the Supreme Court by the accused persons. The following observations of the Supreme Court are relevant for the purpose of this case : "the words any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty are capable of a narrow as well as a wide interpretation. If these words are construed too narrowly, the session will be rendered altogether sterile for, "it is no part of an official duty to commit an offence, and never can be". In the wider sense, these words will take under their umbrella every act constituting an offence, committed in the course of the same transaction in which the official duty is performed or purports to be performed. The right approach to the import of these words lies between these two extremes. While on the one hand, it is not every offence committed by a public servant while engaged in the performance of his official duty, which is entitled to the protection of Sec.197 (1) an act constituting an offence, directly and reasonably connected with his official duty will require sanction for prosecution under the said provision. As pointed out by Rama-swami, J. , in Baijnath V/s. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1966 SC 220 at p.222, it is quality of the act that is important, and if it falls within the scope and range of his official duties, the protection contemplated by Sec.197 of the Criminal Procedure Code will be attracted. As pointed out by Rama-swami, J. , in Baijnath V/s. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1966 SC 220 at p.222, it is quality of the act that is important, and if it falls within the scope and range of his official duties, the protection contemplated by Sec.197 of the Criminal Procedure Code will be attracted. " in sum, the sine qua non for the applicability of this section is that the offence charged, be it one of commission or omission, must be one which has been committed by the public servant either in his official capacity or under colour of the office held by him. While the question whether an offence was committed in the course of official duty or under colour of office, cannot be answered hypothetically and depends upon the facts of each case, one broad test for this purpose, first deduced by Varadacharier, J. , of the Federal court in Hori Rum V/s. Emperor, 1949 FCR 159 is generally applied with advantage. After referring with approval to those observations of Varadachariar, J. , Lord Simonds in H. B. Gill V/s. The King, AIR 1948 PC, 128 tersly reiterated that the "test may well be whether the public servant if challenged, can reasonably claim, that what he does, he does in virtue of his office. " or must be related in some manner with the discharge of official duty. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . there must be a reasonable connection between the act and the discharge of official duty, the act must bear such relation to the duty that the accused could Jay a reasonable claim but not a pretendor fanciful claim, that he did it in the course of the performance of his duty. " Another decision reported in the case of S. B. Saha (supra) is worth mentioning here which is as follows: ". . . . . . . . . . . . . . . It is not necessary for the Court to confine itself to the allegations in the complaint, and it can take into account all the materials on record at the time when the question is raised for consideration. " Another decision report in the case of Madan Singh V/s. P. K. Basu and others, 1962 BBCJ 7 the question of sanction under Sec.197 of the Code has been well discussed. " Another decision report in the case of Madan Singh V/s. P. K. Basu and others, 1962 BBCJ 7 the question of sanction under Sec.197 of the Code has been well discussed. I am tempted to quote a paragraph of the said decision which runs as follows : "learned Counsel for the petitioner, however, argued that even if the public servant be allowed to raise this question in an enquiry under section 202 of the Code, he cannot be allowed to bring an extra-neous matter. This argument is not at all attractive. If a public servant will come to raise objection he cannot do it without disclosing his own defence or making certain statements in support of his case. It is quite possible that in certain cases the complainant itself may give the clue, but in certain cases, the complaint may be so artistically drafted so as to exclude any clue whatsoever. It will, therefore, always be a question of fact as to how and in what manner to raise the objection. The argument of the learned Counsel for the petitioner is also met by the observations of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of S. B. Saha from which a portion has been quoted above. It has been specifically mentioned in that quotation that in considering the question whether or not sanction for prosecution is required, it is not necessary for the Court to confine itself to the allegations in the complaint and it can take into account all the materials on the record at the time when the question is raised and falls for consideration. It implies that when the question is raised, the materials should also be placed before the Magistrate, and the Magistrate will, therefore, be perfectly entitled to consider all those matters of course for the limited purpose of examining if sanction for prosecution will be required. It implies that when the question is raised, the materials should also be placed before the Magistrate, and the Magistrate will, therefore, be perfectly entitled to consider all those matters of course for the limited purpose of examining if sanction for prosecution will be required. " In the case of Pancham Lal V/s. Dadan Singh, 1979 CLJ 1018 it has been held that even the slap for maintenance of law and order becomes necessary in discharge of official duty which is a ticklish problem, and thus the conduct of any public servant to prevant breach of peace cannot depend upon the calculated and measured behaviour but such conduct which may apparently look different beyond the scope of discharge of official duty, is covered under the exception for prosecution as contemplated under Sec.197 of the Code. However, in order to appreciate the definition between the act done in discharge of official duty a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of S. B. Sambhu V/s. T. S. Krishnaswamy, AIR 1983 SC 64 needs to be cited. In that case a Munsif Magistrate had been asked to give his comments on a transfer petition filed by an Advocate in connection with a civil suit pending in his court and the munsif Magistrate in his report has described the lawyer who happened to be the complainant, as rovvdy, a big gambler and, a mischievous element. It was held by the Supreme Court that no sanction was required as it was not a part of the official duty of the Munsif Magistrate at all. Therefore, a sharp contract will indicate that the scope of Sec.197 of the Code cannot be limited by viewing the allegations with a narrow compass ; rather the basic and fundamental limit to be considered would be as to whether the accused public servants were on their duties and the acts done by them were in discharge of their official duties. 9 In the instant case, it appears that, according to the complaint, there was a chase, firing and arrest and also a police case. It need not be mentioned here again that all the accused persons named were police officers on duty. In the circumstances, I am inclined to accept the contention of the learned counsel that non-existance of sanction under Sec.197 of the Code was a legal impediment for the complaint. It need not be mentioned here again that all the accused persons named were police officers on duty. In the circumstances, I am inclined to accept the contention of the learned counsel that non-existance of sanction under Sec.197 of the Code was a legal impediment for the complaint. Moreover the explanation attributed for the delay in filing the complaint cannot be said to be presentable explanation, as absolutely not a word has been whispered by any man whatsoever indicating that the complaint and the deceased had been rounded, as claimed in the complaint petition. 10. In the result, the application fails and it is dismissed. Application dismissed.