JUDGMENT - M.S. RATNAPARKHI, J.:---The remand order passed by the Appellate Authority under the Hyderabad Houses (Rent, Eviction, and Lease) Control Act, 1954, of muleting exemplary costs of Rs. 500/- on the tenant has been challenged in this writ petition-tenant. 2. The controversy covers a very narrow compass, and this Court could not have much cognizance, had it not been a matter of concern. The respondent instituted an action for eviction of the petitioner under the Act. The Rent Controller served the notice of the proceedings on the tenant and it appears that in December, 1985, the tenant was directed to file the written statement. However, no written statement was filed and the matter was adjourned to 9-1-1986. It has been the contention of the petitioner tenant that he attended the Court on that date but the Presiding Officer was not present. The clerk concerned, therefore, openly declared, that the Board fixed on 9-1-1986 would be adjourned, en bloc, to 7-2-1986. With this pronouncement, he left the Court. 3. However, to his surprise he found that the date 7-2-1986' was scratched and in its place the date 21-11986' was substituted. He was not aware of the subsequent change of date. He, therefore, did not and could not attend the Court on 21-1-1986. However, the matter was called on that date and stood adjourned to subsequent date, that is, 31-1-1986. It is his contention that he was all the while under the impression that the case was fixed on 7-2-1986 and therefore, he did not attend the Court during the intervening period. 4. However, on 31-1-1986 what transpired before the Court was not known to him, He, however, learnt on 3-2-1986 that an eviction order was passed against him and under that order he was directed to vacate the premises within 30 days. 5. The tenant, therefore, challenged this order in appeal before the Appellate authority-the District Judge, Aurangabad, Vide Rent Appeal No. 9/86. The application was supported by an affidavit signed by his Counsel Mr. Dinesh Gangapurkar, Advocate. In this affidavit, the petitioner explained all the circumstances, the gist whereof was that he was never aware of the fact that the case was fixed on 21-1-1986. It was also his contention that there were communal riots at the Aurangabad between 17-1-1986 and 27-1-1986 when curfew was clamped in the city and particularly in the locality where he resides. In this affidavit, the petitioner explained all the circumstances, the gist whereof was that he was never aware of the fact that the case was fixed on 21-1-1986. It was also his contention that there were communal riots at the Aurangabad between 17-1-1986 and 27-1-1986 when curfew was clamped in the city and particularly in the locality where he resides. In these circumstances it was not possible for him to attend the Court and put up his say in the form of written statement. However to show his bona fides he has filed his written statement before the Appellate Court and requested that this written statement containing the defence which he is likely to raise in the original proceedings. His ultimate prayer in the appeal was that the final order passed by the Rent Controller should be set aside and a fair trial should be ordered. 6. The learned District Judge heared this appeal and by his judgment pronounced on 3rd "April, 1986, allowed the same. It appears from the reasoning adopted by the learned District Judge that the grounds made out by the present petitioner were quite genuine and there was no reason to disbelieve the same. The affidavit of Mr. Gangapurkar, Advocate, was accepted by the learned District Judge. The learned District Judge also found that due to reasons beyond his control, the petitioner could appear before the trial Court and could not file his written statement. The written statement furnished by the petitioner before the District Judge was accepted. However, an unprecedented condition was imposed by the District Judge on the a petitioner, directing him to pay Rs. 500/- to the respondent. The result was that the appeal was allowed and the contention of the tenant were accepted in toto. The genuineness of his grounds were accepted without any reservation. Inspite of this he was saddles with exemplary costs of Rs. 500/-, presumably as a condition precedent for acceptance of the written statement filed by the tenant. The parties have now fairly told me that presently the case is pending before the Rent Controller. Both the parties have put upto their respective cases by way of pleadings and now the case is awaiting trail. 7. This writ petition has been directed against the order passed by the District Judge directing the petitioner to pay Rs. 500/- as costs to the respondent. Mr. Both the parties have put upto their respective cases by way of pleadings and now the case is awaiting trail. 7. This writ petition has been directed against the order passed by the District Judge directing the petitioner to pay Rs. 500/- as costs to the respondent. Mr. Loya, learned Counsel for the petitioner, termed this order as unprecedented, where a party which has fully satisfied the Court about the genuineness of its cause and which has got the relief from the Court has been muleted with the punitive costs of Rs. 500/- and that too without any fault. The admitted position is that the case was fixed for written statement on 9-1-1986. On that date it stood adjourned to a subsequent date as the Presiding Officer was not present. From the record and documents produced before me it appears that the further date was 7-2-1986. Mr. Kader, learned Counsel for the respondent, had no grievance about this. It is also not much disputed that during the intervening period the social life in Aurangabad city was pretty disturbed because of the communal disturbances when curfew was clamped in that part of the city where the petitioner lives. There was thus a good cause for the petitioner is not attend by the Court. There was no question of intentionally avoiding because the learned District Judge has accepted the genuineness of both these averments namely : that the petitioner was not aware of the dates "21-1-1986 and 31-1-1986" and secondly, that the whole social life in Aurangabad was disturbed. Apart from this, what emerges from the circumstances which were put before the Court was that the tenant was all the while anxious in attending the Court and there is nothing to show that he had shown any obstructionist tendency. Apart from this, the admitted position is that he was not aware of the dates so fixed and secondly, that the whole social life of Aurangabad was disturbed due to communal disturbances, it could be easily inferred that there was a good cause for his non-appearance. The learned District Judge accepted this position also. The learned District Judge rightly condoned his absence and set aside the eviction order. What appears to be more shocking particularly in view of the acceptance of these averments as genuine is the condition of imposing costs of Rs. 500/- on the tenant-petitioner. The learned District Judge accepted this position also. The learned District Judge rightly condoned his absence and set aside the eviction order. What appears to be more shocking particularly in view of the acceptance of these averments as genuine is the condition of imposing costs of Rs. 500/- on the tenant-petitioner. Admittedly, the petitioner had a grievance about the order of eviction quite successfully before the District Court and in fact, the learned District Judge was very much impressed by the genuineness of his cause. There was thus nothing to find fault with the tenant petitioner either in the matter of conduction his cause or attending the Court. Normally when a suitor is successful before the Court in establishing his claim, the general rule that is followed by the courts is that costs should follow the event. A successful party normally is entitled to claim its costs. What happened in this case is that the successful party has been penalised inspite of the fact that it was successful in convincing the Court about the genuineness of its cause. Mr. Loya, learned Counsel for the petitioner, urged that this act was not only unprecedented but it was in contravention of all known canons. Mr. Loya also invited my attention to the decision of this Court in (Shankar Sadu Wanjhe v. Smt. Parwatibai Ramchandra Dongre)1, A.I.R. 1976 Bombay 214. In that case the successful party was directed to pay the costs of the unsuccessful party inspite of the fact that the former had succeed, Mukhi, J., observed : "This, in my opinion, is no real exercise of discretion under section 35 of the Civil Procedure Code. As far as I am aware, such orders are some times made, but they are invariable made with consent because in that case the appellant rather than losing his appeal is content to obtain an order of remand by consenting to pay costs or by having the costs thrown away, as the case may be." 8. It is true that the case cited above pertains to a second appeal which was preferred by the party before the High Court. However, in the present case this Court is not functioning as a regular Appellate Court. It has been asked to exercise its extra ordinary jurisdiction and that too regarding the discretionary order passed by the Court. At one stage, Mr. However, in the present case this Court is not functioning as a regular Appellate Court. It has been asked to exercise its extra ordinary jurisdiction and that too regarding the discretionary order passed by the Court. At one stage, Mr. Loya, learned Counsel for the petitioner, contended before me that me order directing the petitioner to pay costs was without jurisdiction, inasmuch as the Court was not empowered to allow such costs. I am not very much impressed with this argument because the concept of jurisdiction is something different and it has nothing to do as to how the jurisdiction should be exercised. The question at this stage is whether the Court has discretion to grant the costs. If under the statute, the Court or Tribunal or the authority has jurisdiction to grant costs, then it cannot be a case of want of jurisdiction. It may be that in some cases, the manner in exercising that jurisdiction may be harsh or to use the language of Mr. Loys, unprecedented. But it in itself it does not amount to want of jurisdiction. If considered from this point of view, section. 22 of the Rent Control Act empowers the Tribunal to grant costs to the successful party. How this costs should be calculated and how it should be worked out is the procedural matter and it is completely the discretion of the Court and the Court alone to work out this matter. 9. Even assuming that it was a matter completely within the discretion of the Court, we cannot lose sight of the fact that there are well recognised principles which govern the exercise or non-exercise of discretion. The exercise or non-exercise of discretion in itself cannot be a subject matter of scrutiny or interference by this Court under Article. 227 of the Constitution of India. The principle laid down in (Mhod. Yunus v Mohd. Mustaqim and others)2, A.I.R. 1954 Supreme Court 38, is a good guide on this point. This Court however, while sitting under its supervisory jurisdiction cannot lose sight of the fact that the courts subordinate to it are working within the limitations prescribed by law. It is from that point of view that this case has to be considered. Normally this Court would be very slow in interfering with the discretionary orders passed by the courts below. It is from that point of view that this case has to be considered. Normally this Court would be very slow in interfering with the discretionary orders passed by the courts below. But at times when the discretion exercised by the subordinate Court shocks the conscious not only of the litigant but also of the persons who come in contact with the administration of justice, then, this Court cannot sit silent. After-all, the strength of the Court depends not only upon the statutes enacted by the Legislature but by the confidence that people have in the institution, itself and if something comes out affecting that very base of the institution this Court should not be a silent spectator but it would be justified in exercising its supervisory jurisdiction. From that point of view, the order challenged my not be ab initio void or illegal. But if on the background of broad principles that the order shocks the conscious, then this Court would be justified in interfering with the same. It is from this angle only that the order passed by the learned District Judge deserves interference at the hand of this Court. The petition is allowed. Rule is made absolute. The condition directing the payment of costs of Rs. 500/- by the petitioner to the respondent is hereby quashed. There shall be no order as to costs. Petition allowed. -----