JUDGMENT : Hari Lal Agrawal, J. - This writ application has been filed by the petitioner for a rule of mandamus' directing respondent no. 7, the Subdivisional Officer, Siwan-cum-Collector under the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) Act, to deliver possession of the piece of land which has been sold by Mossomat Ram Kishori Devi, respondent no. 6, to Gautam Pandey, respondent no. 1, under a sale deed dated 1.5.1984, which transaction the petitioner wants to preempt under section 16 (3) of the Act. 2. The petitioner filed the pre-emption application in the prescribed form within the prescribed period on 28.8.1984 before respondent no. 7 after complying with all the formalities with a prayer for delivery of possession of the transferred land to him during the pendency of the pre-emption application. The notice of the application was issued upon the concerned opposite parties by ORDER :dated 12.10.1984, but no ORDER :was made with respect to the delivery of possession. On 27.11.1984 the petitioner, therefore, filed another application before respondent no. 7 for passing an ORDER :regarding delivery of possession of the land in question, but again no ORDER :was passed. In the mean time, respondent no. 1, the purchaser, appeared and filed show cause and, inter alia, took the plea that he as karta of his joint family had purchased another portion of the same plot on the western boundary of the land in question and, therefore, the application for pre-emption was not maintainable. The petitioner refuted the statements made in the show cause by his application. Dated 29.3.1985 and reiterated for passing an ORDER :for delivery of possession, but no ORDER :was again passed by respondent no. 7 and by ORDER :- dated 12.4.1985 (Annexure 3) the application was rejected. 3. This application was heard in full at the admission stage itself as notice had been issued earlier to respondent no. 1, the purchaser, being the necessary contesting party, who has entered appearance, and with the consent of both the parties this application is being disposed of finally at the admission stage. 4. Mr. 3. This application was heard in full at the admission stage itself as notice had been issued earlier to respondent no. 1, the purchaser, being the necessary contesting party, who has entered appearance, and with the consent of both the parties this application is being disposed of finally at the admission stage. 4. Mr. Balbhadra Prasad Singh, who appeared on behalf of the petitioner on the first day of the hearing, had invited our attention to the following provisions from section 16 (3) of the Act : "(3) (i) When any transfer of land is made after the commencement of this Act to any person other than a co-sharer or a raiyat of adjoining land, any co sharer of the transferor or any raiyat holding land adjoining the land transferred, shall be entitled, within three months of the date of registration of the document of the transfer, to make an application before the Collector in the prescribed manner for the transfer of the land to him on the terms and conditions contained in the said deed : Provided that no such application shall be entertained by the Collector unless the purchase money together with a sum equal to ten percent thereof is deposited in the prescribed manner within the said period. (ii) On such deposit being made the co-sharer or the raiyat shall be entitled to be put in possession of the land irrespective of the fact that the application under clause (i) is pending for decision : Provided that where the application is rejected, the co-sharer or the raiyat as the case may be, shall be evicted from land and possession thereof shall be restored to the transferor and transferee shall been entitled to be paid a sum equal to ten per cent of the purchase-money out of the deposit made under clause (i). (iii) If the application is allowed, the Collector shall by an ORDER :direct the transferee to convey the land in favour of the applicant by executing and registering a document of transfer within a period to be specified in the ORDER :and, if he neglects or refuses to comply with the direction the procedure prescribed in ORDER :21, rule 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), shall be, so far as may be, followed." The prescribed form for an application by a co-sharer or a raiyat of an adjoining land, for transfer of land to him under section 16(3) of the Act, inter alia, contains the following provisions. xx xx xx 3. As I am a co-sharer of the transferor/a raiyat, holding land as described in Schedule II attached hereto, adjoining the land specified in Schedule I, I hereby make this application that the land transferred by the aforesaid transferor raiyat be transferred to me on the terms and conditions contained in the sale deed. 4. I request that pending decision of the application, I may be declared to be entitled to put in possession of the land with immediate effect." On the basis of the aforesaid provisions Mr. Balbhadra Prasad Singh submitted that the scheme of these provisions was mandatory in nature and, therefore, respondent no. 7 should have passed an ORDER :for giving possession of the land in question to the petitioner. 5. On behalf of the respondent no. 1 it was submitted that if such an interpretation was given then it was bound to create great injustice inasmuch as on the mere filing of an application, which maybe even frivolous, the so called pre-emptor would read the benefit of the lands for an indefinite period as the litigation was bound to take a considerable time and unscrupulous persons in the garb of making pre-emption applications would enjoy undue benefits to the great prejudice of the rightful and bona fide purchasers. 6. On behalf of the petitioner, however, it was submitted that if the language of the statute was unambiguous, simply because unjust result may follow, the court should not refuse to give effect to the intention of a legislature. 6. On behalf of the petitioner, however, it was submitted that if the language of the statute was unambiguous, simply because unjust result may follow, the court should not refuse to give effect to the intention of a legislature. In the case of Nasiruddin v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal (A. I. R. 1976 S. C. 331) it was observed that “if there are two different interpretations of the words in an Act, the court will, adopt that which is just, reasonable and sensible rather than that which is none of those things. If the inconvenience is an absurd inconvenience, by reading an enactment in its ordinary sense, whereas if it is read in a manner in which it is capable, though not in an ordinary sense, there would not be any inconvenience at all; there would be reason why one should not read it according to its ordinary grammatical meaning.” 7. Reference has also been made to the following passage in Duport Steels Ltd. & others v. Sirs & others (1980 (1) All England Law Reports 529) : "... ... the role of the judiciary is confined to ascertaining from the words that Parliament has approved as expressing its intention what that intention was, and to giving effect to it. Where the meaning of the statutory words is plain and unambiguous it is not for the judges to invent fancied ambiguities as an excuse for failing to give effect to its plain meaning because they themselves consider that the consequences of doing so would be inexpedient, or even unjust or immoral.... " It is, however, not a case where I am called upon to decide any question of ambiguity or not to give effect to the meaning of the said provision. 8. Strong reliance was placed on the case of Rajkishore Singh v. Bhubneshwari Singh and others (1968 B.L.J.R. 33) where it has been observed that the scheme of section 16(3) was to prevent undue fragmentation of holdings and to facilitate consolidation with a view to the utilisation of the land in the most advantageous manner. "This seems to be the reason why the extraordinary provision of allowing the applicant to be put in possession during the pendency of the application is permitted. "This seems to be the reason why the extraordinary provision of allowing the applicant to be put in possession during the pendency of the application is permitted. Apparently the legislative contemplated that considerable time may elapse between the date of filing of the application and the date on which the ORDER :s are passed by the revenue authorities; including the ORDER :s' of appellate and superior courts, and did not want that consolidation and utilisation of the land in the best manner should be postponed so long. But at the same time, with a view to provide for proper restitution to the transferee if the application is eventually rejected, solatium by way of ten per cent of the purchase money was directed to be paid to him……." 9. It is, no doubt, true that the scheme of section 16(3) is to avoid fragmentation of land by a sale even at the initial stage, but find it difficult to accept the argument that the provision is mandatory in the sense that the Collector in no case postpone the issuance of an ORDER :for immediate delivery of possession pending the hearing of the application. In ORDER :to avoid any frivolous or mischievous claim, he must examine in the first instance the priciples governing the rule of injunction, namely, (1) prima facie case and (2) balance of convenience: Before passing an ORDER :, therefore, under clause (ii) of sub-section (3) of section 16, the Collector under the Act must prima facie be satisfied that the pre-emptor had a prima facie case and the balance of convenience was in favour of allowing delivery of possession in his favour to avoid fragmentation. If the Collector does not come to bold in favour of the pre-emptor on these two questions which, in my view, must be held to be sine qua non for success for immediate delivery of possession of the land the application must be rejected. In other circumstances wherein spite of a prima facie case the Collector, in some circumstance or in a peculiar case, feels that it would not be just and proper to ORDER :delivery of possession, he may refuse to accede to the prayer of the preemptor. It is well known that the considerations in the sale deeds are usually suppressed to save stamp duty. It is well known that the considerations in the sale deeds are usually suppressed to save stamp duty. On this account as well, the preemptor has got a peculiar advantage of getting more valuable lands below the market value under this provision. It is also well known that the dispute of pre-emption takes considerable time to conclude after passing through the stages of appeal, revision and writ courts and thereafter the delaying tactics, which is hound to take place in re-transfer of the land to the purchaser, can be well imagined. Therefore, the Collector, in my view, should be very careful and cautious in passing ORDER :of pre-emption in favour of the pre-emptor by an interim ORDER :, otherwise it is bound to create great injustice to the purchaser. 10. To conclude, I would hold that the provision for delivery of possession during the pendency of an application for pre-emption, is not mandatory but only directory in nature and the authority dealing with the matter must satisfy the conditions indicated above before passing the ORDER :for giving delivery of possession to the pre-emptor. Taking such a view in my considered opinion would neither do injustice to either party nor would do violation to the legal provision and the legislative intendment. 11. I would, therefore, allow the application in part and direct respondent no. 7 to pass a fresh ORDER :on the application of the petitioner keeping in view the conclusions and observations recorded above. In the circumstances, however, I shall make no ORDER :as to costs. M. P. Varma, J.- It has rightly been observed by my learned Brother in his well discussed JUDGMENT : that the scheme of the Act is to prevent undue fragmentation of holdings and section 16(3) has been put in the Act to the advantage of a co-sharer or an adjoining raiyat of the land in question. Nobody becomes entitled to be put in possession of the land ipso facto by mere filing an application and on deposit of the money mentioned in the registered dead. Such an application under clause (ii) of Section 18 (3) of the Act can succeed only if the court prima facie finds and holds that the applicant is a co-sharer or raiyat and not otherwise. Such an application under clause (ii) of Section 18 (3) of the Act can succeed only if the court prima facie finds and holds that the applicant is a co-sharer or raiyat and not otherwise. The court is to examine these conditions even when it proceeds to dispose of the application finally under clause (iii) of section 16(3) of the Act. In this circumstance my learned Brother has nicely dealt with the whole issue. I agree with him and I also hold the same view that the provision is not mandatory in form but only directory in nature.