S.K. MAL LODHA, J.—By this appeal, under section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949, the appellants State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur, Head Officer Tilak Marg, Jaipur (for short the Bank herein) and others, question the correctness of the order dated October 19, 1985 of the learned Single Judge of this Court, by which the writ petition filed by the petitioner-respondent was allowed and the order terminating his services (Anx. 1) dated April 23, 1983 was quashed. \ 2. The petitioner-respondent was employed as a clerk in the Bank from January 11, 1972. He was a permanent employee of the Bank. He worked in Central Accounts Department at Bikaner from January 11, 1972 to February 14, 1982 and, thereafter, at the Jasusar Branch till the order of termination was issued. It appears that a preliminary enquiry was held against the petitioner-respondent and a report was submitted by Shri B.C. Chhabra. The extracts from that report have been submitted by the Bank as Ex.R.3. The material portion of the report may be quoted as under:- "In conclusion I have to state that Shri J.C. Khadgawat is a person with a tendency to out turn the normal channels for redressal of his grievance and can go to the extent of making false and frivolous complaints. The whole evidence of Shri Khadgawat reveals, particularly the letter addressed to Shri Samirdas and marked Ex. 1 that to cut with the position of the recognised union of the Bank employees he could resort to malign the senior officers of the Bank and for a sake the secrecy bond so vital in a credit institution that his CONTINUOUS INDULGENCE TO EXTRA constitutional activities is a great hazard to build up the image of the institution in public eye." After the submission of the report, the order of termination of services (Anx. 1) dated April 23, 1983 was passed, which may be reproduced hereinbelow:- "We have to advise that as you have forfeited the trust and confidence of the Bank, your services are hereby terminated with immediate effect. In terms of paragraph 522 of the Shastri Award, we are paying you 3 months pay and allowances being Rs. 4980. 15 p. in lieu of notice. In terms of paragraph 522 of the Shastri Award, we are paying you 3 months pay and allowances being Rs. 4980. 15 p. in lieu of notice. Though your termination cannot be deemed to be "retrenchment" within the meaning of section 2(00) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, yet with a view to avoiding any legal complications, you are hereby being paid one months wages being Rs. 1660.05 P in lieu of one months notice in terms of section 25 f (a) of the Act ibid and a sum of Rs. 9130.30 P being retrenchment compensation as required in terms of section 25 F (b) of the Act ibid. Three cheques for the aforesaid amounts are enclosed. Please note that the amounts outstanding against you towards loans availed by you from the Bank will be adjusted out of the permissible amount of your Provident Fund and Gratuity payable to you." 3. The petitioner-respondent filed the writ petition on May 4, 1983 praying that an appropriate writ, order or direction for quashing the order Anx. 1 may be issued allowing him all consequential benefits, such as salary etc, The order Anx, 1 dated April 23, 1983 was challenged on the ground that para 522 of the Shastri Award, in which this order has been passed, is invalid and further that it has been passed on the ground of malides and that it is arbitrary and in violation of Arts. 14 and 16 of the Constitution. The writ petition was opposed by the Bank, by filing a reply dated May 8, 1983. While controverting the grounds raised by the petitioner-respondent for quashing the order of termination, an objection was raised that the writ petition was not maintainable for enforcement of para 522 of the Shastri Award. It was submitted that the petitioner-respondent had no cause of action and even if he has, it was a matter to be dealt with in accordance with the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, ("the Act") for, the matter relating to the termination of services is an Industrial dispute. It was also submitted that instead of taking disciplinary proceedings and thereafter passing the order of dismissal, a lenient view was taken by the Bank and the petitioner was discharged from service, after giving him three months notice and allowances in lieu thereof. Along with the reply, the documents, (Exs. It was also submitted that instead of taking disciplinary proceedings and thereafter passing the order of dismissal, a lenient view was taken by the Bank and the petitioner was discharged from service, after giving him three months notice and allowances in lieu thereof. Along with the reply, the documents, (Exs. R. 1, to R. 4) were filed. It may be stated that Ex.R 4 contains the extracts from the statements of the petitioner-respondent made before Shri H.C. Chhabra, the Investigating Officer, during the preliminary enquiry. A rejoinder to the reply was filed reiterating the stand taken in the writ petition and it was submitted that the petitioner-respondent has rightly invoked the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution for quashing the order Anx. 1 dated April 23, 1983. The learned single Judge after considering the contentions that were raised before him, allowed the writ petition by his order dated October 18, 1985 and quashed the order Anx.l terminating the services dated April 23, 1983. He also gave consequential direction to the effect that the petitioner is entitled to be reinstated with full back wages. Aggrieved, the appellants have filed this appeal as aforesaid. 4. Caveat was lodged on behalf of the petitioner-respondent. 5. We have heard Mr. MM. Vyas, learned counsel for appellants and Mr. M. Mridul for the respondent no. 1 (caveator). 6. Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the learned single Judge erred in entertaining the writ petition, which purported to challenge para 522 of the Shastri Award. According to him, Shastri Award, which was later on modified by the Desai Award, was like a decree of civil court and as it is not a statutory provision, it cannot be challenged in a writ petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution and further as a decision of the civil court cannot be challenged by filing a writ petition the Paragraphs contained in the Shastri Award also cannot be challenged. 7. The learned single Judge opined that the objection regarding maintainability of the writ petition is devoid of any merit, for, the writ petition is not for the enforcement of the Shastri Award, but, in the writ petition, the validity of the order Anx. 1 dated April 23, 1983 terminating the services of the petitioner, has been challenged and according to him that was permissible in accordance with Chandulal Vs. 1 dated April 23, 1983 terminating the services of the petitioner, has been challenged and according to him that was permissible in accordance with Chandulal Vs. Management M/s. P.A.W. Airways Inc. (1) and Bhanwarlal Vs. R.S.R.T.C. (2). 8. We may usefully reproduce Para 522 of the Shastri Award: "522. We now proceed to the subject of termination of employment. We give the following directions: (1) In case not involving disciplinary action and subject to clause (6) below, the employment of a permanent employee may be terminated by three months notice on payment of three months pay and allowances in lieu of notice. The services of a probationer may be terminated by one months notice or on payment of a months pay and allowances in lieu of notice. (2) A permanent employee desirous of leaving the service of the Bank shall give 1 months notice in writing to the manager. A probationer desirous of leaving service shall give 14 days, notice in writing to the manager. A permanent employee or a probationer shall when he leaves service, be given an order of relief signed by the manager. (3) If any permanent employee leaves the service of the Bank without giving notice, he shall be liable to pay the Bank one months pay and allowances. A probationer if he leaves service without giving notice, shall be liable for 14 days pay and allowances. (4) The services of any employee other than a permanent employee, or probationer may be terminated and he may leave service after 14 days notice. If such an employee leaves service without giving such notice he shall be liable for a weeks pay (including all allowances). (5) An order relating to discharge or termination of service shall be in writing and shall be signed by the manager. A copy of such order shall be supplied to the employee concerned. If such an employee leaves service without giving such notice he shall be liable for a weeks pay (including all allowances). (5) An order relating to discharge or termination of service shall be in writing and shall be signed by the manager. A copy of such order shall be supplied to the employee concerned. (6) In cases of contemplated closing down or of retrenchment of more than five employees, the following procedure shall be observed; (a) two months notice of such proposed action shall be given individually to all the employees concerned, with a statement of the reasons for such proposed action; (b) the manager or an officer empowered in this behalf shall within the period of such notice hear any representation from the employees concerned or any registered union of the bank employees; (c) after the hearing of such representation and the receipt of a report in the matter, if necessary, by the management, if it decides to give effect to the contemplated closing down or retrenchment in the original or an amended form the services of the employees may be terminated by giving notice or payment, in lieu thereof for the periods prescribed above." Learned counsel for the appellants has cited Mukherjee (K.M.) Vs. State Bank of India (3), S. Palani Vs. Indian Bank (4), Kishan Dev Puri Vs. Union of India (5), and P. Mallaiah Etc. vs. Andhra Bank (6) in support of his contention. 9. What was held in the cases relied on by the learned counsel for the appellants is that the enforcement of the award like one Shastri Award is not permissible and in such matter Arts. 14 and 16 of the Constitution cannot be invoked. The order Anx. 1 has been passed in terms of Paragraph 522 of the Shastri Award, which provides that in a case not involving disciplinary action and subject to clause (6) the employment of the permanent employee may be terminated by three months notice or on payment of three months pay and allowances in lieu of notice. 10. The precise question raised by the petitioner in the writ petition was whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, the Bank could take resort to Paragraph 522 of the Shashtri Award without holding disciplinary enquiry in accordance with it. In other words, the validity and correctness of the order Anx. 10. The precise question raised by the petitioner in the writ petition was whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, the Bank could take resort to Paragraph 522 of the Shashtri Award without holding disciplinary enquiry in accordance with it. In other words, the validity and correctness of the order Anx. 1 dated April 23, 1983 has been challenged and for that purpose, the writ petition is maintainable. The question of enforcement of Para 522 of the Shastri Award is not at all involved in this case. The authorities cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner-appellants are therefore, not applicable. 11. Para 522 of the Shastri Award, is more or less analogous to Regulation 34 which came up for consideration in Chandulals case (1), which has been reproduced by the learned single Judge in the impugned order. It needs to be mentioned here that a Full Bench of this Court has also taken the same view in Bhanwarlals case (2), wherein the question regarding the maintainability of the writ petition was raised. It needs to be mentioned here that a Full Bench of this Court has also taken the same view in Bhanwarlals case (2), wherein the question regarding the maintainability of the writ petition was raised. While repelling that contention, it was stated in para 170 of the report, as under:- (i) If the right which is sought to be enforced is right created under the I. D, Act such as Chapter VA, then the remedy for its enforcement is either under S. 33C or raising of an industrial dispute, the case may be; (ii) If the industrial dispute arises under the I.D. Act then normally, the remedy available to the suiter is to get an adjudication under the Act; (iii) Further, in above two categories of cases, if the Government refuses to make a reference either by not passing an order in a reasonable time, normally two months in individual cases and fifteen days notice in cases involving several employees together or refuses to refer by an express order then, this Court can always interfere under Art. 226 of the Constitution; (iv) Again in case, the validity of any statutory provisions or rules, regulations having force of statute is challenged or an order is challenged on the ground of violation of constitutional provision then, the applicants can file a writ directly without insistence of reference; (v) In all the above cases, in those of the particular cases, where involved disputed questions of fact arises for adjudication, this court would not interfere under Art. 226 of the Constitution, irrespective of the implications of bar of S. 10 of the Act being available or not." It is, thus clear that if the order is challenged on the ground of violation of constitutional provisions, then, the aggrieved petitioner can file writ petition without insisting of any alternative remedy that may be available to him We, therefore, reject the first contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants that Art. 226 of the Constitution could not be invoked for challenging Para 522 of the Shastri Award and that writ petition was not maintainable. The distinction, which was sought to be drawn by the learned counsel for the appellants in regard to Bhanwarlals case (2) that it relates to statutory provisions and in that case clause 13 of the Standing Orders was challenged, is also of no avail because the principle laid down by the Full Bench of this Court is that under certain circumstances, the writ petition challenging the termination order is maintainable and in that connection, it was ruled that if any order terminating services is passed in violation of Arts. 14 and 16 of the Constitution, the writ petition can be entertained and Art. 226 of the Constitution can be invoked for the purpose. 12. It was, next, urged by the learned counsel for the appellants that in this case, no further enquiry was necessary as it was not held simply for the reason that during the course of preliminary enquiry which was conducted by Shri H.C. Chhabra, the petitioner-respondent by and large admitted the allegations that were made against him. In this connection, learned counsel for the appellants took pains to refer to the extracts of the statement (Ex.R-4) of the petitioner-respondent and also the extract from the report of the Investigating Officer Shri H.C. Chhabra and pressed for our consideration that on the basis of these admitted facts, it was not at all necessary to hold any enquiry further in the matter and as such the petitioner-respondent cannot take advantage of the fact that disciplinary proceedings should have been held in the matter as envisaged by para 521 of the Shastri Award. When the admitted facts wers there, no further enquiry, according to the learned counsel was necessary. In this connection, reference was made to K.S. Bansal vs. Indian Airlines (7). We have carefully read the aforesaid decision, of the learned single Judge of the Delhi High Court. In that case, the letters were written by the petitioner to the President of India casting aspersions on the Chairman of the Corporation. Thereafter, an order of termination simpliciter under r. 13 of the Regulations, was passed. The contention was raised whether the order could be challenged as malafide or colourable exercise of power under Regulation 27 and in that connection the question of applicability of Art. 311 of the Constitution was raised. Thereafter, an order of termination simpliciter under r. 13 of the Regulations, was passed. The contention was raised whether the order could be challenged as malafide or colourable exercise of power under Regulation 27 and in that connection the question of applicability of Art. 311 of the Constitution was raised. It was held on the facts of that case that the petitioners services were terminated on the basis of the letters which he had written to the President of India and Prime Minister. The letters were admitted to have been written by him and so it was held that the enquiry and the charge-sheet etc. would be an idle formality, and rule 13 in such case, could properly be invoked and the employer could terminate the services simpliciter. The learned Judge concluded that the action of the management cannot be said to be malafide or that it was colourable exercise of power. It may be stated here that in the order Anx- 1 dated April 23, 1983, the Bank has mentioned that the petitioner has forfeited the trust and confidence of bank. In other words, without a proper enquiry the Bank came to the conclusion that the petitioner has forfeited the trust and confidence of the Bank and on account of that resort was made to para 522 of the Shastri Award for terminating the services of the petitioner by making payment of pay, allowances etc. in terms thereof. In our opinion, the conclusion which was arrived at by the learned Single Judge in K.S. Bansals case (7) is in respect of the peculiar facts and circumstances of that case and cannot be availe of by the learned counsel for the appellants in support of his contention. We may state that the so called admissions relied on by the learned counsel for the appellants by making reference to the extracts of the statement contained in Ex.R.4 are not conclusive against the petitioner for holding that he has forfeited the trust and confidence of the Bank, because that is based on preliminary enquiry and without affording an opportunity of defence being taken by the petitioner, as during the course of enquiry, he could have explained the alleged admissions or admitted facts. 13. The matter does not rest at that. The conclusion that the petitioner has forfeited the trust and confidence, has been reached without any enquiry. 13. The matter does not rest at that. The conclusion that the petitioner has forfeited the trust and confidence, has been reached without any enquiry. One does not know that if an opportunity would have been afforded to the petitioner - respondent to give his explanation to the allegations that have been made against him and after taking into consideration that explanation, the Bank would have imposed the penalty or punishment of termination of the services. It should also be remembered that during the course of preliminary enquiry when the statement of the petitioner-respondent was recorded, he was not bound at that stage to disclose his defence or give any explanation. It will be useful here to refer to S.L. Kapoor Vs. Jagmohan (8), wherein, while dealing with the point regarding natural justice, his Lordship O. Chinnappa Reddy, J. speaking for the court, observed as under :- "In our view, the principles of natural justice know of no exclusionary rule dependent on whether it would have made any difference if natural justice had been observed. The non-observance of natural justice is itself prejudice to any man and proof of prejudice independently of proof of denial of natural justice is unnecessary. It will comes from a person who was denied justice that the person who has been denied justice is not prejudiced. It was further held as follows :- "As we said earlier where on the admitted or indisputable facts only one conclusion is possible and under the Law only one penalty is permissible, the Court may not issue its writ to compel the observance of natural justice, not because it is not necessary to observe natural justice but because Courts do not issue futile writs. We do not agree with the contrary view taken by the Delhi High Court in the judgment under appeal". 14. It is, thus, clear that it is not a hard and fast rule that where the facts are in disputable or that they are admitted, it is not necessary to observe the principles of natural justice. It is futile for the learned counsel for the appellants to contain that no regular enquiry was necessary or contemplated for passing the order terminating the services of the petitioner. The order Anx. It is futile for the learned counsel for the appellants to contain that no regular enquiry was necessary or contemplated for passing the order terminating the services of the petitioner. The order Anx. 1 is conspicuously silent with respect to the grounds or reasons on which the Bank formed the opinion that petitioner has forfeited the trust and confidence of the Bank. There is justification for the learned counsel for the petitioner-respondent to contend that in the order Anx. 1 the expression used is "forfeited the trust and confidence to the Bank which conveys unspecified allegation and the same is vague. 15. In Chandulals case (1) the services of the workman were terminated on the grounds that the workman was involved in an act of smuggling and on the basis of loss of confidence, without holding any enquiry. The allegation against the workman in that case was that he was involved in an act of smuggling and, therefore, instead of exposing him to prosecution, the respondent was justified in terminating his services for lack of confidence. It was observed as under:- "In any view of the matter this amounts to a dereliction on the part of the workman and, therefore, the stand taken by the management that termination for loss of confidence does not amount to a stigma has to be repelled. In our opinion, it is not necessary to support our conclusions by reference to precedents or textual opinion as a common sense assessment of the matter is sufficient to dispose of this aspect. Retrenchment is defined in S.2(00) of the Industrial Disputes Act and excludes termination of service by the employer as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action. If the termination in the instant case is held to be grounded upon conduct attaching stigma to the appellant, disciplinary proceedings were necessary as a condition precedent to infliction of termination as a measure of punishment, Admittedly, this has not been done. Therefore, the order of termination is vitiated in law and cannot be sustained." It is not necessary to multiply the authorities, as the position appears to be well settled by the apex court of the country. Therefore, the order of termination is vitiated in law and cannot be sustained." It is not necessary to multiply the authorities, as the position appears to be well settled by the apex court of the country. In these circumstances, we find ourselves unable to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the appellants that in view of the so-called admitted facts or admissions made by the petitioner-respondent in his statements before the Investigating Officer Shri S.C. Chhabra, which has been produced as Ex.R.4, no useful purpose could be served by holding enquiry or that no further enquiry was necessary. It may be stated that the allegation of forfeiture of trust and confidence of the Bank is in respect of the conduct attaching stigma on the petitioner respondent. It was held in Chandulals case (1) that the enquiry is a condition precedent for inflicting penalty of termination of service, 16. It was, next, contended, as was done before the learned single Judge, that the petitioner-respondent has taken the advantage of the order Anx. 1 inasmuch as, he withdrew the amount awarded to him in terms of Para 522 of the Shastri Award, under which the order Anx.l was passed. In this connection, Mr. M.M. Vyas urged that the terms contained in the Shastri Award are part of service contract and so, at the most the order of termination, if wrongly passed, may be in breach of the terms of the contract and, therefore, the question that the fundamental right of the petitioner as envisaged by Para III of the Constitution has been violated and, therefore, the principle of estoppel is not attracted, should be accepted. On the other hand, Mr. Mridul, learned counsel for the petitioner-respondent submitted that the doctrine of estoppel, cannot be availed of by the Bank for multiple reasons, namely (1) that there is no question of estoppel in this case; (2) that as the petitioner was not aware of the legal position, as such and so in such a case doctrine cannot be attracted, and that the petitioner-respondent was aware of this right, (3) that withdrawal of the cheque pertaining to the pay and allowances by the petitioner-respondent has not led the Bank to change its position and, therefore, the question of estoppel does not arise: and (4) that there was no intentional relinquishment of a known right. 17. 17. It was held in M.P. Sugar Mills Vs. State of U.P. (9), that waiver means abandonment of a right and it may be either express or implied from conduct, but its basic requirement is that it must be an intentional act with knowledge. It was further held that there can be no waiver unless the person who is said to have waived is fully informed as to his right and with full knowledge of such right, he intentionally abandons it. 18. Sec. 15 of the Evidence Act was considered in Mahindra & Mahindra Vs. Union of India (10). It was laid down therein that estoppel can arise only if a party to a proceeding has altered his position on the faith of a representation or promise made by another. 19. In a case relating to Mineral Concession Rules, in M/s. Shrikrishnadas Tikara Vs. State of M.P. (11), it was held that where there is no case made out of intentional relinquishment of a known right by the State Government such voluntary and intentional abandonment of a known advantage or benefit, waiver cannot be postulated. 20. In Olga Tellis Vs. Bombay Municipal Corporation (12), their Lordships of the Supreme Court made the following weighty observations:- "There can be no estoppel against the Constitution. The Constitution is not only the paramount law of the land but, it is the source and sustenance of all laws. Its provisions are conceived in public interest and are intended to serve a public purpose. The doctrine of estoppel is based on the principle that consistency in word and action imparts certainty and honesty to human affairs. If a person makes a representation to another, on the faith of which the latter acts to his prejudice, the former cannot resile from the representation made by him. He must make it good. This principle can have no application to representations made regarding the assertion or enforcement of fundamental rights. For example, the concession made by a person that he does not possess and would not exercise his right to free speech and expression or the right to move freely throughout the territory of India cannot deprive him of those constitutional rights, any more than a concession that a person has no right of personal liberty can justify his detention contrary to the terms of Article 22 of the Constitution. Fundamental rights are undoubtedly conferred by the Constitution upon individuals which have to be asserted and enforced by them, if those rights are violated. But, the high purpose which the Constitution seeks to achieve by conferment of fundamental rights is not only to benefit individuals but to secure the larger interests of the community. The Preamble of the Constitution says that India is a democratic Republic. It is in order to fulfil the promise of the Preamble that fundamental rights are conferred by the Constitution, some on citizens like those guaranteed by Articles 15,16,19,21 and 29 and, some on citizens and non citizens alike, like those guaranteed by Articles 14, 21, 22 and 25 of the Constitution." On the basis of the principles laid down in the aforesaid authorities, we proceed to examine the contention regarding estoppel. In this case, after passing of the order Anx. 1 in compliance thereof, the petitioner-respondent withdrew the amount of pay and allowances. This by itself, as contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner-respondent, does not mean taking benefit out of the order. In these circumstances, when the cheque was taken delivery of, it cannot be said that the petitioner-respondent has taken the benefit of that order, and so he is estopped from challenging the termination order. Apart from that, learned counsel for the appellants could not satisfy us to how the Bank has changed its position after the withdrawal of the cheque by the petitioner-respondent. The petitioner-respondent has challenged the order Anx. 1 dated April 23,1983, as arbitrary, and in violation of Arts. 14 and 16 of the Constitution inasmuch as no proper enquiry was held by the Bank before terminating his services. For all these reasons, we cannot hold that on the ground of estoppel, the petitioner could not have been granted the relief which the learned Single Judge has granted. The contention in respect of estoppel is, therefore, repelled. 21. We may state that in the writ petition, the petitioner-respondent challenged the validity of Para 522 of the Shastri Award. Learned counsel for the appellants wanted to argue before us and in fact, submitted that Para 522 of the Shastri Award is valid and that the writ petition could not have been entertained for challenging it. 21. We may state that in the writ petition, the petitioner-respondent challenged the validity of Para 522 of the Shastri Award. Learned counsel for the appellants wanted to argue before us and in fact, submitted that Para 522 of the Shastri Award is valid and that the writ petition could not have been entertained for challenging it. He invited our attention to the impugned judgment while dealing with the point that clause (1) of Para 522 of the Shastri Award, should be struck down. We have carefully considered the order of the learned single Judge and, in our opinion, he has not adjudicated on the question of the validity of Para 522 of the Shastri Award, because according to him, it was not necessary to go into this question for the reason that he was primarily concerned with the order Anx. 1 terminating the services of the petitioner and that question that arose was whether it was violative of Arts. 14 and 16 of the Constitution and flagrant disregard of the principles of natural justice inasmuch as no enquiry was held against the petitioner respondent. In our considered opinion, in the circumstances of the case, in view of the dictum laid down by their Lordships in Chandulals case (1) the learned single Judge was right in not going into the question regarding the validity of Para 522 of the Shastri Award. In this connection the learned Single Judge has observed as under:- "Thus without examining the validity of clause 1 of Para 522 of Shastri Award, 1 hold that the order of termination passed by the Bank is absolutely illegal and deserves to be quashed". The only other two contentions that remain to be examined by us in this appeal are : 1- Whether the learned single Judge should have ordered the reinstatement of the petitioner-respondent; and (2) Whether in the absence of any allegation by the petitioner-respondent that he remained unemployed after passing of the termination order until the decision of the writ petition, back wages should not have been awarded. Considerable reliance was placed by the learned counsel for the appellants in this connection of Chandulals case (1) which was cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner-appellant before us. Their Lordships observed as under:- "The quantum of compensation has now to be ascertained. Ordinarily, the appellant would have gone back into service with full back wages. Considerable reliance was placed by the learned counsel for the appellants in this connection of Chandulals case (1) which was cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner-appellant before us. Their Lordships observed as under:- "The quantum of compensation has now to be ascertained. Ordinarily, the appellant would have gone back into service with full back wages. Admittedly he has been out of employment from March 1974. If he had gone back into service he would have been entitled to back wages of a little more than 11 years. In computing compensation this aspect has to be kept in view. If he was restored to service he would have been assured of employment for a further term of years. Keeping this as also other relevant aspects in view, we quantify the compensation payable to the appellant at Rs.2 Lakhs. In M/s. H.S. Limited, Rourkela Vs. A.K. Roy (13), the Tribunal exercised its discretion mechanically without weighing the circumstances of the case, and according to their Lordships of the Supreme Court, that was no exercise of discretion at all. The Supreme Court quashed the order of reinstatement. After considering the principles laid down in Ruby General Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. P.P. Chopra (14), their Lordships held that compensation for a period of two years at the rate of Rs. 160/- per month, that being the last salary drawn by the concerned workman, would meet the ends of justice. Mr. Mridul submitted that the learned single Judge in exercise of his discretion has ordered for reinstatement of the petitioner-respondent and while hearing a special appeal in the absence of any strong and compelling reasons, we should not interfere with that discretion. He also submitted that the petitioner respondent specifically prayed in the writ petition for reinstatement and payment of back wages, but no issue was joined on that. In this case as no regular enquiry was held and the petitioner-respondent was not afforded the opportunity of hearing in defence, the learned single Judge was right in ordering for the re-instatement of the petitioner-res-pondent. As the order Anx. l was illegal and not sustainable in law, the petitioner respondent was entitled to re-instatement and it cannot be said that in making this direction the learned single Judge has exercised his discretion arbitrarily or in disregard of the well-recognised judicial principles. As the order Anx. l was illegal and not sustainable in law, the petitioner respondent was entitled to re-instatement and it cannot be said that in making this direction the learned single Judge has exercised his discretion arbitrarily or in disregard of the well-recognised judicial principles. It will not be proper for us at this stage to interfere with the order of re-instatement. 22. As regards payment of full back wages, it is a necessary consequence of setting aside of the illegal order of termination of service. Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that it was the petitioner-respondent to have pleaded that he was unemployed after passing of the termination order and as such he was entitled for back wages in their entirety. According to Mr. M.M. Vyas, the burden in this connection was on the petitioner-respondent, whereas Mr. Mridul, learned counsel for the petitioner-respondent submitted that the petitioner had specifically prayed that all the consequential benefits, namely, payment of salary, allowances etc. (back wages) should be paid to him and that was not specifically denied by pleading the fact that the petitioner was employed after termination of his services until reinstatement. The learned single Judge rightly awarded back wages to him. Our attention was drawn to Shambhu Nath Vs. Bank of Baroda (15). The question that made arose was : who has to prove, whether workman or the Management, that the workman was gainfully employed anywhere after the services were terminated. In that case, there was no material on record to show that the workman was gainfully employed anywhere. The Management did not furnish any particulars in this regard to the Court. It was observed that the workman could have been asked to furnish the necessary information at the earliest stage, but this was not done. It was held that the workman was not expected to prove the negative. The Supreme Court restored the order of the Tribunal directing reinstatement of workmen with full back wages and other benefits from the date of suspension. 23. The learned single Judge having quashed the order Anx.1 terminating the services of the petitioner, rightly ordered that the petitioner-respondent was entitled to be re-instated with full back wages and in the absence of exceptional circumstances, ordinarily this was the only direction that was contemplated. 24. No other point survives for our consideration in this appeal. 25. 23. The learned single Judge having quashed the order Anx.1 terminating the services of the petitioner, rightly ordered that the petitioner-respondent was entitled to be re-instated with full back wages and in the absence of exceptional circumstances, ordinarily this was the only direction that was contemplated. 24. No other point survives for our consideration in this appeal. 25. The result is that this appeal fails and it is, hereby, dismissed summarily. An afterword: 26. Nothing said hereinabove will effect the Bank prejudicially or adversely, if it decides to hold enquiry against the petitioner-respondent in respect of the alleged conduct, which according to it, warrants disciplinary action against the petitioner-respondent. The order passed by the learned single Judge, as affirmed in the appeal, will not preclude the Bank from holding an enquiry against the petitioner-respondent in accordance with law, if it so chooses.