JUDGMENT K.P. Ramakrishna Menon, J. 1. The first respondent terminated the services of the petitioner, by order dated 25-3-1977. The order reads: "Shri. M. K. Ravi, Bundling Supervisor Grade II is informed that the Board of Directors of the Kerala State Bamboo Corporation Limited, Angamali have decided to terminate his appointment as Building Supervisor Grade II in exercise of the provisions under Clause (I) of the terms and conditions of his appointment orders Ist cited. The said clause is extracted below for your reference. Clause (I) : The appointment is on contract for a period of one year during which period the Corporation reserves the right to terminate his services even without assigning any reason thereof. Accordingly the appointment of Shri Ravi as Bundling Supervisor Grade II is hereby terminated with effect from the afternoon of 25-3-1977. Shri N, K. Ravi will hand over charge of the Depot to Shri Augustine John, Bundling Supervisor Grade II. Shri M. K. Ravi is also informed that the Board has been phased to grant him one month's salary in lieu of notice." 2. By order G. O. (Rt) No. 1105/79/ L & H dated 4-8-1979 the Government referred the following issues pertaining to the termination, for adjudication: "1. Is the termination of the service of Shri M. K. Ravi, Bundling Supervisor Gr. II with effect from 25-3-1977 justifiable and proper 2. If not justifiable and proper to what remedies the worker is entitled to. 3. Dealing with the termination order, the Labour Court has held thus: " .................. Even if it is assumed that it is a termination without attaching any stigma it amounts to a retrenchment as defined in S.2(oo) of the Act as has been held in a series of recent decisions of the Supreme Court. So even if it is assumed Ext. W3 (termination order) is a simple termination it cannot stand as legal and valid in so far as the due formalities provided under Sec, 25F of the Act have not complied with." Having found so, the learned counsel for the petitioner submits, the Labour Court ought not to have considered the alternate case of the management, namely that the termination, though apparently is a discharge simpliciter, in fact, is 'a punishment for misconduct'. According to the learned counsel, the Labour Court has no authority to consider the above alternate case of the management. 4. According to the learned counsel, the Labour Court has no authority to consider the above alternate case of the management. 4. The question thus arising for consideration is, can the Labour Court go behind the order of termination which apparently is a discharge simpliciter, to find the reasons which led to the order. This question is no more a moot question in view of a catena of decisions of the Supreme Court. In this connection it is profitable to refer to one of the earliest decisions of the Supreme Court, the decision in Chartered Bank v. Chartered Bank Employees, ( 1960 (2) LLJ 222 ). There the Supreme Court has held thus: "The Industrial Tribunal can go behind the form of the order and see whether it is a mere camouflage for a dismissal for misconduct without following the prescribed procedure." In short the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal can 'lift the veil to see the true nature of the order' as held in the decision of the Supreme Court in Gujarath Steel Tubes Ltd. v. G. S. T. Hazdoor Sabha ( 1980 (1) LLJ 137 .) It cannot therefore be said that the Labour Court exceeded its jurisdiction in considering the alternate case pressed into service by the management with a view to justify the termination. Unless such an authority is found in the courts/tribunals, the employer with impunity may "resort to camouflage by garbing or cloaking a punitive discharge in the innocuous words of discharge simpliciter." 5. The learned counsel then contended that the Labour Court, in any event should not have allowed the management to adduce evidence for the first time before it justifying the order of termination because it is mandatory that a discharge or dismissal of the employee for misconduct can be made only after conducting an enquiry, contemplated under the certified standing orders. Want of such an enquiry voids the order of termination. According to the learned counsel, the order in such circumstances, will be one passed in violation of principles of natural justice. This argument at the first blush is convincing. But tested in the light of the pronouncements of the Supreme Court, particularly the one in Workmen of fires tone Tyre & Rubber Co. v. Management 1973 (1) L.L.J. 278 , the above argument, is without substance. The Supreme Court has held there thus. This argument at the first blush is convincing. But tested in the light of the pronouncements of the Supreme Court, particularly the one in Workmen of fires tone Tyre & Rubber Co. v. Management 1973 (1) L.L.J. 278 , the above argument, is without substance. The Supreme Court has held there thus. "If there has been no enquiry held by the employer or if the enquiry is held to be defective, it is open to the employer even now to adduce evidence for the first time before the tribunal justifying the order of discharge or dismissal .............................. Therefore, the position is that even now the employer is entitled to adduce evidence for the first time before the Tribunal even if he had held no enquiry or the enquiry held by him is found to be defective ...................... This right of the management to sustain its order by adducing independent evidence before the Tribunal, if no enquiry has been held or if the enquiry held is to be defective, has been given judicial recognition over a long period of years". It was while construing the provisions contained in S.11A of the I. D. Act introduced w. e. f. 15-12-1971, the Supreme Court laid down the above dictum. Even if the order of termination simpliciter is punitive in nature and hence could not have been passed without an enquiry contemplated under the certified standing orders, the award Ext P1 upholding the order of discharge/termination cannot be voided on the ground of non compliance with the requirements of the provision contained in the certified standing orders because the employer has availed of the opportunity available to him under law and adduced sufficient evidence in justification of the said order before the Labour Court. I am fortified in this view by the decision of the Supreme Court in Bombay Municipality v. P. S. Malvenkar ( AIR 1978 SC 1380 = 1978 Lal I. C. 1096). The Supreme Court has stated thus in this decision. I am fortified in this view by the decision of the Supreme Court in Bombay Municipality v. P. S. Malvenkar ( AIR 1978 SC 1380 = 1978 Lal I. C. 1096). The Supreme Court has stated thus in this decision. "We are fortified in this view by a catena of decisions of this court, where it has been consistently held that no distinction can be made between cases where the domestic enquiry is invalid or defective and those where no enquiry has in fact been held as required by the relevant standing orders and in either case it is open to the employer to justify his action before the Labour Tribunal by adducing all relevant evidence before it". 6. For another reason also the above argument is liable to be rejected. Though the employee was aware of the procedure for the conduct of domestic enquiry into charges of misconduct, prescribed under the certified standing j orders, he without demur acquiesced in the hearing of the alternate case of the employer and let in evidence to demolish the some. Only when the verdict went against him the employee thought of raising this point, for the first time in the original petition. It must, in this connection, be remembered that it is a well established principle of law that a party to a proceeding is always free to waive the benefit of procedural law. The petitioner by adducing evidence before the labour court to substantiate his plea, opposing the alternate case of the employer, must be deemed to have given up the benefit he could have had, had the dispute been first considered and disposed of in terms of the certified standing orders. 7. The Labour Court therefore has rightly considered the above alternate case of the employer intended to justify the order of termination. 8. The very frame of the issue referred for adjudication suggests that the employer can have resort to any legal means to justify the order of termination. It is profitable to repeat the issue in this context. The issue: "Is the termination of the service of Sri. M. K. Ravi, Bundling Supervisor Gr. II with effect from 25-3-1977 justifiable and proper." To justify the order means to establish that the order is valid in law. It is profitable to repeat the issue in this context. The issue: "Is the termination of the service of Sri. M. K. Ravi, Bundling Supervisor Gr. II with effect from 25-3-1977 justifiable and proper." To justify the order means to establish that the order is valid in law. The employer sought to justify it by relying on clause (1) of the order of appointment which reads: -- "The appointment is on contract for a period of one year during which period the Corporation reserves the right to terminate Ms services even without assigning any reason thereof." The employee however contended (see para 3 of the claim statement) that "the termination of the service of the workman is a clear example of naked victimisation and wrecking vengeance against the association and its workers". Again in para 4 of the claim statement it is stated that "the workman had on several occasions reported to the minister about the mismanagement of the Corporation Officials. This is also one of the reasons for terminating the services of the workman. The management has not issued any charge sheet against the workman ..........................The order of the management terminating the service of the workman is illegal and without any basis. The dismissal is wrongful, unjustified and arbitrary. The workman is entitled to reinstatement with full backwages and continuity of services". The employee thus has understood the termination as one of dismissal. That is how he has understood or at least taken, the termination, is clear from the following statement in his claim statement: "The dispute relating to his dismissal was conciliated by the District Labour Officer, Alwaye on several occasions". The only inference possible from the above pleadings is that, just like the employer, he also had contended before the labour court that the form of the simple terminating service is a camouflage or an order of dismissal for misconduct. The petitioner in these circumstances cannot be heard to say that the tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction in considering the alternate case of the employer. 9. Yet another contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is this. Only the dispute arising out of dismissal or discharge can be made the subject matter of investigation under S.11A of I. D. Act. Here the dispute dealt with by the Labour Court under S.11A is an order of termination simpliciter. 9. Yet another contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is this. Only the dispute arising out of dismissal or discharge can be made the subject matter of investigation under S.11A of I. D. Act. Here the dispute dealt with by the Labour Court under S.11A is an order of termination simpliciter. However the Labour Court dealt with the issue as if it was an issue falling under S.11A. The Labour Court thus has committed an error of jurisdiction and for this reason alone the award is liable to be set aside. This argument is not sustainable in view of the indisputable fact that the employee himself has treated the order as one of dismissal. The pleadings of the petitioner in the claim statement, extracted in the preceding para are relevant in this context. For the reasons stated above this argument is rejected. 10. Now coming to the findings entered in the award; they are beyond challenge as they are based on proved facts. It has been found that the employee has misappropriated money belonging to the Corporation. May be that the misappropriation is only temporary; nevertheless it is misappropriation. It has also been found that the allegation of victimisation cannot stand. The discussion in this regard in the award is relevant. The discussion is contained in para 14 and 15 of the award. They are extracted hereunder: ".................. So the explanation is only a lame excuse which could be pleaded convincing evidence that there were justifiable reasons for the omission such a plea has to be discarded. I don't find any justification for the non accounting, When the money was not accounted or utilised for the official purpose the only presumption that could be made is that the money was misappropriated. As already stated the money is said to have been refunded subsequently. So the misappropriation is only temporary." " ................. Whatever it be the contention that the Management's action amounts to victimisation cannot stand when we have acceptable evidence to show that Shri. Ravi had committed misappropriation which formed the basis of the action. It is also clear from the circumstances of this case that the Management if it wanted to victimise Shri. Ravi would very well have dismissed him on the charge of misappropriation. But it is seen to have effected a simple termination only. It is also clear from the circumstances of this case that the Management if it wanted to victimise Shri. Ravi would very well have dismissed him on the charge of misappropriation. But it is seen to have effected a simple termination only. The submission of the Management that it really had a soft corner for Shri. Ravi and it did not want to harm his future by a dismissal seems genuine and that again is a circumstance to negative the plea of victimisation. So the action of the Management was bona fide." It can thus be seen that the above findings are unassailable. Under no circumstances the findings can be said to be perverse. The said findings therefore cannot be interfered with in this proceedings under Art.226 and 227 of the Constitution. The O. P. is without merits. The same is accordingly dismissed.