JUDGMENT D.N. Johan, J. - This petition although was reported to be cognizable by a Single Judge, was presented before the Division Bench and on 18.12.1985 the Division Bench was pleased to order that notices be issued to opposite party No. 1 to show cause why the writ petition may not be admitted. It is indicated that notices were to be issued directing that the petition would come up for orders on 20th January, 1986. Till that date, the operation of the order contained in Annexure-4 dated 15.11.1985 was stayed. 2. This matter was listed today in lunch hours but when I learnt that a Division Bench had taken cognizance in the matter, it was ordered by me to be placed before a Division Bench today. It is in these circumstances that the case is before this Court. 3. The landlords have filed this petition against the tenant who is resident of house No. 55 Mohalla Sheikhayya Purwa, Police Station Kowari, District Bacharach, in which the landlords are also residing. The tenant Manhgi Lai moved an application u/s 27 of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, hereinafter referred to as the Act, for issue of direction to the landlord to discharge his obligation regarding the amenities which were formerly being enjoyed by him and were being reduced. The application was resisted by the landlord who is the Petitioner in this writ petition alleging that Manhgi Lai was not his tenant. He was only a licensee and the court had no jurisdiction to try . u/s 27 of the Act. Other pleas as alleged were also denied. The learned prescribed authority after considering the objections and cross-objections, by its Order dated 15.11.1985 allowed the tenants application directing the landlord to restore the possession of the bath-room within two weeks by opening its door and to restore electric connection. In the event of failure on the part of the landlord, the court would get it executed at the expense of the Petitioner. The landlord Petitioner, feeling aggrieved by the said order, approached this Court by means of this petition Under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 4. The petition has been resisted on behalf of opposite party No. 1 who happens to be the tenant and a counter affidavit has also been filed with a prayer for vacation of to stay order. 4. The petition has been resisted on behalf of opposite party No. 1 who happens to be the tenant and a counter affidavit has also been filed with a prayer for vacation of to stay order. Instead of passing an order of admission, since affidavits have been exchanged between the parties, we heard the learned Counsel for the parties on merits and propose to dispose of the petition itself as it lies in a very narrow ambit. 5. We have heard the learned Counsel for the parties and gone through the averments and cross-averments made by the contesting parties in their respective affidavits. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner vehemently argued that the prescribed authority had no jurisdiction to entertain the application basically on the ground that the opposite party No. 1 was merely a licensee and not his tenant. The second allied contention of the learned Counsel is that once the tenant has been deprived of the possession, that possession cannot be restored through Section 27 of the Act and the relief can only be through a suit. we have given our anxious consideration to the entire facts and circumstances of the case and we have no hesitation in observing that these contentions are devoid of merits. Section 26 of the Act places certain obligation on the landlord and Sub-section (I) reads as Under: No landlord shall, without lawful authority or excuse, cut off, withhold or Deduce any of the amenities enjoyed by the tenant. (Emphasis supplied) We are unable to subscribe to the submission made by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner that in view of Sub-section (2) of Section 27, the court could not restore the possession of the bath-room in exercise of its powers u/s 27 of the Act. In our opinion, Sections 26, 27 and 28 are to be read conjunctively as Sections 27 and 28 of the Act provides for procedure to secure the ultimate goal provided u/s 26(1) of the Act. The procedure cannot curtail the ambit and scope of the obligations envisaged u/s 26(1) of the Act. It clearly places an obligation on the landlord! not to cut off or withhold or reduce any of the amenities that was enjoyed by the tenant. The procedure cannot curtail the ambit and scope of the obligations envisaged u/s 26(1) of the Act. It clearly places an obligation on the landlord! not to cut off or withhold or reduce any of the amenities that was enjoyed by the tenant. If, therefore, any tenant was in enjoyment of a toilet or bath room, it cannot be said that merely by locking the toilet or bath-room, the landlord would not be reducing the amenities en eyed by the tenant. Bath-room is as essential as a toilet or a bed-room. It can well be equated in the category of amenities like enjoyment of water connection and electricity. We are, therefore, of the vie A' that locking up the bath-room amounts to reduction of the amenity enjoyed by the tenant. The learned Counsel for the Petitioner has placed reliance on a Single Judge decision of this Court Jafar Mohammad Kuwait v. Prescribed Authority, Aligarh 1982(1) ARC 429. In this case, it was the tenant who had gone before the High Court as he was forcibly deprived of the use of passage that existed for his sweepers to clean the gutter and pick up rubbish etc. since there was a finding of fact recorded by the court below, it was observed that illegal dispossession from the accommodation in question was not covered within the ambit of Section 27 of the Act and remedy was available by means of a suit. We are in agreement with this decision only to the extent that the ratio was applicable to the facts of that case but the ratio of the case cannot be made applicable generally to all facts and circumstances. The observation that a tenant could claim a lesser relief in the shape of free excess of the sweeper to the disputed portion in question is very significant. In the instant case, it is the admitted case of the parties that bath-room was enjoyed by the tenant and naturally it could not be expected that after locking of the bath-room, the ladies of the house would not be compelled to take their bath in open. If the landlord is allowed to usurp any part of the accommodation already let out, then there would be an end of speedy and efficacious remedy and the poor tenant would be left with no alternative but to undergo a prolonged litigation in the civil court. If the landlord is allowed to usurp any part of the accommodation already let out, then there would be an end of speedy and efficacious remedy and the poor tenant would be left with no alternative but to undergo a prolonged litigation in the civil court. In our opinion, therefore, the phrase "reduce any of the amenities enjoyed by the tenant" is to be interpreted in a broader sense, in the instant case, depriving the tenant of the use of bath-room would certainly tantamount to curtailment of amenities which is as essential as a toilet and, therefore, in our opinion, it would be covered within the ambit of Section 26(1) and that right is enforceable u/s 27 of the Act. 6. Another decision relied upon by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner is also a Single Judge decision Bales war Singh v. Prescribed Authority, Kanpur 1982 ARC (Suppl) 358, writ petition seeking relief against a landlady when the tenant was deprived of the use of open roof. Same view was expressed by the learned Judge as was held by him in the case of Jafar Mohammad Kidwai v. Prescribed Authority, Aligarh (supra). In a country like India, where most of the period of the year one has to face scorching heat, depriving a person of enjoyment of open roof would tantamount to taking back possession of the amenity and, therefore, the remedy was only a civil suit for restoration of possession cannot be said to be declaration of good law. We are in respectful disagreement with the view expressed by the learned Single Judge and in our opinion, in view of facts and circumstances of each and every case, the authority should decide whether by the action of landlord, a tenant is being deprived of any essential amenity that was being enjoyed by him previously and if that is being deprived of by the landlord, then certainly the landlord is not discharging his obligations envisaged under the Act. In our opinion, the ratio of cases Jafar Mohammad Kidwai v. Prescribed Authority, Aligarh and Bales war Singh v. Prescribed Authority, Kanpur (supra) does not lay down a correct law. 7. In our opinion, the ratio of cases Jafar Mohammad Kidwai v. Prescribed Authority, Aligarh and Bales war Singh v. Prescribed Authority, Kanpur (supra) does not lay down a correct law. 7. Now dealing with the question of jurisdiction, we would like to observe that merely by mentioning that by a certain date, the Respondent was a licensee and not a tenant, it cannot be held that the prescribed authority had no jurisdiction to act u/s 27 of the Act. In our opinion, the prescribed authority in view of the averments and cross-averments made by the respective parties has to apply its mind to the facts of the case, that it was the tenant who was being deprived of the amenities or not. Such questions cannot be decided merely on a bald allegation. The question of jurisdiction is always a mixed question of law and fact and in each and every case, the question of jurisdiction is to be decided in the light of facts emerging out of the allegations and cross-allegations made by the respective parties. In the instant case, the court below recorded a finding that certain portion of the accommodation had been given by the Petitioner not as a grace because the opposite party neither happened to be a friend, nor relative or even a resident of the same village, tonsil or district. In such a circumstance, it is impossible to conceive that one would let out the use and occupation of the building without any remuneration. These days even one is not prepared to let out accommodation to his own kith and kin what to say of friends. In such circumstances, the accommodation would not have been given to the opposite party No. 1 without any remuneration by the landlord. That being so, in our opinion, the prescribed authority rightly assumed the jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the dispute and curtailment of the amenities enjoyed by the tenant. Both these contentions, therefore, in our opinion are devoid of merits. It has, however, been brought to our notice that the Petitioner treating the opposite party No 1 as a licensee terminated his license and his brother has filed a suit in the civil court for possession. Both these contentions, therefore, in our opinion are devoid of merits. It has, however, been brought to our notice that the Petitioner treating the opposite party No 1 as a licensee terminated his license and his brother has filed a suit in the civil court for possession. It is clarified that finding recorded in one case shall not stand as rest judicator in another suit and the court will have to decide the matter on the basis of evidence produced by the contesting parties in the civil suit. With these observations, we do not think that the petition has any merit to call for any interference by this Court in exercise of our jurisdiction Under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, The petition accordingly fails and is dismissed. No Order as to costs. The stay order shall stand vacated.