JUDGMENT Qureshi. J. (1) This second appeal is directed against the judgment and decree dated 22-8-1974, passed by Shri S.S. Dwivedi, Additional District Judge, West Nimar, Khargone, in Civil Appeal No. 15-A of 1968 deciding the appeal against the judgment and decree dated 11-1-1968 passed by the Civil Judge Class I, Khargone in Civil Suit No. 20-A of 1966. 2. Facts leading to this appeal in short are that one Bhagwan s/o Rama filed a snit in the Court of the Civil Judge Class II, Khargone for declaration of his title on the ground that in village Salwan, agricultural land bearing Khasra No 187 area 2 acres is mutated in the name of the plaintiff and defendants Ganpat, Sakharam and Kadva. The land originally belonged to one Rama who bad three sons Ganpat i.e. plaintiff, Vitthal and Bhagwan. Vitthal had two sons, namely, Sakbaram and Kadva As such, the plaintiff and defendant No.1 are brothers and defendants No.2 and 3 are the sons of the deceased brother Vitthal. 3. According to the plaintiff, they were the members of joint Hindu family. But 40 or 45 years prior to the date of the institution of the suit there was a partition between the brothers. Since then each one was in possession as an owner of his respective share. At the time of the partition the father of defendants No.2 and 3 i.e. Vitthal was alive and the mother of the plaintiff and defendant No.1 and grand mother of defendants No.2 and 3 was also alive. Rama, the father of the plaintiff was dead. At the time of partition, the suit land survey No. 187 was kept separate for the maintenance of the mother of the plaintiff, defendant No.1 and Vitthal, father of defendants No.2 and 3. However, the name of all the three brothers was mutate a on the suit land. After the death of Vitthal, the names of defendants No. 2 and 1 were mutated in place of their father. Since the date of partition, the mother was residing with the plaintiff. In the year 1947, the mother of the plaintiff died while living with the plaintiff. Only plaintiff spent money on funeral rituals and other religious riles of his mother, the other brothers did not share the expenses with the plaintiff. Since the date of partition, the mother was residing with the plaintiff. In the year 1947, the mother of the plaintiff died while living with the plaintiff. Only plaintiff spent money on funeral rituals and other religious riles of his mother, the other brothers did not share the expenses with the plaintiff. Therefore, it was agreed between the brothers that since other brothers had not contributed towards the expenses, incurred by the plaintiff on the funeral rituals of their mother, the two other brothers i.e. defendant No. 1 and father of defendant No.2 and 3 relinquished their rights from the suit land in favour of the plaintiff and since then the plaintiff became the sole owner of the suit land. The fact of relinquishment of their rights was also recorded in an agreement (Ex. P. I) dated 19-9-1947, between the parties later on when the plaintiff asked the defendants to get the name of the plaintiff mutated exclusively after the deletion of the names of the defendants they declined to do so and asserted their shares in the suit land, therefore, the plaintiff had to file this suit. 4. During the pendency of the suit before the trial Court, the defendants No. 1 and 3 died and their legal representatives were brought on record. The legal representatives of the deceased Kadva admitted the claim of the plaintiff. However, Ganpat in his life time and Sakharam, the defendant resisted the suit on the ground of their title on the suit land. They denied that they have relinquished their claim in the suit land. The execution of the so called agreement was also denied by them. It was averred on their behalf that although plaintiff had incurred all the expenses on the funeral rituals and other religious rites on the death of the mother of the plaintiff but they did not relinquish their rights in the suit land in lieu of the share of the expenses, instead they had agreed to pay their share after the settlement of account. Some legal pleas were also raised pertaining to maintainability of the suit and admissibility of the agreement of relinquishment. The trial Court decreed the suit of the plaintiff. aggrieved by which the defendant No. 1 filed the civil regular appeal before the additional District Judge, Khargone, who vide impugned judgment and decree reversed the finding of the trial Court and dismissed the suit. The trial Court decreed the suit of the plaintiff. aggrieved by which the defendant No. 1 filed the civil regular appeal before the additional District Judge, Khargone, who vide impugned judgment and decree reversed the finding of the trial Court and dismissed the suit. Hence this appeal. 5. The learned counsel for the appellant, Shri S.D. Sanghi assalils the findings of the learned lower appellate Court on the ground that the lower Court has erred in not considering Ex. P.1 the agreement, between the parties to ascertain the nature of the possession of the plaintiff on the suit land. From Ex. P.1, it is manifest that the defendants had relinquished their share in the suit land in the year 1947. Since then, the plaintiff was in exclusive possession of the suit land as an owner. Therefore, by adverse possession as an owner to the knowledge of the defendants for a period of over 12 years, the plaintiff perfected his title by prescription. The learned appellate Court bas erred in holding that the document (Ex. P.1) cannot be looked into even for ascertaining the nature of the possession of the plaintiff. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondents Shri Chafekar argued that Ex. P.1 being a document of abandonment of rights needs registration according to section 49 of the Registration Act. Therefore, such an unregistered document cannot be admitted in evidence even for collateral purposes for ascertaining the nature of possession. So the learned lower Court has rightly held that, the plaintiff cannot seek any aid from Ex. P.1 to prove his title. Reliance has been placed by both the learned counsel on the decisions of the Supreme Court, Privy Council, Bombay High Court and the High Court of Madhya Pradesh. 6. There cannot be no dispute that section 49 of the Registration Act imposes in interdict on the admission of an unregistered document affecting the immovable property which requires registration. However, such unregistered document can be admitted in evidence even though affecting the immova-property in the suit for specific performance of the contract or as evidence of any collateral transaction not required to be affected by registered instrument. As such, if a document has to be admitted for proving collateral transaction then that transaction should be in such a document which if executed, would not require the registration. As such, if a document has to be admitted for proving collateral transaction then that transaction should be in such a document which if executed, would not require the registration. It, therefore, follows that such a collateral transaction which is sought to be proved by an unregistered document which is not admissible in evidence because of its non-registration should be such that it may be divisible from the transaction, the document of which requires a registration and such transaction should not be dependant upon the transaction, the document of which requires a registration. In N. Vardapillai and another v. Jeevratmal [AIR 1919 PC 45] on which the learned counsel for appellant has placed reliance, it has been held that even when the donors do not get gift deed registered still allow the donees to enter into possession of the gifted property and the donee remains in possession of the property for over 12 years, the title for the donee becomes perfect as against the donor's heirs. In that case, two widows who were the owners and were in possession of the property in equal shares, presented a petition to the Collector, whereby they prayed that order for transferring the villages in the name of one Duraisani be passed as they had given away that property as Shtndhan to her. On the above petition, the property was registered in the Dame of Duraisani and she was also in possession of the property and she thereafter continued in possession till her death. The question was whether she had acquired title to the property by adverse possession. On the above facts, the Privy Council held that although the petition submitted by the two widows could not be admitted in evidence to prove gift for want of registration. But it could be referred to for showing that subsequent possession of Duraisani as a donee and owner of the land and not as a trustee or a manager of the two widows. The document could be referred to show the nature of possession of Duraisani. The aforesaid judgment was considered by the Supreme Court in Mst. Kirpul Kaur v. Bechan Singh [ AIR 1958 SC 199 ]. The authority on which the lower Court placed reliance for passing the impugned judgment and on which the learned counsel for the respondents has also based his argument. The aforesaid judgment was considered by the Supreme Court in Mst. Kirpul Kaur v. Bechan Singh [ AIR 1958 SC 199 ]. The authority on which the lower Court placed reliance for passing the impugned judgment and on which the learned counsel for the respondents has also based his argument. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid judgment has held as under :- "The agreement between the parties cannot be admitted in evidence to show the nature of possession of one of the parties subsequent to its date. The party being in possession before the date of the document to admit it in evidence to show the nature of her p0ssession subsequent to it would be to treat it as operating to destory the nature of the previous possession and to convert what had started as adverse possession into a permissive possession and, therefore, to give effect to the agreement contained in it which admittedly cannot be done for want of registration. To admit it in evidence for the purpose sought would really amount to getting round the statutory bar imposed by section 49 of the Registration Act". The judgment of the Privy Council in Vardapillai v. Jeevratmal (supra) was considered by their Lordships of the Supreme Court and they did not disagree with Privy Council's decision. But on the facts of the case before them it was held that although an unregistered document affecting the immovable property can be referred to for collateral purposes, for showing the nature of possession of the property, still it cannot be admitted in evidence to show that the adverse possession before the date of the document was converted into a permissive possession by virtue of that document. Allowing the unregistered document for such purpose to be admitted would actually destroy the nature of the previous possession and would convert what had started as an adverse possession into a permissive possession. As such, if such a document is admitted in evidence it will amount to getting round the statutory bar imposed by the Registration Act. 7. In the instant case, the appellant plaintiff was in possession of the suit land before the execution of Ex. P.1 but that possession was not on his own behalf but on behalf of his mother. It is ul1disputed that the suit land was given to the mother of the appellant by Ganpat and Vitthal. 7. In the instant case, the appellant plaintiff was in possession of the suit land before the execution of Ex. P.1 but that possession was not on his own behalf but on behalf of his mother. It is ul1disputed that the suit land was given to the mother of the appellant by Ganpat and Vitthal. As the plaintiff was looking after the mother, he was also looking after the suit land which was given to her for maintenance. Therefore, the possession of the appellant prior to the execution of Ex. P.1 was actually not a possession either adverse or permissive but actually a possession on behalf of his deceased mother. After the death of the mother he was inducted into possession as he had spent money on her cremation and other religious rites. The other co-owners of the suit land did not contribute to the expenses and in lieu of the contribution of those expenses, given their shares in the suit land to the plaintiff. Therefore the plaintiff came into possession of the suit land claiming his own rights as the owner of that land after the death of his mother when Ex. P.1 was executed. Therefore, it cannot be held that by admitting Ex. P.1, even for collateral purpose, of proving the nature of possession, the earlier permissive possession shall be converted into an adverse possession. Actually when the plaintiff appellant took possession of the suit land, after the death of his mother, it was as an owner. Therefore in view of the Supreme Court judgment in Mst. Kirpal Kaur v. Bachan Singh (supra) wherein their Lordships instead of differing with the Privy Council's judgment in Vardapillai v. Jeevratmal (supra) have approved the principle enunciated by the Privy Council, but on the facts of that case, enunciated the principles as discussed above it cannot be held that the document (Ex. P. 1) cannot be used in evidence even to prove the nature of possession of the appellants. 8. It is undisputed that the cause of action to the respondents accrued for the possession of the suit land on the date on which the mother of the appellant died. They could have filed a suit against the present appellants for partition and possession of the suit land within 12 years of the date of the cause of action. But they have not done so. They could have filed a suit against the present appellants for partition and possession of the suit land within 12 years of the date of the cause of action. But they have not done so. Since the date of the death of the mother of the appellant in the year 1947 till the filing of the present suit by the appellant himself, the appellant remained in possession of the suit land continuously, openly to the knowledge of the respondents and others treating himself as the owner of the suit land. Therefore, although the appellant was inducted into the possession of the suit land on the strength of Ex P.1 and that document being not admissible in evidence, he could not be treated as owner on the date of his induction into possession of the suit land as an owner of that land by virtue of Ex. P.1, still his induction in possession on the date of the execution of Ex. P.1 followed by his continuous uninterrupted possession of the suit land treating himself as an owner of the suit land for a 'period of over 12 years entitled him to claim the ownership of the suit land by virtue of adverse possession. The plaintiff-appellant had filed present suit for declaration of his title, only after the perfection of his title by adverse possession. 9. In the result, the appeal of the appellants is allowed. The judgment and decree passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Khargone is set aside. Instead, the judgment and decree passed by the learned Civil Judge Class-I Khargone in Civil Suit No. 20-A of 1966 dated 11-1-1968 is restored. In the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.