JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) THE petitioner is mother of the respondent. She executed a registered sale-deed dated 24-1-1985 valued at Rs. 42,000/- in his favour in respect of a house. Afterwards, she instituted a suit against him for a declaration that the sale-deed was illegal and void on the allegations that it was got executed by the respondent without payment of consideration and by practising fraud upon her. The suit was valued at Rs. 42,000/- for the purpose of jurisdiction and fixed court-fee of Rs. 30/-only was paid thereon under Schedule II of Article, 17 of the Court-Fees Act. An objection was raised on behalf of the respondent that the plaint was deficiently stamped as the suit fell under section 7 (iv) (e) of the Court-Fees Act for the purpose of court-fees and ad valorem court-fees on Rs. 42,000/- was required to be paid thereon. The trial Court, by order dated 31-10-1985, upheld that contention of the respondent and ordered the petitioner to pay ad valorem court-fees on the value of the sale-deed. Being aggrieved thereby, the petitioner has preferred this revision petition. ( 2. ) AS observed by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of Shamsher singh vs. Rajinder Prashad and others (AIR 1973 S. C. 2384) - "court in deciding the question of court-fee should look into the allegations in the plaint to see what is the substantive relief that is asked for. Mere astuteness in drafting the plaint will not be allowed to stand in the way of the court looking at the substance of the relief asked for. " Thai was a suit instituted by sons for a declaration that a mortgage deed, valued at Rs. 16,000/-, executed by their father was null and void and ineffectual as the. property belonged to a pint Hindu family and the mortgagee had been effected without consideration and family necessity. A decree was also obtained by the mortgage on the basis of the mortgage deed. Their Lordships held that the plaintiffs were really asking either for setting aside the decree or for the consequential relief of injunction restraining the decree-holder from executing the decree against the mortgage property and that the ad valorem court-fee under section 7 (iv) (c) of the Court-fees Act was required to be paid on the plaint. Their Lordships held that the plaintiffs were really asking either for setting aside the decree or for the consequential relief of injunction restraining the decree-holder from executing the decree against the mortgage property and that the ad valorem court-fee under section 7 (iv) (c) of the Court-fees Act was required to be paid on the plaint. That decision was relied upon by a Single Bench of this Court in the case of Ashok vs. Narsinghrao and others ( 1974 MPLJ 900 - 1975 J. L. J. 395 ). The same principle was stated by a Division Bench of Nagpur High Court in the ease/of Dattaji Parashramji Patil vs. Mst. Bhagirathi and others (ILR 1939 Nagpur 373) in the following words - "what matters is what must be done in order, if that prayer be granted, to make the granting of it effective. Consequently, it was there decided that, if it is sought to have a deed declared not binding, for example because it has been obtained by fraud, a Court acting properly would not leave the matter at large by merely declaring that the deed was not binding, but it would send for the deed in order that it be delivered to the Court to be cancelled. That is the proper way in which such a contest would end, and if it ended in that way, the plaintiff would have obtained two reliefs: (1) the declaration, and (2) the cancellation of the document; and he would get that in point of fact, even though he only asks for the declaration, especially if he put, as he has done here, a subsequent prayer for such relief as the Court may think fit. In this particular case that ancillary prayer is worded differently and as follows, "any other proper and lawful declarations be made. " The effect, however, would be the same. In all such cases although all that is asked for is a declaration, the prayer involves consequential relief. If that be so, then section 7 (iv) (c) applies. " The matter was also considered by a Full Bench of this Court in the case of Santosh chandra and others vs. Gyan Sunder Bai and others ( 1970 MPLJ 363 - 1970 J. L. J. 290 ). If that be so, then section 7 (iv) (c) applies. " The matter was also considered by a Full Bench of this Court in the case of Santosh chandra and others vs. Gyan Sunder Bai and others ( 1970 MPLJ 363 - 1970 J. L. J. 290 ). After discussing the relevant case law, including the decision of the Division bench of Nagpur High Court in the case of Dattaji Parashramji Patil (Supra), the Full bench concluded as follows - "thus, all these cases lay down the proposition that where it is necessary for a plaintiff to avoid an agreement or a decree or a liability imposed, it is necessary for him to avoid that and unless he seeks the relief of having that decree, agreement, document or liability set aside, he is not entitled to a declaration simpliciter. In such cases the question of court-fees has to be determined under section 7 (iv) (c) of the Act. " The decision of the Full Bench was later relied upon by a Single Bench in the case of sunderbai vs. Manoharsingh Yadav (1974 J. L. J. Note 75 ). The last mentioned suit was for a declaration that the sale-deed was not binding upon the plaintiff as it was obtained by practicing fraud upon her. It was held that, unless the plaintiff sought the relief of setting aside the document, he was hot entitled to the declaration simpliciter and that court-fees had to be determined under section 7 (iv) (c) ibid. ( 3. ) IN the present suit, the petitioner-plaintiff is prima facie, bound by the sale-deed. She being a party thereto, the relief of declaration simpliciter is not available to her under the proviso to section 34 of the Specific Relief Act and the declaration claimed by her necessarily involves the prayer for consequential relief of cancellation of the sale-deed. Therefore, she must pay ad valorem court-fee on the value of the sale-deed. Thus, the view taken by the trial Court does not call for interference and the revision petition fails. ( 4. ) IN the result, therefore, the revision is dismissed with costs. Revision dismissed.