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1986 DIGILAW 239 (ORI)

AMULYA CHANDRA BANERJEE (DEAD) AND AFTER HIM SARAJUBALA DIBYA v. BISESWAR MUKHERJEE (DEAD) AND AFTER HIM SMT. SUBALA MUKHERJEE

1986-07-03

D.P.MOHAPATRA

body1986
JUDGMENT : D.P. Mohapatra, J. - The Appellant being unsuccessful in both the courts below has filed this Second Appeal challenging the decision of dismissal of his suit. The Appellant filed the suit for declaration of title in respect of plaint 'A' Schedule land and for recovery of vacant possession thereof after evicting the Defendant and removing the materials and structures therefrom and for damages pendente lite and future at the rate of Rs. 200/- per month till eviction. The property described in Schedule 'A' of the plaint was raiyati land situated in mouza- Jharsuguda, P.S. Jharsuguda bearing H.S. Plot No. 1389 measuring O. 10 acres bounded on the East by land of Imperial Talkies, West-Kalimandir, North-Kolabira road and in South-Land of Imperial Talkies. 2. The gist of the case made out in the plaint was that late Baidyanath Banerjee, father of the Plaintiff, was occupancy tenant in respect of 20.75 acres of raiyati land including the plaint 'A' Schedule. He was in possession of the said lands since about 40 years in his own right, title and interest and had otherwise perfected his title thereto by adverse possession. The Defendant without the knowledge and consent of the Plaintiff and under some arrangement with Late Baidyanath Banerjee came to possess the Schedule 'A' land on the condition that he would enjoy the land so long he would be regularly rendering the service of 'Dhupa' to the Goddess 'Samsan Kali' and in the event of his failure to render such service he (Defendant) would lose his right to enjoy the land and would part with possession thereof in favour of the original tenant Baidyanath Banerjee or his successor-:in-interest, as the case may be. The Defendant rendered service of 'Dhupa' to the Goddess 'Samsan Kali' and enjoyed the land described in the Schedule 'A' for some years, but after the death of Baidyanath Banerjee in or about 1950 the Defendant gave up rendering the service and consequently lost his right of enjoying the property. Indeed, a few months after the death of Baidyanath Banerjee, the Respondent parted with possession and enjoyment of suit lands in favour of the Plaintiff and since then the Plaintiff possessed the same in his own right, title and interest and adversely to the entire world including the Defendant till his dispossession by the latter. Indeed, a few months after the death of Baidyanath Banerjee, the Respondent parted with possession and enjoyment of suit lands in favour of the Plaintiff and since then the Plaintiff possessed the same in his own right, title and interest and adversely to the entire world including the Defendant till his dispossession by the latter. It was the further case of the Plaintiff that he was staying at Ranchi and taking advantage of his long absence from Jharsuguda, the Defendant in or about 1961, without any right whatsoever trespassed upon the suit land and wrongfully possessed the same by constructing houses thereon behind his back and without the knowledge and consent of the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff after coming to know about the wrongful possession of Defendant over schedule 'A' land as aforesaid, demanded vacant possession of the land from the latter orally as well as by issuing notice, but without any success. Hence, the suit for reliefs noticed earlier. The Defendant (Respondent) in his written statement admitted that the suit lands and some other lands originally belonged to Late Baidyanath Banerjee and he was possessing the same. According to the Defendant Late Baidyanath Banerjee gifted away the suit land which was raiyati land absolutely and unconditionally under a deed of gift executed on 10-7-1944 in favour of the Defendant and placed him in possession thereof. The Defendant accepted the gift and in pursuance of the same had been possessing the suit land since then in his own right and adversely to the right of others. The Defendant further stated that the landlord consented to the transfer and had acknowledged the tenancy of the Defendant by acceptance of rent from him. The Defendant proceeded to state that he constructed a pucca house with R.C. roof and a tiled house with brick-walls on the suit land. He further asserted that the Plaintiff never possessed the suit land at any time far less within 12 years of the suit. The death of Baidyanath Banerjee in 1950 was admitted. Regarding rendering of the service of offering 'Dhupa' to 'Smasan Kali' the Defendant's case was that he was only rendering help and assistance to Baidyanath Banerjee and after the death of the latter since nobody of his family performed the 'Puja', the question of the Defendant's rendering help did not arise. On these allegations, the Defendant pleaded that the suit deserved to be dismissed. 3. On these allegations, the Defendant pleaded that the suit deserved to be dismissed. 3. The trial court on consideration of the respective cases of the parties held that the Defendant had accepted the gift from Plaintiff's father unconditionally and had proved his continuous possession over the suit land after the gift. He did not accept the Plaintiff's plea that the Defendant was dispossessed shortly after the death of Baidyanath. The court further held that the Defendant had acquired valid title over the suit land on the strength of the deed of gift and had also perfected his title by adverse possession. On these findings, the trial court dismissed the suit. 4. On appeal by the Plaintiff the lower appellate court on assessment of the evidence on record concurring with the finding of the trial court held that the Plaintiff could not prove that he ever dispossessed the Defendant from the suit land and that he himself possessed it at any time between 1951 and 1960. The court further held that materials on record clearly established that the Defendant came into possession of the suit land by virtue of the gift made in his favour in 1944, and continued in possession of the suit land since then. The first appellate court also observed that the trial court rightly came to the conclusion that it was not proved in the case that the Defendant constructed a house on the suit land only in 1962 and not prior to that. The submission on the question of law that the deed of gift in favour of the Defendant being an unregistered one, was invalid and was not accepted by the court below. Hence, this appeal by the Plaintiff against the aforesaid concurrent decision of the court below. 5. Sri. R.K. Mohapatra, the learned Counsel for the Appellant challenged the decision of the court below mainly on two grounds; (i) the deed of gift executed by Baidyanath Banerjee in favour of the Defendant having not been backed by a registered document which was mandatory under law, could not convey valid title in favour of the donee and, (ii) the suit land having been given to the Defendant for non-agricultural purpose, the provisions of C.P. Tenancy Act (for short the 'C.P.T. Act') have no application. As such, the courts below erred in holding that in view of the provisions of Section 46 of the said Act, the deed of gift could not have been registered at the time of execution. 6. Since the two questions are interlinked they are taken up together for consideration. The provisions of the C.P.T. Act relevant for the purpose are Section 2(5) which provides that 'land' means land which is let or occupied for agricultural purpose, or for purposes subservient to agriculture, and includes the sites of buildings appurtenant to such land. Section 46, as it stood prior to amendment in 1953 dealt with devolution of occupancy right. u/s 46(3) of the said section it was laid down that: Section 46(3) No occupancy tenant shall be entitled to sell, make a gift or mortgage, sublet (except for a period not exceeding one year) or otherwise transfer his right in his holding or in any portion thereof, and every such sale, gift, mortgage, sublease (other than for a period not exceeding one year) or transfer shall be voidable in the manner and to the extent provided by the two next following sections. Under the first proviso of the said Sub-section, it was provided that an occupancy-tenant may transfer his right of occupancy to any person, who if he survived the tenant, would inherit the right to occupancy, or to any person in favour of whom as a co-sharer the right of occupancy originally arose, or who has become by succession a co-sharer therein: Sub-section (5) of section document transferring occupancy quoted hereunder: Section 46(5). Notwithstanding anything contained in the Indian Registration Act, 1877, no officer empowered to register documents shall admit to registration any document which purports to transfer the right of an occupancy tenant in this holding or in any portion thereof unless the document recites that the transferee is a person who if he survived the tenant, would inherit the right of occupancy or is a person in favour of whom as a co-sharer the right of occupancy originally arose or who became by succession a co-sharer therein. Section 47(1) of the Act made provisions for setting aside transfer by an occupancy tenant. Section 47(1) of the Act made provisions for setting aside transfer by an occupancy tenant. Under the said provisions, if an occupancy tenant transfers any portion of his right in any land in contravention of the provisions of the last foregoing section (Section 46), any such person as would be entitled to inherit his right in the holding in the event of his death without nearer heirs, or the landlord from whom the tenant held the land may on application to a Revenue Officer, made within two years from the date on which in pursuance of the transfer the tenant parted with possession of the laid, be placed in possession, subject so far as the Revenue Officer may, in accordance with rules made by the Local Government, determine, to his acceptance of the liabilities of the transferring tenant for arrears of rent and for advances made by the landlord or other persons for the necessary expenses of cultivation. Section 95 of the Act makes provisions barring jurisdiction of Civil Court in certain cases. Under the said section it is provided: Save, where it is expressly provided to the contrary, no court other than the court of a Revenue Officer or Settlement Officer shall fix, alter or commute any rent or call in question any rent fixed by a Revenue Officer or Settlement Officer, or shall take cognizance of any dispute or matter in respect of which 46 prohibited registration of rights. The said provision is authority is given by this Act to a Revenue Officer or Settlement Officer. Section 97 of the Act makes provisions that except, as provided in Section 95, the Civil Court shall have jurisdiction in all suits between the landlord and tenants as such: (1) Suit being the suit for ejectment. (2) Suits to recover possession of land from which a tenant has been illegally ejected by the landlord and (3) Suits for arrears of rent. In the present case, as noticed earlier, it was specifically asserted in the plaint that late Baidyanath Banerjee the father of the Plaintiff was an occupancy tenant since more than 40 years in respect of 20.75 acres of raiyati land including plaint 'A' Schedule land and he was in possession of the said land. This assertion has not been denied by the Defendant. This assertion has not been denied by the Defendant. On the other hand, in paragraph 1 of the written statement it is stated thus: ...It is true that the plaint 'A' Schedule lands and some other lands originally belonged to late Baidyanath Banerjee and he was possessing the suit land till the date of gift as mentioned in the subsequent parts of this written statement, whereafter the Defendant has been in exclusive possession of the suit land in his own right and adversely against the right of others. It is also the admitted case of the parties that the Defendant has constructed a pucca building on a portion of the suit land, in 1962 or sometimes earlier. In view of the pleadings, the courts below proceeded on the footing and in my view rightly, that the suit property was a part of the holding of the occupancy tenant late Baidyanath Banerjee and as such, provisions of C.P.T. Act applied to the transfer by Baidyanath Banerjee in favour of the Defendant. 7. The other question for consideration is whether the gift by Baidyanath Banerjee in favour of the Defendant was invalid on the ground of non-registration. From the provisions of Section 47 of the Act, as it stood at the time of transfer, it is clear that the transfer of the holding or any portion by an occupancy tenant in favour of a person other than the one who is to succeed to the tenancy on the death of occupancy tenant, was prohibited. Further, it was provided under Sub-section (5) of Section 46 that such a document even if executed, could not be registered by any officer authorised to register the document. In view of these provisions there can be no doubt that the gift by Baidyanath in favour of Defendant was invalid and the deed of gift could not be registered in view of the bar u/s 46(5) C.P.T. Act. But this does not conclude the question. Section 47 (as it stood then) lays down the procedure for questioning an invalid transfer and authority to annul such transfer. The Plaintiff being the heir or late Baidyanath Banerjee, could have challenged the transfer in favour of the Defendant in accordance with the procedure laid down in Section 47 of the Act before the competent Revenue Officer. He did not take any such step. The Plaintiff being the heir or late Baidyanath Banerjee, could have challenged the transfer in favour of the Defendant in accordance with the procedure laid down in Section 47 of the Act before the competent Revenue Officer. He did not take any such step. u/s 95 of the Act, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to take cognizance of any dispute for which or matter in respect of which authority is given by the Act to a Revenue Officer or Settlement Officer is expressly barred. Thus, the present suit filed by the Plaintiff to recover possession from the Defendant was not entertainable by the Civil Court. The view taken by me gains support from the decision of this Court in the case of Udaya Naik Vs. Lokanath Naik and Others. In that case a Division Bench of this Court on consideration of provisions of Sub-section (5) of Section 46 of the C.P.T. Act along with the provisions of the Indian Registration Act and Section 123 of the T.P. Act held that the requirement about compulsory registration of a deed of gift under the general law of transfer is not applicable where the transfer is of an occupancy holding to a person other than the persons specified in Sub-section (3) of Section 46. The Court did not accept the contention that Section 46 of the C.P.T. Act must be completely ignored and the validity of the transfer judged from the provisions of the T.P. Act and the Registration Act. The court further held Section 6 of the T.P. Act makes it clear that the provisions of that Act apply only to those classes of properties which are transferrable and where-by any other law for the time being in force, transfer of a certain class of property is prohibited except to a certain specified class of persons the provisions of the T.P. Act would not apply to such transfers except to those specified persons. 8. 8. Presumably, to get over the aforesaid difficulty the Plaintiff came with a case that the gift by Baidyanath Banerjee in favour of the Defendant was a conditional one, subject to the latter performing service of offering 'Dhupa' to 'Samsan Kali' and after the death of Baidyanath Banerjee, Defendant ceased to perform the said service and voluntarily relinquished possession of the suit property and subsequently during the Plaintiff's absence from Jharsuguda the latter trespassed upon the land sometimes in 1961. This story has not been accepted by the courts below who have concurrently held that the deed of gift was not a conditional one and further that the Defendant was all along in possession of the suit property since 1944 and was not dispossessed at any time after the death of Baidyanath Banerjee as alleged by the Plaintiff. There is no scope for interfering with these concurrent findings of the fact in this Second Appeal. In view of this finding the conclusion would be inevitable. The Defendant having remained in possession of the suit property since 1944 under an invalid deed of gift, his possession was adverse, perfected his title by adverse possession and the Plaintiff's suit instituted in August, 1968 was barred by limitation. Some other decisions cited by the learned Counsel for the Appellant may be noted. In the case of Gangaprasad Nandasao Bani and Anr. v. Itwar Singh Manoharsingh Maowar and Ors. AIR 1939 Nag 287, where it was held that the term 'land' in C.P.T. Act and the C.P. Land Revenue Act does not apply to sites in the Abadi because such sites are let out for the purposes of constructing houses for the habitation of human beings and that can be regarded as a purpose subsequent to agriculture within the meaning of that definition. This case is of no assistance to the Appellant here since the position has been accepted that the suit land in the present case were raiyati lands and the lease was for agricultural purpose. Similarly the decision in the case of Ambika Prasad v. Betti Madho AIR 1929 Oudh. 529, was cited in support of the contention that non-compliance of any term in a contract of tenancy does not ipso fact operate as cancellation of contract unless right of re-entry or power to cancel lease is reserved. Similarly the decision in the case of Ambika Prasad v. Betti Madho AIR 1929 Oudh. 529, was cited in support of the contention that non-compliance of any term in a contract of tenancy does not ipso fact operate as cancellation of contract unless right of re-entry or power to cancel lease is reserved. This decision is also of a little assistance to the Appellant in the present case. As noticed earlier the categorical finding in this case is that the Defendant was in possession of the property since 1944 and the Plaintiff was not in possession at any time during this period. 9. On the analysis in the foregoing paragraphs, the position is manifest that the Second Appeal is devoid of merit and the same is accordingly dismissed, but in the circumstances without any order for costs. Final Result : Dismissed