Judgment S.S.SANDHAWALIA, J. 1. Whether a lacuna in framing a procedural form or a rule mandated by a statute would render the statute itself in a state of suspended animation till such rules are framed is the solitary though significant question in these two connected civil revisions referred for an authoritative decision by the Division Bench. 2. The facts deserve notice with the strictest brevity and in so far as they are relevant to the pristinely legal issue aforesaid. The title suit, giving rise to the proceedings, was filed by the plaintiff (opposite party) for the eviction of the defendants (petitioners) on the ground that the fixed term tenancy under the lease deed dated the 10th October, 1975, had expired on the 30th of June, 1982. 3. Sec.14 of the new Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1982, puts a fetter on the defendant-tenants right to resist such a suit, if it has been filed for eviction on the ground of expiry of the tenancy by efflux of time or for his bona fide reasonable requirement. The Section prescribes that the defendant-tenant, in such a case, has to file an affidavit, stating the grounds on which he seeks to make contest and obtain leave of the court to contest the suit. Under the said provision, the defendant, on the 9th February, 1983, filed a petition, supported by an affidavit, purporting to state the grounds on which he sought leave to contest the suit. On the 20th April, 1983, the plaintiff (landlord) filed her rejoinder, stating therein that the affidavit filed by the defendant-tenant was vague and did not disclose any fact disentitling the plaintiff-landlord from obtaining an order for recovery of possession. The learned trial court in an elaborate order dated the 12th December, 1983, which is sought to be impugned, came to the conclusion that the defendants affidavit did not pass the test laid down in law and it discloses no fact, which would entitle the defendant to contest the suit. Consequently, leave to contest the suit was declined and the case was directed to be put up for further hearing. 4. Consequently, leave to contest the suit was declined and the case was directed to be put up for further hearing. 4. Later, on the 12th January, 1984, the defendant-petitioner filed a petition, praying for acceptance of the written statement, filed along with the said petition, to which a rejoinder dated the 31st January, 1984, was filed by the plaintiff, objecting to the prayer of the defendant aforesaid. Learned trial court by a detailed order rejected the defendants petition, holding that the same was nothing but mala fide and mere abuse of the process of the court. It further recalled the earlier order dated the 8th January, 1983. 5. Aggrieved by the aforesaid orders, Civil Revisions Nos. 386 and 388 of 1984 have been preferred to assail them. 6. These petitions originally came up before my learned Brother Prabha Shanker Mishra, J., sitting singly. Before him, the basic issue pointedly raised was, whether Sec.14 of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1982, and the procedure prescribed therein can operate in the absence of the rules prescribed, as provided under S.33 of the said Act, read with Ss.13 and 14 (1) thereof. Noticing the significance of the issues involved, the matter was directed to be placed before a Division Bench for an authoritative decision. 7. Inevitably herein the whole controversy revolves around the relevant statutory provisions. It is, therefore, first apt to notice these in extenso for ease of reference. "1. Short title, extent and commencement. - (1) This Act may be called the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1982. (2) It applies to the whole of the State of Bihar. 7. Inevitably herein the whole controversy revolves around the relevant statutory provisions. It is, therefore, first apt to notice these in extenso for ease of reference. "1. Short title, extent and commencement. - (1) This Act may be called the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1982. (2) It applies to the whole of the State of Bihar. (3) Sec.28 shall come in force immediately and the remaining provisions of this Act shall be deemed to have come into force on the 1st of April, 1981 and shall continue to remain in force : Provided that the period between expiration of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1977 (Bihar Act XVI of 1977) and the commencement of this Act shall not - (a) render recoverable any sum which during the continuation thereof was irrecoverable or affect the right of a tenant to recover any sum of which during the continuation of the Act was recoverable by him thereunder; or (b) affect any liability incurred under that Act or any punishment incurred in respect of any contravention of that Act or any order made thereunder; or "(c) affect any investigation or legal proceeding in respect of any such liability or punishment as aforesaid; and any such investigation or legal proceeding may be instituted, continued, or enforced and any such punishment may be imposed as if that Act has not expired." "11. Eviction of tenants. - (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any contract or law to the contrary but subject to the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (Act XIV of 1947), and to those of Sec.18, where a tenant is in possession of any building, he shall not be liable to eviction therefrom except in execution of a decree passed by the Court on one or more of the following grounds :- xxx xxx xxx xxx (c) where the building is reasonably and in good faith required by the landlord for his own occupation or for the occupation of any person for whose benefit the building is held by the landlord : xxx xxx xxx xxx (e) in case of a tenant holding on a lease for a specified period, on the expiry of the period of the tenancy; xxx xxx xxx xxx "13. The provisions of Sec.14 to have overriding effect. The provisions of Sec.14 to have overriding effect. - The provisions of Sec.14 or any rule made thereunder shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained elsewhere in this or in any other law for the time being in force." "14. Special procedure for disposal of cases for eviction on ground of bona fide requirement.- (1) Every suit by a landlord for the recovery of possession of any premises on the ground specified in clause (c) or (e) of Sub-Section (1) of Sec.11 shall be dealt with in accordance with the procedure specified in this Section. (2) The court shall issue summons in the prescribed form in every suit referred in Sub- Section (1) without delay. xxx xxx xxx xxx (4) The tenant on whom summons is duly served (whether by ordinary mail or by registered post) shall not contest the prayer for eviction from the premises unless he files an affidavit stating the ground on which he seeks to make such contest and obtains leave from the Court as hereinafter provided; and in default of the appearance in pursuance of the summons or his obtaining such leave the statement made by the landlord in the suit for eviction shall be deemed to be admitted by the tenant and the landlord shall be entitled to an order for eviction on the ground aforesaid. (5) The court shall give to the tenant leave to contest the suit if the affidavit filed by the tenant discloses such facts as would disentitle the landlord from obtaining an order for eviction on the grounds specified in Cls.(c) and (e) of Sub-Section (1) of S.11. (6) When leave is granted to the tenant to contest the suit, the latter may, within fifteen days from the date of the order, pray after filing the requisite court-fee, required for a written statement that the affidavit may be treated as the written statement or if he chooses to file a separate written statement he may do so within fifteen days of the grant of leave to contest the suit and if he does not file the written statement within the period he shall not be allowed to do so later. The court shall thereafter commence the hearing of the suit as early as practicable. xxx xxx xxx xxx 8. The court shall thereafter commence the hearing of the suit as early as practicable. xxx xxx xxx xxx 8. Learned counsel for the petitioners pinned himself with technical literality of Sub-Section (2) of Sec.14 and, in particular, the words "the court shall issue summons in the prescribed form". It was contended that admittedly till now under the Rules the form of the summons mandated by the statute has not been prescribed. On that premise the forcible submission was that Sections 13 and 14 of the Act have not come into force at all and, indeed cannot in the absence of the prescribed form of summons. Alternatively, it was contend that Ss.13 and 14 of the Act should be deemed to be in a state of suspended animation and can possibly come into force if and when such a form of summons to be issued has been duly prescribed by the State Government, as directed by the statute. 9. Before adverting to the aforesaid contention, it must be noticed that the issues raised herein are substantially covered by an illuminating judgement of the learned single Judge in Rajendra Singh V/s. Bahadur Singh 1984 Pat LJR 525 : (AIR 1984 Patna 371). Learned counsel for the petitioners had fairly conceded that there was no authority on the specific point to the contrary but he strenuously, though perhaps vainly, assailed the correctness of the view therein. 10. In Rajendra Singhs case the identical issue had come up before S.J. Hyder, J., and four distinct submissions were raised on behalf of the petitioners therein (para 9 of the report). Adverting Seriatim to each one of them, the learned Judge convincingly repelled them. Somewhat picturesquely he concluded as under :- "As already stated, the said provisions provide for a special procedure governing suits of a particular nature. May be that the State Government has not prescribed the form of summons to be issued to a defendant in a suit falling under the same provisions of law. This omission on the part of the Bihar State cannot be legitimately construed as if repealing or holding in abeyance the operation of the said provisions of law as if by a side wind .....................The courts are under a duty to give effect to the legislative intent which is clear from the provision of the Act. This omission on the part of the Bihar State cannot be legitimately construed as if repealing or holding in abeyance the operation of the said provisions of law as if by a side wind .....................The courts are under a duty to give effect to the legislative intent which is clear from the provision of the Act. To insist that the new procedure prescribed by S.14 of the Act can come into force only when a summons as required by Sub-Section (2) of Sec.14 of the Act has been prescribed by the State Government is to insist on a futile rigidity. It is not possible to subscribe to the view that Sec.14 of the Act has either not come into force or stands pro tanto repealed on account of inaction of the State Government. The Rules framed by the State Government under S.33 of the Act are only ancillary to the purposes of the Act. They strangely depart from the course earmarked for them when they govern instead of subserving the purpose of the Act. In case the submission of the learned counsel is accepted, it will be an instance of the tail. wagging the dog." 11. In assailing the ratio in Rajendra Singhs case, the learned counsel for the petitioners primarily projected the alleged ground of prejudice or likely prejudice to a tenant unless he was served with the summons in the form prescribed. It was sought to be argued that by virtue of Sections 13 and 14, the Act now prescribes a general and special prescribes for the trial of suit thereunder. According to the counsel, unless the tenant was served with clear notice by way of the statutory pre-prescribed summons, he was bound, or in any case, likely to be prejudiced and would remain in dark as to the procedure applicable to his case. 12. Though the aforesaid submission might bring some credit to the ingenuity of the learned counsel, the same is pointedly fallacious on a closer examination. The matter has to be viewed against the legislative history of the Act and its preceding provisions. These have been delineated in some detail in paragraph 3 of the report in Rajendra Singh V/s. Bahadur Singh 1984 Pat LJR 525 : (AIR 1984 Patna 371) and it is unnecessary to traverse the same ground again. The matter has to be viewed against the legislative history of the Act and its preceding provisions. These have been delineated in some detail in paragraph 3 of the report in Rajendra Singh V/s. Bahadur Singh 1984 Pat LJR 525 : (AIR 1984 Patna 371) and it is unnecessary to traverse the same ground again. It suffices to supplement it by noticing that Sections 13 and 14 of the Act appear to have been borrowed from the Delhi Rent Control Act. 1958, and are in pari materia with Sections 25A and 25B thereof. Now, even a plain reading of Sections 13 and 14 of the Act would make it manifest that so far as eviction on the ground of bona fide personal requirement and expiry of the specified period of lease is concerned the only procedure now provided is under S.14. In no uncertain terms it has been declared in S.13 that the provisions of S.14 have overriding effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith either in the Act or in any other law for the time being in force. It has consequently to be pointedly highlighted that S.14 of the Act now provides a special and exclusive procedure for trial of suits for eviction on the grounds of clauses to and (e) of S.11(1). This procedure is materially and substantially different from the trial of suits on the ground specified in the other clauses of the said S.11. Consequently, the moment a notice or a summons is served on a tenant for eviction on the ground of Cls.(c) and (e) of S.11(1), it is the clearest notice to him that the proceeding would be contested only within the parameters of the specified procedure spelt out in S.14. There is no question of any written statement or a full-dressed trial as such at the threshold stage and under Sub-Section (4) of S.14, a tenant cannot contest the eviction unless he first files an affidavit stating the ground on which he seeks to make such a contest and obtains the, pre-requisite leave from the court as provided in Sub-Section (6) thereof. Consequently, any element of prejudice or its likelihood in this context is thus eliminated. The apprehension that in the absence of the prescribed form of summons, there would inevitably be some prejudice is thus wholly unfounded. 13. Consequently, any element of prejudice or its likelihood in this context is thus eliminated. The apprehension that in the absence of the prescribed form of summons, there would inevitably be some prejudice is thus wholly unfounded. 13. That the legislature itself never intended to give any mandatory sanction to the prescription of the form of the notice under S.14(2) is manifest from the fact that apart from Sec.28, all the remaining provisions of the Act were given retrospective effect from the 1st of April, 1981, the act being Bihar Act 4 of 1983 which was published in the Bihar Gazette (Extraordinary) No. 252 on the 21st of February, 1983. So, plainly enough, the Act and Sections 13 and 14 were accorded retrospectivity for a period of two years. By the very nature of things, there could not possibly be a prescribed form under the rules for the purpose of S.14 during this interregnum. Therefore, the legislature could not have intended the absurdity of first making the statute retrospective with effect from the 1st of April, 1981, and then rendering it nugatory or as has been put picturesquely in a state of suspended animation ad interim till a rule and the form were duly prescribed. It is significant to notice that the State in its sublime indifference has not framed any rule or prescribed the from of summons under Sub-Section (2) of Sec.14 till now even after the judgement in Rajendra Singhs case (supra). It seems somewhat plain that the legislature itself never intended Sec.14(2) to be inflexibly mandatory and viewed it as a directory procedural provision. 14. Yet again it has to be noticed that herein we are called upon to construe primarily procedural provision. It is well to remind oneself that procedure is the handmaid of justice and not a road block thereto. To say and to hold that the non-prescription of a mere procedural form occasioned by the failure of the State to frame the rule would virtually destroy or render nugatory the basic provisions of Section-14 incorporated by the legislature is, to my mind, carrying a hyper technical argument to untenable lengths. 15. Learned counsel for the petitioner was unable to lay any meaningful challenge to the considered and reasoned view of the learned single Judge in Rajendra Singh V/s. Bahadur Singh (supra). Therefore it is unnecessary to traverse the same ground again. 15. Learned counsel for the petitioner was unable to lay any meaningful challenge to the considered and reasoned view of the learned single Judge in Rajendra Singh V/s. Bahadur Singh (supra). Therefore it is unnecessary to traverse the same ground again. The learned Judge took the view that Sections 13 and 14 of the Act as against the other general provisions are independent of each other and deal with different topics and distinct subjects. He further held that Sub-Section (2) of S.14 is, directory and not mandatory and further that the doctrine of casus omissus was not attracted to the case. It suffices to say that we are entirely in agreement with the aforesaid view and the ratio in Rajendra Singh V/s. Bahadur Singh, 1984 Pat LJR 525 : (AIR 1984 Patna 371) is hereby affirmed. Equally it calls for notice that in Ajit Kumar Singh V/s. Anil Kumar Yadav, 1984 Pat LJR 904 it was again reiterated that special procedure has been laid down in S.14 of the Act and that S.13 directs that the provisions of S, 14 will have overriding effect. 16. To conclude on the legal aspect, the answer to the question posed at the outset is rendered in the negative and it is held that a mere lacuna in framing a procedural form or a rule mandated by statute would not render the statute itself in a state of suspended animation till such rules are framed. 17. Though the matter stands concluded against the petitioner on the issue of law, it is equally more so on facts as well. It is significant to note that when the petitioner put in appearance in court in pursuance to the summons, it made an application dated the 8th January, 1983. The contents of the said application would leave no manner of doubt that the petitioner was more than amply aware of the nature of proceedings against it and in express terms sought time to file an affidavit in contest in terms of Sub-Section (4) of S.14. Not only that, it did in fact file such an affidavit. Annexure-2 at page 23 expressly affirmed the grounds of this affidavit in contest with the clear distinction as to what was based on deponents personal knowledge and what was based on his personal belief. Not only that, it did in fact file such an affidavit. Annexure-2 at page 23 expressly affirmed the grounds of this affidavit in contest with the clear distinction as to what was based on deponents personal knowledge and what was based on his personal belief. Thereafter the issue was not only contested and debated before the court but after full consideration thereof it came to the conclusion that no fact at all was disclosed in the said affidavit which would merit the allowance of the contest of the proceedings for eviction on merits. It is only after such rejection that pretence was made that the petitioner wanted to file a written statement. It would appear that it was catching at a straw and trying to hang on the words "written statement" used by the court in its order granting the application for filing an affidavit in contest. This quibble on the inadvertent phraseology employed by the court has to be read in the context of the application of the petitioner praying to file an affidavit in contest alone and is thus of no great relevance whatsoever. The court below was thus perfectly justified in rejecting it out of hand. 18. Both the revision petitions are thus without merit and are hereby dismissed with costs. 19. Before parting with this judgement we feel compelled to notice somewhat regretfully that the State, in its sublime indifference, has still not framed the necessary rule or the prescribed form for the summons under S.14(2) of the Act despite the categoric observation in Rajendra Singh V/s. Bahadur Singh : (AIR 1984 Patna 371) (supra). We accordingly direct that a copy of this judgement be forwarded to the State Government and we hope that it will expeditiously proceed to frame the requisite rule and prescribe the form of the summons under S.33 of the Act in conformity with the mandate of Sec.14 thereof. PRABHA SHANKER MISHRA, J. 20 I agree.