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Allahabad High Court · body

1986 DIGILAW 245 (ALL)

Sanjiv Yadara v. Union of India

1986-03-03

A.S.SRIVASTAVA, R.K.SHUKLA

body1986
Judgment R.K. Shukla, J. 1. BY this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India the petitioner Sanjeev Yadav has challenged the order of his detention dated 6th June 1985 passed under Section 3 (2) of National Security Act (for short the Act) by District Magistrate Agra hereinafter referred to as the detaining authority. A copy of the aforesaid detention order dated 6th June 1985 (annexure-7) with the ground of detention (annexure-8) were served upon the petitioner who was already in jail on that date. This order of detention was approved by the State Government on 14-6-85 and petitioner was communicated of that approval through district authorities on 15-6-85. The petitioner made representation to the State Government through jail authority which was rejected by the State Government on 21-6-85 after due processing. This rejection was communicated to the petitioner on 24-6-85. The State Government referred the detention of the petitioner to the Advisory Board on 17-6-85. The Advisory Board after hearing the petitioner on 17-6-85 submitted its opinion to the State Government on 24-7-85. After considering the opinion of the Advisory Board the State Government confirmed the aforesaid order of detention of the petitioner on 29-7-85. 2. THE ground of detention as explained in the counter affidavit of the detaining authority Sri P. K. Misra is an incident dated 9-5-85 wherein the petitioner is alleged to have thrown an acid bottle on one Km. Ranjana Soni with intention to kill or deface her at about 2.45 P. M. while she was sitting in the Examination Hall with other examinees, Km. Ranjana Soni was badly injured. Five other students namely Km. Rashmi Agarwal, Km. Suman Mathew, Km. Kabita Saran of M.Sc. (Final) and Km. Nelu Upadhaya of B. A, II year also received simple burn injuries. Km. Ranjana Soni was a student of M.Sc. II year, in St. Johns College Agra. She was living in a hostel which she had left as the petitioner used to trouble her and started living in the town with her relation. Proceedings under Section 107/117 IPC were started against the petitioner on account of the incident. 3. IT is alleged that due to the incident dated 9-5-85 an atmosphere of tenor prevailed in that college as well as in other Colleges also, in examinations particularly amongst girls and their guardians. The injured were sent to hospital. As Km. Proceedings under Section 107/117 IPC were started against the petitioner on account of the incident. 3. IT is alleged that due to the incident dated 9-5-85 an atmosphere of tenor prevailed in that college as well as in other Colleges also, in examinations particularly amongst girls and their guardians. The injured were sent to hospital. As Km. Ranjana Soni was badly injured she was detained in the hospital and other aforesaid five injured students were released from the hospital after giving first aid. Km. Ranjana died due to those injuries on 1-6-85 and the case crime no. 338 of 1985 was converted from Section 307 IPC to Section 302 IPC. 4. ONE more incident dated 4-10-83 was in the back-ground of this incident by the detaining authority when he considered the above incident dated 9-5-85. That incident related to an alleged attempt to demand money by the petitioner from a citizen on pistol point on 4-10-83. According to the detaining authority this occurrence dated 9-5-85 is proved from the dying declaration and post-mortem report of Km. Ranjana Soni and injury reports of the aforesaid five injured apart from the first information report. On the basis of the aforesaid ground the detaining authority passed the aforesaid detention order against the petitioner on 6th June 1985 to maintain public order. In his counter affidavit, Sri P. K. Misra the detaining authority (District Magistrate) has stated unambiguously in paragraphs 3, 13, 17, 19 and 20 that the incident of throwing of acid on Km. Ranjana Soni and others on 9-5-85 affected public order and it was not related to mere law and order. 5. ON the other hand allegation of the petitioner is that he belongs to a very respectable family as his grand father Chaudhari Dhiri Singh was a member of Legislative Council during pre- independence days and thereafter his father Sri Virendrapati has been a member of Legislative Assembly and he is a practising Advocate. The petitioner himself passed out from the U. P.Sainik School and thereafter joined Colvin Taluguadar College Lucknow. He obtained his B. A. Degree from St. Johns College Agra and also passed M. A. Examination in 1984 in 1st Division and attained 4th position in the University of Agra. According to the petitioner he was falsely implicated in the aforesaid case crime no. 582 of 1983 by Sri D. P. Singh Yadav Sub-Inspector, respondent no. He obtained his B. A. Degree from St. Johns College Agra and also passed M. A. Examination in 1984 in 1st Division and attained 4th position in the University of Agra. According to the petitioner he was falsely implicated in the aforesaid case crime no. 582 of 1983 by Sri D. P. Singh Yadav Sub-Inspector, respondent no. 6 who was posted at P. S.Harparbat Agra because father of the petitioner declined to marry petitioner's brother with the neice of aforesaid D. P. Singh. Sri D. P. Singh vide his counter affidavit has clearly denied the aforesaid allegations. The detaining authority, vide paras 5 and 8 of his counter affidavit admitting that proposal against the petitioner was initiated by police of P. S. Harparbat, has denied that the police had submitted the report against the petitioner malafide. He also denied the allegation that he passed the order mechanically on the recommendation of the police. According to him the order was passed only on genuine satisfaction regarding the desirability of the detention of the petitioner under Section 3 (2) of the National Security Act. In para 13 of the affidavit the detaining authority (District Magistrate) has clearly stated that the activity of the petitioner which has been taken as the ground to detain the petitioner is dated 9-5-85. The other activities of the petitioner were referred to as the back-ground of the said activity dated 9-5-85 of the petitioner. 6. SRI V.C. Misra, learned counsel for the petitioner has vehemently urged that it is quite clear from the evidence on record that the petitioner loved Km, Ranjana Soni and when she refused to give him lift, he threw acid on Km. Ranjana Soni in the Examination Hall, which incidently caused simple injuries to other girls also. There is no allegation that the examination was stopped and the students could not appear in the examination According to him this is a single act which was directed against a single individual and was not subversive of public order. Therefore the detention of the petitioner on ostansible ground of preventing him from acting in a manner prejudicial to the public order was not justified. After hearing the counsel for the parties and careful scrutiny of the record of the case, we feel and Mr. Therefore the detention of the petitioner on ostansible ground of preventing him from acting in a manner prejudicial to the public order was not justified. After hearing the counsel for the parties and careful scrutiny of the record of the case, we feel and Mr. Misra and the State counsel also agree to it that success or failure of this petition depends on the determination of the question whether the activity dated 9-5-85 of the petitioner created a problem of public order or that of law and order only. 7. THE distinction between the concept of public order and that of law and order has been well adverted to by High Courts as well as by the Supreme Court of India in a number of cases. In the case of Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar, AIR 1966 SC 740 Hidayatullah, J. as he then was observed that any contravention of law always affected order, but before it could be said to affect public order it must affect the community at large. He considered three concepts "law and order" "public order" and "the security of the State" and observed that to appreciate the scope and extent of each one of them one should imagine three concentric circles. THE largest of them represented law and order. Next represented public order and the smallest represented the security of the State. THE act might affect law and order but not public order just as an act might affect public order but not security of the State In the subsequent case of Arun Ghosh v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1970 SC 1228 the same court held as under : "Public order is the even tempo of the life of the community taking the country as a whole or even a specified locality. Disturbance of public order is to be distinguished from acts directed against individuals which do not disturb the society to the extent of causing against disturbance of public tranquillity. It is the degree of disturbance and its effect upon the life of the community in a locality which determines whether the disturbance amounts only to a breach of law and order. Take for instance a man stabs another. People may be shocked and even disturbed, but the life of the community keeps moving at an even tempo, however much one may dislike the act. Take for instance a man stabs another. People may be shocked and even disturbed, but the life of the community keeps moving at an even tempo, however much one may dislike the act. Take another case of a town where there is communal tension. A man stabs a member of the other community. This is an act of a very different sort. Its implications are deeper and its affects the even tempo of life and public order is jeopardised because the repercussions of the act embrace large sections of the community and incite them to make further breaches of the law and order and to sub-vert the public order. An act by itself is not determinant of its own gravity. In its quality it may not differ from another but in its potentiality it may be very different ". 8. IN Arun Ghosh's case (supra) petitioner Arun Ghosh molested two respectable young ladies, threatened their father's life and assaulted two other individuals. Arun Ghosh was detained under Section 3 (2) of the Preventive Detention Act 1950 in order to prevent him from acting prejudicially from maintaining public order. The Supreme Court held in that case that however reprehensible the appellant's conduct might be it did not add up to the situation where it may be said that community at large was being disturbed, therefore, it could not be said to amount to an apprehension of breach of public order and hence Mr. Ghosh was entitled to be released. The true distinction of area of public order and law and order lies not in the nature of quality of the Act but in the degree and extent of its reach upon the society. The distinction between the two concept is a fine one but they sometime overlap also. Similar acts committed in different context and circumstances might cause different reactions. In one case it might affect specific individuals only and therefore touch the problem of law and order, while in another it might affect public order. The act by itself therefore is not determinant to its own gravity. It is the potentiality of the act to disturb the even tempo of the life of the community which makes it prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. The Supreme Court also held that public order is what the French call "order publique" and is something more than ordinary law and order. 9. It is the potentiality of the act to disturb the even tempo of the life of the community which makes it prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. The Supreme Court also held that public order is what the French call "order publique" and is something more than ordinary law and order. 9. IN the present case the acts of the petitioner affected the family of Km. Ranjana Soni and also five other individuals who received simple burn injuries. The act of throwing acid by the petitioner was directed against Km. Ranjana Soni only and was not directed against other girls in general. They suffered injuries because they were sitting close to Km. Ranjana Soni. They were not his target. All the other girls were discharged from the hospital after getting first aid. Unfortunately Km. Ranjana Soni died on 1-6-85. On this incident a case was registered against the petitioner under Section 307 IPC and after the death of Km. Ranjana Soni the case has been converted from Section 307 to Section 302 IPC. That case is pending trial. There is no doubt that the conduct of the petitioner is reprehensible. He happens to be an unhappy victim of his hopeless passion. But it does not add up to that situation where it may be said that community at large was being disturbed or in other words there was a breach of public order or likelihood of breach of public order. The case falls within the dictum of Chief Justice Hidayatullah in Arun Ghosh's case (supra) and the distinction made in the aforesaid Ram Manohar Lohia's case as well as in a Full Bench decision of this Court in the case of Ashok Dixit v. Union of India, in writ petition no. 10159 of 1984 decided on 1-8-85. Therefore following the ratio of the aforesaid cases we are of the opinion that the incident alleged against the petitioner pertained to single individual and therefore related to and fell within the area of law and order. IN respect of such act the drastic provisions of the Act are not contemplated to be resorted to and the ordinary provisions of our penal laws would be sufficient to cope with them. 10. IN respect of such act the drastic provisions of the Act are not contemplated to be resorted to and the ordinary provisions of our penal laws would be sufficient to cope with them. 10. IN view of the above discussion, we find it difficult to agree with the contention of the learned State counsel that the aforesaid incident dated 9-5-85 comes within the scope of public order. We are inclined to agree with the counsel for the petitioner that the order of detention in the circumstances of this case is not sustainable and is contrary to the well settled principles indicated by this court as well as Supreme Court in series of cases relating to preventive detention. In the result we allow the writ petition and direct that the petitioner be set at liberty forthwith unless he is required to be detained in Connection with some other case. Petition allowed.