Judgment :- 1. Some time in 1981 the Regional Transport Authority, Trichur, decided to introduce a temporary stage carriage service on the route Thayyoor-Trichur. Applications were duly invited, and two temporary permits were sanctioned by order dated 21-1-1982, one to the first respondent in this Original Petition, and the other, to the 2nd respondent. There was some challenge to these grants before the STAT by a rival applicant, but that did not succeed. The two permits were issued in February, 1982 one to start operation from Thayyoor end. and the other, from Trichur end. The permit issued in favour of the 1st respondent was in respect of KRR 218, a 1978 model vehicle, while the other was in respect of KRD 5880, a 1981 model. 2. The RTA subsequently found that the temporary need had in course of time developed into regular or pucca need. It therefore decided to invite applications for grant of two pucca stage carriage services on the route, end did so in October, 1982. Four persons filed applications in response to the invitation: the petitioner, respondents (1) and (2), and one Viswambaran. The applications were received in November, 1982, and yet temporary permits were issued thereafter also to KR 218 and KRR 5880, in violation of the 1st proviso to S.62, so as to enable respondents (1) and (2) to operate on the route without any break. 3. In the meanwhile the pucca permit applications were processed under S.57, and then taken up for hearing on 28-2-1983. The RTA found that the petitioner and respondents (1) and (2) were all entitled to five marks each under the marking system of R.177A, but it preferred the petitioner and the 2nd respondent of the grant. The 2nd respondent was preferred as "an existing operator on the route", with a 1981 model vehicle. The 1st respondent was also an existing operator on the route, but he was not chosen as his vehicle was of 1978 model. The petitioner was found more suitable for getting the other permit, as he was offering a 1983 model vehicle and had "sector qualification" for 33.5 k.m. on the 42 k.m. route. 4. The 1st respondent took up the matter in appeal. The petitioner was found more suitable for getting the other permit, as he was offering a 1983 model vehicle and had "sector qualification" for 33.5 k.m. on the 42 k.m. route. 4. The 1st respondent took up the matter in appeal. His contention was that though the vehicle he bad specified in the application was not so new as the one offered by the petitioner, he had experience on the whole route (i.e. full sector) by operating on temporary permits, while the petitioner had only experience on a portion of it. The deficiency in model of the vehicle was thus more than made up by richer experience. Under the relevant rule, the permits in question could have been issued only after 30 days of Ext. P5, and even before the expiry of this period, he too had secured and registered a 1983 model vehicle as had been promised in Ext. R1 (a) application and Ext. R1(b) representation. These contentions appealed to the STAT After having found that the petitioner and respondents (1) and (2) were all equally qualified under the marking system and there was no dispute at all about award of mark, the STAT thought that actual experience on the whole route was more important than partial experience, and this superiority of the 1st respondent was sufficient to give him an edge in the competition, despite the drawback in the model of his vehicle. Even otherwise, the 2nd respondent bad adduced evidence at the appellate stage to satisfy the Tribunal that he had acquired and registered a later model vehicle for use on the route, within the time allowed by law, if "model" was important from the standpoint of public interest. The STAT therefore partly allowed the appeal: it confirmed the grant in favour of the 2nd respondent, but set aside the grant in favour of the petitioner and held that the 1st respondent had a superior claim to the other permit. 5. This writ petition is directed against Ext. P9 judgment of the STAT but counsel for the petitioner fairly conceded that she was not questioning it to the extent it upheld the grant in favour of the 2nd respondent. What was attacked was only the portion setting aside Ext. P8 grant in favour of the petitioner and preferring the 1st respondent for the permit. And the question is whether that part of Ext. What was attacked was only the portion setting aside Ext. P8 grant in favour of the petitioner and preferring the 1st respondent for the permit. And the question is whether that part of Ext. P9 calls for interference by this Court, in proceedings under Art.226 and 227 of the Constitution. 6. If you approach the question from a commonsense point of view, the answer appears to be simple, and in the negative. After all, two persons were operating on the route on temporary permits for some time; they were chosen, even as temporary operators, after a competitive process. Then came the question of regularising the two permits, by making pucca grants. The two persons had acquired some experience on the route by the time, and in the absence of any one else with longer experience on the route or with other demonstrably superior qualifications, the two established temporary operators could have been easily made permanent. But as a further competitive process or selection was involved at the stage of granting pucca permits also, the RTA thought that an applicant with a later model vehicle, though not without so much of experience as the 1st respondent, would be able to better serve the travelling public. That was certainly a possible approach. The Appellate Tribunal however thought that in the absence of anything to suggest that the 1978 model vehicle of the 2nd respondent was actually inferior (in the matter of seating capacity, comfort, performance etc.), that circumstance alone should not have outweighed the better experience which was his rightful claim. That again, was another possible approach. When the qualifications of rival applicants are weighed in the golden scale of public interest, model of the vehicle may appear to be more important for some people, while experience on the same route may appear to be more important for the others. The STAT is a superior Tribunal; and so long as its assessment of the rival qualifications cannot be said to be arbitrary, mala fide or patently illegal, this Court cannot ordinarily interfere in exercise of its extra-ordinary jurisdiction. More so in a case like the present where the 2nd respondent also bad, as bad been promised in due time, acquired and registered a 1983 model vehicle and bad offered it for use on the route, before the time for actual issue of the permit had arrived. 7. More so in a case like the present where the 2nd respondent also bad, as bad been promised in due time, acquired and registered a 1983 model vehicle and bad offered it for use on the route, before the time for actual issue of the permit had arrived. 7. But we of the legal fraternity are accustomed to go by precedents, even where the answer to a question appears to be simple and obvious. I shall therefore briefly refer to the contentions of counsel for the petitioner, founded entirely on some reported decisions. 8. In Chandramathi v. Kasaragod Bus Transport Co. (1984 KLT 220) a Division Beech of this Court observed that award of marks under R.177A cannot preclude consideration of other factors relevant under S.47(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act. The decision even went to the extent of suggesting that the very factors for which marks are awarded at the initial stage could sometimes enter the reckoning at a subsequent stage, while finalising matters on the touch-stone of public interest, under S.47(1). Counsel for the petitioner relied on the above observation to contend that before upsetting the decision of the RTA in the present case, the STAT should have independently and separately weighed factors like sector, residence, office and workshop, even though the marks secured by the contestants were all the same. It seems to me that the STAT has, in the present case, taken into account all such things; and the learned judges in Chandramathi had themselves been careful to state "that the authorities should not normally or ordinarily go behind the marks, and such a course should be reserved for cases where other qualifications are equal". That is, their lordships were only referring to certain possible approaches, and not insisting that such approaches were to be made in every case. Going behind the marks is not prohibited in all cases, but that should be done rarely and sparingly, depending upon the compulsions of the situation. And what the STAT has done in the case on hand is to go behind the marks, when they were found to be equal, to find out a ground for distinction. 9. Going behind the marks is not prohibited in all cases, but that should be done rarely and sparingly, depending upon the compulsions of the situation. And what the STAT has done in the case on hand is to go behind the marks, when they were found to be equal, to find out a ground for distinction. 9. It is also interesting to notice that on the question of awarding marks for certain factors under R.177A, and then taking those very factors once again into account for determining "public interest" under S.47 (1), a different view had been expressed by a learned judge of this Court in O. P. 2363/83, by observing: "When the framers of the Rules, for the purpose of awarding marks, classified those who had 75 to 100 per cent sector qualification into one group, and two applicants had obtained the maximum number of marks that could be awarded under that head, to draw a further microscopic distinction and to have a further mini classification do not appear to be justified or warranted, as the intendment of the rule was to ignore such marginal differences while assessing the relative merits of the applicants" Bound as I am by the law as laid down by the Division Bench, I hope it will not be impermissible for me to suggest that the approach made in the above passage also appears to be equally, if not more logical. 10. Counsel then relied on the following observations of Eradi J. (as he then was) in the Full Bench decision reported in Narayanan v. RTA (1980 KLT 249): "If all other qualifications are equal as between two applicants, one of whom had furnished in his application the particulars of his vehicle and the other had furnished such particulars only at a later stage before the matter was taken up for consideration by the Regional / State Transport Authority and the vehicle offered by the latter is found to be of a later model and better quality (providing better comforts for the passengers) than the vehicle offered by the former, the Regional/State Transport Authority will be perfectly justified in taking the view it will be in the public interest to grant the permit to the applicant who has offered the better vehicle. However, if in such a case the vehicles offered by both the applicants are found to be substantially of the same type, quality, model etc. and if in respect of other matters both the applicants are equally qualified it will be open to the Regional/ State Transport Authority in its discretion to prefer for the grant the applicant who had furnished the particulars of his vehicle in She application itself treating the said circumstance as a ground for tilting the balance as between the two persons whose qualifications are equal in all other respects." The argument advanced is that even if it was permissible for the STAT to have relied on the belated offer made by the 2nd respondent, in the matter of making available a 1983 model vehicle, that Tribunal could have acted on it only if two conditions had been satisfied: (i) the petitioner had specified an older model vehicle in his application; and (ii) the 1983 model offered by the 2nd respondent was found to be capable of providing better conforts. Both these conditions were obviously not there, and the STAT was therefore bound to recognise the petitioner's preferential claim in the light of the second situation postulated by the Full Bench, it is contended. But as I read the passage, the second situation is attracted only when other conditions are equal, and that was not so in the instant case, as the petitioner had only partial sector, while the 2nd respondent had full sector. 11. Here also, it will be pertinent to point out that one of the learned judges of the Full Bench (Viswanatha Iyer n had a few words of his own to say, on the view taken by the others. 12. It is no doubt true that the RTA and STAT here had been influenced in their decisions by the circumstance that respondents (1) and (2) were both "existing operators on the route" at the relevant time. But, says counsel, they were "illegal operators" because the permits they were having on the date of Ext. P5 had evidently been issued in contravention of the 1st proviso to S.62. Here again, reliance is placed on the decision of a learned single judge in O. P. 4653/83 wherein it has been categorically held that experience gained on account of permits issued against the provisions of the Act could not be taken into account at all. P5 had evidently been issued in contravention of the 1st proviso to S.62. Here again, reliance is placed on the decision of a learned single judge in O. P. 4653/83 wherein it has been categorically held that experience gained on account of permits issued against the provisions of the Act could not be taken into account at all. Without disagreeing with the above proposition, I venture to think that its application should not be universal, and that some qualifications may be found necessary in certain situations. I shall turn to the question presently; but assuming that everything said in O. P. 4653/83 is to be strictly applied to the facts of the case on hand, the result will only be that the experience gathered by respondents (1) and (2) by reason of any temporary permit granted after November, 1982 will have to be ignored. The experience from February, 1982 to November, 1982 was still there, and that was in no way illegal. And that was also not worthless experience of the distant past, as Est. P5 grant was on 28-2-1983 only. And that itself was sufficient to give an edge to them Respondents (1) and (2) were pioneers on the route, they were there till the pucca permit applications became pending and even the operation thereafter had never been declared illegal by any competent authority. And above all, it has to be noticed that this question, in the form in which it has been argued, is not even raised in the Original Petition. 13. Thus the decisions relied on by counsel are insufficient to conclude that the STAT has committed an error of law apparent on the face of the record, justifying interference by this Court in these proceedings. Before parting with the Original Petition by dismissing it, however, I think it will be useful to reflect for a moment on the role of precedents in cases like the present. Under S.47(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, what ultimately governs the grant of a permit is public interest, though a few factors relevant for assessing that interest are enumerated in the sub-section itself. R.177A makes a more comprehensive approach and lays down guidelines wider in their reach, but public interest is still the predominant consideration. Under S.47(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, what ultimately governs the grant of a permit is public interest, though a few factors relevant for assessing that interest are enumerated in the sub-section itself. R.177A makes a more comprehensive approach and lays down guidelines wider in their reach, but public interest is still the predominant consideration. And the very legislature which has specified the criterion to be assessed, has also created specialist bodies for doing that work, like the RTA, STA and the STAT. Primarily, therefore, the assessments should be left to them, except in circumstances where they are found to be so wayward as to require correction, i.e. in cases where the superior court can confidently assert, in exercise of its extra-ordinary jurisdiction, that no reasonable person charged with the body's responsibilities under the statute would have exercised the power in the manner it did. "Neither the laws nor the Constitution are too sacred to change, and the decisions of judges are not holy writ", said Warren E. Burger: to him, precedents are only tools to serve the people, and not masters to enslave them. This is not to say that the need for judicial discipline, consistency and certainty should be overlooked; but it should not also be overlooked that what is often relied on as precedent is not the ratio decided, but individual opinions and personal philosophies spun into the fabric of law. Decisions on the scope of S.47 are legion: they speak of sector, experience, workshop, residence, model, seating capacity and horsepower of vehicles, nature of the roads, virgin routes and routes not so virgin, and very many other factors, some tangible, some imponderable. But to emphasise a particular sentence in a decision referring to some of these factors, with special reference even to the marks of punctuation, is to make a mechanical approach to the question with no appeal to reason or logic. 14. Reference has already been made to the view taken in O.P. 4653/83 that experience gathered by an operator under a permit issued against the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act could not be treated as experience at all. If the idea is to firmly discourage illegalities, the proposition is beyond reproach. 14. Reference has already been made to the view taken in O.P. 4653/83 that experience gathered by an operator under a permit issued against the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act could not be treated as experience at all. If the idea is to firmly discourage illegalities, the proposition is beyond reproach. But if you are trying to make a choice from a number of applicants for grant of a stage carriage permit on a route, some with experience and others without it, will it not serve the public interest better, so far as operation of service on the route in question is concerned, if those with experience are preferred? And in that context, is it so important to note that the experience set up by an applicant is something he could not have gathered, had the permit under which it was granted been challenged and set aside before its period had expired? Can you deny the existence of a human being, for example, solely because the birth certificate in his possession is spurious? Can you treat a millionaire as a poor man because his millions were all earned by violating tax and other laws? Is it always proper or necessary to ignore realities? It may perhaps be possible to suggest that experience acquired by operatic g on a permit subsequently set aside cannot be taken into account. It can also possibly be suggested that as between two applicants, one with 'legal experience' and the other with "illegal experience", the former could be preferred. But the question can still be raised whether the point of time when the statutory body has to make a selection from a number of applicants before it is the most propitious one for examining collateral attacks against earlier grants made by it. 15. In D.R. Venkitachalam v. Dy. Transport (AIR 1977 SC 842) the Supreme Court said that marks can only guide, but not govern the award of permits; and I think the same could be said about principles the courts are accustomed to formulate in the abstract, while trying to settle concrete disputes. To apply them with the rigour of a statutory formula, without regard for the context, would be to move into positions from which we cannot withdraw even when wisdom and commonsense so dictate. I dismiss the Original Petition, but make no order as to costs.