GULAB C. GUPTA, J. ( 1 ) THE appellants, having been convicted for offence punishable under S. 376, I. P. C. and sentenced to five years' R. I. each, by judgment dated 9-4-1982, passed by Shri S. L. Gupta, Additional Judge to the Court of Sessions Judge, Chhatarpur, in Sessions Trial No. 140 of 1981, have preferred this appeal challenging their aforesaid conviction and sentence. ( 2 ) THE appellants were put on trial for having committed sexual intercourse on Smt. Santu against her will on 3-4-1981 at village Shahgarh. It was alleged that on the date of incident, Smt. Santu, had gone to pick up Mahuwa flowers along with her father, uncle and cousin sister. While in the jungle, her father and uncle moved little ahead of them, and she, along with her cousin Munni, were left behind. At about 9. 00 a. m. when both these girls were picking up Mahuwa flowers, the two appellants came on the spot. Appellant Billa asked the prosecutrix to permit him to commit sexual intercourse, on which she said that she would report the matter home. On this appellant Billa felled her on the ground and appellant Vinod committed sexual intercourse with her. After Vinod, appellant Billa also did the same. During this period, they put her own Sari in her mouth and, therefore, she could not even shout. Her cousin Munni, who was witnessing the incident, however, shouted, on hearing which Smt. Shyambai came on the spot. On seeing Shyambai coming towards the place of incident the appellants ran away. The two girls reported the matter to Jagannath brother of the prosecutrix. A report of the incident was lodged and prosecutrix was sent for medical examination. Broken pieces of bangles were seized from the spot vide Ex. P 4. After investigation the appellants were put on trial as aforesaid. ( 3 ) THE learned Judge, relying on the evidence of Smt. Santu (P. W. 1) and Munnibai (P. W. 2), held that the prosecutrix had been subjected to sexual intercourse. Appreciating the evidence on record, the learned Judge held that the prosecutrix was above 16 years of age. The learned Judge however did not agree with the defence version that the rape had been committed with the consent of the prosecutrix. That is how the appellants have been convicted and sentenced as aforesaid. Appreciating the evidence on record, the learned Judge held that the prosecutrix was above 16 years of age. The learned Judge however did not agree with the defence version that the rape had been committed with the consent of the prosecutrix. That is how the appellants have been convicted and sentenced as aforesaid. ( 4 ) SUBMISSION of the learned counsel for the appellant is that all circumstances of this case, including the expert opinion of Dr. (Mrs.) Khare, pointed to the consent of the prosecutrix to the sexual intercourse. The circumstances giving rise to the aforesaid inference are said to be opinion of Dr. (Mrs.) Khare that sexual intercourse was not forcible (para 10), absence of injuries and the fact that the incident was not narrated to Shambai, who had come on the spot after hearing shouts of Munnibai. ( 5 ) BEFORE examining the aforesaid in detail we may consider the value of the opinion of Dr. (Mrs.) Khare in the matter. She had admittedly examined the prosecutrix Santu on 4-4-1981 and had given her report (X. P-12-A ). According to her, there was "no mark of external injury on any part of the body. " On internal examination, she found hymen of the prosecutrix freshly torned at 5 O'clock position and bleeding on touch. In her report (Ex. P-12-A), she had opined that intercourse had taken place within about 12 hours. Dr. (Mrs.) Khare also repeated these facts in her statement in the Court and had clearly and specifically told that prosecutrix had been subjected to sexual intercourse within 24 hours. In cross-examination, she further stated that she found no sign of previous sexual intercourse. Her opinion was based on absence of old tears in the hymen. At the end of her cross-examination she, however, gave the opinion that because there was no external injury on the girl's person, she was of the opinion that the girl was not subjected to sexual intercourse forcibly. It is this part of the expert opinion which is said to be crucial and conclusively establishing consent. There can be no dispute that evidence given by Dr. (Mrs.) Khare is relevant under S. 45, Evidence Act. It may also be conceded that Dr. (Mrs.) Khare, because of her medical qualification, may be termed as an expert, who has expert knowledge and skill in medical science. There can be no dispute that evidence given by Dr. (Mrs.) Khare is relevant under S. 45, Evidence Act. It may also be conceded that Dr. (Mrs.) Khare, because of her medical qualification, may be termed as an expert, who has expert knowledge and skill in medical science. In law, however, the term "expert" has a special significance and no witness is permitted to express his opinion unless he is an expert within the meaning of the term under S. 45 Evidence Act. In each case, the Court has to decide whether a person said to be an expert, is really an expert taking into account his skill, study and experience. In many cases, persons having no educational qualification but having knowledge of high order, have been treated to be experts. In Baldev Raj v. Urmila Kumari, AIR 1979 SC 879 , Opinion of a doctor who had not specialised in gynecology but had knowledge of high order of midwifery as an obstetrician, was accepted as an expert. Clearly, therefore, what is admissible is the opinion of such an expert in the field in which he or she has acquired special knowledge. Outside specialised field, the opinion of the expert would cease to be expert opinion and fall outside the purview of S. 45, Evidence Act. In Deeks v. Wells, AIR 1933 PC 26 it was held that depositions of expert witnesses as to result of their opinions, and as to the effect of them, do not come within the domain of expert evidence at all. In State v. Gaspar AIR 1971 Goa 3 opinion of Medical Officer as to mental condition of accused on a particular date on the basis of testimony of witnesses to acts of accused on that date, was held not the expert opinion but his presumption. There can, however, be no dispute that an expert's evidence is a good evidence and cannot be rejected simply because it may not be decisive. In spite of it, the Court is not bound by the expert opinion though it is bound to consider the same along with other evidence and circumstances appearing in a particular case. In Haji Mohd. There can, however, be no dispute that an expert's evidence is a good evidence and cannot be rejected simply because it may not be decisive. In spite of it, the Court is not bound by the expert opinion though it is bound to consider the same along with other evidence and circumstances appearing in a particular case. In Haji Mohd. v. State of W. B. , AIR 1959 SC 488 , the Court held that in the circumstances of a case, the Court can refuse to place any reliance on the opinion of an expert which is unsupported by any reasons. As far as medical evidence is concerned, it has never been considered to be substantive evidence of the charge, but has been accepted as corroborative of the charge. It has been accepted since long that knowledge of medicine and human body is a matter of science and, hence, Courts have treated expert medical opinion with respect. In spite of it, a medical man cannot be allowed to give his opinion on matters which are within the province of the Courts to decide. Indeed, it is expected of law Courts that they would not surrender their will, independence or judgment to an expert and would in all cases in which expert evidence is adduced before it, after giving it such weight as they may think it deserves, make up their own mind upon an issue in respect of which the expert testimony has been given. There are reported cases where the Courts have rejected medical opinion as valueless where the opinion was based on in sufficient data or reasons. In case of conflicting expert opinions, the expert evidence has carried little weight with Courts. In the context of this law, we may now appreciate the value of the opinion given by Dr. (Mrs.) Khare. As far as her evidence that the prosecutrix had no external injury on her person is concerned, the same is the result of her examination of the prosecutrix and is within the domain of expert evidence. This part is, therefore, clearly admissible under section 45 of the Evidence Act. The opinion that absence of external injury would prove absence of force used against the prosecutrix is her personal opinion, unrelated to the medical science in which she claims to have special knowledge. This part is, therefore, clearly admissible under section 45 of the Evidence Act. The opinion that absence of external injury would prove absence of force used against the prosecutrix is her personal opinion, unrelated to the medical science in which she claims to have special knowledge. Absence of injury may or may not indicate absence of physical violence, and absence of physical violence, by itself, does not mean that sexual intercourse has not been committed forcibly. Indeed, the opinion only illustrates the vastness of her ignorance of the true meaning and scope of the term. A force need not be actual physical force. A threat of violence may, at times, prompt submission of the prosecutrix to sexual act and may not cause any physical injury. In spite of it, it will not be possible to hold that sexual intercourse was not committed forcibly. Similarly, the prosecutrix, because of age, physical capacity or other circumstances, may not be in a position to offer resistance or struggle and, therefore, may not suffer any bodily injury. That again would not prove that sexual intercourse was not by force. Even in cases where the prosecutrix may struggle and resist, may not suffer actual bodily injury because of other circumstances like the place where the act is committed and her own condition including the manner in which it had been committed. Clearly, therefore, the opinion of Dr. (Mrs.) Khare relied upon by the appellants, is, at the most, her own opinion falling outside the purview of S. 45, Evidence Act. That the opinion is wrong and inconclusive is amply illustrated. The fact that the opinion is given on a suggestion in cross-examination would provide sufficient justifications to criticise her being interested in acquittal of the appellants. Possibility of an expert being partisan, is, by itself, sufficient to destroy the credibility of her evidence. In this view of the matter, it is not possible to give any benefit to the appellants on the basis of the opinion given by Dr. (Mrs.) Khare. ( 6 ) WE may now examine the other circumstances, which, according to the learned counsel for the appellants, indicate consent of the prosecutrix, viz. , absence of the injury on her person and her immediate conduct in not reporting the incident to Shyambai. (Mrs.) Khare. ( 6 ) WE may now examine the other circumstances, which, according to the learned counsel for the appellants, indicate consent of the prosecutrix, viz. , absence of the injury on her person and her immediate conduct in not reporting the incident to Shyambai. Santu (P. W. 1), in her evidence, had stated that the appellant Billa felled her on the ground and, thereafter, caught hold of her both hands and Vinod committed sexual intercourse with her. In her cross-examination (para 11), she had stated that she suffered abrasion on her back and hand and was feeling pain. She was not asked any question about the injuries not being found by Dr. (Mrs.) Khare to whom she had been sent for medical examination. A close reading of her statement as a whole indicates that it is very likely that she may have suffered injury as stated. In cross-examination, she has stated how appellant Billa was standing towards her head and overpowering her by catching her two hands. Now, if a girl has to be overpowered as aforesaid, it would completely negative her being a consenting party. No woman consenting to be a party to sexual-intercourse would like her hands to be held by another person during the sexual intercourse. In this context, absence of injury or the conflict between her evidence and the medical evidence, becomes immaterial. It may be that she had felt pain on her hands and had thought that she had suffered abrasion also, but had really not so suffered. It may even be that when asked by the lady doctor, she may not have considered a small abrasion to be of any consequence in the context of sexual violence done to her. The possibility of her giving a false statement is ruled out, as her evidence is fully corroborated by the evidence of P. W. 2 Munnibai, who is a minor girl of about 11 years of age. In Rafique v. State of U. P. (1980 Cri LJ 1344) (SC ), it has been held that absence of injury, by itself, in the context of other cogent and acceptable evidence on record, would not be a ground for holding that there was no sexual intercourse against the will of the prosecutrix. In Rafique v. State of U. P. (1980 Cri LJ 1344) (SC ), it has been held that absence of injury, by itself, in the context of other cogent and acceptable evidence on record, would not be a ground for holding that there was no sexual intercourse against the will of the prosecutrix. Presence of Munnibai also rules out the possibility of Santu being a consenting party, as no girl would ever agree to sexual intercourse in the presence of her cousin sister. As far as not reporting the matter to Shyambai is concerned the same appears to be inconsequential. Prosecutrix had been married about two years before the incident and was naturally not inclined to risk her marriage by telling her matters to outsiders. Santu (P. W. 1) had admitted that though she told Shyambai that appellants had caught hold of her, she had not told about sexual intercourse. In cross-examination, she had admitted that Shyambai was also picking Mahuwa at a distance of about a furlong and half from the place. Munnibai (P. W. 2) had stated that on hearing her shouts, Shyambai had come and on Shyambai's asking, she had told that the two appellants had committed sexual intercourse. There had been no cross-examination of this witness on the point of her stating the incident to Shyambai. This evidence, therefore, is the reason why Santu had not told Shyambai about it. Indeed, there was no necessity of Santu to tell Shyambai about the incident. It is true that Shyambai herself had gone back on her case-diary statement and was declared hostile. Her evidence, therefore, does not corroborate the evidence of two witnesses aforesaid. In spite of it, Shyambai had stated that she had seen Santu and Munni crying. This only proves that both the girls were seen crying immediately after the incident. A girl consenting to sexual intercourse would not cry as aforesaid. Under the circumstances, the defence version of consent has no legs to stand upon. ( 7 ) IN view of the discussion aforesaid, conviction of the appellants for offence punishable under S. 376, I. P. C. appears to be just and proper and needs no interference. ( 8 ) AS far as sentence is concerned, the appellants are young and misguided persons. ( 7 ) IN view of the discussion aforesaid, conviction of the appellants for offence punishable under S. 376, I. P. C. appears to be just and proper and needs no interference. ( 8 ) AS far as sentence is concerned, the appellants are young and misguided persons. The learned Judge has not considered their youth to be an extenuating circumstance because of increasing cases of personal violence and crime rate. True that the present trend is disturbing, but that cannot be a justification for condemning these youthful offenders for the days to come. That they are not entitled to get leniency in the matter of sentence is clear, but that does not justify any severe sentence on them as well. Taking an overall view of the matter, a sentence of three years R. I. would be just and proper in the instant case. The sentence imposed upon the appellants is, therefore, modified. ( 9 ) EXCEPT for the modification of the sentence as aforesaid, the appeal fails and is dismissed. The appellants, who are on bail, are directed to appear before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Chhatarpur, on 17-3-1986 to receive this judgment and undergo the sentence. Appeal dismissed. .