Judgment U. P. Singh, J. 1. The Management of M/s. Esem Tools and Components manufacturing Company has challenged the order of the Labour Court, Ranchi, (Annexure-4) wherein it was held that the Proviso to Sec.11-A of the Indus trial Disputes Act (in short, the Act) does not debar the workmen from leading evidence on the points of victimisation, unfair labour practice and mala fides on the part of the Management in dismissing them. 2. The Government of Bihar, in their notification dated 3rd January, 1978, acting under Sec.10 (1) (c) of the Act, referred the following industrial disputes for adjudication to the Labour Court, Ranchi:- "whether the dismissal of the following seven workmen by M/s. Esem tools and Component Manufacturing Company, Ranchi, is proper and justified If not, what relief these workmen are entitled to ?" 3 Charges framed were served on the concerned workmen and enquiry was held after providing all the opportunity to the workmen to defend their respective cases. The punishment of dismissal was imparted to the concerned workmen by the Management of the petitioners firm after holding a fair and proper domestic enquiry. On the prayer of the petitioner-firm the question of validity of the domestic enquiry held by the Management before dismissing the concerned workmen was heard by Respondent no.1, the Labour Court, as a preliminary issue. By order dated 22-12-1980 the said point was decided and it was held that the domestic enquiry conducted by the Management of the petitioner-firm was valid and proper. Consequently, Respondent Mo.1 fixed the case for hearing on the question of victimisation, unfair labour practice and bonafide of the Management in dismis sing the conncerned workmen. On 28th Feburary, 1981, when the counsel for the petitioner-firm came prepared to argue the matter regarding punishment on the basis of the materials on record, a petition was filed on behalf of the concerned workmen that they wanted to lead evidence to show that the action of the Management in dismissing them was not proper and bonafide and the management had indulged in unfair labour practice and has, thus, victimised the concerned workmen. On 5th March, 1981, the petitioner-firm filed a rejoinder by way of reply to the aforesaid petition and stated that since the domestic enquiry was held to be fair and proper, the workmen had no right to lead fresh evidence under the provisions of Sec.11-A of the Act. On 5th March, 1981, the petitioner-firm filed a rejoinder by way of reply to the aforesaid petition and stated that since the domestic enquiry was held to be fair and proper, the workmen had no right to lead fresh evidence under the provisions of Sec.11-A of the Act. The labour Court framed the issue to decide if the concerned workmen could be allowed to lead evidence on the question of victimisation, unfair labour practice and mala fide of the Management in dismissing them. After hearing both the parties, the Labour Court held that prvisio to Sec.11-A of the Act did not debar the workmen from leading fresh evidence on the point of victimisation, unfair labour practice and mala fide of the Management in dismissing the concerned workmen. 4. Mr. M. S. Mitter, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of Respondent no.2, contended that the workmen were entitled to lead fresh evidence, not led in the domestic enquiry, and the Labour Court was justified in allowing their application. He referred to the following observation of the Supreme Court in paragraph 44 of the judgment in the case of Workmen Firestone Tyre and Rubber company V/s. The Management, (AIR 1973 Supreme Court 1227) :- "the expression materials on record occurring in the proviso, in our opinion, cannot be confined only to the materials which were avail able at the domestic enqiry. On the other hand, the materials on record in the proviso must be held to refer to materials on record before the Tribunal. They take in ;- (1) the evidence taken by the Management at the enquiry and the proceedings of the enquiry ; or (2) the above evidence and in addition, any further evidence led before the Tribunal; or (3) the evidence placed before the Tribunal for the first time in support of the action taken by an employer as well as evidence adduced by workman contra. " 5. The petitioners counsel also relied on the said judgment and in order to correctly appreciate the ratio of the entire judgment, observations in para graphs 18, 19, 25, 30, 33, 37 and 44 of the judgment were referred to. Reliance was also placed on a Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of cawnpur Sugar Works V/s. State of Bihar and others, (1984 BLJR 813 ). 6. Reliance was also placed on a Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of cawnpur Sugar Works V/s. State of Bihar and others, (1984 BLJR 813 ). 6. In the aforesaid case of Cawnpur Sugar Works, (supra) the Division bench of this Court has fully discussed and explained the ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Workmen, Firestone Tyre and Rubber Company, (supre) and stated :- "the Supreme Court comprehensively analysed the law on the subject as it stood before the introduction of Sec.11-A by amendment in 1971 and then discussed the legal effect of the section. It was pointed out that if a proper enquiry was shown to have been held by an employer and the finding of misconduct was plausible conclusion, flowing from the evidence adduced at the said enquiry, the labour Tribunal, before the amendment had no jurisdiction to sit in judgment over the decision of the employer as an appellate body. The grounds on which interference with the finding was possible were limited, namely, unfair labour practice, mala fides victimisation of a workman by the Management and perverseness. In view of the said provision of Sec.11-A the Supreme Court held that even where a dismissal of a wokman by the employer on ground a miscon duct is preceded by a proper valid enquiry, the section empowers the labour Court or tribunal to re-appraise the evidence and examine the correctness of the finding thereon. On the question of admission of additional evidence, the law before amendment permitted the employer to lead fresh evidence in support of the finding of mis conduct of the workman only if the enquiry washed to be unfair or where no enquiry was held at all. The employer could not be allowed to rely on fresh evidence led for the first time before the labour Court, if the domestic enquiry was found to be fair. While discussing the meaning and scope of the proviso in Sec.11-A, the Supreme Court held that this position remained unaltered, mean ing thereby that the Management can give fresh evidence only if the domestic enquiry is held to be unfair or that, in fact, no enquiry was held at all. This position is clear from the observations made in paragraphs 18, 19, 25, 30, 33 and 37 of the judgment. " 7. In that background, the observations, relied on by Mr. This position is clear from the observations made in paragraphs 18, 19, 25, 30, 33 and 37 of the judgment. " 7. In that background, the observations, relied on by Mr. Mitter, wera made in paragraph 44 of the Supreme Court judgment. The position is further clarified in express terms later in the very paragraph 44. Accordingly, I hold in view of the finding of the Labour Court that the domestic enquiry held by the petitioner was fair and proper, the respondent-workmen were not entitled to rely on any evidence, not led in the domestic enquiry, and the Labour Court was not justified in allowing their application for fresh evidence, 8. In the result, the order of the Labour Court passed in Reference Case no.1 of 1978 (Annexure-4) is quashed and the Labour Court is directed to consider the case on merit and pass order in accordance with law. The petition is, accordingly, allowed but without costs. Petition allowed.