JUDGMENT : G.B. Patnaik, J. - The Petitioner challenges the order of the revisional authority under the Orissa Land Reforms Act, (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act') who by the impugned order has directed restoration of possession in favour of opposite party No. 1 u/s 23-A of the Act. 2. An application u/s 23-A of the Act was filed by opposite party No. 1 alleging that the Petitioner is in illegal possession of the raiyati land of opposite party No. 1 since 1961 appertaining to plot Nos. 446/1760 and 446/1761 of khata No. 55. Since the said possession is in contravention of Section 22 of the Act, an order of eviction should be passed against the Petitioner. The Revenue Officer rejected the said application by coming to the conclusion that Section 23-A of the Act does not apply in the facts and circumstances of the case. On appeal, the Additional District Magistrate affirmed the aforesaid order of the Revenue Officer. Opposite party No. 1 thereafter carried a revision to the Special Officer, Land Reforms. The revisional authority by his order dated 22-3-1983 in O.L.R. Revision Case No. 27 of 1981 allowed the revision and held that opposite party No. 1 was entitled to get back the lands u/s 23-A of the Act. 3. In this writ application, interpretation of Section 23-A of the Act comes up for consideration. This provision was not there originally in the Act. Section 22 of the Act contains a restriction on alienation of land by a Scheduled Tribe. Under the said provision any transfer made by a raiyat belonging to a Scheduled Tribe in favour of a non-Scheduled Tribe person without the previous permission in writing of the Revenue Officer is void. The said restriction is also applicable in case of an alienation made by a Scheduled Caste person. Section 23 lays down the procedure to be followed by the Revenue Officer when a transfer is made in contravention of Section 22. For such a petition u/s 23 of the Act, there was no period of limitation provided in the Act and, therefore, the twelve year period prescribed under Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963 applied. Section 23 lays down the procedure to be followed by the Revenue Officer when a transfer is made in contravention of Section 22. For such a petition u/s 23 of the Act, there was no period of limitation provided in the Act and, therefore, the twelve year period prescribed under Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963 applied. The Act was then amended by President's Act 17 of 1973 and by the amended provision, it was specifically provided that in the Limitation Act, 1963 in its application to proceedings u/s 23 of the Act in Article 65 the period of limitation would be thirty years in the case of immovable property belonging to a member of Scheduled Tribe or a Scheduled Caste, specified in relation to the State of Orissa. This amended provision came into force with effect from 2-10-1973 and it was numbered as Section 23-A(2) of the Act. Though the Act provided a remedy in case of invalid transfers, but there was no remedy where a non-Scheduled Tribe or non-Scheduled Caste person forcibly occupied the land of a Scheduled Tribe or a Scheduled Caste person without any document of title for the same. That mischief was remedied by the legislature by inserting another provision by Orissa Act 44 of 1976. Section 23-A of the principal Act was re-numbered as Section 23-B and the new provision which was inserted by amendment in 1976 was numbered as Section 23-A. Under this new provision, when any person is found to be in unauthorised occupation of a holding belonging to a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe person by way of trespass or otherwise, then the Revenue Officer after giving the parties concerned an opportunity of being heard can order eviction of the person so found to be in unauthorised occupation and can cause restoration of the property to the said raiyat or to his heir. This provision is prospective in nature. The question which arises for consideration in the present case is as to whether the aforesaid provision contained in Section 23-A of the Act applies in the facts and circumstances of the present case. 4. This provision is prospective in nature. The question which arises for consideration in the present case is as to whether the aforesaid provision contained in Section 23-A of the Act applies in the facts and circumstances of the present case. 4. The revisional authority has taken the view that if a person has not perfected his title by way of adverse possession on the date the President's Act 17 of 1973 came into force by which the extended period of thirty years possession became necessary to acquire title by adverse possession then in such a case if the unauthorised occupant has not been in possession for thirty years by the time when Section 23-A came on the statute book, he can be evicted by the Revenue Officer under the provisions of Section 23-A of the Act. In other words, he has held that the extended period of limitation would also apply to an application u/s 23-A of the Act. In my view, the aforesaid conclusion cannot be sustained in law. Section 23-B(2) clearly states that the thirty year period would apply to proceedings u/s 23 of the Act. It is an accepted rule of construction that the words, phrases and sentences of a statute are ordinarily to be understood in their natural, ordinary and grammatical meaning unless such a construction leads to an absurdity or the context or object of the statute suggests a different meaning. If the words of the statute are in themselves precise and unambiguous then no more can be necessary than to expound those words in their natural and ordinary sense. The words themselves alone do in such cases best declare the intention of the law-giver. See, opinion of Tindal, C.J. in Sussex Peerage case 11 Cl & F. page-143 quoted in the case of The Commissioners for Special Purposes of the Income Tax v. John Frederick Pemsel (1891) A.C. 531 (H.L.). The duty of a Judge is to expound as to what is the true intention of the Legislature and it is within the province of the Legislature to determine what is best for the public good and to provide for it by proper legislation. In the case of AIR 1932 165 (Privy Council), construction of Article 182 of the Limitation Act, 1908 came up for consideration. In the case of AIR 1932 165 (Privy Council), construction of Article 182 of the Limitation Act, 1908 came up for consideration. It was observed by their Lordships: ...The fixation of periods of limitation must always be to some extent arbitrary, and may frequently result in hardship. But in construing such provisions equitable considerations are out of place, and the strict grammatical meaning of the words is, their Lordships think, the only safe guide.... This being the rule of construction and the plain meaning of Section 23-B(2) being that it applies only to an application filed u/s 23 of the Act, it is not permissible to construe that it also applies to an application u/s 23-A of the Act. The revisional authority, therefore, committed a gross error in applying the thirty year period of limitation contained in Section 23-B(2) to an application u/s 23-A of the Act. 5. The aforesaid conclusion gains support from the fact that the extended period of limitation contained in Section 23-B(2) of the Act was there on the statute book when Section 23-A was brought on the statute book, Yet, the Legislature have not taken any steps to make the extended period applicable to an application u/s 23-A of the Act. An illegal transfer in contravention of Section 22 has, therefore, been treated on a different footing from an illegal or unauthorised possession contemplated in Section 23-A of the Act. In my considered opinion, therefore, in case of an unauthorised occupation coming within the ambit of Section 23-A of the Act, the limitation provided for in Section 23-B(2) of the Act has no application. Necessarily, therefore, on the date Section 23-A came on the statute book, if an unauthorised occupant has prescribed title by adversely continuing in possession for more than twelve years, then the Revenue Officer will have no jurisdiction to divest him of the said right in exercise of powers u/s 23-A of the Act. Consequently the revisional authority committed a gross error of law apparent on the face of the order in applying the extended period of limitation contained in Section 23-B(2) of the Act to the facts and circumstances of the present case and such an error must be corrected by issuing a writ of certiorari in exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court. Accordingly, the order of the revisional authority in Annexure-2 to the writ application is hereby quashed. Accordingly, the order of the revisional authority in Annexure-2 to the writ application is hereby quashed. 6. The writ application is allowed, but in the circumstances, there will be order as to costs. H.L. Agrawal, C.J. 7. I agree. Final Result : Allowed