Judgment U. P. Singh, J. 1. This is an application under Articles 226 and 227 of the constitution in which the petitioner seeks redress for, what according to him, is a breach of his fundamental rights under Articles 14 and 16 (1) of the Constitution. The facts are these ; 2. In response to an advertisement issued by the respondent-Bank for appointment to the posts of "clerks of Works", the petitioner offered himself as a Candidate and was engaged for a particular project. The post was purely temporary and it was terminable after the construction of the project was over. The appointment as on fixed salary for the duration of the construction. He joined the said post on 18/12/1972 at Jamsbedpur Branch. His services were for construction of Jamshedpur staff quarters. He was engaged for a particular project and for a specific work under the agreement. As a necessary consequence of the contract of employment his service was terminated on 3-8-1976. After that he joined another service under a different employer. He was again appointed as Site Engineer on 3-8-1977 and this appointment was again on contrac basis only for a specified job, i. e. for the construction of staff quarters at Ranchi on the same previous terms and conditions contained in the agreement annexed with the counter affidavit, marked Annexure A/2 and the relevant clause (vii)may be quoted: "the services of the Site Engineer may be terminated at any time at the banks discretion on one months notice but if the work of the Site engineer is found unsatisfactory, the Bank will have the right to dispense with the temporary services without notice notwithstanding the non-completion of the construction of the building. " 3. In accordance with Clause VII of the agreement, the petitioner was served with a notice dated 2-7-1976 whereby his services were terminated with effect from 3-8-1976. 4. The two fold grievances were raised by the petitioner, namely, (i) that one Shri J. K. Roy had been made a regular employee of the Bank in January, 1975 on completion of one year of service in terms of the Circular dated 25-4-1974 which laid down that all the "clerks of Works" had completed one year of service or more to be considered as regular employee of the bank. The benefit of the aforesaid circular was denied to the petitioner although he had completed more than one year of service ; and (ii) that he was denied Officers grade I of the Bank Gradre which should have been given to him in terms of new Circular dated 16-7-1977 (Annexure 7 ). The prayer had, thus, been made for issue of writ of mandamus calling upon the respondents to implement the terms of Circulars dated 25-4-1974 and 16-7-19/7. 5. In a counter affidavit filed by the respondents it has been urged that the petitioner was engaged for a particular job He was appointed as "clerks of works" only for a contracted duration and work and his services were terminated on 3-8-1976 as the necessary consequence of the contract of employment. From the advertisement is would appear that the applications were invited for a temporary post of "clerks of Works" to supervise the construction of the Banks building at Jamshedpur and Ranchi Branch on a fixed salary all inclusive of rs.550 per month for the duration of the construction. The post was purely temporary and to be terminated after the construction of the project was over. The Bank had been constantly reminding the petitioner for enterting into an agreement which he ultimately did in 1974 and that too after the Bank finally wrote a letter to him that in case he does not sign the agreement, his services may be terminated. Since the petitioners services were for a particular project question of continuing him in service was out of context. The letter dated 25-4-1974 has been wrongly referred to by the petitioner as circular. In fact, the said letter was only a communication from the Central Office for collection of some dates with a view to facilitate the discussions with the federation. The service of the petitioner was rightly terminated because the project for which he was a pointed was complete and there was no further need of his services. In so far as the Circular dated 16-7-197 is concerned it has no application in the petitioners case because the services of the petitioner had already been terminated on 3-8-1976 before the said circular took its birth on 16-7-1977. The petitioners case therefore, could not be governed by this circular when he was not in service during the relevant period. In so far as the Circular dated 16-7-197 is concerned it has no application in the petitioners case because the services of the petitioner had already been terminated on 3-8-1976 before the said circular took its birth on 16-7-1977. The petitioners case therefore, could not be governed by this circular when he was not in service during the relevant period. The Rules quoted by him in paragraph 15 of the writ application were not applicable in his case. Since he had been engaged only for a specific purpose and his continuation was governed by the agreement executed by him. Therefore, the service Rules and/or the 1979 Order were not applicable in his case. By the so-called circular dated 16-7-1977, the Bank bad decided to engage retired officials in future for a particular purpose. The petitioner was not entitled to any benefit under the so called circular because he was not in service at the time when it became effective. The cases referred to in Paragraphs 24 to 26 of the writ application have no application and hearing on the petitioners case. Those appointments were regular in the Banks cadre whreas the petitioner was engaged only for a particular project and for specific works as laid down in the agreement. His service could not be said to be continuous because in terms of the agreement it was terminated on 3-8-1977. After that he joined service under a different employer for qute sometime and was again appointed in the Bank on 3-8-1977 on the same terms and conditions for construction of staff quarters at Ranchi. Raference of the case of Shri J. K. Roy of Calcutta has got no bearing in so far as the petitioners case is concerned. These are two different cases set on altogether different footings. The petitioners case was absolutely different. He was engaged only for the contracted durations and work. As a necessary consequence of the contract of employment his services were terminated. The petitioners appointment as a Site Engineer as of its own king and it was uncomparable with any other appointment including the promotional appointment of Mr. Roy in the junior Officer Grade I. Mr. He was engaged only for the contracted durations and work. As a necessary consequence of the contract of employment his services were terminated. The petitioners appointment as a Site Engineer as of its own king and it was uncomparable with any other appointment including the promotional appointment of Mr. Roy in the junior Officer Grade I. Mr. Roy was absorbed as Site Engineer by the Calcutta region of the Bank on the following norms :- (A) A "clerk of Works" must serve with the Bank for minimum five years as temporary "clerk of Works" on a consolidated salary of rs.550 per month before absorption. (B) The period of five years temporary service must be uninterrupted. (C) Must be Diploma in Civil Engineering from a recognised institution. 6. The categoric statement in the counter affidavit that the petitioner had not completed five years of Uninterrupted temporary service as "clerk of Works" at the relevant time was not denied ; Therefore, his case does not come under the said crieria. The petitioners case is quite different from the case of Shri Roy who joined the Banks service in 1964 and was absorbed in permanent cadre in the year 1975 after putting in service of 9 years 7 months, thus, having more than 5 years of uninterrupted service. In the facts and cirumstances of the present case, therefore, the petitioner has failed to establish that he was discriminated. 7. The petitioners case is an ordinary case of a contract being terminated by notice under one of its clauses. There was no compulsion on the petitioner to enter into the contract he did. He was as free under the law as any other person to accept or to reject the offer which was made to him. Having accepted, he still has open to him all the rights and remedies available to other persons similarly situated to enforce any rights under his contract which have been denied to him, assuming there are any, and to pursue in the ordinary course of the land such remedies for a breach as are open to him to exactly the same extent as other persons similarly situated. He has not been discriminated against and he has not been denied the protection of any laws which others similarly situated could claim. The remedy of a writ is misconceived. 8. Article 16 (1) is equally inapplicable. He has not been discriminated against and he has not been denied the protection of any laws which others similarly situated could claim. The remedy of a writ is misconceived. 8. Article 16 (1) is equally inapplicable. The whole matter rests in contract, Article 16 (1) deals with equality of opportunity in all matters relating to employment or appointment to any office under the State. The petitioner has not been denied any opportunity of employment or of appointment. He has been treated just like any other person to whom an offer of temporary employment under these conditions was made. His grievance, when analysed, is not one of personal differentiation but is against an offer of temporary employment on special terms as opposed to permanent employment. But, of course, the State can enter into contracts of temporary employment and impose special terms in each case, provided they are not inconsistent with the Constitution, and these who chose to accept those terms and enter into the contrect are bound by them, even as the State is bound. When the employment is permanent, these are certain statutory guarantees but in the absence of any such limitations, Government, is, subject to the qualification mentioned above, as free to make special contracts of service with temporary employees, engaged in works of a temporary nature, as any other employer. In the case of Ramesh Prasad V/s. State of Bihar and others, air 1978 SC 327 , it was held equality is for equals, that is to say, those who are similarly circumstanced are entitled to an equal treatment. The guarantee of equality does not imply that the same rules should be made applicable to all persons in spite of differences in their circumstances and conditions. In the facts of the present case, the contention of infringment of right under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution must fail. 9. The contention that the petitioner is a workman and there is violation 0f Sec.25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act must also fail. Whether a particular person under whatever designation he may be known, is a worker or not under the Act depends upon the terms of contract entered into between him and the employer. Here the petitioners services were purely contractual for specific time and specific job and the principal nature of the job performed by the petitioner was only supervisory. 10. Whether a particular person under whatever designation he may be known, is a worker or not under the Act depends upon the terms of contract entered into between him and the employer. Here the petitioners services were purely contractual for specific time and specific job and the principal nature of the job performed by the petitioner was only supervisory. 10. In the result, this application is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.