JUDGMENT 1. - This appeal is directed against the judgment dated 17th February, 1976 passed by the learned Addl. District Judge, Jhalawar, in Civil Appeals No. 27 of 1975 and 9 of 1975, dismissing the Appeal No. 9 of 1975 and maintaining the judgment of the learned Munsif & Judicial Magistrate, Aklera dated 11th October, 1975 and allowing appeal No. 27, of 1975, by which the suit of the plaintiff was dismissed. 2. Briefly stated the facts of the case are that the plaintiff obtained a conditional decree against the defendants for preemption in respect of certain lands on 17th April, 1974. The decree provided that the defendant shall deliver possession of the suit land to the plaintiff on letters depositing Rs. 3,000/- in the court within two months from the date of judgment and in case of default, the suit shall stand dismissed with costs. In the decree, it was also directed that Rs. 3,000/- may be paid to defendant Madan Mohan or his guardian Mangi Lal. The other relevant facts are that two months period allowed for paying or depositing the amount expired on 17th June, 1975 which fell during the summer vacation which lasted upto 29th June, 1975. The court re-opened on 30th June 1975. On opening of the court on 30-6-1975, the plaintiff obtained triplicate challans from the court to deposit the amount in the Bank. Due to half yearly closing the Bank did not accept the amount on that day, and, therefore, the same was deposited on 1st July, 1975. After depositing the amount the plaintiff decree-holder filed an execution application and obtained possession of the land in dispute from the defendant. Upon their dispossession the defendants filed an application on 19th September, 1975, before the executing court contending that on plaintiff's failure to deposit Rs. 3,000/- on 17th June, 1975 in a court, the suit of preemption stood dismissed automatically and, thus, the question of execution of the preemption decree became irrelevant. It was prayed by the defendants that the possession of the suit land be restored to them. 3,000/- on 17th June, 1975 in a court, the suit of preemption stood dismissed automatically and, thus, the question of execution of the preemption decree became irrelevant. It was prayed by the defendants that the possession of the suit land be restored to them. The objections raised by the defendant judgment debtor were contested by the decree-holder contending that there was summer vacation from 2nd June, 1975 to 29th June, 1975 and, thus, it was not possible for him to deposit the purchase money in accordance with the command of the decree passed by the court on 17th April, 1975. It was also contended by the decree-holder that he had a right to deposit the amount of opening day after vacation. It was thus, submitted by the decree holder that in the facts and circumstances of the case it should be held that the decree holder has deposited the amount within the time fixed by the court in the decree of preemption. The learned Executing Court held that the money was not deposited when it ought to have been deposited by the decree-holder and the suit for preemption was dismissed. The executing Court also directed that the possession of the land in question be restored to the defendants. An appeal was preferred. The appellate Court also confirmed the order of dismissal of the suit. 3. The main point for determination in the appeal is whether the plaintiff decree-holder was entitled to the benefit of vacation and the purchase money deposited by him on 1-7-75 was within time in terms of the command of the decree. The learned trial court passed its judgment relying on the case of the Chandanmal v. Phoolchand AIR 1952 Rajasthan 181 and the learned Counsel for the respondent also placed strong reliance on it. In that case, a decree for pre-emption was passed and it was directed in the decree that the defendant shall deliver possession of the house in dispute to the plaintiff on deposit of Rs. 6900/-. It was also ordered that the said sum shall be deposited in the court within three months from the date of judgment, which was 28th Feb. 1949. 6900/-. It was also ordered that the said sum shall be deposited in the court within three months from the date of judgment, which was 28th Feb. 1949. The contention on behalf of the respondent in that case was that the purchase money should have been deposited by 28th May, 1949 and, as nothing was deposited by that date, the plaintiffs have lost their right of preemption over the property. It may be mentioned that there was vacation from 16th May to 30th June, 1975 and as such, it was contended that on account of vacation it was not possible for the plaintiffs to deposit the purchase money on 28th May, 1975. It was also on record in that case that the civil courts were not closed for all purposes during the vacation of that year, as an order was passed by the High Court of the former State of Jodhpur on 2nd May, 1949, with respect to vacation of that year in the subordinate courts and the order was that no civil cases will be taken up except such as were more than one year's old on the first day of May year 1949. Thus, the civil courts were not closed completely, and were open for the decisions of cases which were pending for more than one year on the 1st May, 1949. It was also ordered that, in order to avoid hardship to the litigant public, the civil courts would entertain plaints and petitions in urgent cases, even during the vacation. The learned division Bench, decided the case and also observed that it was obviously an urgent matter as the time fixed by the court was expiring during the vacation on 28th May, and it was the view of the learned Division Bench that the District Judge could have accepted the proposed money even if it was deposited on 28th May and thus, it was finally held that the contention of the appellant that he could not possibly deposit the money on 28th May was not well founded. Shri Sharma, learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that Chandan Mal's case (supra) is not applicable in the facts and circumstances of the case on various grounds. He submitted that in view of the fact that during vacation, the civil courts were not completely closed in that case, and this was not the position in the instant case. Shri Sharma, learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that Chandan Mal's case (supra) is not applicable in the facts and circumstances of the case on various grounds. He submitted that in view of the fact that during vacation, the civil courts were not completely closed in that case, and this was not the position in the instant case. In the year 1975, civil courts remained closed for summer vacation from 2nd June, 1975 to 29th June, 1975, under the orders of the High Court. It was ordered that all plaints, and appeals in civil cases which but for the closing of the court would have been filed during the vacation shall be filed on the day the courts reopens. Another argument that was raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant was that as per Section 11 of the General Clauses Act, the amount could have been deposited on the reopening on the courts after vacation Reliance has been placed on Kailash Industrial Mills v. Shanti Swaroop AIR 1981 Rajasthan 61 . The learned Counsel for the respondent submitted that this case is completely covered by the proposition of law laid down by this court in Chandan Mal's case(supra). He has further submitted that in view of the Order 20, Rule 14 Civil Procedure Code it is clear that on failure to deposit the purchase money the consequence was dismissal of the suit with costs. Shri M. Rafique, learned Counsel for the respondent, also urged that preemption decree was a conditional decree, and, as such, a court passing a decree for pre-emption with condition to pay purchase money within the time fixed by the decree has no power under Section 148 or 151 Civil Procedure Code to extend time for payment. He has placed reliance on Shiv Shanker Dayal v. Shanti Devi AIR 1972 Rajasthan 139. Shri Rafique has also placed reliance on C.F. Angadi v. Y.S. Hirannaya AIR 1972 Supreme Court 239 to substantiate his contention that the judgment debtor had two options open to him to make payment. He could have made payment to the decree holder or could have deposited the amount in the court. Thus, he cannot take the advantage of his own wrong. 4. I have given my thoughtful consideration to the respective submissions made by the learned Counsel for the parties. He could have made payment to the decree holder or could have deposited the amount in the court. Thus, he cannot take the advantage of his own wrong. 4. I have given my thoughtful consideration to the respective submissions made by the learned Counsel for the parties. In my opinion, the facts of Chandanmal's case (supra) are not applicable to the case in hand. In that case, the civil courts were not completely closed. As per the order of the High Court of former State of Jodhpur no civil cases could be taken up by the civil court except as were more than one year old as on 1st day of May, 1949. There was also a clear direction that the civil courts would entertain plaints and petitions in urgent cases during the vacation. But in the instant case, the position is not the same. The High Court gave the directions that all plaints and appeals in civil cases which but for the closing of the court could have been filed during the vacation shall be filed on the day the court would reopen. Further, it appears that the case in which the decree for preemption was passed was based on the law of preemption in Marwar in 1922. The learned Division Bench did not consider the provisions of General Clauses Act. In the Rajasthan General Clauses Act, 1955, there is a clear provision which provides for computation of time, which is reproduced as under: 11. Computation of time, where, by any Rajasthan Law, any act or proceeding is directed or allowed to be done or taken in any court or office on a certain day or within a prescribed period, then, if the court or office is closed on that day or the last day of the prescribed period, the act or proceeding shall be considered as done or taken in due time if it is done or taken on the next day afterwards on which the court or office is open; Provided that nothing in this section shall apply to any act or proceeding to which the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 (Central Act 9 of 1908, applies. 5. The said section makes it clear that the object of the section is to enable a person to do what he could have done on a holiday, on the next working day. 5. The said section makes it clear that the object of the section is to enable a person to do what he could have done on a holiday, on the next working day. Thus, where a period is prescribed for the performance of an act in a court or office and that period expires, then if the court or office is closed on that day, the act should be considered to have been done within that period if it is done on the next day on which the court or office reopens Thus, for the applicability of the provisions of Section 11 of the Rajasthan General Clauses Act, 1955 there should be a period prescribed and that period should expire on a holiday. There is another pertinent distinction between the case in hand and the case that was decided by the learned Division Bench. The civil courts are governed by the General Rules (Civil) 1952, which have been framed by the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan for the guidance of the civil courts subordinate to it in exercise of the rule making powers conferred upon it by Article 227 of the Constitution of India and all other powers enabling it in that behalf. The rules provided for deposit of money. The relevant rules are rules 255 to 261. As per the procedure laid down in the rules, payment of money to the courts required to be made by means of tender upon printed triplicate form. The tender is required to be handed over to the Munsrim or clerk of the court. Thereupon an office report is to be obtained and the order to receive payment is to be prepared in the office of the court and shall be enacted upon the duplicate and triplicate forms of the tender and it would run in the name of the Treasury or Receiving Officer. The order is required to be signed by the Presiding Officer. Thus, the situation in Chandan Mal's case (supra) was quite different then the situation which is prevalent in the instant case. It is an established principle that an authority can be used as precedent in a subsequent matter if the facts and circumstances of the case are identical. In my opinion, the case of Chandan Mal's is distinguishable. 6. Thus, the situation in Chandan Mal's case (supra) was quite different then the situation which is prevalent in the instant case. It is an established principle that an authority can be used as precedent in a subsequent matter if the facts and circumstances of the case are identical. In my opinion, the case of Chandan Mal's is distinguishable. 6. In Kailash Industrial Mills v. Shanti Swaroop (supra) , this court had the occasion to consider the applicability of Section 11 of the Rajasthan General Clauses Act, 1955 and the court considered as to whether Section 11 of the Rajasthan General Clauses Act, 1955 is attracted not with standing the availability of alternative to pay directly to landlord. In that case, in a suit for arrears of rent and ejectment, the tenant was directed to pay monthly rent either to landlord or to deposit it in the court before 15th of every succeeding month and due to vacation the court was closed and, therefore, deposit of rent was delayed. The tenant made the deposit on the opening day of the court and, this court held that the deposit must be considered to have been made in due time in view of the provisions of Section 11 of the Rajasthan General Clauses Act, 1955. It was clearly observed that the section would be attracted despite the fact that there was an alternative with the tenant to pay the amount of rent to the landlord. It was further made very clear that when an alternative was optional then it cannot be said that Section 11 of the Rajasthan General Clauses Act can have no application. In Kailash Industrial Mill's case (supra) the case of Lakhpatraj v. Dr. Narendrapal Gupta decided by this court on 21st February, 1979, in civil Revision Petition No. 611 of 1975 was also considered. In Lakhpat Raj v. Narendrapal Gupta (supra) , this court after considering the relevant provisions of General Rules (Civil), 1952 held that during the vacation the amount of rent could not be deposited by the tenant. It was also held in that case that the amount could be deposited only by an order of the court and the order of the court could not be obtained during vacation. It was also held in that case that the amount could be deposited only by an order of the court and the order of the court could not be obtained during vacation. In Bhagwandas Tiwari v. Gaya Prasad 1975 RCJ 21 , a similar question arose for consideration and it was observed by the Madhya Pradesh High Court that an order of the Presiding Officer is necessary for making deposit in the court and, thus, it was not possible for the defendant to deposit the rent during the vacation. 7. In C.P. Angadi v. Y.S. Hirannayya AIR 1972 Supreme Court 239 , it was contended before the Supreme Court that for the payment it was open to the respondent to pay the amount to the appellant either on December 31, 1959 or January 1, 1960 and he should not have waited till the 2nd to deposit the amount in court and the learned Counsel submitted that under Order 21, Rule 1, CPC, the respondents could have paid the amount to the appellant on January 1, 1960 or earlier than this. He should not have waited till 2nd deposit the amount in court and, if the last day of the period happened to be a date on which the court was closed, i.e. a circumstances which should relieve the respondent of his obligation to pay the amount within the time specified. The Hon'ble Supreme Court noted that there was a conflict of opinions among the High Court. The learned Counsel for the appellant before the Supreme Court relied upon Kunj Behari Singh v. Bindeshri Prasad Singh AIR 1929 Allahabad 207 , Roshan Lal v. Ganpat Lal AIR 1938 Allahabad 199 , Indal v. Ram Nidh AIR 1946 Oudh 156 and Ramkinkar Singh v. Smt. Kamal Besini Devi AIR 1938 Patna 451 . An opposite view was taken in Suryaprakasa Rao v. Venkataratnam ACR 1938 Mad 523 and Bhikabhai v. Ram Deo Sukdeo AIR 1949 Nagpur 141 . The Hon'ble Supreme Court decided the question as what is the principle which should be applied in a case where a party to a consent decree is given time to do an act within a specified day or by a specified day and fails to do it on the ground of impossibility of performance on the last day specified but does it on the practicable day. The Hon'ble Supreme Court then considered the case of Mohammed Jan v. Shyam Lal AIR 924 All 218 , a full bench judgment of the Allahabad High Court. There a decree in a preemption suit gave the plaintiff a period of one month within which he was required to deposit the purchase money in order to obtain the benefit of the decree in his favour, and the period expired on a date on which the Court was closed for the vacation and the plaintiff made the deposit on the day on which the Court re-opened. It was held by the learned Judges of the Allahabad High Court that the deposit was in time under the terms of the decree. They said that there is a generally recognised principle of law under which parties who are prevented from doing a thing in court on a particular day, not by an Act of their own but by the court itself, are entitled to do it at the first subsequent opportunity. The learned Judge took into consideration the broad principle that although the parties themselves cannot extend the time for doing an act in court, yet if the delay is caused not by any act of their own, but by some act of the court itself, such as the fact of the court being closed, they are entitled to do the act on the first opening day. This is what has been held in Shooshee Bhusan Rudro v. Gobind Chunder Roy 1891 ILR 18 Cal 231 . The other judgments that were considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court were of Madras High Court further and Allahabad High Court. The Hon'ble Supreme Court quoted with approval the following principle, which was laid down in Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 57, 3rd Edition page 97, para 172: Again the general rule does not hold good where the last day is a Sunday and the act to be done is one the performance of which on a Sunday is prohibited by the Sunday Observance Act, 1677, or where the act has to be done, not by the partly only, but by the court or by the party only but by the court or by the party in conjunction with the court. In such cases the act may, when the last day limited for the performance of it happens to be a day when the court or its office is closed, be done on the next practicable day. 8. On the basis of this proposition the Hon'ble Supreme Court approved the case of Mohammed Jan v. Shyam Lal (supra) . Ultimately, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the deposit made by the respondent on 2nd January, 1960 was in substance and in fact a deposit made in terms of the compromise decree. 9. The learned Counsel for the respondent also relied on Chima v. Chunilal AIR 1957 Rajasthan 378 . In this case, a circular of the former Jaipur Government dated 8th May, 1948 was considered and according to the Notification the Courts were enjoined to undertake all urgent work even daring the vacation. Further, the view taken in Chirman's case (supra) goes contrary to the view expressed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in C.F. Ansadi's case (supra). In Chandanmal v. case, the case of Mohammed Jan v. Shyamlal (supra) was considered and was distinguished on the ground that the Courts were not closed. But the judgment of the Allahabad High Court has been considered by the Supreme Court in C.F. Angadi's case (supra) and held that it lays down the correct law. The facts of the case are to some extent identical. In that case also, the civil courts were closed for vacation and on the opening of the Court, the plaintiff made the deposit required by the decree and the deposit was held to be valid, after considering the provisions of Order 20 Rule 14 CPC. I am of the opinion that when by application of Section 11 of the Rajasthan General Clauses Act, 1955 an act can be considered to have been done within time, it cannot be said that the act of depositing of the amount required to be deposited pursuant to the command of the decree, then it cannot be said that the act of depositing of the amount under the decree was of an urgent nature. As I have already observed that an order of Presiding Officer is necessary for making a deposit in the Court and, for a party it would not be possible to deposit in the amount during vacation. As I have already observed that an order of Presiding Officer is necessary for making a deposit in the Court and, for a party it would not be possible to deposit in the amount during vacation. I am in prefect agreement with the proposition of law laid down in Kailash Industrial Mill's case (supra). 10. The learned Counsel for the respondent also submitted that in this case the Courts reopened on 30th June, 1975; but in fact, the amount was deposited on 1st July, 1975. The facts on record are that on 30th June, 1975, he submitted a tender and obtained challan on the same day. He went to the Bank to deposit the amount, but the bank did not accept the amount due to half-yearly closing in the bank and, therefore, the amount was deposited on 1st July, 1975. These facts are not disputed. It is also not in dispute that the amount is required to be deposited in the bank, and thus if the bank refuses to accept the amount offered by the plaintiff, it will be deemed to have been deposited by him on the day of refusal, though, it might have been deposited on 1st July, 1975. The deposit made by the plaintiff also comes within the proposition of law laid down by the Supreme Court i.e. when the last date for the performance of which happens to be a date when the Courts or its offices are closed should be done on the next practicable day. As the amount was not accepted by the bank on 30th June, 1975 obviously, it was deposited by the plaintiff on 1st July, 1975 the day on which the amount was due for payment and was not accepted by the bank, it should be taken to be date for payment of the amount. Even otherwise also the amount deposited on 1st July, 1975, is within time. 11. In the result, I allow the appeal setting aside the order of the learned Addl. District Judge, Jhalawar, dated 17th February, 1976 and that passed by the learned Munsif, Aklera dated 11th October, 1975 and, hold that the deposit made by the plaintiff was in substance and in face a deposit in terms of the decree. 12. In the facts and circumstances of the case, I leave the parties to bear their own costs.Appeal Allowed. *******