G. C. JAIN, J. ( 1 ) THIS judgment shall also dispose the writ petition No. 1824/71 (Bal Krishan Kapoor v. Delhi Development Authority) as they raise common questions for determination. ( 2 ) THE Delhi Improvement Trust, predecessor-in-interest of the Delhi Development Authority (respondent No. 1) by two separate lease deeds, both dt. June 3, 1941, granted a lease for 90 years in respect of plots Nos. 35 and 36 Block F, Darya Ganj, Delhi, in favour of Radha Kishan Kapoor. Mrs. Sham Kapoor and Bal Kishan Kapoor, petitioners in these petitions are successors-in-interest of the said Radha Kishan Kapoor in respect of plots Nos. 35 and 36 respectively. One of the covenants of the lease deed was that the lessee shall not use "the said land and building that may be erected thereon during the said term for any other purpose than for the purpose of shops with residential flats without the consent in writing of the said lessor. . . . . . . . ". Cl. (ii) of the lease deed inter alia provided : "or if the lessee shall not observe and perform the covenants hereinafter contained or if this Lease shall become void under the provisions hereof the Lessor may notwithstanding the waiver of any previous breach or right of re-entry cancel this lease and take possession of this land and the buildings and the fixtures that may then be thereon and also initiate appropriate proceedings for recovery of rent, penalty or other sums payable by the Lessee to the lessor under these presents. " ( 3 ) DELHI Development Authority issued a notice dt. Dec. 23, 1970 to Sh. Amar Nath husband of Smt. Sham Kapoor, one of the petitioners requiring him to show cause within 30 days of the receipt of the notice as to why for the breach of Cl. (vi) of the lease deed the lease may not be cancelled and the said land together with all such buildings, erections and material as may be found therein may not be re-entered upon. This followed a letter from the Executive Officer of the D. D. A. dt. May 5,1971 in connection with the misuse of the plot in question and payment of consideration money. The Executive Officer sent a similar letter dt. May 5, 1971 to Bal Kishan Kapoor. It appears that both the lessees made some representations through their counsel. This followed a letter from the Executive Officer of the D. D. A. dt. May 5,1971 in connection with the misuse of the plot in question and payment of consideration money. The Executive Officer sent a similar letter dt. May 5, 1971 to Bal Kishan Kapoor. It appears that both the lessees made some representations through their counsel. Those representations were rejected by letters dt. July 5, 1971. ( 4 ) FEELING aggrieved the petitioners filed these writ petitions seeking declaration that the notices were illegal, unauthorised and without jurisdiction; the respondents were not competent to demand any consideration money and in any case the demand was unwarranted and illegal. They also seek a writ of certiorari quashing the said notices and a writ of mandamus directing the respondents not to interfere with the enjoyment by the petitioners of the leasehold rights except in accordance with law. ( 5 ) ON behalf of the respondents a preliminary objection has been raised. The objection is that the petitions under Art. 226 were not competent because the action for cancellation of the lease deeds for breach of one of its terms, namely, the term regarding user, was a contractual action and not a statutory one and therefore it could not be challenged by a writ petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India. Reliance, in support of this plea, was placed on a Division Bench decision of this Court in Mangat Ram v. Delhi Development Authority, AIR 1984 Delhi 246. It was held in this case that the cancellation of lease for breach of the term of the lease deed was purely a contractual action and not a statutory one and hence it would not be open to the lessee to challenge the cancellation or in other words to enforce the contractual rights by a writ petition. ( 6 ) TO decide this plea it requires consideration whether the impugned action Of the respondents is an action purely under the contract or it was a statutory action. One of the notices challenged by Mrs. Sham Kapoor (Petitioner in C. W. 1325/71) is dt. Dec. 23, 1970 asking her to show cause as to why the lease may not be cancelled and the property may not be re-entered. She also challenged the notice dt. One of the notices challenged by Mrs. Sham Kapoor (Petitioner in C. W. 1325/71) is dt. Dec. 23, 1970 asking her to show cause as to why the lease may not be cancelled and the property may not be re-entered. She also challenged the notice dt. May 5,1971 whereby the Executive Officer asked her to see him in connection with the misuse of the lease of the land. The other petitioner Balkishan Kapur (in C. W. 1325/71) challenges the later notice only. A perusal of these notices makes it clear that the action which the D. D. A. was contemplating was purely under the lease agreement. The main contention of the petitioners in the writ petitions was that the land under the lease could be used for "shops with residential flats" which term meant that the building could be used for both residential and shop purposes and for no third purpose. There was no restriction for not using the first or second floor or the garage for commercial purpose and therefore there was no misuser or breach of the term in question. In support of this plea reliance has been placed on the decision of this Court in Delhi Dev. Authority v. Bawa Raghbir Singh, 1978 Rajdhani LR 201. According to the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the D. D. A. , under the terms of the lease deed only the ground floor could be used for shop and the remaining floors could be used only for residential purpose: Thus the main dispute which required determination in this case was whether there was no breach of the covenant regarding the user, and, consequently the respondents were not entitled to take action for re-entering the land and building. In this situation there cannot be any doubt that the petitioners by these petitions were enforcing the contractual rights, i. e. the right to enjoy leasehold rights under the lease agreements. No statutory right was involved in these petitions. The decision in Mangat Ram s case (AIR 1984 Delhi 246) (supra) fully applied to these cases. ( 7 ) MR. P. N. Lekhi, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, relied on a Supreme Court decision in Md. Hanif v. State of Assam, (1970) 2 SCR 197 . No statutory right was involved in these petitions. The decision in Mangat Ram s case (AIR 1984 Delhi 246) (supra) fully applied to these cases. ( 7 ) MR. P. N. Lekhi, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, relied on a Supreme Court decision in Md. Hanif v. State of Assam, (1970) 2 SCR 197 . The Supreme Court in this case observed "but as already pointed out the appellant in the present case is not merely attempting to enforce his contractual right but important constitutional issues have been raised on behalf of the appellant. " These observations show that in that case the contractual rights only were not involved but some constitutional issues had also been raised. This is not the case here. In the present petitions, in my opinion, the petitioners are enforcing their rights under the lease agreements only. This position is clear from a later judgment of the Supreme Court in Radhakrishna Agarwal v. State of Bihar, AIR 1977 SC 14%. In that case the State Government had leased out some forest land to the appellant to collect and exploit sal seeds for 15 years on a payment of royalty on certain rate. The State under the terms of the lease revised the rate of royalty and thereafter cancelled the lease for breach of certain conditions. The lessee filed a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution. Observing that the contracts did not contain any statutory terms or obligation and no statutory power or obligation which could attract the application of Art. 14 was involved. It was held that the petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India was not competent. ( 8 ) ON behalf of the respondents reliance was also placed on express Newspapers Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, (1986) 1 SCC 133 : ( AIR 1986 SC 872 ). In this case A. P. Sen, J. observed "due process of law in a case like the present necessarily implied the filing of a suit by the lessor i. e. Union of India, Ministry. of Works and Housing for the enforcement of the alleged right of re-entry, if any, upon forfeiture of lease due to breach of the terms of the lease. " These observations do not help the petitioners. It was nowhere held that a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India for enforcing contractual rights was competent. of Works and Housing for the enforcement of the alleged right of re-entry, if any, upon forfeiture of lease due to breach of the terms of the lease. " These observations do not help the petitioners. It was nowhere held that a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India for enforcing contractual rights was competent. ( 9 ) FOR the reasons mentioned above the writ petitions were not maintainable and are consequently dismissed as such. No order as to costs.