Judgment :- PADMANABHAN, J. Appellant was convicted by the Sessions Judge, Tellicherry in SC No. 75/82 for offences punishable under Ss. 302, 392 and 201 of the Indian Penal Code. For the offence punishable under S. 302, he was sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life. For the other two offence rigorous imprisonment for one year each are sentences given. It is provided in the judgment "But the sentence of the offence under Ss. 392 and 201 merge in the sentence for the offence punishable under S. 302 IPC as it is life imprisonment". We understand that what the Sessions Judge meant was that the sentences should be undergo concurrently. 2. The charge was that in between 9 and 10 p.m. on 13-11-1981 at his shop in Puvathur Desom, the appellant murdered Sathi daughter of Raman by strangulating her. The further case is that he robbed her of her gold chain and wrist watch and caused the evidence to disappear by packing and throwing the dead body into a well in order to screen him from the offence. 3. Deceased Sathi was aged 35 and unmarried. Appellant was aged 26. They reside at a distance of 1 1/2 kms. In Koodali bazar near the mosque there is a shop building having four rooms. The appellant is occupying two of the rooms for conducting his stationery shop, cycle shop and his business in hiring furniture. Sathi was a tailor doing her tailoring work at home. She was residing with her relations. It so happened that she fell in love with the appellant who is much younger to her and belonging to a different community. They were having free sex. Deceased Sathi used to visit the appellant every day more than once. She made no secret of the love affair. She even divulged the free sexual connection as well as the assurance given by the appellant to marry her. On the 11th and 12th of November 1981 the appellant was away from station, having gone to Coimbatore for business purposes. Deceased Sathi was making frantic enquiries about him on those days. On 13-11-1981 the appellant returned. After 9 p.m. On that day the deceased and the appellant met hear his shop. The prosecution case is that the incident happened thereafter before 10 p.m. 4. PW. Deceased Sathi was making frantic enquiries about him on those days. On 13-11-1981 the appellant returned. After 9 p.m. On that day the deceased and the appellant met hear his shop. The prosecution case is that the incident happened thereafter before 10 p.m. 4. PW. 11 is a relation of the deceased and he is conducting a hotel and tea shop near the shop of the appellant. There was a milching cow in the house of the deceased. Every morning deceased Sathi used to go to the hotel of PW. 11 for selling milk and taking tea. She used to return by or about 10 a.m. Even when milk was not available for sale she used to go to the tea shop for taking her tea. Even though on 13-11-1981 milk was not available for sale, she went to the tea shop early morning as usual. Thereafter she did not return home. Enquiries an searches were made from the 13th till 16th without any result. On the 16th PW. 1, sister's son of the deceased, went over to the Mattannur Police Station an gave Ext. P1 information. On the basis of the information a crime under the caption "woman missing" was registered. On that day itself there was information that foul smell was coming from the dry well behind the mosque which is near the shop of the appellant. The dead body of a woman tied inside a gunny bag was found in the well in a decomposed state. Maggots were found crawling all over. By the dress and teeth the body was identified to be that of deceased Sathi. On the neck there was ligature mark also. Therefore the crime under the caption "woman missing" was converted into one under Ss. 302, 392 and 201 of the Penal Code. 5. The appellant was arrested on 23-11-1981. On the information given by him when questioned. M.O. 1 gold chain with locket identified to be that of deceased Sathi and worn by her was recovered under Ext. P6 mahazar. The information is Ext. P19. 6. The evidence is purely circumstantial. The position of law regarding nature of evidence required in such a case is now well settled. Prosecution will have to prove all the circumstances without any omission. Those circumstances put together must form a complete chain without any missing link. P6 mahazar. The information is Ext. P19. 6. The evidence is purely circumstantial. The position of law regarding nature of evidence required in such a case is now well settled. Prosecution will have to prove all the circumstances without any omission. Those circumstances put together must form a complete chain without any missing link. All the circumstances should lead only to one hypothesis namely the guilt of the accused. No circumstance should suggest his innocence. In short the circumstances put together should unerringly speak only to the guilt of the accused and not in any way to his innocence. 7. The evidence shows that deceased Sathi was in love with the appellant. She used to meet him more than once every day and they used to indulge in free sexual connection behind the shop. She went under the impression that the appellant will marry her even though they belonged to different communities and there was disparity in age. She was in the habit of moving freely every day during odd hours alone. She frequented the cinema theatre and used to return home late in the night. She was not in the habit of obeying the elders. Her relationship with the appellant and even the sexual connection was not kept secret by her. There is also evidence to show that on the 11th and 12th November 1981 she was making frantic enquiries about the appellant when he was not seen. Finally when the appellant returned on 13-11-1981 they met together after 9 p.m. Thereafter Sathi was not seen alive and her dead body was found as stated above. The dead body was packed in gunny bags and tied with bullock's nose cord, the type of which was exposed for sale in the appellant's shop. M.O. 1 gold chain usually worn by the deceased was found missing. That was recovered from the house of the appellant on the information given by him. So also there is evidence to show that deceased Sathi warned the appellant that she will expose him before the public if he betrays her by refusing to marry. These are the main circumstances relied on by the trial court for entering conviction. 8. Identification of the dead body, identification of M.O. 1 gold chain with locket and homicidal nature of death by strangulation are facts not in dispute. These facts are amply proved by the prosecution evidence also. 9. These are the main circumstances relied on by the trial court for entering conviction. 8. Identification of the dead body, identification of M.O. 1 gold chain with locket and homicidal nature of death by strangulation are facts not in dispute. These facts are amply proved by the prosecution evidence also. 9. We are already stated that the appellant is doing his business in two shop rooms. The other two shop rooms in the same building are occupied by PWs. 9 and 10. Both of them said that the deceased used to visit the shop of the appellant daily more than once. Though PW. 9 refused to divulge his impression regarding the connection between the appellant and the deceased PW. 10 did not make a secret of it. He said that they were in love. PW. 7 who is the brother of the deceased has also spoken to this fact. PW. 12 is the wife of PW. 11. She said that on 12-11-1981 the deceased went to her house. In answering to her query the deceased admitted her relationship with the appellant. She made all praises about the appellant. She even divulged that they are going to marry at Guruvayoor secretly. The evidence of PW. 12 further shows that Sathi was entertaining a belief that the appellant may not cheat her. It is also seen from the evidence that Sathi was forcing the appellant to marry her and even told him that he will be exposed if the refuses to marry her. PW. 13 is the wife of PW. 2 who is also the brother of the deceased. She said that deceased told her about the love affair and the promise made by the appellant to marry her. PW. 19 has also spoken to these facts from informations received from the deceased herself. It is not necessary to add items of evidence in this respect. It is sufficient to say that the prosecution succeeded in establishing beyond doubt that Sathi and the appellant were in love, that they were having free sex and Sathi went under the impression that the appellant will marry her. 10. There is the evidence of the relations and even strangers that as usual on 13-11-1981 Sathi left the house early morning wearing M.O. 1 gold chain with locket. M.O. 2 series ear rings and a wrist watch. PW. 10. There is the evidence of the relations and even strangers that as usual on 13-11-1981 Sathi left the house early morning wearing M.O. 1 gold chain with locket. M.O. 2 series ear rings and a wrist watch. PW. 11 said that in the morning on that day deceased Sathi went over to his hotel, had tea and went in the direction of the appellant's shop. PWs. 9 and 10 said that as usual on 13-11-1981 also Sathi went towards the shop of the appellant. Finding the shop closed, she enquired with PWs. 9 and 10. PW. 3 said that on the evening on 13-11-1981 at about 6 p.m. Sathi travelled along with her in a private bus. Even though Sathi had to get down at Puvathur for going to her house she actually got down from the bus at Koodali. During this time PW. 3 saw the gold chain worn by the deceased. PW. 4 was the ticket collector on duty in the gate of the cinema theatre at Koodali. On 13-11-1981 by about 7-30 p.m. he saw the deceased entering the theatre for the second show. He also saw her returning early during interval by about 8.45 p.m. This part of the evidence of PW. 4 is corroborated by PW. 19 also. PW. 17 is a person who usually returns home in the night along with the appellant on the back seat of his bicycle. He said that on 13-11-1981 when he went to the shop of the appellant only one plank was found open. On seeing him that was also closed and the appellant was attempting to go home on bicycle. According to this witness the appellant never used to close his shop and go home so early. When asked about the reason the appellant said that he will divulge it later. When PW. 17 as usual, attempted to go along with the appellant on the bicycle the appellant told him that he is not physically well to ride the bicycle and therefore it is better that PW. 17 goes home walking. Accordingly he went away. PW. 18 also said that on that day the appellant closed the shop early and went away. PW. 19 is the son of the sister of deceased Sathi. He is also one who is aware of the love affair of appellant and deceased Sathi. 17 goes home walking. Accordingly he went away. PW. 18 also said that on that day the appellant closed the shop early and went away. PW. 19 is the son of the sister of deceased Sathi. He is also one who is aware of the love affair of appellant and deceased Sathi. On 13-11-1981 itself he came to know of the disappearance of Sathi. The next day he asked the appellant whether deceased Sathi came to him. Appellant answered in the negative and told him that two days earlier she met him and went away saying that if she is not married she will expose him before the public. If actually it is proved by the evidence that on the night of 13-11-1981 the appellant and deceased Sathi met, the above attitude on the part of the appellant could only be taken as suspicious. It must definitely indicate the guilty mind. 11. After PWs. 17 and 18 saw the appellant going away from his shop on the night of 13-11-1981 earlier than the usual time, PWs. 20 and 21 saw him again coming to the shop riding the bicycle. They also saw deceased Sathi in the by-lane near the shop of the appellant. They also saw the appellant meeting Sathi and talking to her. Both these witnesses were employees in the hotel and tea shop ran by PW. 11. They were having their stay in the tea shop itself. Therefore even after the tea shop owner returns home these two people will be there. They are therefore competent witnesses also. It was after some courtesy talk with PW. 20 that the appellant went to deceased Sathi and talked to her. PW. 20 has not noted the movements of the appellant thereafter. But PW. 21 said that after about an hour by about 10.30 p.m. the appellant was found going back on the bicycle. Nobody has seen Sathi alive thereafter. Thus this is a case in which the prosecution succeeded in establishing beyond doubt that the appellant is the person with whom deceased Sathi was seen alive last. When questioned under S. 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure he did not admit this meeting. He had no explanation to offer also. This conduct is also suspicious and incriminating. 12. PW. 1 (son of a sister of deceased Sathi), PWs. When questioned under S. 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure he did not admit this meeting. He had no explanation to offer also. This conduct is also suspicious and incriminating. 12. PW. 1 (son of a sister of deceased Sathi), PWs. 2 and 7 (her brothers) and other witnesses said that M.O. 1 chain with the locket, M.O. 2 series earrings and the watch belonged to the deceased and they were purchased on her behalf and given to her by PW. 7 from the shop of PW. 28. These witnesses have also spoken to the fact that as usual on 13-11-1981 also Sathi went out wearing the above ornaments and watch. As earlier stated PW. 3 saw her at 6 p.m. wearing M.O. 1 PW. 28 supported the evidence of these witnesses when he said that these ornaments were sold from his jewellery shop. Ownership of deceased Sathi over M.Os. 1 and 2 and the fact that she was wearing them on 13-11-1981 is also therefore established beyond doubt. The appellant has no case that M.O. 1 belongs to him or that he got it from anybody else as receiver of stolen property or otherwise. There is nothing to indicate that the deceased parted with M.O. 1 at any time before her death. Nobody other than the appellant knows how the deceased parted with M.O. 1 and how he came by it. Appellant is the only person who must be presumed to have exclusive knowledge in that respect. It is proved beyond doubt that the deceased was last seen alive in the company of the appellant who had the motive to do away with her because of her insistence that he should marry her. He had the duty to explain what happened to the deceased after she was in his company on the night of 13-11-1981. When the evidence was put to him he only made a flat denial which means that he was not in a position to give any explanation at all. This is evidently an incriminating circumstances which leads only to the inference that he is the person guilty of murder. In such a situation the unexplained possession of M.O. 1 leads to the further conclusion that he committed robbery by voluntarily causing the death of Sathi. This is evidently an incriminating circumstances which leads only to the inference that he is the person guilty of murder. In such a situation the unexplained possession of M.O. 1 leads to the further conclusion that he committed robbery by voluntarily causing the death of Sathi. The prosecution case which is not consistent with a case of murder for gain is no reason to think that such a conclusion is not possible. The failure of the prosecution to trace the watch worn by the deceased is not a circumstance which will weaken the prosecution case or evidence. In all cases it may not be possible for the investigating agency to trace out all items found missing from the dead body. The fact that M.O. 2 series ear-rings were found on the dead body itself is also no circumstance weakening the prosecution evidence. The ear-rings could have gone unnoticed or the appellant might not have taken pains to remove them in his hurry. What we are concerned with is only how the appellant came by possession of M.O. 1. 13. Another item of evidence consists of the gunny bags in which the dead body was packed and the bullock's nose cords with which they were tied. PW. 26 is the dealer who sold the bullock's nose cords to the appellant. Some of the witnesses have spoken to the presence of identical gunny bags also in the shop of the appellant. But we do not feel that these items of evidence could be taken as conclusive. Gunny bags and bullock's nose cords of identical varieties could be had elsewhere also. They are items freely available for purchase in the market. Therefore these are only circumstances which could be taken along with other items of evidence. 14. The discovery of M.O. 1 under S. 27 of the Evidence Act was the subject of very serious challenge before us. The appellant was arrested on 23-11-1981 and on the basis of Ext. P-19 information given by him when questioned by the investigating officer (PW 38) M.O. 1 was recovered under Ext. P6 mahazar from a concealed place at the residence of the appellant himself. We have earlier stated that the prosecution not only proved that M.O. 1 belonged to the deceased. But also that it was worn by her when she was missing. The information conveyed by the appellant was spoken to by PW. 38. P6 mahazar from a concealed place at the residence of the appellant himself. We have earlier stated that the prosecution not only proved that M.O. 1 belonged to the deceased. But also that it was worn by her when she was missing. The information conveyed by the appellant was spoken to by PW. 38. An extract of that information, which is evidently copied from the confessional statement of the appellant was proved by PW. 38 as Ext. P19. What is required under S. 27 of the Evidence Act is only "any fact deposed to as discovered in consequence of information received from a person accused of any offence, in the custody of a police officer". When a person accused of an offence is in the custody of a police officer and any fact is deposed to as discovered in consequence of any information received from him, so much of the information as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered could be proved. Section 27 of the Evidence Act does not require any particular mode of proof either regarding the information or regarding the fact thereby discovered except as 'deposed to'. The wordings used are only "deposed to as discovered consequent on the information". The information mentioned in the section is generally described as "disclosure statements". These disclosure statements will be invariably contained in the statements recorded by the investigating officer on questioning the accused, whether they will amount to confession or not. Those statements will be in the case diary. At the time when the investigating officer questions the accused and records his statement it will be a compact whole containing informations amounting to confession and those which do not amount to confession. Sections 25 and 26 of the Evidence Act operate as bar to the admissibility of such confessional statements. Section 27 operates as a proviso to Ss. 25 and 26. When the statement of the accused is recorded the investigating officer may not know which portion of it may have to be used or could be used a later stages for discoveries under S. 27. That contingency will arise only when a fact is discovered in consequence of any information contained in the statement already recorded. The original information will be only the one included in the statement already recorded and kept in the case diary. That contingency will arise only when a fact is discovered in consequence of any information contained in the statement already recorded. The original information will be only the one included in the statement already recorded and kept in the case diary. Any extract of it could only be a copy of that portion of the original statement contained in the case diary. Whether that is extracted and produced as a separate document or is incorporated in the mahazar is immaterial. At any rate it will only be a reproduction of what is originally recorded or a portion of it. What is required is only "deposed to as discovered in consequence of the information". The authenticity of the information, in case of dispute could be considered by the Court with reference to the original statement contained in the case diary which could at any time be called for by the Court. Even otherwise the Court could consider the truth as well as genuineness of the information. Even a mahazar and the inclusion of the disclosure statement in it cannot be said to be something insisted on by any statutory provision. The formality of the preparation of a mahazar incorporating the disclosure statement contained in the case diary itself is only to act as an assurance to the actions of the investigating officer. What is statutorily required is only "deposed to as discovered in consequence of the information". The acceptability of what is "deposed to" as "discovered" and "in consequence of information" are matters to be decided by the Court in the facts and circumstances of each case. 15. Investigation is the province of the police. The main process of investigation is collection of materials to decide whether the accused is to be placed for trial or not. That process includes questioning of the accused and witnesses, conducting search and seizures and even so many other acts. Except where there are statutory provisions making it incumbent on the investigating agency to do particular items of investigation in particular manner after observing the requisite formalities, the rest of the investigation will have to be left to the discretion of the investigating agency. The power of the Court is only to ascertain whether that process was regularly and properly performed and whether the materials so collected and placed before Court are acceptable or not. The power of the Court is only to ascertain whether that process was regularly and properly performed and whether the materials so collected and placed before Court are acceptable or not. We said so because in relation to the recovery under S. 27, the counsel for the appellant strenuously contended before us that there are violations of Ss. 100 and 165 of the Cr.P.C. which vitiates the discovery and make it unacceptable. Strictly going by S. 27 what is required is only the evidence of the investigating officer or other police officer regarding the information and the fact that discovery was in consequence of the information. We are not forgetful of the fact that S. 27 of the Evidence Act is a provision which is often misused by dishonest investigators. In such cases safeguards are insisted on by Courts for the purpose of ensuring regularity and correctness of the actions of the police officers. It may not be correct to say that police officers will have to question the accused in the presence of witnesses or with their attestation. A written mahazar prepared at the time of discovery consequent on the information is not something which is insisted on, by any provision of law. It is being done and insisted on only as a contemporaneous record to act as an assurance or guarantee to the correctness of the actions of the police officer. Whether the information was actually given by the accused and whether the discovery is correct are all matters which could be gone into and decided by the Court. For that purpose the Court could call for and peruse the case diary also over and above evaluating the evidence in other respects. So far as the information is concerned what is required is only that as far as possible it should be recorded in first person and made available to the Court and the discovery must be shown to have been in consequence of the information. It is not necessary that the information should be reproduced from the case diary and produced as a separate document. In such a situation it could only be a copy of original information contained in the case diary. It is not necessary that the information should be reproduced from the case diary and produced as a separate document. In such a situation it could only be a copy of original information contained in the case diary. We feel that the provisions of S. 27 could be deemed to be complied with if the information in first person is recorded in the recovery mahazar with a further statement that the discovery was in consequence of the information and these facts are deposed to by the concerned officer in the box. We do not mean to say that the production of the information as a separate document is not correct. What we said is that for the purpose of compliance with S. 27 the incorporation of the relevant information in the recovery mahazar will be sufficient. The statement given by the accused when questioned by investigating officer may be lengthy and it may contain statement which may or may not amount to confession. There may be incriminating materials in it. What is relevant under S. 27 is only that much of the information specifically relating to the discovery. What could be proved under S. 27 is also only that much of the information. If the entire statement of the accused is produced before Court and admitted in evidence that is likely to prejudice the mind of the Court on reading the incriminating confessional portions of the statement. That is why the relevant information alone could be extracted and presented before Court. 16. We have already stated that preparation of the mahazar and incorporation of the disclosure statement in it are only formalities insisted by Court for giving assurance to the correctness of the actions of the police officer and that it is for the Court to decide whether the information and the discovery are acceptable or not. In this case investigation was conducted by PW. 38. It was he who arrested the appellant and recorded the statement which includes the information extracted in Ext. P-6 and also produced as Ext. P-19. PW. 38 has spoken to the information, the consequent discovery and the preparation of Ext. P-6. They are PWs. 7 and 8. PW. 7 is the brother of the deceased and PW. 8 is a stranger. They have supported the evidence of PW. 38. The connection was that PWs. P-6 and also produced as Ext. P-19. PW. 38 has spoken to the information, the consequent discovery and the preparation of Ext. P-6. They are PWs. 7 and 8. PW. 7 is the brother of the deceased and PW. 8 is a stranger. They have supported the evidence of PW. 38. The connection was that PWs. 7 and 8 are not "independent and respectable inhabitants of the locality in which the place to be searched is situate" and hence the discovery under S. 27 cannot be accepted. According to the counsel the provisions of Ss. 100 and 165 of the Cr.P.C. are applicable to discoveries consequent on information under S. 27 of the Evidence Act. We are not in a position to agree. 17. Section 100 of the Cr.P.C. appears in Chapter VII dealing with the processes to compel production of things. Section 100 deals with search or inspection on the basis of warrants. In all cases of search under the chapter it is necessary as provided in S. 100(4) that the officer or person making search shall call two or more independent and respectable inhabitants of the locality to attend the same. Only if such persons are not available other persons could be called. So also S. 100(5) provides that the search should be in their presence and a list etc. will have to be prepared. Section 165 deals with searches during investigation under emergency situations without obtaining warrant from Courts. The provisions of S. 100 relating to search are made applicable in cases of search coming under S. 165 also. There cannot be any dispute that the provisions of S. 100(4) and (5) are applicable to searches under the Code of Criminal Procedure. But we are not at that question. We are only at the question whether these formalities are essential for discoveries under S. 27 of the Evidence Act. The counsel contended that Ss. 100 and 165 of the Cr.P.C. provide for general principles to be followed in the process of search and seizure and since discovery under S. 27 of the Evidence Act is also seizure the above provisions are applicable in the absence of any separate provision. We do not find our way to agree with this argument. Section 27 of the Evidence Act does not contemplate any search or seizure. It refers only to information and the consequent discovery. We do not find our way to agree with this argument. Section 27 of the Evidence Act does not contemplate any search or seizure. It refers only to information and the consequent discovery. Emphasis is to the information in consequence of which the discovery, which lends assurance to the information, is made. What is admissible is only the information, the correctness of which is ensued by the discovery made in consequence of it. What is allowed to be proved is only the information. The fact discovered is relevant only in proof of the information. The position in relation to searches is entirely different. In such cases importance is to the articles or things seized. These two provisions are not analogous. Section 27 appears in different statute under different context. Unlike Ss. 100 and 165 no specific formality is provided for cases coming under S. 27 of the Evidence Act. What is required is only the satisfaction of the Court on the correctness of the information and its relation to the fact thereby discovered, to the extent relevant for the purpose of the case. Preparation of mahazar or presence or attestation of witnesses are only formalities on which the Court may or may not insist in given cases for its satisfaction depending upon the facts and circumstances. Unlike S. 100 or 165 of the Cr.P.C., there is not statutory provision insisting on preparation of mahazar or search list or attestation by witness so far as a discovery under S. 27 of the Evidence Act consequent on the information given by the accused is concerned. In such cases non-compliance of these formalities by themselves may not vitiate the discovery or the mahazar and make them unacceptable. If the Court feels that the uncorroborated testimony of the police officer by itself is capable of inspiring confidence, there is nothing forbidding the Court from doing so. Corroboration need be insisted on only where it is considered necessary. 18. In this case the evidence of PW 38 itself is acceptable in relation to the information and the discovery in consequence of it. But in addition to his evidence we are having the attestation of PWs. 7 and 8 and their supporting evidence in the box. It is true that PW. 7 is the brother of the deceased. PW. 8 is an independent witness. Simply because PW. 7 is the brother his evidence cannot be discarded. But in addition to his evidence we are having the attestation of PWs. 7 and 8 and their supporting evidence in the box. It is true that PW. 7 is the brother of the deceased. PW. 8 is an independent witness. Simply because PW. 7 is the brother his evidence cannot be discarded. Ideas and concepts of respectability have undergone radical changes. Now respectability cannot be measured in terms of wealth, education, power or such other facts taken by themselves. Every citizen will have to be considered respectable unless shown otherwise or unless he makes out otherwise. Simply because PW. 8 does not belong to the locality where the discovery was made his evidence cannot be discarded. The evidence of PWs. 7, 8 and 38 taken together unquestionably establishes that consequent on the information of the appellant M.O. 1 was discovered from a place in his house exclusively known to him. We have already stated that M.O. 1 was proved beyond doubt to have belonged to the deceased and worn by her on the date of incident itself. The unexplained possession of M.O. 1 by the appellant by itself and taken along with other evidence and circumstances detailed above leads only to the conclusion of his guilt. In order to make the circumstantial evidence complete and conclusive there need not be innumerable circumstances established in the case. Only thing is that the chain of circumstantial evidence must be complete in itself without any missing link and every link must only lead to the guilt and not in any way to the innocence. That test is satisfied in this case. The evidence conclusively establishes the guilt of the appellant for having committed the offence punishable under Ss. 302, 392 and 201 of the Indian Penal Code. In the result, the convictions as well as the sentences are confirmed and the criminal appeal is dismissed. Appeal dismissed.