JUDGMENT : Lalit Mohan Sharma, J. Whether section 5 of the Limitation Act applies to petitions under section 16(3) of the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) Act (hereinafter referred to as 'the Ceiling Act); and when does the period of limitation prescribed for such an application commence in a case where the sale deed is registered not in the office of the Sub-Registrar within whose sub-district the transferred property is situate but by the Registrar mentioned in section 30(2) of the Registration Act, 1908, are the main questions to be answered in this case. 2. The disputed land, 20 acres in area, belonged to the National Tobacoo Co. (respondent no. 2) and was transferred under a registered deed dated 15.1.74 in favour of the Alliance Agro Industries (P) Ltd. (respondent no. 1). The document was presented for registration before the Registrar, Calcutta, under section 30 (2) of the Registration Act, which reads thus. '"30 (2)-The Registrar of a district in which a presidency-town is included and the Registrar of the Delhi district may receive and register any document referred to in section 28 without regard to the situation in any part of India of the property to which the document relates" and was registered on 31.1.74. The petitioners are ralyats of adjoining land within the meaning of section 16 (3)(1) of the Ceiling Act. It is stated in the writ application that they heard about the transaction on 21.6.74, made an enquiry and obtained a certified copy of the sale deed on 27.6.74 at Calcutta. The deposit, as required by the proviso to section 16 (3) (1) of the Ceiling Act was then made on 2.7.74, and the application for pre-emption was filed the next day, that is on 3.7.74. The Land Reforms Deputy Collector before whom the application was filed dismissed the same on the ground of limitation by his ORDER :in Annexure 2. The petitioners appealed. The Additional Collector who heard the appeal remanded the matter for re-bearing by the Land Reforms Deputy Collector. The present respondent no. 1 challenged the ORDER :under section 32 of the Act before the Board of Revenue. The Member, Board of Revenue, by his ORDER :in Annexure 4 has set aside the appellate ORDER :. The petitioners have filed the present writ application for quashing the ORDER :s in Annexures 2 and 4. 3. Mr. The present respondent no. 1 challenged the ORDER :under section 32 of the Act before the Board of Revenue. The Member, Board of Revenue, by his ORDER :in Annexure 4 has set aside the appellate ORDER :. The petitioners have filed the present writ application for quashing the ORDER :s in Annexures 2 and 4. 3. Mr. Shreenath Singh, appearing on behalf of the petitioners, has criticised the ORDER :in Annexure 4 on several grounds. He contended, inter alia, that the Board was in serious error in holding on the one hand that the petitioners application before the Land Reforms Deputy Collector was barred by limitation and at the 'same' time characterising the application as pre-mature. I do not consider it useful to consider the reasonings given in Annexure 4. The result of this case is dependant on the two points mentioned earlier, on which the learned counsel for the parties have made elaborate arguments. 4. While dealing with the question of applicability of section 5 of the Limitation Act to the pre-emption applications, Mr. Singh emphasised the wider scope of the section under the present Limitation Act which came into force on 1.1.54. Under the earlier Act of 1908, section 5 was excluded from special and local laws by section 29 (2)(b). The said provision however has been omitted from the new Act and new section 29 (2) directs that- “The provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only in so, far as, and to the extent to which they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law.” The learned counsel contended that the word 'application' in the present Act includes 'petitions' under special Acts, as was pointed out in paragraph 21 of the JUDGMENT : in The Kerala Electricity Board v. T.P. Kunhaliumma A.I.R. 1977 S.C., 282, and since section 16 (3) of the Ceiling Act has not excluded section 5 of the Limitation Act, in express language, it must be held to be applicable. I do not think it permissible to hold that for the exclusion of section 5, a local Act must use an express provision in positive form to that effect. Reference may be made to the decision of the Supreme Court in Hukumdev Narain Yadav v. Lalit Narain Mishra, A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 480, where a similar argument was pressed and rejected. I do not think it permissible to hold that for the exclusion of section 5, a local Act must use an express provision in positive form to that effect. Reference may be made to the decision of the Supreme Court in Hukumdev Narain Yadav v. Lalit Narain Mishra, A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 480, where a similar argument was pressed and rejected. In para 17 of the JUDGMENT :, it was held that "if on an examination of the relevant provisions, it is clear that the provisions of the Limitation Act are necessarily excluded, then the benefits conferred therein cannot be called in aid to supplement the provisions of the Act" and "even in a case where the special law does not exclude the provisions of sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act by, an express reference, it would nonetheless be open to the court to examine whether and to what extent, the nature of those provisions of the nature or the nature of the subject-matter and the scheme of the special law exclude their operation." Similar was the position in the Commissioner of Uttar Pradesh Sales Tax v. M/s-Parson Tools and Plants, Kanpur : A.I.R 1975 S.C. 1039, where the Limitation Act was held to be excluded by necessary implication. The question, therefore, which arises is whether section 16(3) by necessary implication excludes section 5 of the Limitation Act. 5. Mr. Tarkeshwar Dayal, appearing on behalf of the respondents, argued that the Ceiling Act is a self-contained Code and wherever the legislature intended the period of limitation fixed by the Act to be capable of extension the power in that regard was vested in the authority concerned. He referred to the provisions in sections 6, 8, 10, 13 and 28; as also to the provision in section 30 in this regard, which has now been repealed; and, section 32 dealing with the revisional power of the Board of Revenue under sub-section (i) and its suo motu power under sub-section (iii). Reliance was placed on the decision in Inspecting Assistant Commissioner (Acquisition) v. Kedar Nath Jhunjhunwala : 1983 P.L.J.R. 237 to which I was a party. 6. Reliance was placed on the decision in Inspecting Assistant Commissioner (Acquisition) v. Kedar Nath Jhunjhunwala : 1983 P.L.J.R. 237 to which I was a party. 6. The scheme of the Act and the provisions, mentioned above, firmly suggest the exclusion of the/Limitation Act and in this regard I would further rely on the praviso in section 16 (3)(1), quoted below, which lends great support to this conclusion: "Provided that no such application shall be entertained by the Collector unless the purchase money together with a sum equal to ten percent thereof is deposited in the prescribed manner within the said period." The "said period" refers to "three months" of the date of registration of the document of transfer mentioned in sub-section 3 (i). The provision is mandatory and emphatic by depriving the Collector of the jurisdiction to entertain the -application if the deposit is not made within the prescribed period. It completely negatives the extensibility. The Act came into force in 1962 before the new Limitation Act. In view of section 29 (2)(b) of the old Act, it cannot be suggested that the period mentioned in sub-section 3 (i) was capable of being extended before 1964. After the repeal of the old Limitation Act by the new one, the Ceiling Act has been amended on several occasions and charges were made even in respect to the period of limitation and the power to extend the same with reference to several sections other than section 16 (3)(i). 7. The object of the Ceiling Act is to fix a ceiling area on land permissible for a person to hold, but the Act, besides directly dealing with the acquisition of surplus land, also provides for several connected matters. Chapter III provides for resumption of land by a raiyat from under raiyat in certain conditions, Chapter VII with acquisition and status of occupancy raiyat by under raiyat; and Chapter V and Chapter VI with certain restrictions on future acquisition and subletting. By the very nature of Chapter II, it was considered essential to provide for extension of the period in several sections, but not in section 16 (3). So far section 30 is concerned, it was treated differently at different times. Originally, the section prescribed 60 days for filing an application subject to further extension on proof of sufficient cause for the delay. So far section 30 is concerned, it was treated differently at different times. Originally, the section prescribed 60 days for filing an application subject to further extension on proof of sufficient cause for the delay. In 1976, the period was reduced to 30 days and later the provision regarding the condonation of delay was omitted altogether. The Board of Revenue was vested with wide powers under section 32 for rectifying any error committed by the subordinate officers and the exercise of this authority was not subjected to any period of limitation. Subsequently, by amendment while retaining this power to act suo motu a right to file an application for revision within 30 days was conferred on the aggrieved party. Presumably, in view of the retention of the original provisions in sub-section (3) it was considered expedient not to permit the period in sub-section (1) to be extended. If the legislature had intended at any stage to permit the period mentioned in section 16 (3) (i) to be capable of extension, it was expected, specially in view of the proviso quoted above, to so indicate in the section while amending the other sections of the Act. A reference was made at the bar to the observation in paragraph 12 of the JUDGMENT : in Mahanth Daya Ram v. The State 1975 B.B.C.J. 667 that the delay in filing a claim under section 15 (3) could be condoned under section 5 of the Limitation Act. An examination of the JUDGMENT : would show that the Court was not called upon to decide the point. Besides, in the present case, I am not concerned with section 15. So far as section 16 (3) (i) is concerned, my conclusion is that it does not attract section 5 of the Limitation Act and the petitioner's application for condonation of delay was not maintainable. 8. Mr. Singh next argued that the period of three months provided in section 16 (3) (i) of the Act must be held to run from the date of knowledge; of the applicant. He relied on the decision in Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh v. Deputy Land Acquisition Officer; A.I.R. 1961 Supreme Court, 1500 and Assistant Transport Commissioner v. Nand Singh : A.I.R. 1980 Supreme Court 15. He relied on the decision in Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh v. Deputy Land Acquisition Officer; A.I.R. 1961 Supreme Court, 1500 and Assistant Transport Commissioner v. Nand Singh : A.I.R. 1980 Supreme Court 15. The learned counsel strenuously contended that if otherwise, the right of a pre-empter can be easily defeated by the vendor and the vendes joining hands and secretly executing the document in one of the four cities mentioned in section 32 of the Registration Act, as has been done in the present case. Referring to sections 66 and 67 of the said Act, he said that a copy of the sale deed has not been received by Dalsingsarai Sub-Registry and the period of limitation ought to be computed from the date on which it is so received. He also suggested that even if it be assumed that the application, for that reason, has to be treated as pre-mature as has been observed by the impugned ORDER :, the petitioner must be held entitled to file a fresh pre-emption application after copy of the deed is received at Dalsingsarai but, in no circumstances, his right in this regard can be negatived. Mr. Dayal, in his reply, Slated that it is not correct to suggest that the petitioner in the present case had no knowledge of the registration of the sale deed in time; He further argued that the law relating to limitation has to be strictly followed and that a plea of hardship cannot prevail against the true construction of the statute, Reliance was placed on the decision in Sheopujan Mishra v. Mango Rai : A.I.R. 1925 Allahabad, 325 in which the suit for pre-emption was filed within the period of limitation counted from the date on which an entry was made at Ballia where the homestead property was situated but after the period if counted from the date of actual registration which took place at Gazipur. White interpreting Article 10 of the Limitation Act applicable to such suits, the Court negatived a similar plea of the plaintiff by observing that the period began to run from the date of actual registration at Gazipur, as "that undoubtedly was the date on which the sale was registered" although "the case may be one of great hardship to the plaintiffs appellant". He also referred to a similar decision of the Punjab High Court in Bal Chander Mani v. Bhagirath : A.I.R. 1961 Punjab, 296 (over-ruled on another point by A.I.R. 1981) Punjab, 340 Sardar Singh v. Dilip Kaur and others. 9. The language of the relevant provision in section 16 (3) (i) is unambiguous and I do not think it is permissible to import the words which are not there. It has to be remembered that the right of pre-emption is a week right and the one which the petitioner is attempting to enforce has been created by the Statute. If the Legislature while conferring such a right has subjected it with certain limitations, the beneficiary must accept it in that form. The provision has to be distinguished from one curtailing an existing right. Examined in this light, the stand of Mr. Dayal appears to be well founded. The observations of the Supreme Court in Nalinakhya Bysack v. Shyam Sunder Halder : A.I.R. 1953 Supreme Court, 148 to the following effect meet the petitioner's plea :- “The Court must proceed on the footing that the Legislature intended what it has said. Even if there is some defect in the phraseology used by the Legislature, the Court cannot, as painted out in Crawford v. Spooner, 6 Moo, P.C. 1 (H), aid the Legislatures defective phrasing of an Act or add and amend or, by construction, make up deficiencies which are left in the Act. Even where there is casus omissue, it is, as said by Lord Russel of Killowen in Hansraj Gupta v. Dehra Dun Mussoorie Electric Tramway Co. Ltd. A.I.R. 1933 P.C. 63 (1) for others that the Court to remedy the defect.” 10. The decisions relied on by Mr. Singh are distinguishable and do not apply to this case. In Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh v. Deputy Land Acquisition Officer (supra), the question arose in regard to the date on which an award under section 18 (2) of the Land Acquisition Act is said to be made. The decisions relied on by Mr. Singh are distinguishable and do not apply to this case. In Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh v. Deputy Land Acquisition Officer (supra), the question arose in regard to the date on which an award under section 18 (2) of the Land Acquisition Act is said to be made. The Court held that the period of limitation would run from the date of communication of the award to the party concerned on the ground that "the award made by the Collector is in law no more than an offer made on behalf of the Government to the owner of the property "and therefore" the making of the award as properly understood must involve the communication of the offer to the party concerned." In Assistant Transport Commissioner v. Nand Singh A.I.R. 1930 S.C. 15, the High Court held that the starting point of limitation for filing an appeal under section 15 of the U.P. Motor Vehicles Taxation Act was the date of the communication of the ORDER :. This view was affirmed by the Supreme Court for the reasons given in Harish Chandra's case referred to above. An additional reason was also mentioned in the following words: “It is plain that mere writing an ORDER :in the file kept in the office of the Taxation Officer is no ORDER :in the eye of law in the sense of effecting the rights of the parties for whom the ORDER :is meant.” The principle applicable to cases where a party has a right to challenge an adverse ORDER :is distinctly on a different footing than the one in the present case created by Statute subject to certain limitations. The deed becomes operative immediately on its registration and the petitioner or for that matter any adjoining raiyat is not entitled to an individual notice of the registration. 11. For the reasons mentioned above, I hold that there is no merit in either of the two points urged on behalf of the petitioners. 12. Mr. Dayal raised another point, namely, that the authority empowered to deal with the pre-emption application under the Act is not a 'Court'. In view of my finding above, I do not consider it necessary to decide the point in the present case. 13. In the result, the writ application is dismissed but without costs.