Judgment DESHPANDE M.S., J.: - In Writ Petition No. 1670 of 1985, the rule is restricted to the prayer for a direction to respondent No. 1 to enact a uniform Rent Control legislation throughout the State of Maharashtra and striking down the Notification, dated October 24, 1968, whereby a house used for non-residential purposes constructed on a site lying vacant on the 1st day of January, 1967, or on a site made vacant after the date by demolition of any structure standing thereon, is exempted from the provisions of the C.P. Berar Letting of Houses and Rent Control Order, 1949; and non-residential premises constructed before the 1st day of January, 1967, have been exempted from the provisions of Chapter III of the said Order. 2. In Writ Petition No. 1695 of 1985, the petitioner seeks a writ striking down the provisions of Chapter III of the C.P. Berar Letting of Houses and Rent Control Order 1949, framed under the C.P. Berar Regulations of Letting of Accommodation Act, 1946, as unconstitutional. 3. In Writ Petition No. 1670 of 1985, petitioner No. 1 is a Society registered under the Societies Registration Act which has been formed with the object of safeguarding the interests of tenants of the Vidarbha Region and bringing about a unified Rent Control Act in place of the out-dated C.P. Berar Letting of Houses and Rent Control Order, 1949 (for short, “the Rent Control Order, 1949”), framed under the C.P. Berar Regulation of Letting of Accommodation Act, 1946 (for short, “the Act of 1946”). Petitioner No. 2, who occupies a shop premises on lease at Akola, is a member of the aforesaid society. Respondent No. 2 filed Regular Civil Suit No. 483 of 1984 in the Court of the 3rd Joint Civil Judge (Junior Division), Akola, without obtaining the permission of the House Rent Controller, on the strength of the Notification, dated October 24, 1968, (NDS) M.G.G., Sr.No. 19, Dept. No. BRA-2067-27097-E, issued by the Urban Development, Public Health and Housing Department, in exercise of the powers conferred under Clause 30 of the Rent Control Order, 1949, which is to the following effect:- “Non-residential houses. No. BRA-2067-27097-E, issued by the Urban Development, Public Health and Housing Department, in exercise of the powers conferred under Clause 30 of the Rent Control Order, 1949, which is to the following effect:- “Non-residential houses. - In exercise of the powers conferred by Clause 30, the Government of Maharashtra hereby exempts - (a) from all provisions of the said Order, any house used for non-residential purposes, if it is constructed on a site lying vacant on the 1st day of January, 1967, or on a site made vacant after that date by demolition of any structure standing thereon; (b) from the provisions of Chapter III of the said Order, any house used for non-residential purposes, if it is constructed before the 1st day of January, 1967.” The petitioner had applied to the 3rd Joint Civil Judge (Junior Division), Akola, for making a reference to this Court under section 113, read with Order 46, Rule 1, Civil Procedure Code, but that application having been rejected, the petitioners approached this Court questioning the Notification as being in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 4. The challenge is based on the ratio of the decision in (Motor General Traders v. State of Andhra Pradesh)1, A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 121 and a Division Bench decision of this Court in (Prabhakar Tanbaji Rokde v. State of Maharashtra)2, 1985 Mh.L.J. 548, holding that Notification No. 659-66 II dated 6th February, 1952 issued by the State Government under Clause 30 of the Rent Control Order, 1949, exempting from the operation of all the provisions of the said order any house used for residential purposes, if the house is constructed on a site lying vacant on 1st January, 1951 or on a site made vacant on or after that day by demolition of any structure standing on such site, is null and void being unconstitutional as violating Article 14 of the Constitution. It is urged that the exemption, which was thought necessary for giving a spurt to the construction activity initially by granting the exemption, has become discriminatory by lapse of time. It is urged that the exemption, which was thought necessary for giving a spurt to the construction activity initially by granting the exemption, has become discriminatory by lapse of time. The challenge is also to the continuance of the Act of 1946 and the Rent Control Order, 1949, on the ground that what was not discriminatory at the formation of the bilingual State of Bombay on November 15, 1956, in view of section 119 of the States Reorganisation Act which continued the provisions of the different Acts prevailing prior to the reorganisation of States, with the dual purpose of facilitating early formation of homogenous units and maintaining political identity and distinctive character of the region till uniformity is achieved, by passage of time, has rendered the continuance meaningless. The contention is that the State can no longer continue the three Acts, viz. the Bombay Rents, Hotels and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 19477 (for short, “the Bombay Act”); the Hyderabad Houses (Rent, Eviction and Lease) Control Act, 1954 (for short, “the Hyderabad Act”); and the Rent Order, 1949, framed under the Act of 1946; which prevail in the different regions which now form the State of Maharashtra as there is no justification for giving a differential treatment to the Vidarbha Region of the State of Maharashtra by continuing outdated provisions of the Rent Control Order, which was enacted as far back as in 1949 in the erstwhile State of Madhya Pradesh, and continued without any amendment after the lapse of nearly 30 years, while the Bombay Act by virtue of amendments made to it kept pace with the times. 5. In Writ Petition No. 1695 of 1985, it is contended that Chapter III of the Rent Control Order, 1949, relating to collection of information and letting of accommodation, which enables the Collector to collect information regarding vacant premises and to allot those premises to any person belonging to one of the four categories mentioned therein, confers an unguided and arbitrary power on the Collector exercisable without leaving a choice to the landlord in selecting a tenant or making a representation against foisting a tenant on him by the Collector. With regard to the four categories to which the allotment of the premises can be made, viz.: 1) Any person holding an office of profit under the Union or State Government; or 2) any person holding a post under the Madhya Pradesh Electricity Board; or 3) or displaced person; or 4) an evicted person, it is urged that they were initially selected arbitrarily and by passage of time, the classification, which was irrational at the initial stages, has been rendered entirely meaningless and discriminatory. 6. We have so far stated only the broad contours of the challenges raised and we will refer to the details thereof while assessing the merits of the contentions raised. 7. Respondent No. 1 - State of Maharashtra, in their return in Writ Petition No. 1670 of 1985, contended that the provisions in the different Acts are rational and not discriminatory. Merely because the provisions of the three Acts, whose schemes are different, are also different, it is not permissible for the petitioners to pick and choose some particular provisions which are not beneficial to them, disregarding the more beneficial ones for urging that those provisions are discriminatory. With regard to the Notification exempting non-residential premises, it was urged that the considerations in respect of residential and non-residential premises are entirely different. Though the Collector under the Rent Control Order, 1949 has power to allot the residential premises under Chapter-III of the Order on a priority basis to various categories, viz. displaced persons, employees of the Central and State Governments, employees of the Madhya Pradesh Electricity Board and evictees, thee was no occasion to allot the non-residential premises to any categories other than the displaced persons. While taking into consideration the subject of allotment of non-residential premises in the year 1968, it was realised that the only possible beneficiaries of allotment of non-residential premises could be displaced persons. By the year 1968, after 20 years had elapsed after the partition of the country, those persons had been rehabilitated and a new generation, which was not entitled to such a benefit, had come into existence. By the year 1968, after 20 years had elapsed after the partition of the country, those persons had been rehabilitated and a new generation, which was not entitled to such a benefit, had come into existence. This was the reason for issuing the notification exempting from the operation of the provisions of Chapter III of the Rent Control Order, 1949, the non-residential houses constructed prior to 1st January, 1967, but the provisions of Chapter II continued to apply to such houses in order to afford protection to the displaced persons who were allotted the non-residential premises. It was urged that the tenants of residential and non-residential premises stand on altogether different footing, because the tenants of residential premises constituted a large community of various categories, including the weaker section of the society, whereas the tenants of the non-residential premises belong to business community carrying on the avocation of trade and commerce; and non-residential accommodation constitutes an integral part of their business establishment. It was not, therefore, necessary to continue the operation of the provisions of the Rent Control order, 1949, in respect of the on-residential house constructed after 1st January, 1967. In view of the vast opportunity created by the Government, initiative through development plans, the construction of non-residential premises has expanded to an unprecedented extent, with the result there is no shortage of non-residential accommodation. 8. In respect of the challenge raised to Chapter-III of the Rent Control Order, 1949, in Writ Petition No. 1695 of 1985, the State Government justified its application by virtue of section 119 of the States Reorganisation Act and the observations of the Supreme Court in (Shri Swamiji of Shri Admar Mutt v. The Commissioner, Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Department)3, A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 1. It was submitted that the provisions of the Rent Control Order, 1949 gave more protection to the tenants than the laws which are in force in the Old Bombay State, and there was no discrimination in the matter whatsoever. 9. We will first take up the challenge raised to the continuation of the three Acts in the State of Maharashtra, since the formation of the bilingual State of Bombay, on November 15, 1956. The pleadings in Writ Petition No,. 1670 of 1985 do not go beyond pointing out the difference in the different provisions obtaining in the Bombay Act and the Rent Control Order, 1949. The pleadings in Writ Petition No,. 1670 of 1985 do not go beyond pointing out the difference in the different provisions obtaining in the Bombay Act and the Rent Control Order, 1949. There is no pleading that the operation of these three Acts are different parts of the State otherwise are so discriminatory as to be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. We were taken through the different provisions of the Rent Control Order, 1949, and the Bombay Act. The submission was that the Rent Control Order, 1949, has not kept pace with changing times, while the Bombay Act was amended on twenty-one occasions from time to time and further amendments were under consideration. This submission, by itself, without reference to the substantive provisions which needed amendment, cannot be of any assistance to the petitioners. The amendments were occasioned on account of the distinctive features of the two enactments and their operation in different areas where not identical. The process resulting in the amendments is far too complex to found an argument of discrimination only on the basis of plurality of the occasions on which the amendments were brought about in the Bombay Act. The contention, that the Rent Control Order, 1949 is limited to only 30 Clauses while the Bombay Act is more exhaustive and detailed one, is only to be stated to be rejected, because it would not be the number of clauses or sections in a particular enactment, which would make it discriminatory. The material difference in the two enactments, in our view, lies firstly in the non-application of the Rent Control Order, 1949, to open sites, while the Bombay Act, by virtue of section 5(viii), brings within its sweep not only buildings but any land not being used for agricultural purposes, and secondly, the duplication of the proceedings which the rent control litigations in Vidarbha have to undergo, the landlord or the tenant being first required to approach the House Rent Controller and then in the event of the landlord seeking possession of the demised premises, to approach the Civil Court for appropriate relief, after obtaining permission of the Rent Controller to give a notice determining the lease. These provisions, though different, cannot obviously be regarded as discriminatory. These provisions, though different, cannot obviously be regarded as discriminatory. It has to be remembered that the reasons for the different provisions are historical, in that, they were enacted by two different legislatures legislating for two different geographical units before they came to be amalgamated under the States Reorganisation Act. May be, in view of the area to which the Rent Control Order, 1949 was to be applied was less populous and there was no pressure on the availability of open sites, it was not thought necessary to extend protection to the lessees of open plots while on account of greater urbanisation in the area covered by the Bombay Act, protection was thought advisable even in respect of open plots which are not used for agricultural purposes. It is impossible to say that these provisions are discriminatory, unless there is proper investigation into how they affect tenants and landlords who reside in the areas where they operate. 10. Though in Vidarbha Region, the area to which the Rent Control Order, 1949 applies, there is certain duplication of proceedings, as a person is required to approach the Rent Controller, before he can file a suit in the Civil Court for appropriate relief, the difference in the procedure by itself would not signify anything, unless by proper pleadings and evidence it be pointed out that the existence of the two sets of authorities in Vidarbha Region results in a hardship such as to render their existence discriminatory. Reference was made by Shri Lohiya, the learned Counsel for the petitioner in Writ Petition No. 1670 of 1985, in order to show unequal treatment under the Bombay Act and the Rent Control Order, 1949, to several factors, viz. the different considerations upon which the standard rents have to be fixed in the Bombay and the Vidarbha areas, the prohibition regarding creation of sub-tenancies, the provisions, bearing upon the landlord's right to permitted increases, the consequences of habitual defaults, the absence of provision in the Rent Control Order, 1949, for ascertaining the comparative hardship to the tenants in the event of a decree for possession, the provisions regarding repairs, the absence of provision legalising long standing unauthorised sub-tenancies in Vidarbha Region; the provision for ensuring continuation of essential services and the conferral of authority on the Rent Controller to decide complex matters, though he happens only to be a Revenue Officer. 11. 11. We have examined carefully each of these factors and we find that though there may be some differences in the manner in which the different provisions have been arranged in the Bombay Act and the Rent Control Order, 1949, the schemes of the two laws being different, in substance there are not more than marginal differences in the provisions of the two legislations on the points which have been attempted to be made out by Shri Lohiya. In the Rent Control Order, 1949, provisions existed in the shape of Clauses 6, 7 and 7-A for substantially freezing the rents at the level they existed in April, 1940, which are to be found in the definition of “standard rent” in Clause 10 of section 5 of the Bombay Act read with sections 10, 10-A and 10-AA. The grievance was that whatever protection the tenant had under Clauses 6, 7 and 7-A of the Rent Control Order, 1949, has been taken away by a Division Bench decisions of this Court in (Omprakash Mulchand Khatri v. Fattelal Maganlal and Company)4, 1986(3) Bom.C.R. 33 : 1986 Mh.L.J. 414. There it was observed that there was nothing basically wrong in initial fixing of a particular outer limit with relation to the 1st of April, 1940 as the cut off date, in the provisions of Clauses 6 and 7 of the Rent Control Order, 1949. However, the indefinite continuation of the formula without any justification despite wholly changed circumstances during a long span of time of which judicial notice can be taken gives a blow to the validity as regards the cut off date 1st April, 1940, and as a result, the provisions of Clauses 6, 7 and 7-A being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution are struck down being unconstitutional. If these were the reasons why the rents should not be freezed to their 1940 level, it is difficult to say how a grievance can be made because of similar provisions remaining in the Bombay Act. 12. With regard to the sub-tenancies, no sub-tenancies without the consent of the landlord can be created in either of the two areas. An amendment incorporating section 15-A was made in the Bombay Act enabling certain licensees in occupation on January 1, 1963 to become tenants while no such concession has been extended to the licencees in Vidarbha Region. 12. With regard to the sub-tenancies, no sub-tenancies without the consent of the landlord can be created in either of the two areas. An amendment incorporating section 15-A was made in the Bombay Act enabling certain licensees in occupation on January 1, 1963 to become tenants while no such concession has been extended to the licencees in Vidarbha Region. Judicial notice, however, can be taken of the fact that there has been greater urbanisation and pressure of population in the industrialised cities of old Bombay Area, and the Legislature was entitled to take into consideration the conditions obtaining in that region for providing relief to a certain category of persons. We cannot regard these provisions of the different enactments operating in different areas as discriminatory in the absence of better material. 13. The consequences of habitual defaults under both the enactments appear to be more or less the same, and the provisions in the Rent Control Order, 1949, are sufficient to take care of the extravagant claim which the landlords may make for obtaining possession of the premises which have been let out. The scope of those provisions has, now been well denied by the decisions rendered by this Court. This is so also with regard to the provisions regarding essential repairs and alteration and the remedies in the event of an interruption in the essential services. 14. Reference was made in the course of the arguments to the observations of the Supreme Court in (Bhayyalal Shukla v. State of Madhya Pradesh)5, 1962 (Supp.) S.C.R. 257; (Anand Prasad v. State of Andhra Pradesh)6, 1963 (Supp.) S.C.R. 844; (State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bhopal Sugar Industries Ltd.)7, A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 1179 and (Vishwasha Thirtha Swamiar v. State of Mysore)8, 1972(1) S.C.R. 137 . On a consideration of these decisions, in the context of the validity of section 76(1) of the Madras Act of 1951 in its application to the South Kanara District of the State of Mysore, now the State of Karnataka, in Shri Swamiji of Shri Admar Mutt v. The Commissioner, Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Department, A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 1, their Lordships observed as follows: “These decisions are authority for the validity of section 76(1) of the Madras Act of 1951 in its application to the South Kanara District of State of Mysore, now the State of Karnataka. This Court has said time and again that dissimilar treatment does not necessarily offend against the guarantee of equality contained in Article 14 of the Constitution. The rider is that there has to be a valid basis for classification and the classification must bear nexus with the object of the impugned provision. In matters arising out of reorganisation of States, continued application of laws of a State to territories, which were within that State but which have become a part of another State, is not discriminatory since the classification rests on geographical consideration founded on historical reasons.” 15. On behalf of the petitioners, reference was made to the observations in Shri Admar Mutt's case (cited supra). There, their Lordships observed, after holding that the continued application of the Madras Act of 1951, which was just five or six years after the passing of the State Reorganisation Act, was not shown by adequate data as being violative of Article 14, as follows:- “But that is how the matter stands today. Twenty-three years have gone by since the States Reorganisation Act was passed but unhappily, no serious effort has been made by the State Legislature to introduce any legislation - apart from two abortive attempts in 1963 and 1977 - to remove the inequality between the temples and Mutts situated in the South Kanara District and those situated in other areas of Karnataka. Inequality is so clearly writ large on the face of the impugned stature in its application to the District of South Kanara only, that it is perilously near the periphery of unconstitutionality. We have restrained ourselves for declaring the law as inapplicable to the District of South Kanara from today but we would like to make it clear that if the Karnataka Legislature does not act promptly and remove the inequality arising out of the application of the Madras Act of 1951 to the district of South Kanara only, the Act will have to suffer a serious and successful challenge in the not distant future. We do hope that the Government of Karnataka will act promptly and move an appropriate legislation, say, within a year or so. A comprehensive legislation which will apply to all temples and Mutts in Karnataka, which are equally situated in the context of the levy of fee, may perhaps afford a satisfactory solution to the problem. We do hope that the Government of Karnataka will act promptly and move an appropriate legislation, say, within a year or so. A comprehensive legislation which will apply to all temples and Mutts in Karnataka, which are equally situated in the context of the levy of fee, may perhaps afford a satisfactory solution to the problem. This, however, is a tentative view-point because we have not investigated whether the Madras Act of 1951, particularly section 76(1) thereof, is a piece of hostile legislation of the kind that would involve the violation of Article 14. Facts in regard thereto may have to be explored, if and when occasion arises.” 16. We have already pointed out that we have before us no material to show that the continued operation of the three different enactments operates in a discriminatory manner in the different areas to which they apply, and their continuation has resulted in a situation so grave as to invite a finding of this Court that the continuance of the Rent Control Order, 1949, must be prevented. The following observations of the Supreme Court in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bhopal Sugar Industries Ltd., A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 1179, are instructive:- “It would be impossible to lay down any definite time-limit within which the State had to make necessary adjustments so as to effectuate the equality clause of the Constitution. That initially there was a valid geographical classification of regions in the same State justifying unequal laws when the State was formed must be accepted. But whether the continuance of unequal laws by itself sustained the plea of unlawful discrimination in view of changed circumstances could only be ascertained after a full and thorough enquiry into the continuance of the grounds on which the inequality could rationally be founded, and the change of circumstances, if any, which obliterated the compulsion of expediency and necessity existing at the time when the Reorganisation Act was enacted.” In the Bhopal Sugar Industries' case (supra), it was further pointed out that mere existence of agricultural income impost in one region, and absence of such impost in another region may not necessarily justify an inference of unlawful discrimination. It would follow, therefore, that the mere plea of different treatment is itself not sufficient to justify the plea of infringement of Article 14 of Constitution. 17. It would follow, therefore, that the mere plea of different treatment is itself not sufficient to justify the plea of infringement of Article 14 of Constitution. 17. Shri Lohiya then referred to the case of Motor General Traders v. State of Andhra Pradesh, A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 121, but there the Supreme Court, while referring to the previous cases, clearly pointed out in para 22 as follows:- “In all these cases while it is true that no provision was actually struck down, there is a firm foundation laid in support of the proposition that what was once a non-discriminatory piece of legislation may in course of time become discriminatory and be exposed to a successful challenge on the ground that it violated Article 14 of the Constitution. This is a sufficient answer to the contention that if at the time when the Act (A.P. Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act (15 of 1960) was enacted, section 32(b) of the Act was not unconstitutional, it cannot at any time thereafter be challenged on the ground of unconstitutionality.” While distinguishing the earlier cases, their Lordships pointed out that the Legislature had to consider which of the different laws should be selected for enforcement in the entire State either with or without modifications. This certainly needed enquiry and investigation because of the diversities prevailing in each reorganised State. On enquiry probably the Legislature might have preferred to apply the very legislation impugned before the Court for the entire State. In these circumstances, it was felt that it was not possible to decide whether a particular law which was challenged before them was discriminatory or not in the absence of necessary pleadings and relevant material. With regard to the case of Motor General Traders, their Lordships pointed out that the question was not one of selecting any particular local law for extension to the other parts of a State, and that was a case where the Legislature while passing the law, had given the exemption apparently as an incentive to encourage building activity, and the Counsel were not able to show how the continuance of the exemption in the case of persons who have built houses more than two decade ago will act as an incentive to builders of new houses now. If that is really so, them there is no justification to continue to have the restrictions imposed by the act on buildings built prior to August 26, 1957 also and the whole Act should have to be repealed. In the said Motor General Traders' case, it was found that no investigation as contemplated in the earlier decisions of the Supreme Court was necessary, and the long period that had elapsed after the passing of the Act itself served as a crucial factor in deciding the question whether the impugned law had become discriminatory or not because the ground on which the classification of buildings into two categories was made was not a historical or geographical one but was an economic one. Exemption was granted by way of an incentive to encourage building activity and in the circumstances such exemption could not be allowed to last for ever. This being the position of law as laid down by the Supreme Court in a series of decisions and as finally explained in the Motor General Traders' case, merely by reference to the different provisions of the three enactments prevailing in the different parts of this State, in the absence of proper pleading and relevant material before this Court, it is impossible to hold that the Rent Control Order, 1949, merely because of the existence of the two other enactments, is discriminatory, and the challenge on this count in Writ Petition No. 1670 of 1985 cannot be sustained. 18. We have referred to the position that the rule was restricted in this case to prayer Clause (c) by which a direction was sought against the State to enact a unified law in the matter of Rent Control Legislation throughout the State of Maharashtra with retrospective effect, and validity of the notification, dated October 24, 1968. The contention was that the rule could not have been so restricted. We need not examine this point in greater detail, in view of our finding that the continuance of the Rent Control order, 1949, is not violative of Article 14 of the Constitution, which would disentitle the petitioners from seeking relief as per prayer Clause (a). By prayer Clause (b) the petitioner sought a direction to the State to extend the existing Bombay Act No. LVII of 1947 to the region of Vidarbha immediately with retrospective effect. By prayer Clause (b) the petitioner sought a direction to the State to extend the existing Bombay Act No. LVII of 1947 to the region of Vidarbha immediately with retrospective effect. No such direction can, however, be given, because it would amount to issuing a writ to the Legislature to enact a certain law. Nor can the direction as sought by prayer Clause (c), to enact a uniform law, can be given. At one stage, Shri Lohiya urged that if no writ could be issued to the Legislature, then this Court may strike down the Rent Control Order, 1949 and the other two enactments and, thus, bring pressure on the State to enact such a legislation. We see no merit in this argument. It is not the function of this Court to bring pressure on the State for adopting a particular course. All that this Court has to consider is whether the Act is discriminatory and violative of certain provisions of the Constitution and requires being struck down. Even if we were to take a different view regarding the applicability of Article 14 of the Constitution to the Rent Control Order, 1949, we would have refrained from striking down its provisions, because that would have left the tenants without any protection, the protection which in a rich measure is available to them under the Rent Control Order, 1949. 19. In fairness, Shri Jaiswal, the learned Assistant Government Pleader, told us that the State Government has been seriously considering the question of rationalisation and unification of the rent laws in the State. In fact, this Court took note in (Prabhakar Rokde v. State of Maharashtra)2, 1985 Mh.L.J. 548 that the two expert reports of the bodies constituted by the State itself, were under consideration. The Rent Acts Enquiry Committee popularly known as “Tambe Committee” was appointed by the Government of Maharashtra in the year 1975 (Urban Development, Public Health and Housing Department by Resolution No. BRA 2174/9011/75 E, dated 20th February, 1975 as amended by Resolution No. BRA 2174/9011-D-57, dated 6th August, 1975) and the Committee after deliberations and review of various legislations prevailing in the State had made a report in 1977 recommending certain measures and having a uniform legislation in the whole State. Maharahstra State Law Commission also gave its Twelfth Report on the unification and consolidation of the Rent restriction laws in the State as far back in July 1970 observing; “The Commission does not see any difficulty in the way of unification and consolidation of the rent restriction laws in the State.” A draft Bill also formed part of the said report. Shri Jaiswal stated that the State Government proposes to introduce a bill to amend Bombay Rent Act in the ensuing Nagpur Session of the State Legislature and it seriously considering the question of having a unified legislation. Presumably the Legislature understands and correctly appreciates the needs of its own people, its laws are directed to problems made manifest by experience and its discrimination are based on adequate grounds, as pointed out in (Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Justice S.R. Tendolkar)9, A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 538. It is best to leave the matter there, in view of the statement made on behalf of the State before us, in the hope that the legislature would see its way to do what is appropriate. 20. That brings us to the question of validity of the provisions of Chapter-III of the Central Provinces and Berar Letting of Houses and Rent Control Order, 1949. The following Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Central Provinces and Berar Regulation of Letting of Accommodation Bill, 1946 (Bill No. 7 of 1946) prepared on 15th August, 1946 and which emerged as the Act speaks for itself: “The influx of a large population to towns as a result of war conditions necessitated the promulgation of the Central Provinces and Berar House Rent Control Order, 1942, under the Defence of India Rules, will lapse at the end of September 1946. The abnormal conditions created by the war still persist and are not likely to subside for some time. Rent Control measures will therefore continue to be necessary and Government proposes to take powers for regulating house rents in urban areas by new legislation. It is proposed to keep the law in operation for a limited period of three years. If normal conditions return earlier, steps will be taken to repeal it.” Section 2 of the C.P. Berar Regulation of Letting of Accommodation Act, 1946 (Act No. XI of 1946) is as follows: “2. Regulation of Letting and sub-letting etc. It is proposed to keep the law in operation for a limited period of three years. If normal conditions return earlier, steps will be taken to repeal it.” Section 2 of the C.P. Berar Regulation of Letting of Accommodation Act, 1946 (Act No. XI of 1946) is as follows: “2. Regulation of Letting and sub-letting etc. - The Provincial Government may, by general or special order which shall extend to such areas as the Provincial Government may, by notification, direct, provide for regulating the letting and sub-letting of any accommodation or class of accommodation, whether furnished or unfurnished, and whether with or without board, and in particular - (a) for controlling the rents fort such accommodation either generally or when let to specified persons or class of persons or in specified circumstances; (b) for preventing the eviction of tenant or sub-tenants from such accommodation in specified circumstances; (c) for requiring such accommodation to be let either generally, or to specified persons or classes of persons, or in specified circumstances, and (d) for collecting any information or statistics with a view to regulating any of the aforesaid matter.” Pursuant to the provisions of the Act, the C.P. and Berar Letting of Houses and Rent Control Order, 1949 was issue on July 1946. Chapter-I thereof contains the definition clauses; Chapter-II relates to fixation of rents and other terms; Chapter-III contains provisions about collection of information and letting of accommodation; and Chapter-IV contains supplementary provisions. 21. Chapter-III, which is material, contains Clauses 22 to 27. Under Clause 22, the landlord has to intimate the vacancy of a house which is vacant, within seven days to the Collector of the District, in the prescribed form and is prevented from letting out or occupying the house, except in accordance with Clause 23. Under sub-clause (2) of Clause 22, no person shall occupy any house in respect of which this Chapter (Chapter-III) applies except under an order under sub-clause (1) of Clause 23 or Clause 24 or on an assurance from the landlord that the house is being permitted to be occupied in accordance with sub-clause (2) of Clause 23. Under sub-clause (2) of Clause 22, no person shall occupy any house in respect of which this Chapter (Chapter-III) applies except under an order under sub-clause (1) of Clause 23 or Clause 24 or on an assurance from the landlord that the house is being permitted to be occupied in accordance with sub-clause (2) of Clause 23. “Clause 23 runs as follows:- “23.(1) On receipt of the intimation in accordance with Clause 22, the Collector may, within fifteen days from the receipt of the said intimation, order the landlord to let us vacant house to any person holding an office of profit under the (a) Union or State Government or to any person holding a post under the Madhya Pradesh electricity Board, or to a displaced person, or to an evicted person and thereupon notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary, the landlord shall let the house to such person and place him in possession thereof immediately, if it is vacant or as soon as it becomes vacant: Provided that if the landlord has in the intimation, given under Clause 22, stated that he needs the hose for his own occupatio, the Collector shall, if, satisfied after due enquiry that the house is so needed, permit the landlord to occupy the same. (2) If no order is passed and served upon the landlord within the period specified in sub-clause (1), he shall be free to let the vacant house to any person.” Under Clause 24, when no intimation as provided under Clause 22 is received, the Collector may order the landlord to let the same to any person belonging to any of the four categories mentioned in Clause 23, and order the landlord to comply with the order. Under Clause 24-A, the Collector may pass an order requiring the landlord to let the house to any of the persons belonging to the four categories, while under Clause 24-B, the person to whom the house is allotted is liable to pay the rent for the house allotted from the date on which it becomes available for occupation. Under Clause 24-A, the Collector may pass an order requiring the landlord to let the house to any of the persons belonging to the four categories, while under Clause 24-B, the person to whom the house is allotted is liable to pay the rent for the house allotted from the date on which it becomes available for occupation. Under Clause 25, the tenancy of any person holding an office of profit under the Union or State Government or to any person holding a post under the Madhya Pradesh Electricity Board and placed in possession of a house by an order under Clauses 23 and 24-A shall terminate on the date of the transfer of, or grant of leave, other than casual leave to such person, or on the date from which such person cease to hold an office of profit under the Union or State Government orceases to hold a post under the Madhya Pradesh Electricity Board, as the case may be, and the said person shall vacate the said house within seven days of such date and the landlord and tenant shall give intimation prescribed in Clause 22 to the Collector in respect of such house. The Collector, under the proviso to that clause, is empowered to extend the tenancy for a period not exceeding four months, on sufficient cause being shown. Clause 26 prohibits sub-letting of the accommodation allotted under Clauses 23, 24 or 24-A, while Clause 27 prescribes the manner in which the orders are to be served. 22. The main challenges raised by Shri Shareef, the learned Counsel for the petitioner in Writ Petition No. 1695 of 1985, to the provisions of Chapter-III are these: The categorisation of the four classes for favourable treatment by Clause 23 is irrational and arbitrary and there is no valid basis for such classification. The persons belonging to these categories are almost inexhaustible and in view of the preference shown to these categories, an ordinary citizen is rendered without any shelter because he cannot be considered for suitable accommodation unless all the claims belonging to the favoured categories are exhausted. This results in invidious discrimination and has no nexus with the object to be achieved, viz. providing housing accommodation on account of the influx of a large population to the towns as a result of war conditions, when the benefit was not obviously to be confined only to certain categories. This results in invidious discrimination and has no nexus with the object to be achieved, viz. providing housing accommodation on account of the influx of a large population to the towns as a result of war conditions, when the benefit was not obviously to be confined only to certain categories. 23. Under Clause 2(2) of the Rent Control Order, 1949, “displaced person” means any person who, on account of the setting up of the Dominions of India and Pakistan, or on account of civil disturbances or fear of such disturbances in any area now forming part of Pakistan, has been displaced from or has left his place of residence in such area after the 1st day of March, 1947, and who has subsequently been residing in India. Under sub-clause (2-a), “evicted person” means a tenant whose landlord has been granted permission to give notice to determine the lease on a ground specified in Item (vi) of sub-clause (2) of Clause 13 (i.e., for the purpose of bona fide occupation). The third category, viz., the employees of Madhya Pradesh Electricity Board, has apparently become non-existent , because there has been no amendment in this respect after the formation of bilingual State of Bombay, or the State of Maharashtra, when Madhya Pradesh Electricity Board has ceased to operate in the Vidarbha area and the employees thereof do not form a part of the class of beneficiaries for which Clause 23 can operate. 24. The second ground raised is that unguided power of allotment has been conferred on the Collector in the matter of selecting houses and allotting them to the persons belonging to these categories, a power which is to be exercised without the consent of the landlord, or without providing for the representation by the landlord to the choice of the tenant and compelling the landlord to accept whoever is allotted the premises as his tenant. These powers verge almost on expropriation. They are not regulated by providing for an appeal. Further, after the lapse of nearly forty years, it is not necessary to continue the preference for displaced persons, and thee is no reason to prefer an evicted person as defined in the Rent Control Order, 1949, or a Government servant, to the exclusion of the classes of people who fall outside these categories. 25. Further, after the lapse of nearly forty years, it is not necessary to continue the preference for displaced persons, and thee is no reason to prefer an evicted person as defined in the Rent Control Order, 1949, or a Government servant, to the exclusion of the classes of people who fall outside these categories. 25. We will take up the four categories of persons who have been included in Clause 23 for consideration, serially. We see considerable force in the argument that a displaced person will not continue to be entitled to any favourable treatment, after a lapse of nearly 39 years since the partition of the country. There was obviously a need for providing for the rehabilitation of displaced persons upon the partition when they had to migrate to this country from their ancestral home, and the provision, which was obviously necessary then, by lapse of time, has ceased to have any relevance to the present-day conditions. In fact, in its return, the State itself has stated that one of the reasons for excluding them and granting exemption under the notification, dated October 24, 1968, was that no special provision is now necessary for displaced persons after a long lapse of time, and the considerations which then existed have now worne out, a new generation having come-up which does not require this protection. It would, therefore, be impossible to sustain the provisions of Chapter-III which operate to exclude the other categories and provide for the protection of displaced persons since their continuance would be per se discriminatory. 26. Shri Jaiswal, the learned Assistant Government Pleader, conceded that the persons holding office of profit under the Union or State Government, or holding post under the Madhya Pradesh Electricity Board, would not be entitled to any concession in respect of non-residential premises and these categories were inadvertently continued in Chapter-III. 26. Shri Jaiswal, the learned Assistant Government Pleader, conceded that the persons holding office of profit under the Union or State Government, or holding post under the Madhya Pradesh Electricity Board, would not be entitled to any concession in respect of non-residential premises and these categories were inadvertently continued in Chapter-III. With regard to the evicted persons, though it cannot be denied that some provision would be necessary for accommodating them, if they are to be evicted from the premises they occupied, by virtue of the permission granted by the Rent Controller under Clause 13(3)(vi), it is difficult to see how they, as a class, can stand on a better footing than those others who have also no accommodation of their own and had been waiting for accommodation even for a period longer, while the evicted persons were already occupying certain premises for their residence. In relation to them, those belonging to the evicted category would, in any event, not stand on a better footing. 27. Shri Jaiswal, however, urged that provision was necessary for allotting residential houses to the persons holding office of profit under Union or State Government, because they had to face the hardship of transfer from one part of the country or the State to another, and special provision would be necessary for them. We fail to see how the hardship to this class of persons can be said to be more than to the others similarly situated, only because they happen to be employees of private employers, or other public Corporations, who would have to fact similar hardships. Preferring as a class Union or State Government employees, in our view, would be per se discriminatory and would amount to almost a denial of an opportunity to the persons who do not belong to these categories of securing housing accommodation. 28. Shri Shareef urged that when information is sought in the form given in the Schedule in reference to Clause 22, all that the landlord is to state, besides giving the other details and description of the premises, is only the name of the person to whom it is proposed to be let and nothing else. 28. Shri Shareef urged that when information is sought in the form given in the Schedule in reference to Clause 22, all that the landlord is to state, besides giving the other details and description of the premises, is only the name of the person to whom it is proposed to be let and nothing else. There is no opportunity, if the Collector takes a decision to induct a particular person as a landlord's tenant, for the landlord to make a representation against the choice of the tenant made by the Collector, and he has to accept whoever is imposed upon him as a tenant. There are no guidelines regarding the manner in which the Collector should exercise his power, and it is not regulated by a provision for appeal . It is difficult to regard the powers conferred on the Collector in the matter of allotment of the houses as anything but arbitrary. 29. It is necessary to understand the context in which the Writ Petition No. 1695 of 1985 has been filed. The petitioner-Dinanath Chandani's father was a tenant of house No. 69 in Circle No. 7/12 which was owned by respondent No. 2 Jethmal. After the death of the petitioner's father, the petitioner, along with the other legal representatives, became the second respondent's tenant, and their tenancy is governed by the provisions of the Rent Control Order, 1949. As a sequal to the striking down of the notification dated February 6, 1952, exempting from the operation of the provisions of the Rent Control Order, 1949, any house used for residential purposes constructed on a site lying vacant on January 1, 1951, by the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Prabhakar Rokde v. State of Maharashtra, 1985 Mh.L.J. 548, the provisions of Chapter-III would apply to the petitioner's lease and as a notice has been sent by respondent No. 2, the landlord, to the petitioner contending that the tenancy had become void as it was not created in pursuance of Chapter-III, he has been exposed to a proceeding for eviction. 30. In (Kakubhai and Co. v. Nathmal)10, 1976 Mh.L.J. 450, this Court took the view that the tenancy created in contravention of Clause 23 of the Rent Control Order, 1949, was void. 30. In (Kakubhai and Co. v. Nathmal)10, 1976 Mh.L.J. 450, this Court took the view that the tenancy created in contravention of Clause 23 of the Rent Control Order, 1949, was void. The Supreme Court in (Nanakram v. Kundalrai)11, 1986(3) Bom.C.R. 98 : 1986 Mh.L.J. 506, observed that there is a prohibition in Clause 22(2) on any other person seeking to occupy the house except in accordance with Clause 23. In Clause 23 it is the Deputy Commissioner who can order the landlord to let the vacant house to a person indicated by him, a person who falls in one of the categories specified in the clause or if he is satisfied he may permit the landlord himself to occupy the house. The Deputy Commissioner has power under Clause 28 of the Rent Control Order to take steps and use force for the purpose of securing compliance with or for providing or rectifying any contravention of the Rent Control Order. The Supreme Court observed that the Rent Control Order nowhere mandates that the Deputy Commissioner must eject a person who has entered into possession of a house in violation of Clause 22. If upon a view of the circumstances prevailing, the Deputy Commissioner takes no action in the matter, there is no reason why the lease between the landlord and the tenant, although inconsistent with Clause 22, should not be binding as between the parties thereto, and the transaction is not a void one. The lease not being void, it is not open to either party to avoid the lease on the ground that it is inconsistent with Clause 22. The parties would be bound as between them, to observe the conditions of the lease, and it cannot be assailed by either party in the proceeding between them. In view of the position laid down by the Supreme Court, it would be open to the Collector to exercise the power under Clause 28, in view of the non-compliance of the provisions of Chapter-III. 31. Reference was made on behalf of the respondents to a decision of the Supreme Court in (S.P. Jinadathappa v. R.P. Sharma)12, A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 1523 where the provisions of section 3(3)(a) of the Mysore House Rent and Accommodation Control Act (30 of 1951) containing similar provisions, had been upheld. The provisions, however, of that section were more comprehensive and may be quoted in extenso:- “Section 3(3)(a). The provisions, however, of that section were more comprehensive and may be quoted in extenso:- “Section 3(3)(a). - On receipt of the intimation under sub-section (2), the controller shall, taking into consideration any representation made by the landlord and after making such inquiry as he considers necessary, select the State Government or the Central Government or Government of any other State in India, or any local authority or any educational or other public institution or any officer of any Government, authority or institution, aforesaid, or any other person (hereinafter referred to as the 'allottee') to be inducted as a tenant in the house and direct the landlord by written order (hereinafter referred to as the 'allotment order') to let the house to such allottee at such rent as shall be specified in the allotment order and to deliver possession of the house to the allottee on such date as shall be specified in the said order: Provided that before making an allotment order in favour of any authority or person, other than the State Government, the Central Government or the Government of any State in India or a local authority, the Controller shall consider any representation of the landlord about the suitability of the proposed tenant and shall not allot the house to any person who, in the opinion of the Controller, is an unsuitable tenant.” It was in the light of these provisions that the Supreme Court made the following observations:- “Does the Act then by leaving it to the Controller to select any person other than a Government, local authority, public institution or an officer of any of these as the tenant, impose an unreasonable restriction on the right to property? We do not think it does so. If the Controller could validly choose a Government, a local authority or any institution - which as we have said is not disputed - it can make no difference that instead of such a tenant the Controller chooses a private individual as a tenant. The idea of this provision is that people in need should be found accommodation. Persons in need of accommodation are the public and therefore serving their need, would be serving a public purpose. The idea of this provision is that people in need should be found accommodation. Persons in need of accommodation are the public and therefore serving their need, would be serving a public purpose. An individual would be a member of the public and as the accommodation available can be let out to one, a restriction caused by selection of a member of the public would be one in the interest of the general public. Such a restriction is furthermore not unreasonable. It is enforced only when the owner does not want the house for his own use. It can then make no reasonable difference to the owner if a private individual is chosen as the tenant. The Act further makes ample provision to see that the tenant chosen is suitable. By providing the appeal to the District Judge and a right to move the High Court in revision, full safeguard has been given to secure that an unsuitable person is not foisted on an owner as his tenant.” 32. The provisions of Chapter-III of the present Rent Control Order, 1949, are obviously not similar. The discriminatory nature is writ large on its provisions because the class, which has been selected for the beneficial treatment is so small compared with the large majority which has been excluded. Even persons, who are similarly situated, with the State and an the Central Government employees, have been excluded. With regard to the class of evictees, it is apparent that only the houses constructed before 1951, which had fallen vacant, were available for allotment by the Collector, as new constructions made after 1951 were exempted by a notification which was later struck down in Prabhakar Rokde's case (supra). In respect of the persons, who would have suffered eviction from the houses constructed after 1951, no protection was available, because their eviction was not conditional upon the obtaining a certificate from the Rent Controller under Clause 13(3)(vi) of the Rent Control Order, 1949, in respect of residential premises. We are not dealing with the class of displaced persons, because upon the admission made by the State itself, they are not, now, eligible for the benefit of the exemption. We are not dealing with the class of displaced persons, because upon the admission made by the State itself, they are not, now, eligible for the benefit of the exemption. There is, thus, no rational basis for the classification introduced by Clause 23 in selecting persons who hold office of profit under the Union or the State Government, or the evictees, in respect of residential premises constructed prior to 1951, and that classification does not have any rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved by the C.P. Berar Bill No. 7 of 1946 and section 2 of the C.P. Berar Regulation of Letting of Accommodation Act, 1946. 33. The observations of the Supreme Court in the (In re Special Courts Bill, 1978)13, A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 478 at page 509 furnish the guidelines in this respect. “By the process of classification, the State has the power of determining who should be regarded as a class for purposes of legislation and in relation to a law enacted on a particular subject. This power, no doubt, in some degree is likely to produce some inequality; but if a law deals with the liberties of a number of well-defined classes, it is not open to the charge of denial of equal protection on the ground that it has no application to other persons. Classification thus means segregation in classes which have a systematic relation, usually found in common properties and characteristics. It postulates a rational basis and does not mean herding together of certain persons and classes arbitrarily. 6. The law can make and set apart the classes according to the needs and exigencies of the society and as suggested by experience. It can reorganise even degree of evil, but the classification should never be arbitrary, artificial or evasive. 7. The classification must not be arbitrary but must be rational, that is to say, it must not only be based on some qualities or characteristics which are to be found in all the persons grouped together and not in other who are left out but those qualities or characteristics must have reasonable relation to the object of the legislation. 7. The classification must not be arbitrary but must be rational, that is to say, it must not only be based on some qualities or characteristics which are to be found in all the persons grouped together and not in other who are left out but those qualities or characteristics must have reasonable relation to the object of the legislation. In order to pass the test, two conditions must be fulfilled, namely, (1) that the classification must be founded on an intelligible deferentia which distinguishes those that are grouped together from other and (2) that differentia must have rational relation to the object sough to be achieved by the Act. 8. The differentia which is the basis of the classification and the object of the Act are distinct things and what is necessary is that there must be a nexus between them. In short, while Article 14 forbids class discrimination by conferring privileges or imposing liabilities upon persons arbitrarily selected out of a large number of other persons similarly situated in relation to the privileges sought to be conferred or the liabilities proposed to be imposed, it does not forbid classification for the purpose of legislation, provided such classification is not arbitrary, in the sense abovementioned.” It, therefore, follows that the arbitrary selection of the persons for discriminatory treatment is not founded on intelligible differentia having rational relation to the object, if any, to be achieved an would be clearly invalid. 34. 34. The arbitrary nature of the provisions of Chapter-III is further highlighted by the irrational treatment of even the allottees of the houses by Clause 25, under which the tenancy of any person holding an office of profit under the Union or State Government or to any person holding a post under the Madhya Pradesh Electricity Board and placed in possession of a house by an order under Clause 23 or 24-A shall terminate on the date of the transfer of, or grant of leave other than casual leave, to such person or on the date from which such person ceases to hold an office of profit under the Union or State Government or ceases to hold a post under the Madhya Pradesh Electricity Board, as the case may be, and the said persons shall vacate the said house within seven days of such date and the landlord and tenant shall give intimation prescribed in Clause 22 to the Collector in respect of such house. It is difficult to see what purpose the regulatory provisions of the Rent Control Order, 1949, would serve by enabling the Collector to throw out a person to whom the house has been allotted, merely because he ceased to hold the office of profit. It is apparent that a tenancy is created in respect of such a person and the effect would be to abruptly put an end to such a tenancy by the draconian provision of Clause 25, irrespective of the fact that such a person would require residential premises even after his ceasing to hold an office of profit, or while proceeding on leave. No such consequence would ensure in respect of the other classes selected for the beneficial treatment under Chapter-III, namely, “displaced persons” and “evictees” who would be free to occupy the premises once they are allotted to them, without any constraint. 35. We have indicated above the unbridled powers given to the Collector in the matter of allotment. Though in the Schedule to Clause 22, a form is prescribed for obtaining the information from the tenant, there is no provision for obtaining any information from the person to whom the Collector may allot the house under Clause 23 and about his requirements. We have indicated above the unbridled powers given to the Collector in the matter of allotment. Though in the Schedule to Clause 22, a form is prescribed for obtaining the information from the tenant, there is no provision for obtaining any information from the person to whom the Collector may allot the house under Clause 23 and about his requirements. Chapter-III does not provide for any prohibition in the matter of allotment of premises, even if the proposed allottee may have a house of his own and may not need the premises proposed to be allotted. Nothing can be more inequitable than one which would obviously put a private individual who requires premises urgently for his genuine needs to a disadvantage as he would always stand excluded from consideration, because the letting of the houses has to be regulated through the agency of the Collector. Provisions similar to the Mysore House Rent and Accommodation Control Act (30 of 1951) to which we have referred, requiring the consideration of the question of the suitability of the tenant, after hearing the representations of the landlord regulated further by a right of appeal and access to the High Court, are not to be found in the Rent Control Order, 1949. The challenge to section 3(3)(a) of the Mysore Act was under Article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution of India. While rejecting the challenge under Article 19(1)(f), their Lordships observed in S.P. Jinadathappa's case, A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 1523 that if a tenant had challenged the validity of the provision relying on Article 14, which was not the case before them, that challenge would not have been of substance, because there was ample guidance given to the authority as to how he chose the tenants who firstly had to be suitable and all persons were entitled to apply for being selected as tenants and so had an equal chance to get the house. The choice had to be made from amongst the applicants and that choice depended on the examination of the comparative merits of their claims. The owner also had a right to have his views in the matter being given due consideration by the authority selecting the tenant. The choice had to be made from amongst the applicants and that choice depended on the examination of the comparative merits of their claims. The owner also had a right to have his views in the matter being given due consideration by the authority selecting the tenant. In the absence of similar provisions in the present Rent Control Order, 1949, we are satisfied that the provisions of Chapter-III area piece of invidious delegated legislation which falls foul of Article 14 of the Constitution and have to be struck down. 36. That brings us to the consideration of the validity of the notification, dated 24th October, 1968 which has been challenged in Writ Petition No. 1670 of 1985. We would first consider part 'A' of that notification which exempts any house used for non-residential purposes, if it is constructed on a site lying vacant on the 1st day of January, 1967, or on a site made vacant after that date by demolition of any structure standing thereon. This exemption, which was granted for giving an impetus to construction activities, has been in existence for more than fifteen years. In view of the principles laid down in Motor General Traders's case (supra) and Prabhakar Rokde's case (supra) the ratio of which directly applies to this notification also. It is evident that though the exemption may not have been objectionable as a transitional or temporary measure at an initial stage, it became discriminatory and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution as it persisted in over a long period without any justification. The exemption was granted by way of incentive to encourage building activity ad, in the circumstances, such exemption cannot be allowed to last for ever. The Supreme Court observed that there is some justification for exempting new building say which are five, seven or ten years old from the Act, in order to provident incentive to builders of new buildings, but there is hardly any justification to allot buildings which were constructed more than ten years age to remain outside the scope of the Act. The Supreme Court observed that there is some justification for exempting new building say which are five, seven or ten years old from the Act, in order to provident incentive to builders of new buildings, but there is hardly any justification to allot buildings which were constructed more than ten years age to remain outside the scope of the Act. The landlords of such buildings must have realised a large part of investment made on such buildings by way of rents during all these years, and the Court cannot fail to take into account that owing to continuous influx of population into urban areas in recent years the rates of rents have gone up everywhere and that the landlords of such buildings have been able to take advantage of the situation created by the shortage of urban housing accommodation which is now a universal phenomenon. 37. The respondent-State contended that the houses used for non-residential purposes would be in a class apart from those used for residential purposes and considerations in the two cases would be different. This argument is no longer available, in view of what the Supreme Court has stated in (Rattan Arya v. State of Tamil Nadu)14, 1986(3) S.C.C. 385 , while considering the provisions of section 30(ii) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960, which provided that tenants of residential buildings paying monthly rent exceeding Rs. 400/- excepted from the protection of the Act whereas no such restriction imposed in respect of tenants of non-residential buildings: “The scheme and structure, the policy and plan of the Act are aimed at regulating the conditions of tenancy, controlling the rents and preventing unreasonable eviction of tenants of all residential and non-residential buildings. For the advancement of these objects, tenants are invested with certain rights and landlords are subjected to certain obligations. They are not rights which are peculiarly capable of enjoyment by occupants of non-residential buildings only as against occupants of residential buildings or by occupants of low-rent buildings only as against occupants of high-rent buildings. Neither from the Preamble nor from the provisions of the Act it is possible to discern any basis for distinction made in section 30(ii) between the tenant of a residential building and the tenant of a non-residential building and that based on the rent paid by the respective tenants. Neither from the Preamble nor from the provisions of the Act it is possible to discern any basis for distinction made in section 30(ii) between the tenant of a residential building and the tenant of a non-residential building and that based on the rent paid by the respective tenants. There is no justification at all for picking out the class of tenants of residential buildings paying a rent of more than four hundred rupees per month to deny them the rights conferred generally on all tenants of non-residential buildings cannot be said to be in a disadvantageous position as compared with tenants of residential buildings and, therefore, they need greater protection. The argument based on protection of the weaker sections of the community is entirely inconsistent with the protection given to tenants of non-residential buildings who are in a position to pay much higher rents than the rents which those who are in occupation of residential buildings can ever pay. Therefore, section 30(ii) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 has to be struck down as violative of Article 14.” As there, here also none of the main provisions of the Act make any serious distinction between residential and non-residential buildings, and the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the State also does not state why any distinction should be made between residential and non-residential buildings in the matter of affording the protection of the Act. To say that a non-residential building is different from a residential building is merely to say what is self-evident and means nothing. 38. Part-A of the notification, dated October 24, 1968, therefore, being irrational and arbitrary and having no nexus with the object to be achieved by the Rent Control Order, 1949, cannot be allowed to stand in the teeth of Article 14 of the Constitution, and it has to be struck down. 39. Part-B of the notification exempts from the provisions of Chapter-III of the Rent Control Order, 1949, any hose used for non-residential purposes, if it is constructed before the 1st day of January, 1967. Since in our view the whole of Chapter-III cannot stand, the question of continuing part-B of the notification would not survive. 40. 39. Part-B of the notification exempts from the provisions of Chapter-III of the Rent Control Order, 1949, any hose used for non-residential purposes, if it is constructed before the 1st day of January, 1967. Since in our view the whole of Chapter-III cannot stand, the question of continuing part-B of the notification would not survive. 40. Shri Jaiswal, the learned Assistant Government Pleader, urged that since two of the classes enumerated in Clause 23(1), namely, the persons holding office of profit under the Union or State Government, or holding post under Madhya Pradesh Electricity Board, would not require non-residential accommodation, and the category of displaced persons has ceased to be eligible for any differential treatment, the exemption granted from the provisions of Chapter-III would be available only to evicted persons and it is not necessary to strike down the exemption which would now be restricted to only one class, namely, the evicted persons. We have already indicated the untenability of the distinction earlier. In our view, the notification dated October 24, 1968, will have to be struck down as a whole, in the circumstances of the present case upon the view that we have taken. 41. Next question, which arises, is whether Chapter-III of the Rent Control Order, 1949 should be struck down as a whole. The provisions of Clauses 22 to 27 revolve around the main and substantive provision made under Clause 23(1) for allotment to the four categories and are severable from the other provisions of the Rent Control Order which have not been challenged before us. It was not even suggested before us that the other provisions of the Rent Control Order, 1949 cannot stand independently of Chapter-III. Applying the test indicated in Motor General Traders' case (supra), we find that Chapter-III of the Rent Control Order, 1949 is severable and is not so intrinsically bound up as to make the Rent Control Order unworkable after it is struck down. 42. In the result, the challenge raised in Writ Petition No. 1670 of 1985 to the continuance of the C.P. Berar Regulation of Letting of Accommodation Act, 1946 and the C.P. Berar Letting of Houses and Rent Control Order, 1949, made thereunder, on account of the existence of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947, and Hyderabad Houses (Rent, Eviction and Lease) Control Act, 1954; is rejected. The impugned notification dated October 24, 1968, is declared null and void being unconstitutional. The challenge raised in Writ Petition No. 1695 of 1985 to the provisions of Chapter-III of the C.P. Berar Letting of Houses and Rent Control Order, 1949 framed under the C.P. Berar Regulation of Letting of Accommodation Act, 1946 as unconstitutional being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India, is upheld, and the said Chapter-III is struck down as being unconstitutional. We, however, make it clear that this decision would not affect the validity of any proceedings in which a decree or order of eviction has become final and the landlord has already taken possession of the building or any part thereof, pursuant thereto. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs of both the petitions. Order accordingly. -----