B. K. MEHTA, B. S. KAPADIA, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner has filed the present Special Criminal Application for quashing the order of detention passed against the petitioners brother-in-law and for issuing appropriate writ order or direction declaring the continued detention of the detenu bad. The brother-in-law of the present petitioner is detained by the order dated 29/09/1985 by the Commissioner of Police Ahmedabad City under the provisions of the Gujarat Prevention of Anti-Social Activities Act 1985 (16 of 1985 ). The grounds for the detention have been furnished to the detenu on the same day i. e. on 29th September 1985. Inter alia it is alleged in the grounds that the detenu has committed offences punishable under secs. 365 326 323 504 and 114 I. P. C. and offence under sec. 135 (1) of the Bombay Police Act which is registered as C. R. No. 186/84 of Gaekwad Haveli Police Station which is pending in the Court. It is also alleged that he has also committed offences under secs. 324 504 and 114 of I. P. C. and also offence under sec. 135 (1) of the Bombay Police Act which is registered as C. R. No. 302/84 of the Gaekwad Haveli Police Station which is also pending in the Court. It is also alleged that he has also committed offences under secs. 145 148 149 436 324 and 153-A of the I. P. C. which is also registered as C. R. No. 79 of 1985 of the Geakwad Haveli Police Station which is now pending in the Court. On these allegations it is alleged that the detenu was known as a dangerous person. It is also alleged that on account of the aforesaid activities there is an atmosphere of terror among the residents of the locality where the detenu was residing and that the said illegal activities of the detenu are going on and therefore it has become an obstruction for the maintenance of public order. It is also alleged that though legal actions were taken against the detenu he was continuing such illegal activities and thereafter the Police Commissioner has recorded his satisfaction of detaining the present detenu as it was necessary so to do. ( 2 ) MR. It is also alleged that though legal actions were taken against the detenu he was continuing such illegal activities and thereafter the Police Commissioner has recorded his satisfaction of detaining the present detenu as it was necessary so to do. ( 2 ) MR. B. J. Shethna the learned advocate appearing for the petitioner has inter alia raised the following grounds for challenging the validity of the detention order: (1) That the offences alleged to have been committed by the detenu are of the years 1984 and 1985 i. e. only for the period of two years while the necessary ingredient for treating any personas dangerous person as required under sec. 2 (c) of the Act is that the person habitually commits or attempts to commit or abets the commission of any of the offences punishable under Chapter XVI or Chapter XVII of the Indian Penal Code or any of the offences punishable under Chapter V of the Arms Act 1959 during the period of three successive years. Therefore as necessary ingredient of commission of offences in three successive years has not been alleged the detenu cannot be treated as a dangerous person for the purposes of this Act. (2) That under sec. 3 (3) of the Act the detaining authority is bound to forthwith report the fact of passing of the detention order along with the grounds on which the order has been passed and also such other particulars which in his Opinion have a bearing on the matter to the State Government. While in the present case the detaining authority has not explained as to why the said order was not communicated to the State Government forthwith and hence the order of detention is vitiated. ( 3 ) MR. Shethna the learned Advocate appearing for the petitioner has submitted that so far as the detenu is concerned the very condition precedent for treating him as a dangerous person has not been complied with inasmuch as the offences alleged to have been committed by him as mentioned in the grounds are only for the years 1984-85 and not for successive three years and therefore he cannot be treated as a dangerous person under sec. 2 (c) of the Act. ( 4 ) MR. S. R. Divetia the Addl. P. P. for the respondents submits that what is required under sec. 2 (c) of the Act. ( 4 ) MR. S. R. Divetia the Addl. P. P. for the respondents submits that what is required under sec. 2 (c) of the Act is habitual commission of the offences during a period of three successive years and therefore it does not mean that there should be commission of offences in each of the three years. ( 5 ) ON this point our attention is invited to the judgment delivered in the Special Criminal Application No. 656 of 1985 decided by the Division Bench of this Court consisting of Justice S. B. Majmudar and Justice R. J. Shah. In the said case after considering the difference in the two definitions of dangerous person given in the Ordinance as well as the present Act the Division Bench has observed as under:" It is to be noted that the definition under the said Act states regarding the period of three successive years and so a dangerous person under the Act would mean a person who either by himself or as a member or leader of a gang during a period of three successive years habitually commits or attempts to commit or abets the commission of any of the offences punishable under Chapter XVI or Chapter XVII of the Indian Penal Code or any of the offences punishable under Chapter v of the Arms Act 1959"in the said case the offences mentioned were of the year 1984 and it was therefore observed that it is therefore clear that the petitioner in view of the said definition under the said Act could not have been detained under the provisions of the said Act. ( 6 ) SIMILAR point was raised in the Special Criminal Application No. 873 of 1985 decided by this very Bench on 10/01/1986 In the said case it is observed after referring to the definition of sec. 2 (c) of the Act as under:"therefore what is required is the habitual commission or attempt to commit or abetment of the commission of the offences during the period of successive three years. The words period of three successive years would mean in ordinary parlance as well as as per dictionary remaining three years following one after another in uninterrupted succession. . . . . . The words period of three successive years would mean in ordinary parlance as well as as per dictionary remaining three years following one after another in uninterrupted succession. . . . . . "in the said case acquittal orders were passed in favour of the detenu for the offences of the year 1982-83 before the detention order was made and only Criminal Case No. 137 of 1984 was pending and there fore it was observed in the said case as under:". . . . Now therefore at the most the material before the detaining authority is with regard to the commission of the offence for the year 1984 only while the definition clearly requires that there should be commission of offences during the period of three successive years. . . . . . . . . . . . ". In that view of the matters it was held in the said case that the definition of dangerous person cannot be attracted so far as the petitioner-detenu in the said case was concerned. ( 7 ) THE argument of Mr. S. R. Divetia learned Addl. P. P. is that it is not necessary that there should be commission of offences during each of the three successive years. According to his submission if during the period of three successive years i. e. in any of the three successive years there is any commission of offences necessary requirement of the definition of dangerous person will be complied with. ( 8 ) IT is important to note that before the said Act came into force there was Ordinance and in the said Ordinance the word during the period of three successive years were not there and these were added subsequently in the Act. In order that the live-link is not snapped the Legislature has required the commission of offences during the period of three successive years. In other words the purpose appears to be to provide for close proximity so as to warrant necessity of prevention. If at all the Legislature wanted that it should be in any of the three successive years then the Legislature would have so drafted the section but that has not been done. In other words the purpose appears to be to provide for close proximity so as to warrant necessity of prevention. If at all the Legislature wanted that it should be in any of the three successive years then the Legislature would have so drafted the section but that has not been done. Meaning should be given to every word used and when the question is of habitually committing the offences during the period of three successive years it would mean that there would be commission of offences for all the three successive years and it should not be of intermittant period or commission of offences should not be of prior to three years. In view of the aforesaid judgments and in view of our above discussion we are unable to accept the contention raised by Mr. Divetia. In the present case the offences alleged against the detenu are only for the year 1984-85 and not for three successive years and therefore the order of detention is invalid. ( 9 ) THE second point raised by Mr. Shethna is that as per subsec. (3) of sec. 3 of the Act when any order is made under this section by an authorised officer he shall forthwith report the fact to the State Government together with the grounds on which the order has been made and such other particulars as in his opinion have a bearing on the matter and in the present case the Commissioner of Police was required to forthwith report the fact to the State Govt. which according to him was not done by the detaining authority. The petitioner has raised this point in para 15 of the petition. While in the counter-affidavit it is stated by the deponent-Commissioner of Police that after the order of detention was made the detaining authority had forthwith reported the fact to the State Government together with the grounds on which the order of detention has been made with other particulars having a bearing on the matter. While on behalf of the State Government the reply-affidavit has been filed by Mr. M. P. Rao Under Secretary wherein in para 4 thereof he has stated about the approval of the detention order on 9/10/1985. However he is silent on the point as to when the order was communicated to the State Government by the detaining authority. Mr. While on behalf of the State Government the reply-affidavit has been filed by Mr. M. P. Rao Under Secretary wherein in para 4 thereof he has stated about the approval of the detention order on 9/10/1985. However he is silent on the point as to when the order was communicated to the State Government by the detaining authority. Mr. Divetia appearing on behalf of the respondents has fairly placed the original file before us and on perusal of the file it appears that the detention order was communicated by the Commissioner of Police to the State Government by his letter dated 3-10-85. Therefore according to Mr. Shethna there is a delay in communicating the said order to the State Government and that the said delay has not been explained by the respondents though the detention order was passed on 29/09/1985. ( 10 ) IN sec. 3 (3) of the Preventive Detention Act 1950 similar phraseology is used while in sec. 7 thereof the legislative prescription in the matter of time is qualified by providing that the act be done as soon as may be. The Supreme Court in this context explained what would be the construction of these two phraseologies in the case of Keshav Nilkanth Joglekar v. The Commissioner of Police Greater Bombay and Others A. I. R. 1957 S. C. 28. It is held by the Supreme Court in the said case that the word forthwith means only that action should be performed with reasonable speed and expedition and that any delay in the matter should be satisfactorily explained. ( 11 ) IN para 10 of the said judgment the Supreme Court has observed as under:" (10) We agree that forthwith in sec. 3 (3) cannot mean the same thing as soon as may be in Sec. 7 and that the former is more peremptory than the latter. The difference between the two expressions lies in our opinion in this that while under sec. 7 the time that is allowed to the authority to send the communication to the detenu is what is reasonably convenient under sec. 3 (3) what is allowed is only the period during which he could not without any fault of his own send the report. Under sec 7 the question is whether the time taken for communicating the grounds is reasonably requisite. Under sec. 3 (3) what is allowed is only the period during which he could not without any fault of his own send the report. Under sec 7 the question is whether the time taken for communicating the grounds is reasonably requisite. Under sec. 3 (3) it is whether the report has been sent at the earliest point of time possible and when where is an interval of time between the date of the order and the date of the reported what has to be considered is whether the delay in sending the report could have been avoided". In the said case the order of 13/01/1956 was communicated on 21/01/1956 but on account of the explanation given it was held that it was done forthwith. ( 12 ) IN the case of Gora v. State of West Bengal AIR 1975 SC 473 the order of detention was dated on 29-12-1973 and it was despatched on 2 and the District Magistrate explained the delay and according to the Supreme Court the explanation given by the Dist. Magistrate was sufficient that he sent the report to the State Govt. with all reasonable despatch and there was no avoidable delay on his part. While holding so the Supreme Court has further observed as under:". . . . . . WHILST taking this view on facts we do not wish to underscore the need for strict compliance with this requirement of sec. 3 sub-sec. (3 ). It is a very import ant requirement intended to secure that the State Government shall have sufficient time for consideration before it decides and the decision has to be made within twelve days of the making of the order of detention whether or not to approve the order of detention and the Court would therefore insist on strict compliance with it and not condone avoidable delay even if it be trivial. . . . " ( 13 ) FOLLOWING the above referred decisions of the Supreme Court this Court has also taken the same view in the Special Criminal Application No. 150 of 1984 decided on 19/06/1984 ( 14 ) LOOKING to the facts and circumstances of the present case it is clear that there is no explanation whatsoever for not communicating the order of detention of the State Government either on 29/09/1985 or on 30/09/1985 or on 1/10/1985. Even assuming that 29/09/1985 and 2/10/1985 were holidays the Commissioner of Police could have despatched the order of detention either on 30/09/1985 or on 1/10/1985 but there is no explanation as to why the order of detention was not despatched forthwith. In that view of the matter non-communication of the detention order forthwith also vitiates the detention order. ( 15 ) AS we have come to the aforesaid findings on the above mentioned points it is not necessary to consider the other points raised by the learned Advocate for the petitioner. ( 16 ) IN result the order of detention passed by the detaining authority against the detenu Makbul Alibhai Patel is hereby quashed and set aside. The detenu is ordered to be released forthwith if he is not required for any other purpose in law. Rule is accordingly made absolute. (KMV) .