Judgment :- 1. Plaintiff Bank, which filed a suit for recovery of amount due under an overdraft agreement, is the appellant. Various contentions raised by the defendants were overruled. The only contention accepted was based on the Cochin Usurious Loans Act, 1111 M. E. Applying the provisions of the said Act the amount of interest claimed by the plaintiff was reduced. That necessitated an appeal. Appeal was filed out of time. An application was filed along with the appeal under S.5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of the delay. That application was dismissed and the appeal was also dismissed as out of time. Hence the plaintiff-Bank has come up in Second Appeal. 2. The two substantial questions of law formulated in the memorandum of appeal and on which notice was issued are: (A) Whether in excusing the delay in filing the appeal under S.5 of the Limitation Act the Court is restricted to only by a wrong legal advice by Counsel or is it wide enough to cover cases where the delay was caused by other reasons occurring in good faith? and (B) Whether the Cochin Usurious Loans Act has any application to the money claims of a Bank which is exclusively governed by the provisions of the Banking Companies Regulation Act. 1949 and directions issued by the Reserve Bank of India under powers granted by the Statute? 3. I am of the view that the first substantial question of law alone could be considered now. If that is found against the appellant and rejection of the delay petition is found proper, that is an end of the matter. On the other hand if it is found that the delay has to be condoned, then also the second question need not now be considered here because the District Judge has not considered the appeal on the merits. In case the delay has to be condoned the only course open is to direct the District Judge to take back the appeal to file and decide the same on the merits. Therefore, I am considering the second appeal only on the first point. 4.. According to the appellant delay was only 49 days but the District Judge says it is 55 days. That controversy is not material. Therefore, I am considering the second appeal only on the first point. 4.. According to the appellant delay was only 49 days but the District Judge says it is 55 days. That controversy is not material. There are two affidavits filed in support of the application for condonation of delay, one by the Deputy General Manager of the Bank and the other by Advocate Sri. S. Narayanan Poti with whom the Bank entrusted the papers for filing the appeal. The original suit was disposed of by a Subordinate Judge. Value of the suit was less than Rs. 10,000/-. In such cases the appeal is to the District Court, otherwise it is direct to the High Court. From both the affidavits, it is seen that under the wrong impression that appeal has to be filed before the High Court the papers were entrusted to Sri. S. Narayanan Poti, a senior lawyer in the High Court. Period of limitation for filing appeal to the District Court is only 30 days whereas it is 90 days if it is to the High Court. On receiving the papers Advocate Sri. S. Narayanan Poti kept them for being conveniently studied. It was only when he looked up the papers that he realised the fact that appeal has to be filed before the District Court for which period of limitation is only 30 days. Immediately he conveyed the information and the appeal was filed with the delay petition after taking back the records from him. These facts are clear from the two affidavits. 5. If the averments in the affidavits are accepted the delay was evidently due to a bona fide mistake. Papers were entrusted to the Advocate under a wrong impression that the appeal has to be filed in the High Court and without looking into the papers the Advocate also thought there is sufficient time to prepare the appeal memorandum for presentation in court. It is only normal that a busy lawyer like Sri. S. Narayanan Poti will be giving preference to matters requiring immediate attention. The District Judge did not find that there is any malafides in the application. It appears from the order of the District Judge that the only decision cited before him was State v. Krishna Kurup (AIR. 1971 Ker. 211) which was quoted with approval in a Supreme Court decision. The District Judge did not find that there is any malafides in the application. It appears from the order of the District Judge that the only decision cited before him was State v. Krishna Kurup (AIR. 1971 Ker. 211) which was quoted with approval in a Supreme Court decision. On the basis of that decision the District Judge went under the impression that delay could be condoned only if it was on the basis of a wrong legal advice. Therefore the petition was dismissed. What is required under S.5 of the Limitation Act is only proof of "sufficient cause" for not preferring the appeal within time. What will amount to "sufficient cause" is a matter for consideration depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case. 6. Wrong legal advice is only one of the species coming under "sufficient cause". Legal advice given by members of the legal profession may sometimes be wrong. Even pronouncements by courts on questions of law may go wrong. To err is human. Litigants are laymen. They may legitimately lean on expert advice in legal as well as other departments, without probing much into the professional competence of the advice. Therefore in such matters an amount of latitude is necessary. The material consideration in such cases should be whether there is any taint of malafides or element of recklessness or ruse. If they are absent and if legal advice was honestly sought and given, it must be treated as 'sufficient cause'. At the same time it is true that mistake of counsel by itself is not always a sufficient ground. In Mata Din v. A. Narayan (AIR. 1970 SC. 1953) Their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed: "The law is settled that mistake of counsel may in certain circumstances be taken into account in condoning delay although there is no general proposition that mistake of counsel by itself is always a sufficient ground. It is always a question whether the mistake was bona fide or was merely advice (devise-Ed) to coyer an ulterior purpose such as laches on the part of the litigant or an attempt to save limitation in an underhand way. The High Court unfortunately never considered the matter from this angle. It is always a question whether the mistake was bona fide or was merely advice (devise-Ed) to coyer an ulterior purpose such as laches on the part of the litigant or an attempt to save limitation in an underhand way. The High Court unfortunately never considered the matter from this angle. If it had, it would have seen quite clearly that there was no attempt to avoid the Limitation Act but rather to follow it albeit on a wrong reading of the situation". 7. Even a miscalculation in the matter of period of limitation may be 'sufficient ground' provided it is found to he bona fide because it is common knowledge that people do commit mistakes in calculation bona fide. Such mistakes also will have to be taken note of by courts in considering whether the delay in filing the appeal should be condoned or not. In Indian Statistical Institute v. Associated Builders (AIR. 1978 SC. 335) the unreasonable attitude of the Advocate which prevented the client from doing the needful in time was held to be sufficient ground. What is required is only whether explanation for the delay is bona fide and the delay occurred on account of sufficient grounds in good faith and not the result of mala fides, recklessness or ruse. 8. It is true that in the case in hand there is no question of any wrong legal advice by the lawyer. It is quite natural that the Bank people might have gone under the impression that appeal has to be filed in the High Court. Even if the Bank had its law officers or legal advisers it is possible that they might have omitted to notice the pecuniary limit by which the appeal could have been filed in the District Court. Copies were applied for and obtained in time. When they were entrusted to Advocate Sri. S. Narayanan Poti the period of limitation for preferring the appeal to the District Court itself was not over. If they were aware at that time that appeal had to be filed in the District Court they would not have come to Ernakulam for that purpose. The averments in the affidavits of the Deputy General Manager and the Advocate show that on 29-9-1977 the papers were entrusted to the Advocate. The Advocate went through the papers and realised the mistake only on 23-11-1977. The averments in the affidavits of the Deputy General Manager and the Advocate show that on 29-9-1977 the papers were entrusted to the Advocate. The Advocate went through the papers and realised the mistake only on 23-11-1977. He conveyed the information at once and the appeal was filed without delay. There is absolutely no reason for suspecting any mala fides, recklessness or ruse. The delay has been sufficiently explained. The second appeal is therefore allowed and the decree and judgment of the appellate court as well as the order on the petition for condonation of delay are set aside. The delay in preferring the appeal is condoned. The case is remanded to the District Judge who will take back the appeal on the file and proceed to dispose of the same on the merits. Court-fee paid on the memorandum of appeal will be refunded to the appellant. Parties are directed to suffer costs incurred before this Court. Allowed.