Judgment :- 1. Plaintiff in a suit for partition is the appellant. Defendant is his brother. They are sons of the same father and mother. They are also the only heirs of their mother. The property sought to be partitioned is the only asset that belonged to the mother, who died. Defendant raised various contentions including adverse possession, lease-hold right and partial partition. The plea of partial partition was heard as a preliminary issue and it was found that the suit is not bad for partial partition. Thereafter, the defendant amended the written statement and contended that the plaintiff has not included those properties which devolved on the mother as heir of her deceased husband namely the father of the plaintiff and defendant. The Munsiff negatived all the contentions including the plea that the suit is bad for partial partition. The suit was decreed. But in appeal the Subordinate Judge, Palghat accepted the plea of partial partition and dismissed the suit. Hence the plaintiff came up in second appeal. 2. Even in the amended written statement it is not specified what are the items of properties left out. There was only a vague statement that the properties inherited by the mother from her deceased husband were not included in the suit for partition and hence the suit is bad for partial partition. The mother admittedly died after commencement of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. Plaintiff bad a case that the mother bad no right over the properties of the father which were already orally partitioned between the heirs. There was another contention for the plaintiff that even before his death the father divorced the mother and married another lady by name Kali in whom he had children. On account of the divorce also the mother was contended to be not entitled to the assets of the father. Ext. B2 is the partition deed between the plaintiff, defendant, Kali and her children. This document was relied on by the plaintiff in proof of the acceptance of the right on Kali and her children by defendant. Another contention of the plaintiff was that under the provisions of the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937, a widow is not entitled to inherit the properties of the husband if they are agricultural lands. It is said that the Act was extended to agricultural lands only on 26-11-1946. Another contention of the plaintiff was that under the provisions of the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937, a widow is not entitled to inherit the properties of the husband if they are agricultural lands. It is said that the Act was extended to agricultural lands only on 26-11-1946. Since the father died before that date, the right of the mother was disputed on this ground also, stating that the properties of the father are agricultural lands. There is yet another contention that even if the mother had any right in the properties of the father there is no unity of interest on account of the fact that the second wife and children of the father are also entitled to the properties whereas the plaintiff and defendant alone are the persons entitled to inherit the properties of the mother. It is also stated by the plaintiff that the plea of partial partition cannot be availed of in cases where the parties to the suit for partition are tenants-in-common. The fact that the mother had no other property of her own except by inheritance from the father is admitted even by the defendant. 3. The mother admittedly died after the Hindu Succession Act came into force. Therefore inheritance is only under that Act. S.19(b) of the Hindu Succession Act says that if two or more heirs succeed to the property of an intestate, they shall take the property as tenants-in-common and not as joint tenants. The suit was filed in 1977 long after the Kerala Joint Hindu Family System (Abolition) Act, 1975 came into force. S.4(1) of the Act provides that as on the date on which the Act comes into force the parties shall be deemed to hold the properties as tenants-in-common as if a partition had taken place among all the members of the undivided family. Under that notion each of the member will be considered as holding his or her share separately as full owner. That means as on the date on which the Act came into force the members will be tenants-in-common. I have mentioned these aspects only to show that the property now scheduled in the plaint as well as the properties, if any, to be included in order to avoid the plea of partial partition, are all co-owner-ship properties which could be taken only at tenancy-in-common. I have mentioned these aspects only to show that the property now scheduled in the plaint as well as the properties, if any, to be included in order to avoid the plea of partial partition, are all co-owner-ship properties which could be taken only at tenancy-in-common. Each of the co-owner will be entitled to definite shares. Regarding such properties the plea of partial partition may not be available. 4. There is no rule of law which says that a party suing for partition will have to include all the properties to which he is entitled along with others, whatever be the capacities in which they claim partition regarding different items. 0.2 R.2 of the Code of Civil Procedure is also applicable only in cases where the claim is based on the same cause of action. The rule of partial partition is only one of prudence and convenience. At any rate the bar of partial partition or 0.2 R.2 of the Code of Civil Procedure could only apply to joint tenancies where the cause of action is the same and not to tenancies-in-common where the cause of actions are distinct and separate. Prohibition against partial partition even in joint tenancies is only a rule of construction, prudence and convenience based on the consequent difficulties and inconvenience and not a rule of law which is invariably applicable in all cases. The argument that even in the case of joint family or tarwad a suit for partition will always be bad for the simple reason that some item was omitted is unsound, although for the sake of convenience and adjustment of equities, such a suit should cover all the joint family or tarwad properties. There may be instances in which even in the case of a joint family or tarwad practical considerations may justify institution and continuance of suits for partition without including all the joint family or tarwad properties. A second suit for partition may not be barred where the omission to include those items in the previous suit was for good reasons. Judicial pronouncements in this respect lay down only a rule of construction, prudence and convenience in relation to the partial partition. It is not an inflexible proposition of law. It is always subject to exceptions in appropriate cases. Judicial pronouncements in this respect lay down only a rule of construction, prudence and convenience in relation to the partial partition. It is not an inflexible proposition of law. It is always subject to exceptions in appropriate cases. Parameswara Menon v. Sachidananda Menon (1970 KLT 1031), wherein a suit for partition without including all the properties was ordered to continue, itself was a case of joint family properties. In that decision it was observed: "The argument that a suit for partition of joint family property is bad if some item or other is omitted is unsound although normally, such a suit should embrace all the assets of the family. There may be circumstances in which practical considerations may justify the institution and continuance of a suit for partition where certain items of co-parcenary property are not included. There is no legal inhibition, if there are justifying features, in allowing a suit for partition. When there are certain items which are omitted from the earlier suit for good practical reasons the second suit will not be barred". 5. The reasons for the rule against partial partition in joint tenancies laid down in the decision in Rajendra Kumar v. Brojendra Kumar (AIR 1923 Cal. 501) and quoted with approval in the above decision reads: "The rule that a partition suit should embrace all the joint property is neither arbitrary nor technical; it is founded on sound and weighty reasons. If the rule were not recognised and firmly applied, multiplicity of litigation would be the inevitable result. If suits for partition were allowed to be instituted in fragments, the jurisdiction of the trial Court and (he forum of appeal might be altered; it might be of paramount importance to a party litigant whether he should have a first appeal or a second appeal to the High Court, and whether he should at all be permitted to seek the judgment of the Judicial Committee with regard to the matters in controversy. The rule further ensures a just partition; parties might otherwise be greatly prejudiced as regards equitable distribution, retention of possession, liability for improvements, and adjustment of accounts. It need not be disputed that there may be very special cases where the application of the rule may be justly relaxed". Sambhudutt v. Srinarain (AIR 1954 Rajasthan 269) was another decision quoted with approval in Parameswara Menon's case (1970 KLT 1031). It need not be disputed that there may be very special cases where the application of the rule may be justly relaxed". Sambhudutt v. Srinarain (AIR 1954 Rajasthan 269) was another decision quoted with approval in Parameswara Menon's case (1970 KLT 1031). In that decision the exceptions to the rule of partial partition in joint tenancies was stated thus: "The reason why in the case of partition between coparceners all the property must be thrown in the hotchpot except for certain well recognised exceptions is that where a member of a joint Hindu family, who broke up the joint status, wants the joint family property to be divided, the cause of action arises at one time, and he must therefore include every item of property in the suit. But in the case of tenants-in-common it is not necessary that the cause of action for partition of every item of the property which is held in common must arise at the same time. Therefore, it may be possible in cases of co-tenants that a suit may lie for one item of property at one time and for another item at another time". So also the inapplicability of the rule in relation to co-ownership properties was summed up in that judgment thus: "It is clear, therefore, that in the case of tenants-in-common it is not essential that all the property held in common should be brought into hotchpot though it is desirable that as far as possible, in order to avoid multiplicity of suits, all the property should be included in one suit. It is, however, for the Court in each case to decide whether the case is of such a nature that the plaintiff should be ordered to include the remaining property also in the suit for division, provided of course the property is within the jurisdiction of the court in case it is immovable property. But the suit, in our opinion, cannot be thrown out on the mere ground that all the property which is capable of partition was not included". 6. It may be always desirable, in order to avoid multiplicity of suits and consequent harassment and inconvenience that as far as possible all the properties should be included even in a suit for partition of co-ownership properties. 6. It may be always desirable, in order to avoid multiplicity of suits and consequent harassment and inconvenience that as far as possible all the properties should be included even in a suit for partition of co-ownership properties. But in such cases it is not essential that all the properties held in common should be brought in the common hotchpot in the same suit. Even in such cases, depending upon the facts and circumstances and the nature of properties, it is competent for the court to order the plaintiff to include the remaining properties also subject to the question of jurisdiction. A suit for partition of co-ownership properties cannot be thrown out on the ground of partial partition. The ordinary rule that a suit for partition is not maintainable cannot apply in case of co-owners having distinct rights. Where the causes of action and the claims are not identical, it may not be desirable to insist on the compliance of the rule against partial partition. 7. The rule against partial partition is only one of equity and convenience. Therefore, it is better to limit the rule in its application to properties over which the parties have community of interest and unity of possession. If partial partition can be had without inconvenience to the other sharers and if it will not stand in the way of equities being adjusted, it is not necessary to insist that all properties will have to be scheduled. Plaintiff is the master of the litigation. Normally he is the person to decide what are the reliefs to be claimed and who are all to be impleaded. Of course, these are all not to be left to the sweet will and pleasure of the plaintiff. His choice could always be only subject to the relevant provisions of law. But normally he cannot be compelled to fight persons against whom he does Dot want to fight. So also he cannot be compelled to schedule properties which according to him are not partible. As earlier stated these are not hard and fast propositions. 8. In this case firstly the plaint schedule property and the properties sought to be included are all co-ownership properties. For claiming partition of the father's and mother's properties the cause of actions are different arising at different times. There are no equities to be adjusted. There is no allegation of any inconvenience also. 8. In this case firstly the plaint schedule property and the properties sought to be included are all co-ownership properties. For claiming partition of the father's and mother's properties the cause of actions are different arising at different times. There are no equities to be adjusted. There is no allegation of any inconvenience also. The items sought to be included are not specified. The plaintiff has got a case that those properties are not partible also. Even if partible, the allegation is that there are other persons also entitled to claim share. If those properties are included factual and legal contentions not existing at present may also arise. Additional parties also will have to be impleaded. There is no unity of interest also. Further, the trial court has exercised its discretion in favour of the plaintiff and the exercise of discretion is not in any way shown to be wrong. Under such circumstances, I am of opinion that the Subordinate Judge was not justified in law or equity in interfering with the discretion for the purpose of non-suting the plaintiff on the basis of the rule of partial partition which is only a rule of prudence and equity. The second appeal is therefore allowed. The decree and judgment of the Subordinate Judge are set aside and those of the Munsiff restored. In the circumstances, the parties are directed to suffer costs incurred before this Court.