A. K. CHATTERJEE, J. ( 1 ) THE short and the main point raised in this revisional application is whether S. 167 (5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure which compels a Magistrate to make an order stopping further investigation into an offence in any case triable as a summons case, if the investigation is not concluded within a period of six months from the date of arrest of the accused unless the Magistrate is satisfied by the Investigating agency, that for special reasons and in the interest of justice, the investigation should continue beyond the said period is attracted if an accused is not arrested but voluntarily surrenders before the Magistrate. The learned advocate for the petitioners has contended that although S. 167 (5) of the Criminal Procedure Code speaks of counting the period of six months from the date of arrest of the accused, still it should apply equally if an accused surrenders before the Magistrate and in such a case the period of six months should be computed from the date of surrender. The learned advocate has also cited a Division Bench decision reported in 86 Cal WN 242 in support of his contention. This authority does not come to the aid of the petitioners because in that case the accused persons were arrested by the police and did not surrender before the Magistrate as in the case before me. Therefore, the Bench decision referred to above is by no means an authority for the proposition that S. 167 (5), Cr. P. C. applies equally whether an accused is arrested by the police or surrenders before the Magistrate. ( 2 ) AFTER a very careful consideration of the question raised in this application, I have no doubt in my mind that S. 167 (5), Cr. P. C. is not attracted in case of surrender of an accused person before a Magistrate. This follows not only from the letters of S. 167 (5), Cr. P. C. but also from the very scheme of the section itself. P. C. is not attracted in case of surrender of an accused person before a Magistrate. This follows not only from the letters of S. 167 (5), Cr. P. C. but also from the very scheme of the section itself. A perusal of S. 167 of the Criminal Procedure Code will at once disclose that it lays down the various procedures to be followed by the Investigating agency and the Magistrate right from the time of the arrest of an accused and it is only as a part of such scheme that it provides that if in any summons case the investigation is not completed within six months from the date of arrest of the accused, the Magistrate is required to make an order stopping the investigation unless he is satisfied that it should continue for special reasons and in the interest of justice. The principle behind this provision is that the Investigating agency may not harass a person for long by binding him over in less serious cases. This consideration obviously does not apply if a person volunteers to surrender before a Magistrate and consequently in such a case, the Investigating agency cannot be under a mandate to conclude the investigation within a specified period. In other words, the provisions of S. 167 (5) of the Criminal Procedure Code have no application when an accused is not arrested by the police but surrenders before a Magistrate. ( 3 ) IN view of the finding above it appears that in this particular case, the investigation beyond six months from the date of surrender of the petitioners without complying with the requirement of S. 167 (5) of the Criminal Procedure Code was not illegal or irregular even though the case is triable as a summons case. ( 4 ) ANOTHER point raised in the revisional application was that the order passed by the Magistrate summoning the petitioners after submission of the charge sheet was illegal because prior to that, they were discharged. There is absolutely no merit in this contention because the order discharging the petitioners was merely a discharge from the bail bonds furnished by them and not a discharge under S. 239 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Indeed the instant case being one triable as a summons case, there could not be any question of discharge under the said section. Indeed the instant case being one triable as a summons case, there could not be any question of discharge under the said section. Thus the learned Magistrate was quite within his right to summon the petitioners after the charge sheet was submitted against them by the police. ( 5 ) FOR reasons stated above I find no substance in the revisional application which is, therefored rejected. ( 6 ) INTERIM order, if any, is vacated. Application rejected.