Judgment :- 1. First defendant is the appellant. He is the owner of a shop building which was rented out to one Kelappan. Kelappan was doing the business of making and selling gold ornaments in the premises under the name and style 'Kelappan and Company'. He died on 9-9-1960. First plaintiff is his widow and plaintiffs 2 and 3 are his sons. Defendants 2 and 4 are brothers of Kelappan and third defendant is his near relation. Even after the death of Kelappan the business continued in the same name and it was managed by the second defendant. The widow and sons were not trading. The sons were minors also. 2. In 1967 first defendant filed an application for eviction on the ground of bona fide requirement for own use and it was dismissed. Thereafter be again filed B. R. C. O. P. 124 of 1971 for eviction on the grounds of arrears of rent, bona fide requirement for own use and sub-letting. 2nd defendant was the first respondent and defendants 3 and 4 were respectively respondents 2 and 3. Respondents 2 and 3 were impleaded as sub-tenants inducted by the tenant. Eviction petition was filed on the assumption that after the death of Kelappan the business was being continued in the premises as a partnership concern of which first respondent (Second defendant) was the Managing Partner. He was impleaded in his individual capacity and as Managing Partner of the Partnership business. Plaintiffs who alone are the legal representatives of Kelappan were not impleaded in the rent control proceedings. Respondents resisted the claim for eviction tooth and nail. Continuance of the business as a partnership concern after the death of Kelappan and the status of the second defendant (first respondent) as the Managing Partner were facts more or less admitted in the rent control proceedings. In order to bring about that respondents 2 and 3 are not subtenants a further contention was raised that the partnership is a joint family concern and the joint family includes respondents 1 and 3 who are brothers of the deceased. Second respondent was contended to be an employee only. Original of Ext. B1 partnership deed was produced in that case to prove this contention. It referred to an earlier partnership deed dated 13-10-1960 which came into existence immediately after the death of Kelappan on 9-9-1960. 3. Second respondent was contended to be an employee only. Original of Ext. B1 partnership deed was produced in that case to prove this contention. It referred to an earlier partnership deed dated 13-10-1960 which came into existence immediately after the death of Kelappan on 9-9-1960. 3. The matter was hotly contested on all the available grounds upto this court. From Ext. A9 order for eviction by the Rent Controller there was an appeal which was dismissed by the original of Ext. A6 judgment dated 12-2-1976 CRP. 16 of 1976 against that order was once dismissed by the District Judge on 8-3-1977. It was the present second plaintiff who filed the original of Ext. B3 affidavit in support of the petition for restoration stating that he is the person conducting the CRP. on behalf of the firm. The CRP. was restored and then disposed of by the original of Ext. A7 on 6-10-1977. Against that there was CRP 3655 of 1977 before this Court and it was dismissed evidenced by Ext. B4 order dated 16-2-1978. Eviction was ordered on all grounds including subletting. Joint family nature of the business was found against and the original of Ext. BI partnership deed was found to be a fabrication. 4. Then the first plaintiff made an unsuccessful attempt to get herself impleaded in execution, probably in an attempt to see whether eviction could he further protracted. It was then that this suit was filed alleging that the order for eviction and delivery will not bind the plaintiffs who were not parties to the rent control proceedings. The main contention is that the estate of deceased Kelappan namely the tenancy was not at all represented in the Rent Control proceedings and hence it will not bind the plaintiffs who are the only legal representatives of deceased Kelappan. Pursuant to the order for eviction appellant/first defendant obtained delivery through Court and hence Plaintiffs sought recovery of possession also. Trial Court dismissed the suit finding that the business conducted in the premises belonged to the joint family of deceased Kelappan which was properly represented in the rent control proceedings by the Managing Partner of the Partnership Firm which was doing the business on behalf of the joint family. The appellate Court disagreed with the trial judge and found that the joint family character of the business was not established. The appellate Court disagreed with the trial judge and found that the joint family character of the business was not established. Hence a decree as prayed for was given allowing recovery of possession of the premises. That is bow the first dependent happened to come up in second appeal. 5. I do not think it necessary to consider the rival contentions and evidence in the rent control proceedings and this suit, certain facts are admitted. Appellant is the owner of the building and it was from him that deceased Kelappan took the same on rent. Thereafter he was conducting a business under the name and style 'Kelappan and Company', whether it was a proprietary concern or a joint family concern or a partnership. After his death also the business continued in the same name with the difference that management was solely by the second defendant. Plaintiffs 2 and 3 were then minors and the widow first plaintiff did not physically take part in the management of the business. The present case of the plaintiffs is that second defendant was managing the business as their agent as per the instrument made by the first plaintiff and there was no partnership and it was not conducted as a joint family business. In short the contention is that the business continued as a proprietary concern of the Plaintiffs who are the legal representatives of Kelappan and on their behalf second defendant was conducting it only as their agent. Plaintiffs had to admit before me at the time of arguments that even during the pendency of the rent control proceedings defendants 2 and 3 were also in occupation of portions of the premises. They were not able to explain how, and on this account they had to resort to hide and seek as satisfy with vague and evasive statements in the plaint. The rent control proceedings was contested by the second defendant admitting the existence of partnership and contending that it was a joint family concern in which fourth defendant was also interested as a member of the joint family. Third defendant was contended to be an employee. These contentions became necessary in the rent control proceedings to explain the occupation of defendants 3 and 4 in order to deny the allegation of subletting which was one of the grounds relied on for eviction. Third defendant was contended to be an employee. These contentions became necessary in the rent control proceedings to explain the occupation of defendants 3 and 4 in order to deny the allegation of subletting which was one of the grounds relied on for eviction. A partnership deed was produced and second defendant claimed himself to be the Managing partner of the partnership business conducted by the joint family. It was in that capacity and in his individual capacity that the second defendant resisted eviction. It has also to be remembered that in the rent control proceedings second defendant was not in a position to deny occupation of defendants 3 and 4 because the same was clinchingly proved by production of licences in their name in relation to the same premises. It is true, that ultimately the joint family nature of the business and the partnership were found against accepting the contention of the first defendant/ appellant. Subletting was also found in favour of the appellant who was the petitioner therein. We are not very much concerned with the contention taken by the parties in the rent control proceedings and their conflict with the present contentions. What we are mainly concerned with is whether the estate of the deceased, whatever be its form, was substantially represented in the rent control proceedings. In that connection we will also be concerned with the question whether in the rent control proceeding the second defendant was only acting in conjunction with the plaintiffs and to their interest or whether he was acting against them. 6. Though in the plaint fraud and collusion on the part of the second defendant is alleged it is vague and the only allegation seems to be that he kept the rent control proceedings, a secret. At the same time it is stated that even on the date of suit second defendant was acting as her agent. The rent receipts produced in this case were admittedly given by the second defendant who filed a written statement supporting the plaintiffs. As Pw.1 first plaintiff said that her two sons are not persons of ability or capacity. She does not know who gave instructions for drafting the plaint. To a question whether the suit was filed at the instance of the second defendant she pleaded ignorance. As Pw.1 first plaintiff said that her two sons are not persons of ability or capacity. She does not know who gave instructions for drafting the plaint. To a question whether the suit was filed at the instance of the second defendant she pleaded ignorance. She said that she came to know of the rent control proceedings and the order only in 1978 after the final order was passed by the High Court. At the same time Ext. B3 shows that when the rent control revision petition was dismissed by the District Judge on 8-3-1977 the second Plaintiff filed the affidavit in support of the application for restoration stating that the business is a partnership, that be is a partner and that he is conducting the CRP. Ext. B3 is attested copy of the affidavit sworn to by the second plaintiff and attested by the Advocate who certified that it was sworn in his presence. The District Judge was not prepared to accept Ext. B3 without proof. The District judge lost sight of the fact that the affidavit attested by the Advocate was accepted and the CRP restored. So also the District Judge did not take note of the fact that the original of Ext.B3 was not denied and eventhough the second plaintiff was present before court he did not go to the box. These circumstances make it clear that the second defendant was contesting the B.R.C. case for and on behalf of the plaintiffs also and with their knowledge, co-operation and participation. Now they cannot turn round and say that the contentions accepting joint family nature of business the partnership, as well as status of the second defendant as Managing Partner were fraudulent and collusive and to the detriment of their interest. Plaint is very vague, evasive and non committal in respect of occupation of the premises by defendants 3 and 4. It cannot be accepted for a moment that for 18 years from 1960 to 1978 plaintiffs were in the dark regarding everything. In fact collusion is only between plaintiffs and second defendant. Plaintiffs appeared in the scene only when all attempts by the second defendant failed. 7. It cannot be accepted for a moment that for 18 years from 1960 to 1978 plaintiffs were in the dark regarding everything. In fact collusion is only between plaintiffs and second defendant. Plaintiffs appeared in the scene only when all attempts by the second defendant failed. 7. Whether Kelappan and Company was a joint family business or not, if it was a partnership and the second defendant was its Managing Partner, the tenancy must be deemed to have been sufficiently represented in the rent control proceedings because second defendant was a party. Even taken for granted that the business did not belong to the joint family and it was not a partnership concern the position will not be different. In such a case the tenancy will be the properitory concern of the legal representative of the tenant namely the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs 2 and 3 were minors and even according to the plaintiffs the business was run and managed exclusively by the second defendant as the agent of the first Plaintiff under the authority given by her. In that capacity itself he was a person interested in the tenancy. If there was a partnership and second defendant was it Managing Partner then there cannot be any dispute that he was competent to represent the tenancy and he actually represented it. If so the only question is whether there was fraud or collusion. Both the Courts below did not find fraud or collusion. Evidence not only rules out such vitiating factors but also shows that on behalf of the tenancy second defendant was over zealous in raising all possible contentions and righting them out till the last court. 8. If so the only substantial question of law to be considered is whether the eviction order is valid or whether it is a nullity on account of non impleading of plaintiffs. 0.30 R.10 CPC. as it stood before the amendment of 1976 provided that any person carrying on a business in a name or style other than his own name may be sued in such name or style as if it were a firm name, and, in so far as the nature of the case permits all rules under 0.30 will apply. If so when the managing partner is impleaded, whether there is a firm or not, the business is properly represented. If as stated in Exts. If so when the managing partner is impleaded, whether there is a firm or not, the business is properly represented. If as stated in Exts. B1 and B3 there was a partnership and second defendant was the managing partner the question of representation is beyond doubt also. 9. When a plaintiff or an appellant after bona fide enquiry ascertains the legal representatives of a deceased defendant or respondent and impleads them, the impleaded representatives sufficiently represent the estate of the deceased and the decision with them on record will bind the entire estate including those legal representatives not brought on record in the absence of fraud or collusion or circumstances indicating that there has not been a fair or real trial or that against the absent heir there was a special case which was not and could not be tried in the proceeding. See Daya Ram v, Shyam Sundari AIR 1955 SC 1040 and Harihar Prasad v. Balmiki Prasad AIR 1975 SC 733. Ordinarily the court does not regard a decree binding upon a person who was not impleaded eo nomine in the action. But there are certain exceptions to this recognised rule In a suit where by the personal law governing the absent heir the heir impleaded represent his interest in the estate of the deceased or in cases where no prejudice is shown to the absent heir, the decree in an action where the plaintiff has after bona fide enquiry impleaded all the heirs known to him will ordinarily bind all persons interested in the estate. But this is also subject to the condition that vitiating circumstances like fraud or collusion are absent. The court will also enquire whether there was a real contest and for that purpose ascertain whether any special defence was available to the absent heir which was not put forward. So also where due to a bona tide mistake the plaintiff files a suit against a person who is not representing the estate of the deceased, in the absence of fraud or collusion or other vitiating circumstances a decree passed against the person impleaded as heir will bind the estate eventhough other persons interested in the estate are not brought on the record (See Mohd. Sulaiman v. Mohd. Ismail AIR 1966 SC 792). Sulaiman v. Mohd. Ismail AIR 1966 SC 792). The first two cases relate to death after suit and the subsequent one is a case of wrong institution, Principle is the same. 10. Ragho Prasad Gupta v. Shri Krishna Poddar (AIR 1969 SC 316) is an extreme case. In that case the decision in any proceeding by or against a benamidar was held to bind the real owner though he is not joined as party unless it is shown that the benamidar could not or did not in fact represent the interest of the real owner. Therein when the benamidar died his heirs were brought on record. The application filed by the real owner for impleading him was dismissed observing that he will not be bound by the decree. But all the contentions available to him were raised and pressed by the heirs of the benamidar. The Supreme Court held that even in such a case the heirs of the benamidar continued to represent the real owner and in the absence of prejudice he was bound by the decree. In an un-reported single bench decision of this Court in CRP 1319 of 1972 there was a lease to two persons. Then they formed a firm with some others also. In the rent control proceedings the Managing Partner alone was impleaded. Contention was that the original lessees were not impleaded and hence the petition will not lie. It was held that impleading of the Managing partner was sufficient. 11. In Subramania Pillai v. Masterly (AIR 1976 Madras 303) it was observed that it is not always the legal requisite that inevitably, only the heirs all of them or any of them, should figure as legal representatives. The Procedural law requiring representation will stand satisfied if there is substantial representation in the sense that all that could be done was done by some one interested in the issue in the suit. The definition of 'legal representative' in S.2(11) CPC is significant. It was defined to mean a person who in law represents the estate of a deceased person. It was also defined to include any person, who intermeddles with the estate of the deceased If the conditions already discussed are satisfied even the representation by a person who has no other interest except possession will suffice to satisfy the test of substantial representation in order to bind the estate. It was also defined to include any person, who intermeddles with the estate of the deceased If the conditions already discussed are satisfied even the representation by a person who has no other interest except possession will suffice to satisfy the test of substantial representation in order to bind the estate. The case in band satisfied all these tests. Second defendant was in possession and management and that is admitted. He raised all contentions evidently with the knowledge and connivance of the Plaintiffs and the matter was earnestly fought up to this Court. Plaintiffs entered the scene only when all the attempts of the second defendant failed. There is absolutely no bona fides in the plaint claim. 12. The last argument was that there is no substantial question of law and the decision was only on questions of fact which cannot be interfered in second appeal. The only substantial question of law on which notice was issued is whether by the representation of the second defendant in the rent control proceedings the plaintiffs are bound by the decision or not. The two tests to decide whether a question of law is a substantial question of law or not are (i) whether it is of general public importance and (ii) whether it directly and substantially affect the rights of the parties and if so whether it is either an open question in the sense that it is not finally settled by the highest court or is not free from difficulty or call for discussion of alternative views. If the question is settled by the highest court or the general principles to be applied in determining the question are well settled and it is only a question of applying these principles then it would not be a substantial question of law (Chunilal Metha v. C.S. & M. Co. Ltd. AIR 1962 SC 1314). Judged by the above principles the question whether the representation by the second defendant will bind the plaintiffs is a question which directly and substantially affect the right of the parties. The decision of the suit must depend upon the answer to that question. That question was wrongly answered by the appellate court and it gave rise to substantial question of law. The suit is ill-conceived. It is mala fide and collusive. Plaintiffs were substantially represented by the second defendant in the rent control proceedings. The decision of the suit must depend upon the answer to that question. That question was wrongly answered by the appellate court and it gave rise to substantial question of law. The suit is ill-conceived. It is mala fide and collusive. Plaintiffs were substantially represented by the second defendant in the rent control proceedings. The decision is binding on them. The second appeal is, therefore, allowed and the decree and judgment of the appellate court are set aside. The suit is dismissed with costs throughout to the appellant/Ist defendant.