ORDER 1. The petitioner was employed as a foundry worker in the Government Press. For the theft of mono-metal weighing about 540 grams and worth about Rs. 20, he was found guilty in the departmental inquiry and therefore, was dismissed from service under the proceedings of the 2nd respondent, dated 14th July, 1980. 2. For the same offence, he was prosecuted in C.C. No. 18991 of 1979 before the 7th Metropolitan Magistrate, Egmore, Madras. However, he was acquitted on 5th August, 1980 as the learned Magistrate held that the guilt was not proved beyond all reasonable doubt. The acquittal by the Magistrate did not weigh with the Ist respondent (appellate authority). Government and thus, it allowed the petitioner's dismissal dismissal to stand by its order dated 24th December, 1982. It is thus two orders are sought to be quashed in this proceeding under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India. 3. One of the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Department ought to have awaited the result in C.C. No. 18991 of 1979 and that if that proceeding ended in an acquittal, the Department ought to have accepted such acquittal and dropped the departmental proceeding. But in view of Corporation of City of Nagpur v. Ram Chandra, (1981 - II - LLJ - 6) and Parrys Confectionery Ltd. v. Industrial Tribunal, 45 FJR 329 the above contention has to be rejected. In the former citation, the Supreme Court held : at P 8 of (1981 - II - LLJ - 6) "Normally where an accused is honourably and completely acquitted, it would not be expedient to continue the departmental enquiry on the very same charges or grounds or evidence, but the fact remains, however, that merely because the accused is acquitted, the power of the authority concerned to continue the departmental enquiry is not taken away nor is its discretion in any ways fettered." In the words of Mr. Justice Ismail as he than was in the other citation : "It is only when the criminal Court, on going through the evidence, has acquitted the accused on the basis that the accused was innocent and was not guilty that the employer will have no right to sit in judgment over the criminal Court to conduct a fresh enquiry, and find the employee guilty of the charges levelled against him. Where an employee has been acquitted by giving him the benefit of doubt or on any other technical ground, the employer will not be precluded from, conducting an enquiry against the employee in respect of the same subject-matter." The decision reported in Tata Oil Mill Co., Ltd. v. Its workmen, 1964 - II - LLJ - 113 at 119 : has only pointed out : "It is desirable that if the incident giving rise to a charge framed against a workman in a domestic enquiry is being tried in a criminal Court, the employer should stay the domestic enquiry pending the final disposal of the criminal case. It would be particularly appropriate to adopt such a course when the charge is of grave character because it would be unfair to compel the workman to disclose the defence which he may take before the criminal court. But to say that domestic enquiries may be stayed pending criminal trial is very different from saying that if an employer proceeds with the domestic enquiry in spite of the fact that the criminal trial is pending, the enquiry for that reason alone is vitiated and the conclusion arrived at the such an enquiry is either bad in law or mala fide." and so, this decision does not render any help to the petitioner in his contention. 4. In the instant case, in the domestic inquiry, the petitioner did not submit any explanation. The Assistant Works Manager, Government Press, held an inquiry. He relied on the written statement of the petitioner admitting the guilt. No doubt, the petitioner would retract his said statement. Nonetheless, it cannot be said that there was no evidence, nor acceptable evidence before the Assistant Works Manager for me to interfere with such finding in the domestic inquiry. 5. The last contention though not actually raised in this proceeding that the extreme punishment of dismissal is highly excessive considering the theft if of material of a value Rs. 20, appears to me to be well founded. Following the decision is W.P. No. 6593 of 1983, I am inclined to set aside the order of dismissal, but with a condition that the respondents are directed to reinstate the petition only as a new employee with no right to the petitioner to claim benefit of any kind on the basis of his past services. Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed. Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed. However, there will be no order as to costs.