JUDGMENT K. Sukumaran, J. 1. The writ petition raises a question basic to the functioning of the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, referred to hereinafter as 'the Tribunal'. Having regard to the recurring nature of such a question, it is desirable that it is considered and dealt with elaborately, so that the decision may serve for future guidance. 2. It is better to relegate to a later stage the claims and counter claims of the contending operators in an understandable scramble for permit. 3. The petitioner relied on Ext. P4 order of the Tribunal to show that in almost similar situation, the Tribunal allowed the original grantee of a temporary permit to operate during an intervening period. Counsel for the respondents submitted that in relation to the very route, the pattern of orders passed by the Tribunal was of a different nature. In such cases, the Tribunal did not permit the original grantee to operate during such intervening period. As indicated earlier, the manner in which the Tribunal functioned on one occasion or another, need not be given much of emphasis or importance. A comet of a season can in no sense be a guiding star. 4. The Tribunal has necessarily to tackle variety of decisions passed by the Regional Transport Authorities. Having regard to the constitution of those bodies, and the pattern of functioning under the existing circumstances, the decisions rendered by them do not compare favourably with those given by trained judicial minds. It is only too recently that this Court had to sternly indicate the obligation of the subordinate transport authorities to pass speaking orders. That obligation had been indicated earlier, and repeatedly. (See A. P. State Road Transport Corporation v. Venkitaramareddy, 1970 (1) SCWR 617 and T. P. Govindan RTA Cannanore, AIR 1972 Kerala 243.) Unfortunately for all concerned, the Regional Transport Authorities were not adhering to the discipline expected of such bodies in dealing with valuable rights of contending parties. Almost with impunity, non speaking orders used to be passed. This Court has now indicated that such remiss ness would no longer be tolerated, and that any ... authority failing to conform to the requirement of law as laid down by this Court, would do so at its peril, of being proceeded against under the Contempt of Courts Act. Almost with impunity, non speaking orders used to be passed. This Court has now indicated that such remiss ness would no longer be tolerated, and that any ... authority failing to conform to the requirement of law as laid down by this Court, would do so at its peril, of being proceeded against under the Contempt of Courts Act. It is to be hoped that here after a non speaking order will be a thing of the past. 5. The lack of reasons is only one among the various infirmities of the orders of such authorities. Quite often, the right emphasis on a crucial fact might be missed. There may be over looking of an important fact which will tilt the balance of the reasoning. A misapprehension of law might vitiate the finding. The Tribunal will have necessarily to correct such errors of the subordinate authorities. 6. The appellate powers of the Tribunal in the present case are not hedged in by restrictive conditions. It can set aside, confirm or vary the order of the Regional Transport Authority. Circumstances justifying, the order could be set aside, and the matter remanded for fresh consideration When the appellate tribunal takes a view different from that of the RTA, sets aside the grant and orders the permit to be issued to one among the appellants, there is no void left in relation to the operation of the vehicle. Things will, however, be different, when the Tribunal sets aside the grant but does not itself make a grant. The Original grantee would be ousted; the new one is yet to come. The earlier vehicle is off the road and a fresh one, not yet arrived. Doubtless the situation is one which the travelling public is much concerned about. Their interest will be served only if they can have the communication. Their interest is only to reach the destination safely and in time. They have no concern as to who owns the vehicle or who drives it, or who collects the fare. It is to tide over such situations that the Tribunal makes ad hoc arrangements. The complaint is that there is no uniformity in the pattern of functioning of the Tribunal in such situations. It is that complaint, quite a basic one in relation to the Tribunal as indicated earlier, that calls for serious consideration. 7. It is to tide over such situations that the Tribunal makes ad hoc arrangements. The complaint is that there is no uniformity in the pattern of functioning of the Tribunal in such situations. It is that complaint, quite a basic one in relation to the Tribunal as indicated earlier, that calls for serious consideration. 7. In the present case, no direction has been given permitting the original grantee to operate the vehicle during the intervening period between the order of the Tribunal and the fresh orders of the Regional Transport Authority on its de novo consideration. According to the petitioner, atleast in some cases, the Tribunal had permitted the original grantee to operated during the intervening period, despite the fact that the grant of the permit stood set aside The Tribunal should not appear to pass orders according to the whim or humour of the Tribunal at a particular time is the contention of the writ petitioner. 8. The question has been raised in the present case in the context of a grant of temporary permit, as distinguished from that of a grant of a pucca permit. Perhaps different considerations might arise in dealing with a similar situation in relation to a pucca permit. It is desirable not to express any views in relation to a hypothetical situation. In that view of the matter the exercise of the discretion of the Tribunal in the context of the order of the Tribunal setting aside the grant of a temporary permit alone is discussed and decided upon. 9. The grant of temporary permit is itself subject to specific conditions contained in the statute. In a sense, the satisfaction of the one or other of the conditions precedent, is indispensable for the authority to grant a temporary permit. A close scrutiny will always be made either by the Tribunal or by this Court to ensure that this jurisdictional condition is properly conformed to and complied with. That being so, operation of a vehicle on a temporary permit, whether on the basis of a proper grant by the Regional Transport Authority, or on an order passed by the appellate authority, or on an ad hoc basis during the intervening period between the remand of the Tribunal and the fresh consideration of RTA, all should comply with the basic condition of the existence of a temporary need. If the basic condition of a temporary need is satisfied, and if the relegation for a fresh decision is only to make a choice from among the contestants, it will be open to the Tribunal to give a proper direction permitting the continued operation of the vehicle of the original grantee during the intervening period unless the original grant is patently perverse. If, however, there is no satisfactory material at all, or if the appellate Tribunal itself is in doubt about the clear existence of materials positing a temporary need be proper not to permit any vehicle to be operated in the route, in the intervening period. In such a situation, the operation of a vehicle will be better postponed till such time as the authority enters a specific finding about the existence of the temporary need. To put it differently, when the Tribunal makes a remand to the R. T. A. for the consideration of the question about the very existence of a temporary need, it shall not give any adhoc permission to the original grantee or the appellant to operate the vehicle during the intervening period. 10. In the present case, the grant of the temporary permit by the RTA was set aside by the Tribunal on the ground that there was no temporary need. The Tribunal pointed out that the order of the RTA did not spell out any temporary need. Not only that According to the Tribunal, no party was "able to point out any circumstances from which any such temporary need can be legitimately spelt out." In other words, there was neither finding nor even a prima facie identification of the materials indicative of the existence of a temporary need. The Tribunal while setting aside the grant of the temporary permit in favour of the petitioner, chose not to permit the petitioner or appellant before it, to operate vehicle on adhoc basis. The view taken is correct. To permit the grantee of the temporary permit to continue operation of the vehicle even in such circumstances would be unjustified in law. In the light of the above discussion, the writ petition fails and it is accordingly dismissed. There will, however, be no order as to costs.