Judgment Binodanand Singh, J. 1. This is plaintiffs appeal against a judgment of reversal. The learned Additional Subordinate Judge had decreed the suit, which has been reversed by the learned 1st Additional District Judge, Hazaribagh, in Money Appeal No.15 of 1969 ; whereas the Money Suit had been 19 of 1971 registered as No.125 of 1966 4 of 1966 2. The appellant had filed the suit for realisation of Rs.5,208.76 Paise as the balance due for the works done by the plaintiff-appellant as contractor together with Rs.1,588.24 Paise interest totalling Rs.6,797/-with interest pendente-lite and future interest. The case of the plaintiff was that it was a registered partnership firm doing contract business for transport of materials in the district of Hazaribagh. In June, 1961, the Superintending Engineer, hazaribagh, had issued notices inviting tenders for transport of Public Works departments materials in the Hazaribagh Division for the period ending 30-6-62. The plaintiff submitted its tender as also deposited an earnest money of Rs.3,000/-as required. On 3-7-61, the Executive Engineer, Hazaribagh, asked the plaintiff-to meet him in connection with the settlement of the contract and when the plaintiff met the Executive Engineer, it was decided that the plaintiff would accept the work at the second lowest tender rate if it was found that the appellants rate exceeded that rate and ultimately, the Executive engineer informed the appellant on 4-7-1961 that he had recommended the plaintiffs rate and terms to the Superintending Engineer, Hazaribagh, for his approval and also asked the appellant to start the work in anticipation of the approval of the Superintending Engineer. In pursuance thereof, the appellant carried on the work of transportation of the Public Works Department as per tender to the entire satisfaction of the Department. The Superintending Engineer, hazaribagh, subsequently decided to ask for fresh tenders for the work and the executive Engineer informed the plaintiff on 23-8-61 about this matter and also asked the appellant to take delivery of such materials only which the appellant had already received on the basis of the railway receipts from the defendant-respondents and not to do any further work. The appellant accordingly stopped further work and requested the Executive Engineer to pay the bills for the work already done as agreed to between them. According to the appellants case, on demand, the Superintending Engineer and the Executive Engineer refused to make payment ar. d hence, the suit was filed. The appellant accordingly stopped further work and requested the Executive Engineer to pay the bills for the work already done as agreed to between them. According to the appellants case, on demand, the Superintending Engineer and the Executive Engineer refused to make payment ar. d hence, the suit was filed. A notice under Sec.80 of the code of Civil Procedure was sent on 17-2-1966, which was duly served on the respondent. 3. The defendant-respondent filed a written statement contesting the suit. According to the case of the respondent, the Executive Engineer, by his letter, dated 4-7-1961 had authorised the plaintiff-appellant to start the work in anticipation of the approval of the Superintending Engineer, but it was not implied in that authorisation that the rate would be subject to the approval of the superintending Engineer, meaning thereby that the rate approved by him will be agreeable to the appellant and the plaintiff started the work on the said condition. The plaintiffs allegation that he would get the payment at the rate of second lowest tender was denied and, according to the respondent, the plaintiff" being an old contractor very well knew that he would be paid at the rate approved by the superintending Engineer. According to the defendant-respondent, no decision was taken by the Superintending Engineer to ask for fresh tenders for the work, but the Superintending Engineer only decided to allow the work to the lowest tenderer, who was one Shri B. L. Choudhary and he was given the work and the plaintiff was accordingly informed. It was also contended that the plaintiff had been paid as per the rate approved by the Superintending Engineer and nothing was due. 4. The only two main points, which were canvassed before the courts below were whether the suit was barred by the law of limitation and, secondly : had the provisions of Sec.79 and 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure been followed and if not, was the suit liable to be dismissed. 5. The trial court decided both the issues in favour of the appellant and decreed the suit on contest with costs, interest pendente-lite and future interest at the rate of 6 percent per annum. On appeal by the defendant, the lower appellate court has reversed both the findings of the trial court and has dismissed the suit. 6. 5. The trial court decided both the issues in favour of the appellant and decreed the suit on contest with costs, interest pendente-lite and future interest at the rate of 6 percent per annum. On appeal by the defendant, the lower appellate court has reversed both the findings of the trial court and has dismissed the suit. 6. The appeal was taken up for hearing before a learned Single Judge of this Court and the only two questions raised were the same as were raised in the courts below. Having regard to these questions of law, the learned Single Judge referred this case to a Division Bench. Hence, this appeal before us. 7. First, I propose to deal with the question whether the appellant can be nonsuited on the ground of contravention of the provisions of Sec.80 read with Sec.79 of the Code of Civil Procedure or not. Admittedly, the suit was instituted by M/s Bhagat and Company as the plaintiff. According to the finding in the trial court judgment, which has not been reversed nor even conside red by the lower appellate court, there is no dispute over the fact that the plaintiff was asked to begin works at the rate agreed on between the plaintiffs agent D. R. Bhagat and the Executive Engineer and that there is no dispute regarding the fact that the plaintiffs claim is confined to this amount only. The plaint as originally filed was signed by D. R. Bhagat. . . plaintiff, followed by the verification portion wherein, it has been stated that :- "i, D. R. Bhagat, a Partner of M/s Bhagat and Co. the plaintiff do hereby declare that the statements made above, are true to the best of my knowledge and belief. Verified at Ha/aribagh, this the 1st day of october, 1966. " Thereafter, it is again signed followed by an endorsement bearing the name D. R. Bhagat,. . Plaintiff. It would bear repetition to say that the suit was instituted by m/s Bhagat and Company as the plaintiff as described hereinbelow. Therefore, the suit was instituted by the appellant M/s Bhagat and Company. The plaintiff had filed an amendment petition in the trial court in which in paragraph 1, it had been added that D. R. Bhagat is one of the partners of the plaintiff-firm. Therefore, the suit was instituted by the appellant M/s Bhagat and Company. The plaintiff had filed an amendment petition in the trial court in which in paragraph 1, it had been added that D. R. Bhagat is one of the partners of the plaintiff-firm. In course of the trial, the plaintiff-appellant had filed an amendment petition in which it prayed that in paragraph 1 of the plaint, it be added "d. R. Bhagat is one of the partners of the plaintiff firm. " the plaintiffs lawyer submitted that nothing new had been stated in the amendment matter, because in the original plaint at the place of verification, it had been clearly stated as quoted above. The attention of the trial court was also drawn to a letter (Ext. A) filed by the defendant, which was written by M/s Bhagat and company to the Superintending Engineer on 19-8-61 in which D. R. Bhagat (P. W.2) had signed as a partner of Bhagat and Compan y and this letter had also stated that the partnership deed and the power of attorney had already been submitted to the Executive Engineer, Hazaribagh. On these facts, the petition for amendment of the plaint was allowed by the trial court. In this background, jit has to be cpnsidered as to whether the lower appellate court was justified in holding that the suit was hit by the provisions of Sec.80, Code of Civil procedure as the lower appellate Court has held. In the draft plaint attached to the notice, the plaintiff had been described as "shri D, R. Bhagat, Partner, Bhagat and Company, Contractors and builders, Mohalla Nawabganj, P. O. P. S. and district Hazaribagh. . . Plaintiff" and in the plaint, the plaintiff has been described as "m/s Bhagat and Company, registered firm under the Indian Partnership act, carrying on works of contract Mohalla Nawabganj, P. S. and district Hazaribagh-plaintiff. " The lower appellate court has taken the view that the suit was filed by M/s bhagat and Company and in the notice, the plaintiff was described as Shri D. R. Bhagat of Bhagat and Company. " The lower appellate court has taken the view that the suit was filed by M/s bhagat and Company and in the notice, the plaintiff was described as Shri D. R. Bhagat of Bhagat and Company. It appeared that the notice was given by Shri d. R. Bhagat, a Partner of Bhagat and Company and, therefore, on a comparison of the notice, with the plaint in the court, the identity of the person, who issued the notice, was not found to be the same by the lower appellate court as the person, who brought the suit. The plaintiff had been non-suited on this ground and for this purpose, the lower appellate court has relied on a decision of the supreme Court in the case of S. N. Dutt V/s. Union of India, AIR 1961 Supreme court 1449. Before, however, adverting to this decision, I am not oblivious of the well settled principle of law that Sec.80 applied to all forms of suit and whatever the relief sought. The Act, albeit a Procedure Code, must be read in accordance with natural meaning of its words and Sec.80 is express, explicit and mandatory and it admits of no implication or exceptions. Coming now to the case of S. N. Dutt (supra), it was held therein that Sec.80, according to its plain meaning, requires that there should be identity of a person, who issues the notice with the person who brings the suit. Where an individual carries on business in some name and style, the notice has to be given bo the individual in his own name for the suit can only be filed in the name of an individual. In that case, notice under Sec.80 was given by M/s. S. N. Dutt and Company and the suit was filed by S. N. Dutt, sole proprietor of a busines carried on in the name and style of M/s S. N. Dutt and Company. In these circumstances, it was held by the Supreme Court that the person giving the notice was not the same as the person suing and that, therefore, Sec.80 was not complied with. It. will bear repetition to say that notice under Sec.80 was given by M/s. S. N. Dutt and Company and the suit was filed by S. N. Dutt. In these circumstances, it was held by the Supreme Court that the person giving the notice was not the same as the person suing and that, therefore, Sec.80 was not complied with. It. will bear repetition to say that notice under Sec.80 was given by M/s. S. N. Dutt and Company and the suit was filed by S. N. Dutt. In the Instant case, the suit was filed by M/s Bhagat and Company and a notice was also given in the name of Shri D. R. Bhagat of Bhagat and Company, Contractors and Builders. On the facts and in the circumstances mentioned above, I see no analogy between cases of S. N. Dutt (supra) AIR 1961 SC 1449 and the instant case. I, therefore, overrule the decision of the lower appellate court on this point, namely, non-compliance with the provisions of Sec.80 of the Code of Civil Procedure and, in my view, the learned Additional Subordinate Judge (the trial court) was right, in holding that the provisions of Sec.80 of the Code of Civil Procedure were duly complied with. To take the view as taken by the lower appellate court would be merely piling unreason upon technicality. 8 This then brings us to the only other question involved in this appeal, namely, the question of limitation which I shall be considering hereinafter. The conflict, if any, which has to be resolved is whether Article 56 of the Old limitation Act (hereinafter referred to as the Old Act) corresponding to Article 18 of the New Limitation Act (hereinafter referred to as the New Act for the sake of convenience) will apply or Article 120 of the Old Act corresponding to Article 113 of the New Act will apply. Article 56 of the Old Act provides three years period of limitation from the date when the work was done for the price of work done by the plaintiff for the defendant at his request where no time has been fixed for payment. The corresponding Sec.18 of the New Act provides the same period of limitation for such claim. Article 56 of the Old Act provides three years period of limitation from the date when the work was done for the price of work done by the plaintiff for the defendant at his request where no time has been fixed for payment. The corresponding Sec.18 of the New Act provides the same period of limitation for such claim. The only slight difference is that Article 120 of the Old Act provides six years period of limitation from the date when the right to sue accrues in a suit for which no period of limitation is provided else where for the suit ; whereas the corresponding Article 113 of the New Act provides only three years period of limitation from the date when the right to sue accrues. Manifestly, therefore, under Article 113 of the New Act, the period of limitation has been curtailed and as a consequence will attract the provisions of section 30 of the New Act, which provides that notwithstanding anything contained in the New Act in a suit for which the period of limitation is shorter than the period of limitation prescribed by the Old Act may be instituted within a period ofseven years next after the commencement of the new Act or within a period prescribed for such suit by the Old Act whichever period expires earlier. Therefore, it has to be determined from the facts of the case and the nature of plaint as to whether Article (120 of the Old Act corresponding to Article 113) of the New act will be applicable or it will be governed by Article 55 of the Old Act corresponding to Article 18 of the New Act. So far as the trial court is concerned, it has stated that the suit was filed by the appellant within three years from the date of refusal by the respondent of the payment of demand of the bill by the appellant and it was not barred by limitation. However, no date of such refusal has been stated. It goes without saying that the refusal must be after the demand is made. Therefore, no express finding with regard to the date of refusal need be gone into. In the trial court, the respondent contended that the period of limitation was to be reckoned from 23-8-1961, the date on which the defendant respondent informed the plaintiff to do no further work. 9. Therefore, no express finding with regard to the date of refusal need be gone into. In the trial court, the respondent contended that the period of limitation was to be reckoned from 23-8-1961, the date on which the defendant respondent informed the plaintiff to do no further work. 9. As has been earlier stated, Article 56 of the Old Act Article 18 of the new Act provides three years period of limitation from the date when the work was done for the price of the work done by the plaintiff for the defendent at his request where no time has been fixed for payment. It is well settled that a suit is governed by this Article if it arises out of a contract to pay the price of work done at the request of the defendant. A claim fo payment of an additional rate over the stipulated period in view of the changed circumstances and not for the price of the work not done as agreed under the contract does not fall within the ambit of this Article. It was laid down by the Supreme Court long way back in the case of Gannon Dunkerley and Co. Ltd. V/s. Union of India AIR 1970 SC 1433 at 1435 and also a Division Bench decision of this Court in the case of The State of bihar V/s. Binod Behari Lall 1974 BBCJ 780 at 787. In the case at hand, the claim is for payment of the price of the work done at the request of the defendant arising out of a contract and not for any claim for the payment of an additional rate over the stipulated period. Here, the work had been done by the plaintiff at the request of the Executive Engineer acting as an agent of the defendant-respondent. But, then the controversy arises as to whether this Article will apply to a case where the work is not done in its entirety. Evidently, in this case the work was not done in its entirety although admittedlly no time had been fixed for the payment, but the plaintiff was stopped from doing any further work by the Executive Engineer on 23-8-1961. It is for the party to assert that its case is governed by Article 56 of the Old Act or Article 18 of the New Act to establish the requirements of the Article. It is for the party to assert that its case is governed by Article 56 of the Old Act or Article 18 of the New Act to establish the requirements of the Article. Therefore, it is not one of such suits where the plaintiff-appellant has sued the defendant respondent after completion of the construction work of the respondent. Therefore, it can safely be inferred that article 56 of the Old Act = Article 18 of the New Act will not govern this case. The only other Article which, then, is to be considered is Article 120 of the Old act which is described as a residuary Article and says that any suit for which no period of limitation is provided elsewhere in the schedule to the Act, the period of limitation would be six years from the date when the right to sue accrues. Article 113 of the New Act, more or less corresponding to Article 120 of the old Act prescribes a period of three years as the period of limitation from the date when the right to sue accrues ; whereas Article 120 prescribes six years period of limitation from the date when the right to sue had accured. In the instant case, from the facts noticed earlier, it will be seen that the right to sue accrued to the plaintiff on 23-8-1961 when the Executive Engineer informed the plaintiffs agent, who is none else, but D. R. Bhagat, a partner of the plantiff firm holding power of attorney, not to do any further work. If Article 120 of the Old Act applies, the period of limitation would extinguish any such right in 1967, i. e. after a period of six years from the date when the right to sue accrued ; whereas under the New act, it would be three years from that date. The suit was instituted in the year 1966. i. e. within the period of six years from the date when the right to suit accrued reckoning from 23-8-1961, but according to the New Act, under Article 113, the period of three years would culminate on 22-8-1964 or 28-8-1964. That brings into play the provisions of Sec.30 of the New Act. The suit was instituted in the year 1966. i. e. within the period of six years from the date when the right to suit accrued reckoning from 23-8-1961, but according to the New Act, under Article 113, the period of three years would culminate on 22-8-1964 or 28-8-1964. That brings into play the provisions of Sec.30 of the New Act. Section 30 provides that any suit for which the period of limitation is shorter than the period of limitation prescribed by the Old Act may be instituted within a period of seven years next after the commencement of the New Act or within the period prescribed for such suit by the Old Act, whichever period expires earlier. It is well-settled that the law of limitation being a law of procedure is retrospective which is applicable to any particular suit or proceeding. Law in force on the date on which the suit or the proceeding is instituted notwithstanding the cause of action may have arisen before the Act came into force. Judicial precedents are numerous on this point, but I may refer to a Division Bench decision of this Court on in this connection. In the case of Mani Devi and others V/s. Ram Prasad and others, air 1968 Patna 70 : 1967 BUR 566. Similar view has been taken by the Assam high Court, the Madhya Pradesh High Court and the Calcutta High Court. Therefore, in all fairness, presumably, of equitable grounds provisions like Section 30 of the New Act have been made to resolve the anomaly. The New Act being retrospective in operation would govern this suit of 1966 which as already stated, prescribes a period of three years limitation only from the date when the right to sue accrued. It goes without saying that but for Sec.30 of New Act, the period of limitation would have expired on 22-8-1964 or 23-8-1964 thereby barring the suit, but Sec.30 (a) of the New Act having provided a non obstante clause saying that notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, any suit for which the period of limitation is shorter than the period of limitation prescribed by the New Act may be the period of seven years next after commencement of this Act or within the period prescribed for such suit by the Old Act whichever period expires earlier. As has already been noticed, under the Old Act, by virtue of Article 120, a period of six years was prescribed, as the period of limitation from the date when the right to sue accrued, which is earlier than the period of seven years ex gratia extension under Sec.30 (a) of the New Act. It may be pertinent to take note of the fact, it is not of very great significance, that previously the period of seven years, in Sec.30 (a) of the New Act was prescribed as five years only, but by virtue of Sec.2 of the Limitation (Amendment) Act, 1969 (10 of 1969), the period of seven years was substituted for five years and it was laid down that it shall be deemed always to have been so done. Taking the shorter period as prescribed in the Old Act, therefore, into consideration, the period of limitation would expire on 23-1-1967 or, perhaps on 22-1-1967 (which is six years from the date when the right to sue accrued ). Obviously, therefore, in the year 1966, when the suit was instituted, the suit cannot be said to be barred by limitation by any stretch of imagination. On this ground also, therefore, I am constrained to hold that the lower appellate court has taken an erroneous view of the law and the finding in that regard also has, therefore, to be reversed. As a matter of fact, the trial Court has recorded a categorical finding that the amount as claimed by the plaintiff appellant has been mentioned in Schedule a to the plaint and in the written statement nothing has been stated about this claim in the schedule. Paragraphs 18 and 19 of the plaint wherein the claim it set forth by the appellant has not been controverted in the written statement of the respondent. It, thus, stands admitted by non traverse of the pleading. The amount in dispute as claimed by the plaintiff appellant, therefore, more or less admitted. This finding of the trial court has not been reversed by the lower appellate court as the appeal there was confined only to two questions of law which were canvassed before this Court. 10. No other point was canvassed in either of the courts below or even before this Court. This finding of the trial court has not been reversed by the lower appellate court as the appeal there was confined only to two questions of law which were canvassed before this Court. 10. No other point was canvassed in either of the courts below or even before this Court. It is therefore, not necessary for us to go into any question relating to any other matter arising in the suit exercising the second appellate jurisdiction. 11. This appeal is, accordingly, allowed, but in the peculiar circumstances of the case, I shall direct the parties to bear their own costs of this appeal. S. K. Jha, J. I agree. Appeal allowed.