JUDGMENT Om Prakash, J. - This is a second appeal by the defendants-appellants against the judgment and decree dated 21st November, 1974, of the learned Civil Judge, Etawah, decreeing the suit of the plaintiff. 2. The plaintiff filed a suit for possession over the suit land, shown by letters ABCD in the plaint map and for mandatory injunction that the defendants be directed to close the door, shown by letter 'B' in the wall AB constructed by them. The plaintiff claimed herself to be the owner of the suit land under the sale-deed dated 25th August, 1969 (Ext. 2), which was executed in her favour by her brothers, who in turn acquired the said land from one Narain by the sale-deed dated 21st June, 1969 (Ext. 3). 3. The defendants denied the plaint case altogether and contended that the suit land formed part of Sehan of their house, which is in the South of the suit land and that they are in possession over the same for ever. 4. The trial court framed several issues. Issue No. 1 related to the ownership of the suit land. The trial court found that the suit land is appurtenant to the defendants' house and they are the owners of the same. The case of the plaintiff was negatived holding that the suit land was not transferred under the sale-deeds either by Har Narain or by plaintiff's brothers. 5. On appeal preferred by the plaintiff, the lower appellate court reversed the judgment and decree of the trial court and held that no door of the defendants was situated on the suit land, but the door of Shri Har Narain whose house is situated towards the west of the suit land, existed towards the suit land and that he remained in possession over the suit land. It was found that Har Narain was the owner of the suit land and the defendants illegally took possession of the suit land and they opened a new door in the wall AB. 6. The short question for consideration is whether any question of law arises in this second appeal requiring the decision of this Court. The chief question for consideration before the lower appellate court was whether Shri Har Narain was the owner of the suit land or the defendants. 6. The short question for consideration is whether any question of law arises in this second appeal requiring the decision of this Court. The chief question for consideration before the lower appellate court was whether Shri Har Narain was the owner of the suit land or the defendants. Having appraised the oral evidence of the parties that came on record, the lower appellate court took the view that the door of the defendants was newly constructed and that the level of the suit land was higher than the level of the house of the defendants. This being so, it was concluded that the suit land could not be appurtenant to the house of the defendants. It was also held that the door of the house of Shri Har Narain opened towards west of the suit land and that the same remained in possession of Sri Har Narain, who owned the land in suit with his brother, who after his death was survived by his son. Having given a finding that Sri Har Narain was the owner of the suit land, the lower appellate court found that the sale-deed (Ext. 3) was validly executed by him in favour of the plaintiff's brother, who in turn executed another sale-deed (Ext. 2) in favour of the plaintiff. From the aforesaid findings, no question of law arises. The ownership of Sri Har Narain was determined by the lower appellate court on the facts and circumstances of the case and not under any document, construction of which may give rise to a question of law. Considering the rival submissions of the parties, the lower appellate court took the view that the case of the plaintiff appears to be more probable than the case of the defendants. It is argued for the defendants that the trial court recorded a clear finding that the sale-deeds (Exts. 3 & 2) were fictitious and that finding has not been reversed by the lower appellate court. I do not agree with this submission. The lower appellate court clearly found that Sri Har Narain was the owner with his brother of the suit land and therefore, the sale-deed could have been executed by him in favour of the plaintiff's brothers. From this finding, it is amply clear that the finding of the trial court regarding fictitious nature of the sale-deed was not endorsed. 7. The lower appellate court clearly found that Sri Har Narain was the owner with his brother of the suit land and therefore, the sale-deed could have been executed by him in favour of the plaintiff's brothers. From this finding, it is amply clear that the finding of the trial court regarding fictitious nature of the sale-deed was not endorsed. 7. Then it was argued that the findings, which are not supported by the oral evidence or any material on record, cannot be approved in second appeal. No finding of the lower appellate court is there which is not supported by the material on record. Purely findings of fact were recorded by the lower appellate court that the suit land could in no case be the Sehan of the defendants house and that there was greater probability in favour of the plaintiff's case that Sri Har Narain had his door of his house, which was towards the west of the suit land and that he alone would have possessed the suit land. These findings do no give rise to any question of law. 8. For the defendants, reliance was placed in Ravi Shanker v. Additional District Judge II, Kanpur and others, 1979 (Allahabad Rent cases 273) and on Abdul Shakur and other v. Kotwaleshwar Prasad & others, (AIR 1958 Alld, 54). Whereas, in the former, it was held that the finding based on assumption are liable to be set aside in the latter it was held that where it appears that in arriving at a finding of fact the first appellate court did not consider the oral evidence, nor did it apply its mind to the question, it is not possible to say that there is any finding of fact which should not be interfered with in second appeal. In my opinion, both the authorities are misplaced before me because as already , pointed out, the findings of the lower appellate court are not based on assumption and they are well supported by the oral evidence that has come on record. I, therefore, hold that the appeal of the defendants cannot be accepted. 9. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed. However, the parties will bear their own costs of this appeal.