JUDGMENT - DAUD S.M., J.: - This petition under Article 227 of the Constitution is aimed against a finding recorded by the competent authority upon a reference made to that authority under section 85-A of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 - hereinafter referred to as the “Act” or “Tenancy Act”. 2. For determination of the crucial questions that arise in this petition, it will be necessary to state a few facts:- On 12-2-1946, the petitioner-plaintiffs executed what has been titled as a “lavni kabulayat” in favour of respondent-defendants and one Lalchand Shankarlal. The purpose of the transaction is spelt out at a number of places in the deed and the repetition is that the lease was for the purpose of enabling defendants to do business in onions and for that purpose to put up warehouses for the storage of onions and such possible non-agricultural use as the land could be put to. The land was leased out for a period of 10 years extendable for another 30 years and the land was that measuring 14 acres and 5 gunthas forming part of Survey No. 440, Pimpalgaon Baswant, Taluka Niphad, District Nasik. Plaintiffs filed a suit in the Court of Civil Judge, Junior Division at Pimpalgaon Baswant for ejecting defendants therefrom. They contended that defendants had put the land to agricultural use in contravention of the lease-deed and that this had led to a valid termination of the lease. Despite such termination, defendants had refused to vacate, and therefore, the suit. Apart from the other defences raised in the written statement defendants contended that the purpose of the lease was agricultural and that they were tenants, for which reason, the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the claim for ejectment against them. The Civil Judge raised the necessary issue about defendants being tenants and referred the same under section 85-A of the Act to the competent authority. This decision was questioned by the plaintiffs in a writ petition to this Court, but without any success. The Tahsildar who is the competent authority under the Act, held that 5 acres and 21 gunthas of the land was land as contemplated by the Tenancy Act and defendants had acquired the status of tenants thereover. The decision of the Tahsildar was appealed against to the Sub-Divisional Officer, Niphal Division at Nasik. The Tahsildar who is the competent authority under the Act, held that 5 acres and 21 gunthas of the land was land as contemplated by the Tenancy Act and defendants had acquired the status of tenants thereover. The decision of the Tahsildar was appealed against to the Sub-Divisional Officer, Niphal Division at Nasik. That learned Officer set aside the verdict of the Tahsildar that defendants were tenants. Respondents, therefore, went in revision to the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal. The revision was heard by the President of the Maharahstra Revenue Tribunal. For four reasons - which I shall refer to at the appropriate stage - the President, Maharahstra Revenue Tribunal, came to the conclusion that the Tahsildar's order was correct and that the S.D.O. had erred. This order of the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal is impugned in the petition before me. 3. For the plaintiffs, it is submitted that the deed of 1946 clearly shows that the lease was for non-agricultural purposes. What was done subsequently by the defendants was a contravention of the lease. They could not by a unilateral act of theirs, create a lease governable by the Tenancy Act. Extraneous factors had been taken into consideration, and, that was why the Tahsildar as also the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal erred. In reply, the contention is that irrespective of how parties to the deed understood the purpose of the lease, the same was agricultural and not non-agricultural. Next, even assuming that the purpose of the land was non-agricultural, from the very inception, the land had been put to agricultural use. After expiry of first 10 years, the defendants continued to use it for agricultural purposes. Plaintiffs had not only acquiesced, but permitted this user. It was not, therefore, open to them to now turn back and claim that putting the land to agricultural purposes, was a contravention of the lease. Thirdly, at a later stage, the land had vested in a Public Trust. Trustees of that Trust had applied under section 88-B of the Act for being exempted from the operation of certain stringent portions thereof. The application having been moved, it was not now open to the plaintiffs to contend that the lease was not governed by the Tenancy Act. In fact, the reference having been made, and, plaintiffs having failed to get the reference set aside, concluded the issue in favour of the defendants. The application having been moved, it was not now open to the plaintiffs to contend that the lease was not governed by the Tenancy Act. In fact, the reference having been made, and, plaintiffs having failed to get the reference set aside, concluded the issue in favour of the defendants. In other words, but for the fact that the land was agricultural land, and the lease was for an agricultural purpose within the meaning of the Act, a reference would not have been made. Plaintiffs had tried to contend the contrary, and, failed even before this Court in an earlier writ petition. Therefore, it was not now open to them to say that the lease was not for a purpose governable by the Tenancy Act. The village papers showed that the land had been used for cultivation, and, to that effect was the evidence led by the defendants. Plaintiffs had not led evidence to establish the contrary. The statutory courts had held the lease-deed to incorporate a lease governable by the Act. This finding was fortified by a consideration of the evidence. It was not, therefore, open to this Court acting under Article 227 to reverse the said finding. 4. Having regard to the submissions aforestated, the points for determination are: 1. Whether the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal was right in restoring the order passed upon the reference by the Tahsildar? 2. Whether this is not a fit case for setting aside Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal's order under Article 227? 3. What order? My findings, for reasons given below, are:- 1. No. 2. No, it is a fit case. 3. Petition allowed as per order. REASONS 5. Learned Counsel appearing for the parties have taken me through the deed of 12-2-1946 in support of their rival contentions. It is Mr. Dudhat's complaint that undue weightage was given to the caption of the deed. The words “lavni kabulayat” prefacing the document, were construed as if they constituted the dominant purpose of the lease. As against this, Mr. Karandikar submits that though the document described the purposes specified therein as non-agricultural, if fact, these were agricultural. That undue weight has been given to the caption, and, a few word picked out at random from the deed by the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal, is clear from para 6 of its judgment. As against this, Mr. Karandikar submits that though the document described the purposes specified therein as non-agricultural, if fact, these were agricultural. That undue weight has been given to the caption, and, a few word picked out at random from the deed by the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal, is clear from para 6 of its judgment. According to the President, the very first word “lavni” used in conjuction with “kabulayat” established that the dominant purpose of the lease was cultivation. With respect to the learned President, he seems to have made a superficial analysis of the document. The correct rule in construction of documents is not give undue weight to this or that word used in the document, but to read it as a whole, and, thus extract its true means. Where the purpose of the lease is spelt out in such details, as has been done in the instant case, it was an error to be swayed by the caption “lavni kabulayat”. 6. I now turn to Mr. Karandikar's submission that the parties to the lease-deed were in error in understanding that the purposes spelt out in the document were non-agricultural. The specified purpose of the lease, to repeal, is business in onions and storage thereof in sheds to be put up, plus such non-agricultural user, as may arise in future. Is this agricultural according to the Tenancy Act? To answer this question, it will be necessary to look into certain definitions as also sections appearing in the Act and a also Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966 - hereinafter referred to as the “Code”. The reference to the Code is on account of section 2(21) of the Act which provides that words and expressions used therein, but not defined, shall have the meaning assigned to them by the Code and the Transfer of Property Act, as the case may be. Section 2(8)(a) of the Act defines the expression “land” as meaning - “land which is used for agricultural purposes or which is so used but is left fall over and includes the sites of farm buildings appurtenant to such land.” Section 4 of the Act deals with persuant deemed to be tenants. The very beginning indicates that to be deemed a tenant the person cultivating, should be cultivating lawfully. In so far as the Code is concerned reliance is placed upon sections 2(9), 41 and 42. The very beginning indicates that to be deemed a tenant the person cultivating, should be cultivating lawfully. In so far as the Code is concerned reliance is placed upon sections 2(9), 41 and 42. To the extent section 2(9) be relevant, it is worded thus:- “Farm building” means a structure erected on land assessed or held for the purpose of agricultural for all or any of the following purposes connected with such land or any other land belonging to or cultivated by the holder thereof viz. (b) for the storage of agricultural produce, (e) for any other purpose which is an integral part of his cultivating arrangement.” A scrutiny of the two sections can wait the appropriate stage. 7. A somewhat similar question arose for determination before Tarkunde, J., in (Special Civil Application No. 1285 of 1965)1. In that case, the petitioner before the High Court had taken on lease a piece of land in a village. The land measured 6 acres and 32 gunthas. The rent note showed that the landlord had put up a building on the land, had enclosed the same within a compound and had planted some mango grants therein. After the taking on lease, the tenant began a bidi factory thereon and obviously the factory was located in the building standing upon the land. After the expiry of period for which the land was taken vis-a-vis the rent note, the tenant started raising paddy on the vacant land. This seems to have been done with a view to buttress the plea in a pending litigation that the lease was for agricultural purposes and the tenant a protected tenant under the Tenancy Act. The matter went upto the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal which held that if the initial purpose of the lease was non-agricultural, the tenant who was a tenant holding over, could not alter that purpose by putting the land to agricultural use, after the period of initial lease was over. The matter was brought under Article 227 and that is how Tarkunde, J., came to deal with it. The learned Judge observed thus:- “In the present case, however, there can be no doubt that the primary purpose of the lease has been non-agricultural all along. As stated above, the cultivation of paddy in 2 acres and 32 gunthas of the land was commenced by the tenant after litigation started between him and the landlord..... The learned Judge observed thus:- “In the present case, however, there can be no doubt that the primary purpose of the lease has been non-agricultural all along. As stated above, the cultivation of paddy in 2 acres and 32 gunthas of the land was commenced by the tenant after litigation started between him and the landlord..... In the present case the primary purpose of the lease was, and continues to be, the running of the Bidi factory even if the area actually used for the Bidi factory was less than the area used for the cultivation of paddy. I, therefore, agree with respect with the decision of the Revenue Tribunal that the primary purpose of the petitioner's lease was non-agricultural, that the property let out to the petitioner was therefore not “land” within the meaning of that term in the Bombay Tenancy Act of 1948, and that the petitioner is not a tenant of the land under the said Act.” An attempt has been made to distinguish this decision and the points of difference urged will be taken up for consideration at a later stage. Mr. Karandikar however refers to Vaidya, J.'s decision in (Special Civil Application No. 633 of 1972)2, decided on 28-3-1973. In the case before Vaidya, J., an attempt was sought to be made to exclude trees standing upon the land leased out from the clutches of the transaction of lease. This was negatived by Vaidya, J., pointing out that the word “land” according to the Code, included trees and things fixed to the earth. This decision is hardly of any relevance to the point before me. Mr. Karandikar then relied upon (Usaf Usman Mujawar v. Yeshwantrao Appasaheb Ghatage)3, 1964 Mh.L.J. 190 : 65 Bom.L.R. 831. Reliance in that case was placed upon (Vinayak Gopal v. Laxman Kashinath)4, 58 Bom.L.R. 592, and, in particular, this passage therefrom - “Normally the purpose of the lease can be determined from the terms of the document itself. If the instrument of tenancy specifically and clearly declares the purpose of the lease, there can be no difficulty in deciding whether the lease falls under section 6(1) or not. If the instrument of lease is silent as to the purpose, then it would be permissible to allow evidence aliunde in regard to the said purpose and the purpose can be determined in the light of such evidence. If the instrument of lease is silent as to the purpose, then it would be permissible to allow evidence aliunde in regard to the said purpose and the purpose can be determined in the light of such evidence. In such cases, it would be permissible and legitimate for the Court to look at evidence concerning the user of the premises by the tenant in order to determine the purpose of the lease.” Mr. Karandikar invites attention to the user to which the land was being put before 1946 and thereafter. He contends that all along the land was being used for cultivation. The use to which the land was being put is irrelevant for the purpose of understanding the object of lease, in view of the fact that the said object can be determined from the terms of the document itself. The lease deed in the instant case, far from being silent, repeatedly refers to the purpose of the lease. 8. Is the land in dispute which is undoubtedly assessed for the purpose of agriculture, necessarily land within the meaning of section 2(8)(a) of the Act? That it cannot be, for section 2(8)(a) makes it clear that it is land used for agricultural purposes which alone can be land within the meaning of the said clause. The other category of land is that which is so used, but is left fallow. But under the terms of the document, it cannot be said that the said land is to be used for agricultural purposes and if not used for that purpose, allowed to remain fallow. The specific purpose of the deed is to put up sheds in which onions can be stored for the purpose of business in onions and other non-agricultural purposes as may be deemed necessary. Mr. Karandikar places special reliance upon the extended definition given under Clause (a) of section 2(8) of the Act. 'Sites of farm buildings'- so contends learned Counsel - are within the meaning of the clause. The dominant - if not the only purpose of the lease - figuring in this case, is, the construction of the sheds or structures for the storage of onions to further the business in onions. The mere fact that the land is the site of a farm building is not sufficient. The dominant - if not the only purpose of the lease - figuring in this case, is, the construction of the sheds or structures for the storage of onions to further the business in onions. The mere fact that the land is the site of a farm building is not sufficient. This is made clear by the inclusive words being qualified by the words which follow, and, which are “appurtenant to such land”. In other words, it is not all land being site of farm building which can be land within Clause (a). To qualify for that inclusion, it has to be side of farm building appurtenant to land which is otherwise used for agricultural purposes. Use of land for agricultural purposes is virtually equivalent to the definition of the expression “to cultivate” in section 2(5) of the Act. This expression with its grammatical variations and cognate expressions means to - “till or husband the land for the purpose of raising or improving agricultural produce, whether by manual labour or by means of cattle or machinery, or to carry on any agricultural operation thereon.” Therefore, the use of any part of land, which is under the plough in the sense of the above definition, for a purpose, such as putting up of a farm building, would still continue to be land for the purposes of section 2(8)(a), but the primary condition would be, that there is a nexus between the use for a farm building and the object of cultivation. The farm building as also the agricultural operation or cultivation, must be by one person. In other words, a person using or intending to use the farm building must be so using it as appurtenant to the remaining portion of the land, which is used for cultivation. Unless this nexus be there between the two objects viz. use as a farm building and cultivation, and also, that the user for both objects be by the same person, the word land is not attracted. I have gone into this matter at some length because of a contention by Mr. Karandikar that the structures on the demised land were being used as appurtenant to the raising of onions by the defendants in their own land situated in the vicinity. I have gone into this matter at some length because of a contention by Mr. Karandikar that the structures on the demised land were being used as appurtenant to the raising of onions by the defendants in their own land situated in the vicinity. The non-agricultural operation - which is permitted to a limited extent - has to be upon that very land which is under cultivation, and, by the same person. One person using lands assessed differently - one of his own ownership, and, the other given to him as lessee - would not be able to say that one land is appurtenant to the other in the sense of that expression appearing in section 2(8)(a) of the Act. I may also mention that there is no evidence about such use as is canvassed by Mr. Karandikar. 9. The reliance placed upon section 2(9) of the Code has now to be considered. A farm building means a structure erected on land assessed or held for the purpose of agriculture, for all or any of the purposes connected with such land as specified in the sub-section and two of the purposes are (i) storage of agricultural produce and (ii) for any other purpose which is an integral part of his cultivating arrangement. Reading the sub-section as a whole, one cannot miss the connection between the dominant purpose which is cultivation, and, the incidental purpose which is to provide for the operations incidental or resultant to the process of cultivation. Thus, storage of agricultural implements, manure or fodder is connected with agriculture in the sense of cultivation of the soil for raising of produce. Next comes storage of agricultural produce. Now, such storage of agricultural produce immediately it is harvested, is the result of agricultural operations culminating in the harvest. Immediately after the harvest or threshing, the produce has to be stored before it is removed to the home of the agriculturist or the market. This storage is incidental, and therefore, a farm building meant for storage, would be a purpose of agriculture. Thirdly, sheltering of cattle by putting up a farm building is also included within Clause 2(9). Cattle are used in cultivation and that they should be provided a roof in the agricultural land, is obvious. Clause (d) provides for a residence of members of the farmer's family, his servants or tenants. Thirdly, sheltering of cattle by putting up a farm building is also included within Clause 2(9). Cattle are used in cultivation and that they should be provided a roof in the agricultural land, is obvious. Clause (d) provides for a residence of members of the farmer's family, his servants or tenants. This, again is making use of the farm building for a purpose connected with the cultivation of the land. The last clause makes the meaning very clear. The purpose to which the farm building is put, is required by this clause to be, an integral part of the cultivating arrangement. Therefore, a farm building by itself or site upon which farm buildings are to be put up, for the purposes specified in section 2(9) of the Code, could not be enough or sufficient to bring the site, within the section 2(8)(a) of Act's expression “land”. The requisite pre-condition is that the building or site upon which a structure to be put up, must be a purpose which is an integral part of the cultivating arrangement. The lease-deed in the instant case goes to great lengths to prohibit the lessees from using any part of the land for purposes other than construction of shed or structures - the former to be used for storage of onions, and, the latter, for purposes which are non-agricultural. The President of the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal has looked into some of the words used in the lease-deed and come to the surprising conclusion that the non-agricultural purposes specified in the lease-deed are incidental to the main purpose which according to him is agricultural, and in particular, the raising of onions upon the land. This reasoning is based on nothing stronger than the commencing words of the document viz. “lavni kabulyat”. But this is missing the substance for form. Except for the use of word “lavni” there is nothing which can be even remotely connected to the cultivating operation or agriculture, as is commonly understood, in the deed itself. The declaration in the deed about the lessees intending to do business in onions has been construed, as inclusive of their being permitted to raise onions on the land. I do not see how this strained interpretation is warranted. The declaration in the deed about the lessees intending to do business in onions has been construed, as inclusive of their being permitted to raise onions on the land. I do not see how this strained interpretation is warranted. If the land was to be used for cultivation purposes, all that was required to be said in the deed, was, that all manner of agricultural operations and matters incidental thereto, could be carried on in the land by the lessees. There was hardly any need for the parties to specify that the lessees wanted to do business in onions, put up onion sheds or that they could put up temporary structures connected with non-agricultural purposes. The detailed specification should have been read excluding cultivation and carrying out of agricultural operations. Instead of so doing the Maharahstra Revenue Tribunal has read it in the reverse fashion. Mr. Karandikar tried to avoid the decision given by Tarkunde, J., in Special Civil Application No. 1285 of 1965 by referring to certain distinguishing features of that case. In particular, he says that there, agriculture was started by the claimant tenant after the expiry of the stipulated period, and therefore, such use was held to be unlawful and not connected with the purpose of the lease. In this case, the tenant started using the land for agricultural purpose during the initial 10 years and also the later 30 years' period. I do not see what deference that would make. Tarkunde, J., determined the purpose of the lease from the circumstances, and thus, indicated that the primary object was non-agricultural. Here, the lease-deed is not silent. It repeatedly emphasises that the purpose of the lease is non-agricultural. In fact, there is no question in this case of there being a primary and subsidiary or secondary purpose. One thing which is excluded by clear implication, is the use of the land for cultivation by the tenants. Significantly, the other purposes for which temporary structures can be put up on the land have not been clarified. This would go to show that the tenants were at liberty to put up temporary structures for purposes other than the business of onions or their storage. But the land could not be used for purposes other than putting up structures whether these were to be used as warehouses for onions or other objects. This would go to show that the tenants were at liberty to put up temporary structures for purposes other than the business of onions or their storage. But the land could not be used for purposes other than putting up structures whether these were to be used as warehouses for onions or other objects. To repeat, what was clearly beyond the scope of the lease, was, tilling of the soil and raising of crops thereupon. The argument that the failure of the plaintiffs to go into the witness box should give rise to an adverse inference against them, is incomprehensible. Nothing turns upon what anyone may choose to say while in the witness box. The question then, arising depends entirely upon a construction of the lease-deed. It was contended that to the knowledge of the plaintiffs, defendants had been raising crops year-after-year. But if the land was in possession of the defendants, there was little that the plaintiffs could do. A breach of the terms of the lease unless specifically condoned can always be acted upon. All that can be said against the plaintiffs is that they allowed defendants to flout the prohibition against using the land for agricultural purposes. But this would not mean that whatever was done would, therefore, become the purpose of the lease or that the prohibition mentioned in the lease-deed became a dead letter. It was argued that the owners of the land had themselves applied for exemption under section 88-B of the Act. First, it is not clear whether the persons who applied under section 88-B included plaintiffs. Next, even assuming that the plaintiffs or any of them were parties to the application, it would not follow that they made any representation to the defendants, for which reason, they are now precluded from going back upon a representation. Lastly, the application came to be dismissed upon its being opposed by the defendants. Therefore, there was no representation and nothing of any consequence which could attract any species of estopped into the operation. 10. A surprising view taken by the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal and urged also in the hearing before me, is, that having regard to an earlier decision, it was not open to the plaintiffs to dispute that the land was an agricultural land governed by the Tenancy Act. 10. A surprising view taken by the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal and urged also in the hearing before me, is, that having regard to an earlier decision, it was not open to the plaintiffs to dispute that the land was an agricultural land governed by the Tenancy Act. This argument has to be considered in the following background: - After defendants' written statement pleading their being tenants governed by the Tenancy Act had come on record, the Civil Judge struck various issues, one of them being as to whether defendants were tenants within the meaning of the Act. When it came to referring this issue to the competent authority, plaintiffs objected contending that the plea giving rise to the issue was devoid of substance and had been raised to merely prolong the proceeding. This contention raised by the plaintiff was negatived and an order of reference drawn up under section 85-A of the Tenancy Act. Plaintiffs came in writ to this Court repeating the contention that the reference was unwarranted. The petition moved by them failed. According to the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal - “The writ petition of the opponents to the High Court questioning the issue of tenancy having been dismissed by the High Court the question of applicability of the Act stood concluded and it is now not open to the subordinate authorities to enter into debate whether the act applies or does not apply to the disputed land.” The fact that reference had to be made has somehow been construed as concluding the issue of tenancy. It is not supported by the text of the relevant provisions in the Act or by precedent. Mr. Karendikar relied upon (Bapu Sitaram Absule v. Appa Mhagonda Patil)5, 76 Bom.L.R. 265. What had happened in that case was that an issue of tenancy was referred by the Civil Judge to the competent authority, who felt that he had no jurisdiction to decide the matter referred to it. There was no appeal from that decision. At a later stage, in the same suit another identical reference was made. The revision-petitioner before the High Court contended that the decision of the competent authority given earlier should be treated as a finding, and for that reason, a second reference could not be made. Mr. There was no appeal from that decision. At a later stage, in the same suit another identical reference was made. The revision-petitioner before the High Court contended that the decision of the competent authority given earlier should be treated as a finding, and for that reason, a second reference could not be made. Mr. Justice Kania (as he then was) observed thus:- “On a plain reading of this section it appears to me that once the Civil Court raises an issue and refers it to the tenancy Court for its determination, the tenancy Court is bound to determine that issue. When the Civil Court refers that issue to the tenancy Court there is necessarily an implied finding that the question in the issue is one which is required to be settled, decided or dealt with by any authority competent to do so under the Bombay Tenancy Act. Once the issue is referred, it is not open to the tenancy authority to say that it has no jurisdiction to decide the issue referred to it. When an order for reference is made it is open to the party, who desires to challenge it to do so, but in the absence of such a challenge being negatived, there is a binding decision that the issue requires to be settled, decided or dealt with by the tenancy Court.” I do not see how this passage can be utilised by the defendants to support the reasoning of the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal reproduced above. Kania, J., certainly did not observe that the making of a reference under section 85-A was tantamount to the recording of a decision that the land was the land within the meaning of the Act vide section 2(8)(a) or that the tenancy pleaded, was, a tenancy governable by the said Act. All that the learned Judge decided was that once a reference had been made, it was not open to the competent authority to look into the correctness or otherwise of the reference made and take up an independent stand as to whether the question should or should not have been referred to it. In other words, it was for the Civil Court to determine whether in a given case an issue requiring reference had arisen. In other words, it was for the Civil Court to determine whether in a given case an issue requiring reference had arisen. Once that finding was given, the competent authority had only one function to perform; that was to answer the reference and not sit in appeal or review of the decision to make a reference. Mr. Karandikar then relies upon Vimada Lal, J.'s, decision reported in (Vithoba Ram Mandir v. Dhairyasinghrao Bhayasaheb Ghatge)6, 73 Bom.L.R. 752. In this case, it was held that a reference under section 85-A could not be made when the question sought to be referred to had already been decided by the competent authority in a previous proceeding between the same parties in respect of the same land. To attract this case, reliance is placed upon the rejection of the section 88-B application. For reasons given earlier, I hold that the rejection of that application has no bearing, much less of a binding nature, upon the question to be decided in the instant case. To summarise, it was four reasons that led the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal to hold that the reference had to be answered in favour of the defendants. First, was the fate of the challenge taken to the making of the reference under section 85-A of the Act. Secondly, there is the appraisal made by the Maharahstra Revenue Tribunal of some of the words used in the lease deed and then hold that the lease figuring in the instant case was governed by the Act. Thirdly, there is the inference drawn by the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal about the applicability of the Act because of the application moved under section 88-B. Fourthly, there is the belief that storage of onions cannot be described as a non-agricultural vocation. These views have been considered and differed. Mr. Karandikar submits that whatever be the error committed by the statutory Courts, it is not open to the High Court sitting under Article 227 to interfere. The submission is that the statutory Courts have taken into consideration the lease-deed and the evidence. Rightly or wrongly, a certain conclusion has been reached upon. That conclusion is one of the fact. While a different view may be permissible, that cannot be a reason for interfering under Article 227. I would make it clear that the evidence in the shape of documents, excluding the lease-deed was totally irrelevant. Rightly or wrongly, a certain conclusion has been reached upon. That conclusion is one of the fact. While a different view may be permissible, that cannot be a reason for interfering under Article 227. I would make it clear that the evidence in the shape of documents, excluding the lease-deed was totally irrelevant. Nothing that the parties alleged, asserted or said, albeit on oath, would make the slightest difference to the construction of the lease-deed. That was the only piece upon which the statutory Court should have concentrated. The transaction, recited therein has a reference to facts. But for that reason any decision taken by the statutory Courts would not be immune from the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227. If the statutory Courts assumed unto themselves a jurisdiction which does not vest in them, by a clear mis-interpretation of the terms of the documents, they are exercising a jurisdiction not vested in them. In other words, it would be a case of usurping jurisdiction, where none exists. In such a case, it is not only the right of the High Court, but its very obligation, to intervene. The finding recorded by the statutory authority is based on a mis-reading, and mis-reading which is apparent on the face of the record. By mis-reading the evidence, they have excluded the jurisdiction of the Civil Court which otherwise had full powers to determine upon the liability of the tenant to be ejected for having allegedly breached conditions imposed upon him when entering into the transaction. Therefore, the contention that Article 227 should not be invoked in the instant case will have to be negatived. The result of the foregoing discussion is that the decision of the Tahsildar restored by the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal, will have to be quashed. Hence the order. ORDER Rule made absolute in terms of Prayer (b) to the petition. The Tahsildar shall answer the reference made by the Civil Judge against the defendants. Costs in this Court as incurred. Rule made absolute. -----