JUDGMENT S. D. Agarwal J. - This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India arising out of proceedings under the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulations of Letting Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972, hereinafter referred to as the Act. The property in dispute is house No. 150, situate in Mohalla Gangapur, Bareilly. It is not disputed that the landlord Kripa Shankar Chaurasia, respondent no. 3 is in occupation of the part of the premises in dispute. The petitioner is the tenant. The landlord moved an application under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act for getting the property released as according to him, he required the other portion of the house for his use and occupation. This application was allowed by the prescribed authority by its judgment dated 9.2.1982. Against the order dated 9.2.82 an appeal was filed by the petitioner under Section 22 of the Act. The appeal was dismissed by the appellate court by judgment dated 16th of September, 1985. The petitioner has now challenged both the decisions of the prescribed authority as well as the appellate court by means of the present petition. 2. The application was moved by the respondent-landlord on the ground that he bona fide required the accommodation in dispute for his use and occupation. According to him he had a family of six persons including himself, wife and four grown up children and it was further case of the landlord that the latrine and dehliz was commonly shared with the landlord and tenant. This was contested by the petitioner. Both the prescribed authority and the appellate court have recorded categorical findings of fact that the need of the landlord-respondent was bonafide and genuine and that the landlord requires an additional accommodation. Both the courts below have recorded a finding that comparing the hardship of the landlord and tenant, the hardship of the landlord would be greater in case the accommodation is not released than that of the tenant. With these findings the application for release was allowed. 3. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties, learned counsel for the petitioner has not challenged the findings recorded in regard to the bonafide need and comparative hardship of the parties. With these findings the application for release was allowed. 3. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties, learned counsel for the petitioner has not challenged the findings recorded in regard to the bonafide need and comparative hardship of the parties. The sole argument raised on behalf of the petitioner is that under Rule 6 (1)(d) of the Rules framed under the Act, the court below should have considered whether the need of the landlord could have been met by releasing only a part of the accommodation, and the court below has erred in granting the release application without considering this aspect of the case. Rule 16(l)(d) is quoted below : "(d) where the tenants' need would be adequately met by leaving with him a part of the building under tenancy and the landlord's need would be served by releasing the other part, the prescribed authority shall release only the latter part of the building." 4. It is not disputed that the petitioner did not take this question either before the prescribed authority or before the appellate court. He has raised this question for the first time in this court. In any case, I permitted the petitioner to raise the question before this court in order to examine the submissions raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner on merits. It is not disputed that the family of the landlord consists of the landlord, his wife and two grown up daughters and three sons. It is also not disputed that in the ground floor the dehliz, handpipe and latrine are common. The accommodation in the occupation of the tenant are three shall rooms on the ground floor and two small rooms on the first floor. The landlord is in occupation of only one room with a kitchen. It is, therefore, obvious, that the property in dispute cannot be divided so that the tenants' need could be adequately met by leaving with him a part of the building under the tenancy with him and the rest of the accommodation would serve the landlords' need. The landlord has grown up daughters and there is only one common latrine and a hand-pipe. In the circumstances, seeing the large extent of the family of the landlord and the accommodation sought to be released, in my opinion, Rule 16 (l)(d) cannot possibly be made applicable. 5. The landlord has grown up daughters and there is only one common latrine and a hand-pipe. In the circumstances, seeing the large extent of the family of the landlord and the accommodation sought to be released, in my opinion, Rule 16 (l)(d) cannot possibly be made applicable. 5. In Mohammad Asghar v. Smt. Zaibunnissa and others,1981 Allahabad Rent Case 561 had observed as follows : "The residential portion of the building is small having a common courtyard and a common passage with only one latrine, bath room and a kitchen. There is no space where the bath room, latrine or the kitchen can be constructed, if both the landlord and the tenant are permitted to stay in the same accommodation. Therefore, only a part of the accommodation will not, thus, suffice the need of either the landlady or the tenant. In the circumstances, the provisions of Rule 16(l)(d) cannot be applied in the present case." 6. The observation made in the abovementioned case of Mohammad Asghar (supra) is fully applicable in the instant case also. As I have already held above, there is a common latrine and a common hand-pipe. It has not been shown that any space is available to construct another latrine. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner has urged that the case should be remanded to the court below for considering the question as to whether rule 16(l)(d) of the Rules is applicable to the facts of the case or not. In Ziaul Haq v. 1st Addl. District Judge, Nainital and others, 1983 (2) All. Rent Cases 38, had an occasion to consider this question and it was opined by him as follows : "I am aware that normally the question as to whether the extent of the accommodation which would be sufficient to meet the need of the landlord is to be decided by the fact finding authorities and not by this Court in a writ petition. However, this is not an absolute rule and the proposition of law cannot be disputed that if the necessary material is already on the record and if the circumstances of a particular cases require to do so, this Court is not precluded from considering the said question. However, this is not an absolute rule and the proposition of law cannot be disputed that if the necessary material is already on the record and if the circumstances of a particular cases require to do so, this Court is not precluded from considering the said question. In my opinion, in the instant case the necessary material is already on the record and the circumstances are also such that it would not be in the ends of justice to prolong the litigation by remanding the case to the Additional District Judge for consideration of this question alone." 8. I fully agree with the observations made by Hon'ble N.D. Ojha, J. in the case of Ziaul Haq (supra). In the present case, as I have already observed above, the facts are not disputed in regard to the accommodation available. It is also not disputed that the latrine and the hand-pipe are common. There is no other fact which requires investigation by the Court below. In fact, the petitioner even did not urge this question either before the prescribed authority or before the lower appellate court knowing obviously for the reasons that it could not be substantiated. In the circumstances, the question of remand of the case does not arise. The application for release was filed as far back as 1977. Eight years have already elapsed and from the averments made in the counter affidavit it is obvious that the landlord and his family members are being put to great inconvenience and even there is a likelihood of criminal litigation between the parties. 9. Learned counsel for the respondent-landlord has also urged that so far as the present case is concerned, in view of the Explanation to Section 21(1) of the Act no objection by the tenant against the application for release is permissible in law. Explanation (i) to Section 21(1) of the Act reads as follows : "(i) where the tenant or any member of his family who has been normally residing with or is wholly dependent on him has built or has otherwise acquired in a vacant state or has got vacated after acquisition a residential building in the same city, municipality, notified area or town area, no objection by the tenant against an application under this sub-section shall be entertained." 10. In the instant case, it is not disputed that Laxmikant, the son of the petitioner has taken a house on rent in the same city. This fact was admitted by the petitioner himself in his affidavit, paragraphs 4 and 5, filed as Annexure 6 to the Writ Petition. The lower appellate court has also accepted this fact in the last paragraph of the judgment. In view of this fact also, no objectioh could have been raised to the release application filed by the landlord-respondent. 11. Learned counsel for the petitioner, however, in reply urged that this Explanation would not apply to a case where the member of a family of the petitioner had taken a property on rent. Accordingly to the learned counsel it applies only to a case where the property is purchased or built by the member of the family of a tenant. 12. This question came up for consideration in Smt. Nathi Bai and others v. The District Judge, Kanpur and others, 1981 All. Rent Cases 575 held that Explanation (i) to Section 21(l)(a) of the Act will be attracted even if the house has been acquired as a tenant. I respectfully agree with this decision given by Hon'ble N.D. Ojha, J. 13. In view of the above, firstly no objection to the application for release is entertainable on the part of the petitioner and secondly on merits, the petitioner has no case and as such the petition is dismissed. The parties are directed to bear their own costs.