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1986 DIGILAW 271 (BOM)

PRABHAKAR PURUSHOTTAM LONKAR v. MAHARASHTRA STATE ROAD TRANSPORT CORPN.

1986-09-10

R.A.JAHAGIRDAR

body1986
JUDGMENT : Jahagirdar, J. 1. In Complaint (ULP) No. 29 of 1984 a grievance has been made on behalf of the petitioner, who is an employee of the second respondent Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation, (hereinafter referred to as- "the respondent"), that the respondent has committed a breach of a settlement subsisting between the employees of the respondent and the respondent. Clause 5(A) of that settlement, dated 1st of August 1981, which is the subject-matter of interpretation before me and which was the subject-matter of interpretation before the Industrial Court in the complaint filed by the petitioner, is in the following terms:-- "Except those workmen who are in the grades of 390-15-450-20-530-25-605-30-905 and 410-20-530-25-705-30-945 all other workmen who complete 12 years of continuous and satisfactory service in their existing grade shall be granted the scale of immediate next higher promotion post. Where there is no immediate next higher promotion, post for the particular category, the higher scale for such a category of workmen, shall be as shown in Annexure 'B'." 2. In order to understand the controversy between the parties it is necessary to mention only few facts. The petitioner who had joined the respondent-Corporation as a Clerk in the year 1951 came to be promoted in due course on 3rd April 1963 as Junior Assistant/Senior Clerk. Subsequently on 14th of September 1974, after completing over 11 years of service in the post of Junior Assistant/Senior Clerk, the petitioner was promoted as Establishment Supervisor. However, for personal reasons the petitioner did not want to continue in the higher post and on his request the petitioner was reverted to the post of the Junior Assistant/Senior Clerk with effect from 10th of May 1976. On such reversion the petitioner's pay was fixed in the scale of the post to which he was reverted after taking into account the increments which he would have earned had he been in that post from 14th of September 1974 to 10th of May 1976. This itself shows that the petitioner was deemed to be in service in the lower post of Junior Assistant/Senior Clerk for the period from 14th of September 1974 to 10th of May 1976 during which period he was temporarily occupying the higher post of Establishment Supervisor. 3. This itself shows that the petitioner was deemed to be in service in the lower post of Junior Assistant/Senior Clerk for the period from 14th of September 1974 to 10th of May 1976 during which period he was temporarily occupying the higher post of Establishment Supervisor. 3. On 1st of April 1983, the respondent fixed the pay scale of the petitioner in terms of Clause 5(A) of the settlement, dated 1st of August 1981, granting him Selection Grade with effect from 1st of April 1980. While doing so, obviously, the respondent proceeded on the basis that the petitioner: had put in 12 years of continuous and satisfactory service in the grade of Junior Assistant/Senior Clerk. However, by an order dated 8th of March 1984 the respondent modified the said order and fixed the salary of the petitioner at a lower level by holding that the petitioner had not completed 12 years of continuous service in the grade of Junior Assistant/Senior Clerk. 4. This order of the respondent was challenged by the petitioner in the complaint filed by him before the Industrial Court and it was alleged specifically that the respondent was guilty of unfair labour practices under items 5, 9 and 10 of Schedule IV to the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971, hereinafter for brevities sake referred to as the "PULP Act". The reference to items 5 and 10, in my opinion, is hopelessly misplaced. If, however, the petitioner succeeded in showing that the order dated 8th of March 1984 was in contravention of Clause 5(A) of the settlement, then the action of the respondent would be covered by item 9 of Schedule IV to the PULP Act. 5. The respondent resisted the application of the petitioner by contending that the petitioner having worked in a higher post from 14th of September 1974 to 10th of May 1976, he had not completed 12 years of continuous service in the "existing grade" as per Clause 5(A) of the settlement, namely, the grade of Junior Assistant/Senior Clerk. The petitioner, therefore, was not covered by the provisions of the said clause of the settlement. This was the only argument which was advanced on behalf of the respondent and this argument commended itself to the Industrial Court at Nasik which by its judgment and order dated 22nd of July 1985 dismissed the petitioner's complaint. The petitioner, therefore, was not covered by the provisions of the said clause of the settlement. This was the only argument which was advanced on behalf of the respondent and this argument commended itself to the Industrial Court at Nasik which by its judgment and order dated 22nd of July 1985 dismissed the petitioner's complaint. It is against this order of the Industrial Court that the petitioner has approached this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 6. Mr. Dharap, the learned Advocate appearing in support of the petition, has taken me through the relevant record and the judgment of the Industrial Court. He has made a grievance, which I find justified, that the Industrial Court has, while interpreting the provisions of a settlement, has done so mechanically without looking to the history of the petitioner's service and in particular the circumstances in which the petitioner's salary had been fixed after he returned to the post of the Junior Assistant/ Senior Clerk from the higher post of Establishment Supervisor, In my opinion, the reasoning contained in the order of the Industrial Court suffers from an error inasmuch as the Industrial Court failed to work out the legal effect of the fixation of the petitioner's salary after his reversion to the post of Junior Assistant/Senior Clerk in the manner in which it has been done by the respondent itself. That fixation was made after taking into account the increments which the petitioner would have earned had he been in continuous service in the post of Junior Assistant/Senior Clerk with effect from 14th September 1974 to 10th May 1976. If full legal effect to this action of the respondent is given, there is no escape from the conclusion that the petitioner will have to be treated to be in continuous service in the post of Junior Assistant/Senior Clerk from 3rd April 1963 till 1st of April 1980 on which day effect had to be given to the provisions of Clause 5(A) of the settlement. 7. Mr. Sawant who appears for the respondent, however, insists that there was a break in the service of the petitioner in the grade of the Junior Assistant/Senior Clerk for the period during which he occupied the higher post of Establishment Supervisor. 7. Mr. Sawant who appears for the respondent, however, insists that there was a break in the service of the petitioner in the grade of the Junior Assistant/Senior Clerk for the period during which he occupied the higher post of Establishment Supervisor. The continuous service of the petitioner will have to be counted afresh with effect from 10th May 1976 and therefore on 1st of April 1980 he could not be regarded as having completed 12 years of continuous service. This is only to repeat the reasoning which has been adopted by the Industrial Court, but this is no answer to giving full effect, though it may be the effect of a legal fiction, to the order passed by the respondent itself while fixing the pay of the petitioner after his reversion to the post of Junior Assistant/Senior Clerk on 10th of May 1976. One can legitimately ask a question as to in what manner the respondent itself has treated the service of the petitioner from 14th of September 1974 to 10th of May 1976. The answer is that the respondent has treated the petitioner as having been in continuous service as Junior Assistant/Senior Clerk because the respondent has while fixing the petitioner's salary on 10th of May 1976 taken into account the increments which he would have earned had he been in such service. I have, therefore, no hesitation in disagreeing with the reasoning contained in the judgment of the Industrial Court as that reasoning discloses an error which is patent. It is patent because it refuses to take into account the effect of the manner in which the pay scale of the petitioner was fixed by the respondent itself after his reversion on 10th of May 1976. 8. It is no answer to this position to contend, as Mr. Sawant has contended, that persons such as the petitioner will take advantage of the higher pay of the post to which they are promoted and then after reversion they also take advantage of the continuance of service. If such situations are repetitive, it is for the respondent, or for that matter for all parties concerned, to incorporate appropriate term in the settlement. On the facts of this case it is impossible to hold that there is an attempt on the part of the petitioner to take wrong advantage of the situation. 9. In the result, the petition must succeed. On the facts of this case it is impossible to hold that there is an attempt on the part of the petitioner to take wrong advantage of the situation. 9. In the result, the petition must succeed. The order passed by the Industrial Court in Complaint (ULP) No. 29 of 1984 is set aside. That complaint is allowed and it is declared that the order dated 8th March 1984 passed by the Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation is an unfair labour practice within the meaning of item 9 of Schedule IV to the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971. The respondent-Corporation is hereby directed to withdraw the same forthwith. There will, however, be no order as to costs in this petition.