JUDGMENT - S.P. BHARUCHA, J.:---Mr. Hegde, Government Pleader, states that the State Government does not desire to file an affidavit. 2. Heard. 3. This writ petition, which comes up before us for admission today, challenges the order of Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, dated the 1st May, 1986 passed under the provisions of section 9(2) of the Citizenship Act, 1955. The order holds that the first respondent had not voluntarily acquired Iranian citizenship. 4. We propose to dismiss the petition in limine and set out briefly the reasons for so doing. 5. The petitioner and the first respondent contested the election to the Ahmednagar Municipal Council. The 1st respondent was declared elected. The petitioner filed and election petition challenging the 1st respondent's election upon the ground that he was an Iranian and not an Indian citizen. In the election petition the petitioner sought and obtained an interim injunction restraining the 1st respondent from functioning as Municipal Councillor. This Court in appeal affirmed the injunction order. The 1st respondent then moved the Supreme Court by way of a Special Leave Petition and also moved the Central Government under the provisions of the said section 9. 6. The Central Government passed an order on 21st March, 1986 holding that the 1st respondent had voluntarily acquired Iranian citizenship. Thereafter, upon the Special Leave petition being called out, the Supreme Court was informed by the Central Government that it was rescinding its order dated 21st March, 1986 since no notice of hearing had been given as required. 7. The Central Government thereupon heard the 1st respondent and, on the orders of the Supreme Court, the petitioner, had passed the order dated 1st May, 1986 holding that the 1st respondent had not voluntarily acquired Iranian citizenship. When the Special Leave Petition reached hearing thereafter, the Supreme Court vacated the injunction granted in the election petition and directed the Court to proceed with its hearing on the basis that the 1st respondent was not an Iranian citizen. The Supreme Court stated that its "order will not prejudice the respondent's right, if any, to challenge the order dated May 1, 1986 in accordance with law." By filing this writ petition the petitioner now challenges the Central Government's order dated 1st May, 1986. 8. The matter of citizenship is one between the person who claims it and the Central Government. No other person is concerned therewith. 8. The matter of citizenship is one between the person who claims it and the Central Government. No other person is concerned therewith. No other person can challenge the grant or refusal of citizenship. Therefore, the petitioner has no locus to challenge the order dated 1st May, 1986. 9. It was submitted by the petitioner's Advocate that the Supreme Court has permitted the petitioner to challenge the order dated 1st March, 1986. This is not so. The Supreme Court carefully said that its order dated 15th May, 1986 would not prejudice the respondent's rights, if any, to challenge that order. 10. It was submitted that the Supreme Court had earlier permitted the petitioner to appear before the Central Government at the hearing under the provisions of the said section 9 and had thus recognised the petitioner's right to challenge the order thereon if adverse to his interests. The petitioner was permitted to appear before the appropriate authority, viz., the Central Government, to decide whether or not the 1st respondent had voluntarily acquired Iranian citizenship. This permission did not recognise or confer upon the petitioner the right to challenge the order when made. 11. It was submitted that the fate of the petitioner's election petition depended upon his success in showing that the 1st respondent was and Iranian citizen and, if he was unable to challenge the Central Government's order dated 1st May, 1986, his election petition would fail. This is so, but it does not entitle the petitioner to challenge the order when he is not otherwise entitled to do so. 12. Our attention was drawn by Mr. Gursahani, learned Counsel for the 1st respondent, to the Supreme Court's judgment in (Bhagwati Prasad v. Rajeev Gandhi)1, A.I.R. 1986 S.C. 1534. This judgement affirmed the position that the said section 9 is a complete Code and that no Court can make a declaration contrary to that made by the Central Government thereunder. Mr. Gursahani submitted that the judgment showed that the petitioner had no locus to challenge the order dated 1st May, 1986. This judgement affirmed the position that the said section 9 is a complete Code and that no Court can make a declaration contrary to that made by the Central Government thereunder. Mr. Gursahani submitted that the judgment showed that the petitioner had no locus to challenge the order dated 1st May, 1986. As we read the judgment, while it may be open to the person against whom an order is made under the said section 9 to seek its quashing in certain circumstances under Article 226 and a remand of the matter to the Central Government, it is not open to any one other than that person to impugn the order. 13. In the result, the writ petition is rejected. Petition rejected. ------