JUDGMENT - S.M. DAUD, J.:---This petition under Article 227 of the Constitution takes exception to the passing and confirmation of a decree for ejectment based upon the alleged default in payment of rent and the professed need of the landlords of the premises for their personal use and occupation. The questions that arise for determination in this petition have to be considered in the following background :- Respondents-plaintiffs are the landlords of the suit premises and the petitioner-defendant a tenant thereof, on an agreement to pay rent of Rs. 15/- per month. On 9th January, 1979 the plaintiffs addressed a notice to the defendant informing him that he was in arrears of rent since February, 1973 and that his tenancy was deemed determined at the end of the calendar month February, 1979 because the premises was required for the personal use and occupation of two persons amongst them, viz. plaintiffs Nos. 1 and 2. The said notice was served upon defendant on 12th January, 1979. On 18th January, 1979 the defendant moved Miscellaneous Application No. 7 of 1979 contending that the agreed rent was excessive and that it was necessary to determine the standard rent. On 3rd February, 1979 the defendant deposited a sum of Rs. 1093.90 Ps. i.e. the exact amount claimed in plaintiffs' notice dated 9th January, 1979. On March 26, 1979 the plaintiffs filed the suit in which the decree came to be passed. They contended that defendant had been in arrears of rent and that his failure to comply with the obligations laid down by the Rent Act upon tenants, rendered him liable to be ejected. Next, it was pleaded that plaintiffs No. 1 and 2 had retired from railway service and were staying in Manmad and Chalisgaon respectively, and that in rented premises, because of defendant's failure to vacate the suit premises. These premises were reasonably and in good faith required for the personal residence of plaintiffs No. 1 and 2. On both the grounds, defendant was liable to be ejected. The suit filed by the plaintiffs was consolidated along with defendant's application for fixation of standard rent. These premises were reasonably and in good faith required for the personal residence of plaintiffs No. 1 and 2. On both the grounds, defendant was liable to be ejected. The suit filed by the plaintiffs was consolidated along with defendant's application for fixation of standard rent. The trial Court held that the agreed rent was the standard rent, that defendant was liable to be ejected because of his being a defaulter in the payment of rent and affirmed the plaintiffs' need under section 13(1)(g) of the Bombay Rent, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (for short, 'Rent Act' or Act'). The resultant decree was questioned in an appeal to the District Court at Nasik. The Appellate Court confirmed the findings and the decree passed by the trial Court. 2. Mr. Rane for the petitioner submits that the statutory Courts had erred in holding defendant to be a defaulter in the matter of payment of rent. As a matter of fact, the entire rent due had been cleared before the institution of the plaintiffs' suit. Therefore, no cause of action for evicting the defendant on the ground of default in the payment of rent survived when the suit came to be instituted. The statutory courts had failed to take into account a Division Bench judgment of this Court in (Narhar Vani v. Narmadabai Nave)2, 1984 Maharashtra Law Journal 313. The courts below had also erred in accepting the plea that the premises was required reasonably and in good faith for the personal use and occupation of plaintiffs Nos. 1 and 2. In any case after the confirmation of the decree by the Appellate Court, plaintiff No. 1 acting as the Karta had entered into a agreement to sell the suit premises to one Sohanlal Ratanchand Dugal. This agreement had taken place on 8th January, 1986 and the intended purchaser had parted with Rs. 1000/- towards earnest. The balance of the price was to be paid by him in ten months. This agreement was conclusive proof that there was no truth in the plaintiffs professed need vide section 13(1)(g) of the Act. 3. Plaintiffs, through their Counsel Mr. Angal, supported the decree obtained. In relation to the agreement dated 8th January, 1986 plaintiff No. 1 tendered an affidavit which was on behalf of himself and plaintiffs Nos. 2 and 4. This agreement was conclusive proof that there was no truth in the plaintiffs professed need vide section 13(1)(g) of the Act. 3. Plaintiffs, through their Counsel Mr. Angal, supported the decree obtained. In relation to the agreement dated 8th January, 1986 plaintiff No. 1 tendered an affidavit which was on behalf of himself and plaintiffs Nos. 2 and 4. This affidavit recites that plaintiff No. 1 had no authority to enter into any transaction on behalf of the remaining plaintiffs. He had a mere 1/4th interest in the co-parcenary property. Plaintiffs No. 2 to 4 had not given consent to the agreement entered into with Sohanlal. Therefore, on both the grounds the decree passed by the statutory courts was right, and had to be affirmed. 4. Having regard to what has been stated above, the points for determination are :--- (1) Whether the defendant was liable to be ejected on account of non-payment of rent as alleged? (2) Whether the plaintiffs reasonably and in good faith required the suit premises for their personal need? (3) What order ? 5. My findings, for reasons given below, are:- (1) No. (2) No. (3) Petition allowed as per order. REASONS 6. Defendants liability to be ejected for non-payment of rent has to be considered in the background of the admitted position which is thus : Rent from February, 1973 had not been paid by him. In the suit notice dated 9th January, 1979, defendant was called upon to pay rent upto the end of the tenancy month February, 1979. The notice was served upon defendant on 12th January, 1979. On 18th January, 1979, he instituted the standard rent application which came to be registered as Miscellaneous Application No. 7 of 1979. On 3rd February, 1979, the defendant credited a sum of Rs. 1093.90 Ps. and this amount represented the sum demanded in notice dated 9th January, 1979. Mr. Rane submits that the deposit having been made within one month of the service of the notice upon his client, no cause of action for ejectment on the ground of default in the matter of payment of the rent, survived. Therefore, the suit subsequently filed i.e. on March 26, 1979, was partially not maintainable. This was because with the deposit made on 3rd February, 1979, no cause which could be litigated under section 12 of the Act remained. Therefore, the suit subsequently filed i.e. on March 26, 1979, was partially not maintainable. This was because with the deposit made on 3rd February, 1979, no cause which could be litigated under section 12 of the Act remained. In support of this contention, learned Counsel relies upon Narhar Vani's case mentioned above. As against this, Mr. Angal for the plaintiffs submits that defendant cannot take the accidental co-incidence of the deposit being made within a month of the notice to get out of the clutches of section 12(3)(a) of the Act. Defendant had taken exception to the contractual rent being the standard rent. He had moved an application for fixation of the standard rent. Therefore, by choice, he had opted for the protection to be found under section 12(3)(b) of the Act. Admittedly defendant had not continued to pay or tender in Court regularly the rent as contemplated by section 12(3)(b) of the Act. The mere fact that the initial arreas were cleared within a month of the service of the suit notice, did not clothe him with immunity from the failure to comply, with section 12(3)(b). A tenant seeking the protection of section 12(3)(b) had firstly to clear the arrears on the first day of the hearing of the suit or on or before such date as the Court fixed and secondly, continue to pay or tender in Court regularly that rent and permitted increases, as and when the same accrued, till the decision of the suit and an appeal, if one was preferred. First let me reproduce the ratio of section 12 in general abstracted from Narhar Vani's case. The relevant passage to be found at the end of paragraph 7 of the judgement reads thus--- " One thing which is common, however, to be found clear on the face of section 12 and its provisions, is, that, if the tenant pays the arrears demanded by the notice under section 12(2), then the landlord is not entitled to file a suit for possession on the ground of arrears in respect of which he is to give or has given a notice under section 12(2). In sub a case the provision of sub-section (1) will also come into operation because if the tenant pays the amount required to be paid by the notice under section 12(2), then the tenant is a person who is ready and willing to pay this standard rent and the permitted increases, as the case may be, and the landlord is disabled from filing a suit for recovery of possession. In a case where the tenant has paid or must in law be deemed to have paid the amount demanded by the notice under section 12(2), not only are the provisions of section 12(3)(a) not attracted, but there is no occasion to call in aid the provisions of section 12(3)(b) because even the provisions of section 12(3)(b) will be attracted, only if there is a claim for recovery of possession. If by compliance with the requirements of the notice under section 12(3)(a) the landlord is disabled from filing a suit for recovery of possession, there is no question of the provision of section 12(3) being attracted at all. 7. The main question is whether the words, "the tenant pays appearing in section 12(1) would cover a case like the present one, where the rent is not remitted directly to the landlord but paid to his credit in Court, and upon an application for fixation of the standard rent? There are no words qualifying the expression, 'the tenant pays'. It there be no qualification to that expression, the natural meaning will have to be given effect to. In other words, why, how, and in what circumstances, the payment is made, is irrelevant, and, once it is established that the same has been made, the landlord is disabled from suing for recovery of possession. In the words of Narhar Vani's decision, "the tenant has paid and, therefore, the provisions of section 12(3)(a) are not attracted." Further, there is no occasion to call in aid the provisions of section 12(3)(b). As made clear by the Division Bench the provisions of section 12(3)(b) will be attracted only, if there is a claim for recovery of possession. But this claim for recovery of possession can be made only if at the date of the suit, the arrears have not been paid or deemed to have been paid. As made clear by the Division Bench the provisions of section 12(3)(b) will be attracted only, if there is a claim for recovery of possession. But this claim for recovery of possession can be made only if at the date of the suit, the arrears have not been paid or deemed to have been paid. The crediting of the arrears in Court within a month of the service of the suit notice would attract the disabling clause contained in section 12(1) of the Act. The contention that defendant's liability would have to be considered under section 12(3)(b) because he had filed an application for fixation of the standard rent, loses sight of section 12(1). Unless the right seek recovery of possession is first established, it is not necessary to go into the applicability of the first or the second clause of section 12(3). The exposition in Narhar Vani's case reproduced above fully supports the argument advanced by Mr. Rane. I would, therefore, hold that the statutory courts were in error in directing the ejectment of the defendant, whether under section 12(3)(a) or 12(3)(b) of the Act. 8. This takes me to the other ground on which the decree is assailed. The specific case advanced in the plaint was that the plaintiffs No. 1 and 2 were staying at Manmad and Chalisgoan respectively because of compulsion, that they were staying at these towns in rented premises, and, that they sincerely desired to come back to Yeola, and in the suit premises. Plaintiff No. 2 Vasant was the only person from amongst the plaintiffs who was examined in support of this plea. It is not necessary to go into the reasons given by the courts below for upholding plaintiffs claim vis-a-vis section 13(1)(a). This is because of the event that took place on 8th January, 1986. A copy of the receipt passed by the plaintiff No.1 has been tendered. It shows that he has entered into an agreement to sell the building which includes the suit premises for Rs. 37,000/- that he has been paid an advance of Rs.1000/- and that the transaction is to be completed within 10 months. The intending purchaser's affidavit has been placed on record and it is to the effect that in entering into the agreement afore-mentioned, plaintiff No.1 was acting as the Karta. 37,000/- that he has been paid an advance of Rs.1000/- and that the transaction is to be completed within 10 months. The intending purchaser's affidavit has been placed on record and it is to the effect that in entering into the agreement afore-mentioned, plaintiff No.1 was acting as the Karta. In other words, the agreement was for and on behalf of the joint family comprising of the plaintiffs. The affidavit in rebuttal is anything but confidence inspiring. First, it is submitted that the plaintiff No. 1 had no authority to represent the remaining plaintiffs. Next it is stated that before entering into the transaction he had not taken the consent of the other plaintiffs. The best person to refute the affidavit tendered by the intending purchaser would be plaintiff No. 1 himself. I agree that the role of the intending purchaser in arming the defendant with material so as to defeat plaintiff's claim, give rise to the legitimate suspicion that he was a decoy or a Trojan horse introduced by the defendant to warm himself, into the confidence of the plaintiff No. 1. Even so, the obvious cannot be overlooked. Plaintiff No. 1 is the eldest amongst the plaintiffs. The price agreed to be paid by Sohanlal is quite attractive, seeing that the return on the property is the measly rent of Rs. 15 per month. A fair sum has been paid by way of an advance to the plaintiff No. 1. Therefore, the agreement of 8th January, 1986 cannot be fobbed off so easily as plaintiff No. 3 has sought to do. It was argued that even if plaintiff No. 1 wanted to sell the property, that would not demolish the proved requirements of plaintiff No. 2. In this connection reliance was placed upon Kanade J.'s judgement reported in (Jainuddin v. Sitaram)2, 1981 Maharashtra Law Journal 493. The plaintiff No. 2 was examined in the trial Court, but has not been chosen to file an affidavit in refutation of Sohanlal's affidavit is significant. His silence now raises doubts about the professed bona fide requirement of plaintiff No. 2 also. Subsequent events have to be taken note of, and, thus viewed, it cannot be said that plaintiffs are entitled to a confirmation of the decree vis-a-vis section 13(1)(g) of the Act. The result is that the petition succeeds. His silence now raises doubts about the professed bona fide requirement of plaintiff No. 2 also. Subsequent events have to be taken note of, and, thus viewed, it cannot be said that plaintiffs are entitled to a confirmation of the decree vis-a-vis section 13(1)(g) of the Act. The result is that the petition succeeds. Having regard to the unusual circumstances, I will leave parties to bear their own costs throughout. ORDER The petition succeeds. The decree for ejectment and ascertainment of mesne profits---pendete lite and future passed in favour of the respondents and confirmed in appeal, is hereby set aside. This part of the claim is dismissed. Parties left to bear their own costs throughout. Rule in the above terms made absolute. Rule made absolute. -----