JUDGMENT : : S.K. Jha. – A reference of this Civil Revision application to the Division Bench with regard to the true interpretation of section 14 (8) of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) control Act, 1982 (Bihar Act No. 4 of 1983) (hereinafter referred to as the Act for the sake of brevity and convenience) has been necessitated by and is reminiscent of an old saying id perferctum est quod ex omnibus suis partious constat; et nihi perfectum est dum aliquied restal agendum; that is perfect which is complete in all its parts, and nothing is perfect whilst anything remains to be done. In this case the difficulty has arisen not from anything inherent in the subject itself which might be quite simple treated but by the loose draftsmanship which of late, has become more frequent in view of the vase increase in the number of new legislative enactments from time to time. When this case came up before a learned single judge of this Court at the admission stage itself a preliminary objection was raised by learned counsel for the opposite party that no civil revision application could be entertained under section 14(8) of the Act. This is once impels me to quote in extensor section 14 (8) of the Act running thus : “14(8). No appeal or second appeal shall lie against an ORDER :for the recovery of possession of any premises made in accordance with procedure specified in this section. Provided that on an application being made within sixty days of the date of the ORDER :of eviction the High Court may for the purpose of satisfying itself that an ORDER :under the section, is according to law, call for the records of the case and pass such ORDER :in respect there to as it thinks fit.” On a plain primafacic reading of this section it would appear that a petition in revision may be filed before the High Court against an ORDER :for the recovery of possession of any premises made in accordance with the procedure provided in the section. But ultimately the point which falls for decision will depend upon whether the well-settled canon of construction of statutes, namely, ut res magis valeat quam pereat is attracted or not. But ultimately the point which falls for decision will depend upon whether the well-settled canon of construction of statutes, namely, ut res magis valeat quam pereat is attracted or not. This section, namely, section 14 of the Act lays down a special summary procedure for disposal of cased for eviction on the ground of bonafide requirement and in sub-section (1) thereof it has been specifically stated that every suit by a landlord, for the recovery of possession of any premises on the ground specified in clauses (c) or (e) of sub-section (1) of Section 11 of the Act shall be dealt with in accordance with the procedure specified in this section. Clauses (c) of section 11 (1) of the Act lays down one of the grounds for eviction of a tenant by the landlord” where the building is reasonably and in good faith required by the landlord for his own occupation or for the occupation of any person for whose benefit the building is held by the landlord; provided that where the court thinks that the reasonable requirement of such occupation may be substantially satisfied by evicting the tenant from a part only of the building and allowing the tenant to continue occupation of the rest and the tenant agrees to such occupation, the Court shall pass a decree accordingly, and fix proportionately air rent for the portion shall henceforth constitute the building within the meaning of clause (b) section 2 and the rent so fixed shall be deemed to be the fair rent fixed under section 5…..” We are not concerned with the remaining portion of this clause. Clause (e) of section 11 (1) of the Act applies to the case for eviction of a tenant holding a building on a lease for a specified period on the expiry of the period of tenancy. In nut shell section 11 (1)(c) applies to the case of personal necessity of the landlord and section 11 (1)(e) applies to the case of eviction on the expiration of the period prescribed under a contract of lease which means by efflux of time. In nut shell section 11 (1)(c) applies to the case of personal necessity of the landlord and section 11 (1)(e) applies to the case of eviction on the expiration of the period prescribed under a contract of lease which means by efflux of time. The special summary procedure for disposal of case for eviction is confined to only two ground, namely, personal necessity of the landlord reasonably and in good faith of either the whole or a substantial portion of the same which can satisfy his personal necessity and the other by efflux of time fixed by the contract of lease for the specified period itself. On no other ground can the summary procedure as prescribed in Section 14 of Act be invoked. Reverting now to the language of section 14 (8) of the Act, although it bears repetition. It speaks that no appeal or second appeal shall lie against an ORDER :for the recovery of possession of any premises made in accordance with the procedure specified in this section. Only a civil revision has been provided for in the proviso to section 14 (8) in case an application is made within 60 days of the date of the ORDER :of eviction (underlining is mine for the sake of emphasis). It was on this footing that an objection was raised that where no ORDER :for recovery of possession of any premises has been made, there is no provision for any revision or for that matter, an appeal or a second appeal since the Act was a self contained Act, Although it is not quite necessary so to do, unless one feels that a provision for appeal prescribed in section 24 of the Act has escaped our attention it is pertinent to not that section 24 unequivocally states that any person aggrieved by an ORDER :passed by the controller may, within fifteen days form the date of receipt of such ORDER :by him, prefer an appeal in writing to the appellate authority. In this context it is relevant to point out that the suits for eviction are filed under the provisions of the Act not before the Controller but before a civil court of competent jurisdiction. In this context it is relevant to point out that the suits for eviction are filed under the provisions of the Act not before the Controller but before a civil court of competent jurisdiction. The matters which can be adjudicated upon by the Controller are alien to the questions which we are dealing with, Therefore, the forum for filing suits for eviction on one ground or the other being a civil court of competent jurisdiction, section 24 cannot, be any stretch of imagination, be pressed into service for the purpose of showing that any provision for appeal has been prescribed under the Act' against an ORDER :refusing to pass an ORDER :of eviction On the grounds mentioned above, namely, personal necessity or efflux of time by contract. The difference in the forum makes all the difference. But this is just by the way, lest it be/ is understood that I am oblivious of the provisions of section 24 of the Act. It is, however manifest that on a superficial reading of section 14 (8) of the Act the landlord has 'not been provided with any remedy in a case lost by him in which he institutes the suit in a civil court of competent jurisdiction for eviction of a tenant either on the ground of personal necessity reasonably and in good faith or in the case of expiry of the period under the leases as per section 11 (1) (c) and (e) respectively. 2. It is patent, therefore, that in its ordinary meaning and grammatical construction the import of section 14 (8) of the Act, as is contended by learned counsel for the opposite party, leads to a manifest contradiction of the apparent purpose of the enactment, or to some inconvenience or absurdity which can hardly have been intended a construction may be put upon it which modifies the meaning of the words and even, the structure of the sentence. This may be done by departing from the rules of grammer, by giving an unusual meaning to particular words, or by rejecting them altogether, On the ground that the legislature could not possibly have intended what its words signify, and that the modifications made are mere corrections of careless language and really give the true meaning. This may be done by departing from the rules of grammer, by giving an unusual meaning to particular words, or by rejecting them altogether, On the ground that the legislature could not possibly have intended what its words signify, and that the modifications made are mere corrections of careless language and really give the true meaning. Where the main object and intention of a statute are clear, it must not be reduced to a nullity by the drafts man's unskilfulness or ignorance of the law, except in a case of necessity, or the absolute intractability of the language used, as Lord Reid has said in "Cramas Properties Ltd. v. Cannaught For Trimmings. Ltd. (1965) 1 W.L.R. 892 of P. 899 that he prefers to see a mistake on the put of the draftsman in doing his revision rather than a deleberate attempt to introduce an irrational rule the canons of construction are not so rigid as to prevent a realistic solution. It is therefore, also an established principle of conons of construction of statutes that sometimes, where the sense of the statute demands it or where there has been an obvious mistake in drafting a court will be prepared to substitute another word or phrase for that which actually appears is the text of the Act (e.f. Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes (12th Edition) at page 231). It has again therefore, been said as a well settled principle of construction of statutes that an Act has to be read as a whole so as not to accuse the legislature of using words here and there which would result in an obvious anomaly. Reading the language of section 14 (8) in this context conceptually, I am convinced in my mind that it is a gross case of the draftsman's lossness in choosing the words to be incorporated in that part of the legislative enactment, which can well be rectified by the court by making modification and more correction of careless language really giving the true meaning to be attached thereto and the court is not powerless in that regard because this will not amount to an act of legislation but merely a clarification of the statutory object and intent. 3. An. example has been given by Mr. S. K. Mazumdar learned counsel for the petitioner. 3. An. example has been given by Mr. S. K. Mazumdar learned counsel for the petitioner. The submission is that if a literal and grammatical adherence is to be given to section 14 (8) of the Act as contended by learned counsel for the opposite party, in the case of a partial eviction that portion of the ORDER :which is against the tenant will only be revisable and not appealable whereas assuming though not admitting, in favour of the opposite party that an appeal would be at the instance of the landlord, then the landlord will have to seek a remedy by way of an appeal before an appellate court the forum being inferior, to that of this Court. What an anomalous situation? I fail to appreciate this point since the Statute has given no right of appeal whatsoever even to a landlord. Therefore. the question of any anomaly does not arise at all. Can it now be said that the legislature intended that in a suit to be fried by a summary procedure the landlord has no remedy at all under section 14 of the Act. In my considered view the answer would be categorically in the negative. I would therefore, having considered the matter in all its ramifications, hold that the words no appeal or second appeal shall lie against an ORDER :for the recovery of possession of any premises made in accordance with the procedure specified in this section has to be read as no appeal or second appeal shall lie in connection with any ORDER :for the recovery of possession of any premises in accordance with the procedure specified in this section meaning thereby that the words "against an ORDER :for recovery of possession" .has to be read as in connection with an ORDER :for recovery of possession which in its turn would be reading the were "against" as "in connection with or relating to." 4. So far I have been dealing with the question as a matter of first impression on the basis of well settled canons of construction of statues but I am beholden to Mr. So far I have been dealing with the question as a matter of first impression on the basis of well settled canons of construction of statues but I am beholden to Mr. Shreenath Sinah, a senior counsel of this Court who amicus curiae stood up and sought permission of the Court duly accorded to him to assist it on the point in controversy by inviting our attention to a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Vinod Kumar Chowdhary v. Smt. Narain Ded Taneja [( 1980) 2 Supreme Court Cases 120) which clinches the issue in so far as the question in controversy in the 'instant case is concerned as a matter of judicial precedent. That was a case dealing with Delhi Rent Control Act, 1953 and it appears that the language of section 14(8) of our Act has, for all practical purposes, been borrowed from the language of section 25-B of the Delhi Act. Section 25-B of the Delhi Act corresponds to section 14 of the Bihar Act with the only difference that in the Delhi Act the furum for adjudication of matters relating to eviction was prescribed to be the court of Controller whereas under the Bihar Act the forum is a civil court of competent jurisdiction. The language of section 25-B (8) of the Delhi Act has, for all practical purposes, been incorporated in section 14(8) of the Bihar Act. The only difference is that in the Delhi Act the ORDER :for recovery of possession of any premises relates to ORDER :s made by the controller in accordance with the summary procedure specified in that section whereas in the Bihar Act a petition has to be filed for revision in the High Court under the proviso to section 14 (8) of the Act. All that has been said in the proviso to section 25-B (8) of the Delhi Act is that the High Court may, for the purpose of satisfying itself that an ORDER :made by the Controller under this section is according to law, call for the records of the case and pass such ORDER :in respect there to as it thinks fir. In the Bihar Act the proviso to section 14(8) speaks of an application to be made by the tenant whereas in the Delhi Act such an application is not a must be the High Court may suo motu invoke its revisional jurisdiction. Apart from subsection (8) of section 25-B of the Delhi Act practically the entire section, namely, section 25-B of the Delhi Act is, for all practical purpose, repeated in section 14 of the Bihar Act. Both these sections are, therefore, clearly in pari materia. A similar question arose in the Delhi High Court on a number of occasions and in a series of decisions the Delhi High Court took the view that revision application was maintainable against the ORDER :of the controller at the instance of the landlord also although in express terms section 25-B(8) did not say so. Ultimately in one of such case the matter came up before the supreme Court in Vinod Kumar Chowdbary's case (supra) and it was held, having considered the matter thread bare, by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that the remedy of the landlady against the ORDER :of the Controller was "by way of revision (and revision only)" of that ORDER :by the High Court as laid down in the proviso to sub-section (8) of section 25-B, even though it was an ORDER :not directing, but refusing, recovery of possession of the premises in dispute. So is the case here before us with the only difference that the ORDER :has been passed not by the Controller as in the Delhi Act which was the proper forum there but by It civil court of a competent jurisdiction as under our Act. Having already held that section 15 B of the Delhi Act and section 14 of the Bihar Act are in puri materia, I am sufficiently fortified in my view that the remedy of the landlord petitioner against the ORDER :of the Court in the present case was "by way of revision (and revision only)" of that ORDER :by the High Court as laid down in proviso to subsection (8) of section 14 of the Act (Bihar Act). Thus the preliminary objection with regard to the maintainability of the Civil revision application raised by learned counsel for the opposite party must be rejected as not tenable in Jaw either on principle or on precedent. Thus the preliminary objection with regard to the maintainability of the Civil revision application raised by learned counsel for the opposite party must be rejected as not tenable in Jaw either on principle or on precedent. I am, therefore, firmly of the view that the civil revision application is maintainable at the instance of the landlord petitioner. 5. Since this is the only point for which this case was referred to a Division Bench. it is now remitted back to the learned single Judge for entertaining the application and deciding the case for admission on its own merits in accordance with law, In the circumstances. however, I shall make no ORDER :as to costs. S. S. Sandhawalia, C.J.-1 agree.