Judgment :- 1. Plaintiff filed a suit on a promissory note for the recovery of an amount of Rs. 1150/-. The defendant contended that he has not executed any promissory note. Further he said that there were some transactions between the plaintiff and the defendant and in connection with these transactions, some papers stamped and signed were given to the plaintiff. I may at once say that in the written statement, the defendant said only that some papers with stamps affixed were given but did not say that those papers contained his signature. His case is that the plaintiff fabricated a promissory note in one of these papers given by him. In evidence the defendant said that the alleged promissory note was not executed by him and that he has given blank papers stamped and signed for the purpose of some other transaction between himself and the plaintiff. 2. The trial court, after considering the evidence, found that the promissory note was not genuine and dismissed the suit. The appellate court, after a re-appraisal of the evidence, did not agree with the trial court. It decreed the suit. Now the defendant files this civil revision petition. 3. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner submits that though there was no question of law raised before the appellate court, which is now an essential requirement for entertaining an appeal in a suit of the nature cognizable by courts of small causes, when the amount or value of the subject-matter of the original suit does not exceed three thousand rupees, the appellate court has admitted the appeal. Counsel refers me to S.96(4) C. P. C. It reads thus:- "No appeal shall lie except on a question of law, from a decree in any suit of the nature cognizable by Courts of Small Causes when the amount or value of the subject-matter of the original suit does not exceed three thousand rupees." 4. The appellate court re-appreciated the evidence and disagreed with the trial court. This, according to the revision petitioner, is against law. He contends that the appellate court can entertain an appeal against the decree of the trial court only on a question of law. When the appeal is entertainable only on a question of law, the jurisdiction of the appellate court to interfere with the decree also is co-terminus with that condition and so confined to a question of law. He contends that the appellate court can entertain an appeal against the decree of the trial court only on a question of law. When the appeal is entertainable only on a question of law, the jurisdiction of the appellate court to interfere with the decree also is co-terminus with that condition and so confined to a question of law. Certainly, this is a very attractive argument. But on a closer examination of this submission, I find that though the appellate court did not say clearly that a question of law is involved, in the appeal, it has considered a question of law that has arisen on the facts of the case. Who should discharge the onus of proof, is a question recognised by courts as a question of law. Appellate court says that the appeal involves a question of burden of proof. 5. In a case where the defendant contends that though the signature in the promissory note produced before the court is that of the defendant, but that signature was put not to authenticate a promissory note but it was a signature put on a blank paper, it cannot be considered as an admission of the execution of the promissory note. The admission of the signature has to be taken along with the statement explaining the circumstance under which the signature was affixed in the document. It has to be treated as a denial of the execution of the promissory note. In those circumstances, the case has to be tried determining the onus of proof on the basis that there is a denial of the execution of the promissory note. 6. What is the content of that connotation'execution'? What are the attributes connoted by the term? Will it signify in addition, inclusion of something in the meaning of the word besides what it primarily denotes? Is it correct to hold that execution means mere admission of the signature on the controversial document, while denying specifically the authentication of the contents of the document? Does not the word execution mean subscribing the signature on the document consciously after a proper and intelligent appreciation of the contents of the. document? Is it correct to hold that execution means mere admission of the signature on the controversial document, while denying specifically the authentication of the contents of the document? Does not the word execution mean subscribing the signature on the document consciously after a proper and intelligent appreciation of the contents of the. document? I am of opinion that where a party only tells the court that the signature on the document is his and explains the circumstances which led to his signing the document, which makes it clear that he never wanted to subscribe his signature to acknowledge and authenticate the contents of the document in question, it can never be said that the party has admitted the execution of the document. In a suit on a promissory note, the initial burden is on the plaintiff to prove execution of the pronote and only when this burden is discharged, the court raises a presumption of passing of consideration for the instrument in favour of the plaintiff. 7. The appellate court observed wrongly that the burden of proof is very heavy on the defendant. I feel that this is not a correct understanding of the law on the point. 8. In Mammad v. Mammad (1957 K.L.T. 328), Varadaraja Iyengar. J. said that the onus in a case of 'this type' rests on the plaintiff to prove both the fact of execution and the advance of consideration. The 'type of case' that was considered by the learned judge was a suit for recovery of an amount on the basis of a promissory note, where the defendant contended that the promissory note is not genuine, in so much so, the defendant has given signed blank papers with the plaintiff and the plaintiff used one such paper to fabricate a promissory note. Fazl Ali, J. in Ramlakhan Singh v. Gog Singh (AIR. 1931 Patna 219) considering this question said "Where the law places the onus on the plaintiff to prove that a document is duly executed, the onus cannot be discharged by merely proving the identity of the thumb impression, but it must be further proved that the thumb impression was given on the document alter it bad been written out and completed." 9.. It is true that S.114, Evidence Act tells us: "The mere fact that a document is admitted to bear a certain signature and that it comes from proper custody ought to be enough to raise an inference that it was signed with the intention of execution". But this presumption is a qualified presumption since it has to be noted that S.114 Evidence Act begins with the words "the court may presume". Further it has to be noted that initial burden of proving execution of a document when it is denied is upon the person alleging execution. 10. I have to remember that "in judicial proceedings as elsewhere the accurate determination of the evidential value of fact's is a condition of the discovery of truth". "Rules and maxims when recognised at all are recognised as proper for the guidance of individual judgment not for the exclusion of it." Presumptive or conditional proof is a fact which amounts to proof only so long as there exists no other fact amounting to disproof. The presumptions are based invariably on no real estimate of probabilities, since it is general, but are recognised and applied for the purpose of placing the burden of proof upon the party who in law should bear it or "who may most justly be made to bear it " 11. I feel that the presumption under S.114, Evidence Act is only a conditional presumption in the sense that if other rebutting circumstances are pointed out, the presumption will certainly lose its probative force. In A. I. R.1931 Patna 219, it is observed thus: "S. 114 is a permissive and not a mandatory section and the court may, having regard to the circumstances of a particular case, refuse to raise a presumption in that case under that section, although in other cases such a presumption may be properly raised." 12. The learned counsel for the respondent submitted that there is no case for the defendant in his pleadings that be has banded over signed papers with the plaintiff. What he attempted to prove in his evidence is inconsistent with the pleading and so his case that he handed over signed papers should not be accepted. There is force in this argument. 13. Both the courts below have not considered the case in the correct perspective. What he attempted to prove in his evidence is inconsistent with the pleading and so his case that he handed over signed papers should not be accepted. There is force in this argument. 13. Both the courts below have not considered the case in the correct perspective. In the circumstances, I feel that the just solution in this case is to set aside the judgments of the courts below and remit the case for a fresh disposal by the trial court. I do so. Parties are allowed to adduce fresh evidence if they want to do so. Parties are directed to appear before the trial court on 12-9-86.