A. P. MISRA, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner is a partnership firm engaged in the manufacture and export of a variety of items, including, inter alia, scarves. According to the petitioner one of the raw material used in the manufacture of the said scarve is metallic polyester yarn. These yarns were imported by the petitioner from Japan for which advance licence was obtained and after manufacture of the scarves they are exported outside India. The petitioner by means of the present writ petition has challenged the seizure order dated 4th December, 1985 (annexure 10, and the order dated 21st december, 1985 (annexure 12), passed by the Assistant Commissioner (Check Post), Sales Tax, ghaziabad. The seizure was made according to the respondents for violation of the provisions of sections 13-A and 28-A of the U. P. Sales Tax Act, 1948. The said impugned order directed the petitioner for furnishing of security to the tune of 40 per cent of the value of the goods seized for its release. ( 2 ) THE petitioners contention was that the said order is bad as there was no sale made by the petitioner within the State of U. P. and as it was meant for export outside India, the seizure itself is illegal and demand of security to the tune of 40 per cent is also bad on that account. The learned Counsel for the petitioner vehemently urged that unless there was sale made by the petitioner the power of seizure cannot be exercised by the respondents. It was further contended that the aforesaid goods were brought in the State of U. P. only for storage purposes and it was not for any business. Section 28-A has been reframed by U. P. Act No. 33 of 1979, which would be relevant for the purposes of the present case. ( 3 ) SECTION 28-A (1) of the Act uses the words "any person (hereinafter in this section referred to as the importer) who intends to bring, import or otherwise receive, into the State from any place without the State, any goods liable to tax under this Act. . . ( 3 ) SECTION 28-A (1) of the Act uses the words "any person (hereinafter in this section referred to as the importer) who intends to bring, import or otherwise receive, into the State from any place without the State, any goods liable to tax under this Act. . . in connection with the business, shall obtain the prescribed form of declaration on payment of the prescribed fee from the assessing authority having jurisdiction over the area, where his principal place of business is situated or, in case there is no such place where he ordinarily resides. " This section makes it clear that any person who either imports, brings or receives any goods liable to tax under this provision exceeding the quantity and value of the goods mentioned therein must obtain the prescribed forms and declaration on payment of prescribed fees. It is not in dispute in the present case that the prescribed form of declaration has not been obtained by the petitioner, when the goods were brought in the State of U. P. from outside U. P. Under Sub-section (1) of Section 28-A there are three essential ingredients, namely, that any person referred to in Section 28-A must bring, import or receive within the State any goods which were brought from outside the State, secondly, such goods must under the law of the State of U. P. be liable to tax, and, thirdly, it must be in connection with the business. If all these ingredients are in existence then he must obtain the declaration in the prescribed form. In the present case, it is not in dispute that the goods were brought from outside the State of U. P. and such goods were liable to tax under this Act and were kept in the State of U. P. which was in connection with the business. It is significant here to point out Sub-section (6) of Section 28-A. Under Section 28-A (6) of the Act the officer making the search or making inspection shall also record his reasons after giving opportunity that such goods were transported in an attempt to evade the assessment or payment of tax due or likely to be due under this Act then he shall order detention of such goods. Thus, the section has taken care that the goods shall not be detained, only in the absence of the requisite document referred to in the section unless he is further satisfied that the action was to evade the payment of tax due or likely to be due under this Act. The argument of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the power of seizure cannot be exercised unless there is proof of sale is misconceived in law. For this reliance was placed in the case of Sales Tax Officer, Navgaon v. Timber and Fuel corporation, Orchha District, Tikamgarh [1973] 31 STC 585 (SC); AIR 1973 SC 2350 . Reference was made to paragraphs 4 and 5 of this judgment. In that case, there was a forest contractor, a registered dealer of M. P. , and they purchased large number of timber in an auction held by the Forest Department of Madhya Pradesh and some parts of the said timber were transferred to U. P. and the remaining were sold in Madhya Pradesh. The assessing authority held not only what was sold in the Madhya Pradesh but what was transferred by the assessee to the state of U. P. amounted to sale. It was on these facts the Supreme Court held that merely transfer of goods by the owner from one place to another cannot amount to sale under the provisions of the Madhya Pradesh Sales Tax Act. In that case, it was the assessment proceedings under which it was held not to be sale. The facts in this case are entirely different. Here the question whether there was sale or not is not relevant at the stage of seizure. If a person merely transfers or transports goods with a view to evade tax where such goods are likely to be taxed under the Act the power of seizure has been provided. This provision empowers the Revenue to check all possible evasions. When section uses the words "likely to be taxed", this itself conceived of stage prior to the sale. When sale actually takes place then question of likely to be due could not be there. In view of this, the foundation of the argument of the counsel for the petitioner basing on the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court do not find any legs to be sustained. When sale actually takes place then question of likely to be due could not be there. In view of this, the foundation of the argument of the counsel for the petitioner basing on the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court do not find any legs to be sustained. In that supreme Court case, the question if it is a sale or not was directly involved and it was in assessment proceedings while present is the case of seizure, which generally is a stage before the assessment. ( 4 ) NEXT, it was argued that the seizure could only be in connection with the business. Reliance was placed by the counsel for the petitioner on the definition of "business" under Section 2 (aa)of the Act which is quoted hereunder: (aa) business, in relation to business of buying or selling goods, includes:- (i) any trade, commerce or manufacture, or any adventure or concern in the nature of trade, commerce, or manufacture, whether or not Such trade, commerce, manufacture, adventure or concern is carried on with a motive to make profit and whether or not any profit accrues from such trade, commerce, manufacture, adventure or concern; and (ii) any transaction of buying, selling or supplying plant, machinery, raw materials, processing materials, packing materials, empties, consumable stores, waste or by-products, or any other goods of a similar nature or any unserviceable or obsolete or discarded machinery, or any parts or accessories thereof or any waste or scrap or any of them, which is ancillary to or is connected with or is incidental to, or results from, such trade, commerce, manufacture, adventure or; concern. ( 5 ) THE definition is very wide enough to cover any trade or any adventure in the nature of trade, commerce or manufacture. It is the petitioners own case that he has imported metallic polyester yarn for the purpose of manufacturing of scarves for being exported outside India. It cannot be doubted that such a transaction would definitely be covered by the words "trade" or "manufacture". It is the petitioners own case that he has imported metallic polyester yarn for the purpose of manufacturing of scarves for being exported outside India. It cannot be doubted that such a transaction would definitely be covered by the words "trade" or "manufacture". We are, therefore, of the opinion that the petitioner has brought the goods within the State of U. P. for the purpose of business or trade which he has undertaken and thus the goods being imported within the State of U. P. was in connection with the business and it would be covered under Section 28-A. Even alternatively the petitioners contention could not be sustained in view of proviso to Section 28-A (1), which is quoted below: provided that where the importer intends to bring, import or otherwise receive such goods otherwise than in connection with business, he may, at his option, in the like manner obtain the prescribed form of certificate. ( 6 ) UNDER this, it has been clearly provided that even for such goods which has been received otherwise than in connection with business, he may obtain the prescribed form of certificate. Similarly, Sub-section (1) of the aforesaid section also makes it clear that where any person intends to bring, import or otherwise receive into the State from any place without the State any goods referred to in Sub-section (1) otherwise than in connection with business and obtains the prescribed form of certificate, the provisions of Sub-sections (2), (3) and (4) were made applicable. Thus, Section 28-A covers both cases, viz. , brought into State in connection with business and otherwise than in connection with business. ( 7 ) LEARNED Counsel then made an application during the course of the hearing of this case for amending the writ petition, which is not objected to by the respondents, which in fact, were additions of grounds and the prayer, by virtue of which it challenged the provisions of Section 28-A, U. P. Sales Tax Act, as ultra vires. ( 7 ) LEARNED Counsel then made an application during the course of the hearing of this case for amending the writ petition, which is not objected to by the respondents, which in fact, were additions of grounds and the prayer, by virtue of which it challenged the provisions of Section 28-A, U. P. Sales Tax Act, as ultra vires. It was vehemently argued that Sub-section (4-A) of section 28-A is beyond the legislative power of the State Government since it is only the sale and purchase which would be covered by entry 54 of List II of the Constitution of India while this section empowers the officer for detention of goods even a stage prior to the same and, therefore, it is beyond the competence of the State Legislature and is also violative of Articles 14 and 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution of India. This argument will not detain us since the validity of this section as amended by U. P. Act No. 33 of 1979 was subject-matter of challenge before this court in the case of Jain Shudh Vanaspati Ltd. , Ghaziabad v. State of U. P. 1983 UPTC 198. This court upheld the validity of that section after detailed considerations of the various arguments raised by the counsel for both the parties. Learned Counsel for the petitioner strenuously urged that in that case though various other contentions were made but the Bench did not take into consideration the provisions of Sub-section (4-A) of Section 28-A of the said Act and, therefore, the matter should be reconsidered. This is now not open to the petitioner. The law is well-settled on this. Where a question of validity has been decided by a Division Bench of a Court then subsequently it cannot be reopened by another Bench only on the ground that one of the points or provisions has not been considered. Thus, we are of the opinion that the petitioner cannot raise now the question of validity of this section again by means of this writ petition. ( 8 ) NEXT, it was urged that the value of the goods seized, if assessed, would be to the tune of only rs. 14,000 while security which has been asked to be furnished is to the extent of Rs. 2,83,200 which is arbitrary and without any authority of law. The said argument, in our opinion, is misconceived. ( 8 ) NEXT, it was urged that the value of the goods seized, if assessed, would be to the tune of only rs. 14,000 while security which has been asked to be furnished is to the extent of Rs. 2,83,200 which is arbitrary and without any authority of law. The said argument, in our opinion, is misconceived. The security asked for is in accordance with Section 13-A (6), under which the officer seizing the goods is empowered to fix the amount sufficient to cover the penalty likely to be imposed. It is a provision enabling such officer in the interest of revenue to ask for such security, if penalty is imposed, would be payable on such goods. Section 15-A (1) (o) is a provision for penalty in case of the contravention of the provision of Section 28-A. Clause (ix) of section 15-A (1) of the Act specifically provides that in a case referred to in Clause (o), a sum not exceeding 40 per cent of the value of the goods involved is the likely penalty which should be imposed by the authority finally deciding the matter. It is in the background of this setting of the various provisions of the Act that the demand of security is ordered and we are of the view that in case if it is finally found that penalty is imposable then the demand of security to the tune of 40 per cent of the value of the goods could not be said to be arbitrary. Therefore, even this contention of the petitioner is devoid of any merit. ( 9 ) THE argument was also made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the order dated 21st December, 1985 (annexure 7 to the counter-affidavit), passed under Section 13-A (6) of the act does not give sufficient reasons for demanding such a security. We have perused the said order. Even on merits it cannot be said that the order is such which calls for any interference in the present proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution. The said order gives very cogent reasons before recording the finding that the explanation submitted by the petitioner was not found to be satisfactory. We have perused the said order. Even on merits it cannot be said that the order is such which calls for any interference in the present proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution. The said order gives very cogent reasons before recording the finding that the explanation submitted by the petitioner was not found to be satisfactory. It was recorded therein that neither any intimation was sent to the sales tax department that they were keeping such goods which was liable to tax within the State of u. P. for purpose of storage nor they have obtained any registration even though they were keeping large quantity of such imported goods. The explanation that this was being kept here only because there is no place for keeping in Delhi was not accepted by the said authorities. It recorded further finding that metallic polyester yarn does not occupy much space. It has also been recorded in the said order that no book of account or other documents were kept at the said place. Even the stock register which was sought to be kept by the petitioner was also not produced before the said authorities. The said order also incorporates that the said goods were imported within U. P. from outside without form 31 and it was on the basis of all these accumulative reasons that an inference was drawn that the said goods were brought in for the purpose of evading tax. We would not like to go on the merits of the contention as it may affect the final adjudication which has yet to be gone into between the parties in future proceedings. Suffice it to say that it cannot be said that this order is without any reason or without any proper consideration. The scope of this order is limited to the fact whether seizure of goods could or could not have been ordered on the facts and circumstances of the case. The authority exercising this power cannot be said to have acted beyond the scope of Section 28-A read with Section 13-A and, therefore, even this contention of the learned Counsel has no merit. The authority exercising this power cannot be said to have acted beyond the scope of Section 28-A read with Section 13-A and, therefore, even this contention of the learned Counsel has no merit. ( 10 ) FINALLY, the learned Counsel at the fag-end urged that the imposition of 40 per cent is excessive and to the tune of 6 per cent should have been demanded in view of the decision reported in Monika International, Varanasi v. Sales Tax Officer (SIB), Varanasi 1984 UPTC 22 and Om Silk Trading Company, Varanasi v. Sales Tax Officer (Mobile Unit), Varanasi 1984 uptc 993. The aforesaid decisions were based on the basis of some circular as to what security should generally be asked in respect of certain goods. However, in the present case neither the petitioner placed any such circular before us nor made any reliance on any such circular. It is not known on the material of this case whether metallic polyester yarn is included or not in that circular and to what extent security could be asked. Thus, even this argument cannot be sustained for quashing the demand of security. ( 11 ) FOR the aforesaid reasons, we are of opinion that no sustainable ground has been raised by the petitioner, which calls for any interference in the impugned order in the present proceedings. ( 12 ) IN the result, the writ petition is dismissed, but costs on parties. .