K. A. BABU v. STATE OP KERALA — 1986 DIGILAW 278 (KER)

Judgment :- 1. The growing buds of a glowing profession are in Court. The petitioners-law students complain about the prospectus for admission to the Law Colleges. They seek reliefs not for themselves; they are already in the Law College, and would claim, are serious at their legal studies. They plead a public cause and for posterity; and they have spared much of their time and energy for projecting the grievances legal and constitutional with considerable sincerity. Mr. M. I. Joseph, President of the Kerala High Court Advocates' Association in which capacity eminently qualified to be of assistance to the Court was generous enough to respond to the request of the court and to offer in profusion his assistance in the resolution of the controversy. 2. The prospectus for admission to the five year LLB, course for 1986-87 applicable to the Government Law Colleges at Trivandrum, Ernakulam and Calicut was published under Ext.P1 on 29-5-1986. It is attacked mainly on two grounds: (1) The prescription under Clause.5(e) of a maximum age limit for admission to the course; (2) the exclusion of the one private law college in the State, the 4th respondent from the entrance examination. 3. The Government by its counter-affidavit dated 24-7-1986 attempted to offer its defence in relation to both the points. I am constrained to observe that the defence was indeed a feeble one. On the second aspect, 4th respondent put up a supportive fort well equipped and well operated to resist the aggression. 4. It is perhaps desirable to sketch the background of the origin of the impugned prospectus before the pleadings are set forth, the defence adverted to, the discussion attempted, and the decision arrived at indicated. 5. Legal education would come within two of the entries in the concurrent list of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, entries 25 and 26, reading: "25. Education, including technical education, medical education and universities, subject to the provisions of entries 63, 64, 65 and 66 of List.1; vocational and technical training of labour." 26. Legal, medical and other professions." The Parliament and the State Legislature have both exercised the powers of legislation in relation to these topics. Education, including technical education, medical education and universities, subject to the provisions of entries 63, 64, 65 and 66 of List.1; vocational and technical training of labour." 26. Legal, medical and other professions." The Parliament and the State Legislature have both exercised the powers of legislation in relation to these topics. The Parliament has enacted the Advocates Act, 1961, "an Act to amend and consolidate the law relating to legal practitioners and to provide for the constitution of Bar Councils and an All India Bar." The State Government has enacted the Kerala University Act, 1974. The Advocates Act assigns, under S.7, many functions for the Bar Council of India. S.7(h) deals with one among them; and that is: "to promote legal education and to lay down standards of such education in consultation with the Universities in India imparting such education and the State Bar Councils;" The functions of the Bar Council include recognition of the Universities whose degree in law shall be a qualification for enrolment as an advocate. S.24 while dealing with the qualifications of a person for being admitted as an advocate, refers to aspects concerning legal education, as contained in sub-clauses.(iii) and (iiia), reading: "(Hi) after the 12th day of March, 1967. save as provided in sub-clause (iii a), after undergoing a three year-course of study in law from any University in India which is recognised for the purposes of this Act by the Bar Council of India; or (iiia)" after undergoing a course of study in law, the duration of which is not less than two academic years commencing from the academic year 1967-68 or any earlier academic year from any University In India which is recognised for the purposes of this Act by the Bar Council of India;" S.49 of that Act confers on the Bar Council of India, powers to make rules for discharging its functions. The section itself enumerates some of the topics on which rule could be so framed. Clause (af) and (d) are particularly relevant in that context. They respectively read: "(af) the minimum qualifications required for admission to a course of degree in law in any recognised University; (d) the standards of legal education to be observed by Universities in India..." The rules have been framed as envisaged under S.49; and have been duly published in the Gazette and are new in force. They respectively read: "(af) the minimum qualifications required for admission to a course of degree in law in any recognised University; (d) the standards of legal education to be observed by Universities in India..." The rules have been framed as envisaged under S.49; and have been duly published in the Gazette and are new in force. Part IV of Rules deals with standards of legal education and recognition of degrees in law for admission as advocates. The conditions for the recognition of a degree in Law from any University, as from 1st June, 1982, 'have been laid down in the above Part. The duration of the course, the pattern and functioning of the colleges, the working time, the medium of instruction, standards of admission, and the courses of study have all been provided thereunder. Rule S is particularly relevant. It reads: "5. Admission of student to the course of instruction in law shall ordinarily be on the basis of merit, No student shall be admitted to the course of instruction in law unless be has inter alia, obtained 45 per cent marks in the aggregate in the qualifying examination for admission. Provided that in the case of students of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes a relaxation of marks upto 5 percent in the qualifying examination may be given." (There is an amendment regarding the minimum marks to be obtained for securing admission. That is not of any direct concern in the present petition, as no contention relating to the same was pressed.) 6. The Syndicate of the Kerala University in its meeting held on 25-12-1983 resolved to implement the five-year LLB. Course from the academic year 1984-85. Acting in its wake, the Government issued G.O.Ms. No. 177/84/H. Edn. dated 16-7-1984 dealing with the various aspects of admission to and conduct of that course. Para.2 of that order dealt with admission. Thereunder: "the existing rules of admission for the 1st year of 3 year LLB course will be followed in the case of admission to the 1st year of the 5 year Law Course." The 5 year Law Course was thus launched in this State, though many months after the commencement of the academic year. 7. It would appear that in 1985, the Kerala Law Students' Association had demanded the introduction of an entrance examination for the admission to the Law Course, apparently seeking a parity with other professional courses. 7. It would appear that in 1985, the Kerala Law Students' Association had demanded the introduction of an entrance examination for the admission to the Law Course, apparently seeking a parity with other professional courses. The Government examined that demand and tentatively decided to introduce the entrance examination for the five-year law course in Government Law Colleges from the academic year 1986-87. On 4-3-1985 the Commissioner for Entrance Examination appears to have written on this aspect. (The relevant file containing the above aspects is not made available to the court. The facts are gathered from the files of the later period.) In answer to a letter dated 7-10-1985 from the Commissioner for Entrance Examinations, the Principal of the Law College, Calicut, forwarded a draft scheme for entrance examination for five-year LLB, course. Para.4 of the draft scheme dealt with the eligibility for admission. For the purpose of the present case it is sufficient to note that that scheme did not envisage any maximum age limit for admission. The Commissioner for Entrance Examination wrote to the Government on 18-12-1985 offering his remarks on the draft scheme. In item 8 dealt with in that letter, he stated: "There does not seem to be any need to prescribe a higher age limit. It is not done in the case of other professional courses." There appears to have been a discussion on 9-1-1986 between the Commissioner and Secretary (Higher Education), the Commissioner for Entrance Examination and the Principal, Law College, Calicut. As a result of the above discussion, the fixation of a maximum age limit for applying for the entrance examination was incorporated as 20 years on the 1st day of January of the year in which the examination is conducted. The Administrative Department, apparently did not feel it necessary to have the views of the Law Department on the matter. The scheme as presented before the Council of Ministers was approved without delay and the prospectus based thereon was issued soon thereafter. 8. The petitioners point out that till now, it has never been the policy of the Government to prescribe a maximum age for admission, in respect of any professional course. According to them, there is hardly any rational or reasonable ground for introducing an artificial age bar for admission to the professional course of law. 8. The petitioners point out that till now, it has never been the policy of the Government to prescribe a maximum age for admission, in respect of any professional course. According to them, there is hardly any rational or reasonable ground for introducing an artificial age bar for admission to the professional course of law. The introduction of an upper age limit, is not an aspect which has been dealt with by the Bar Council in its rules or by the University in its statutes, regulations or ordinances. This executive fiat which makes a serious inroad into the rules and regulations occupying their legitimate fields, according to them, violates Art.14 of the Constitution of India and even forges an unreasonable restriction on the fundamental right to practise any profession under Art.19(g) of the Constitution. 9. The answer of the Government is contained in paragraph S of its counter-affidavit. After referring to the introduction of the five-year LLB course as decided by the Bar Council of India and the objective thereunder, the counter-affidavit proceeds to state: "The Bar Council of India introduced the S year LLB. Course in order to improve legal education. As stated in the preamble of the rules of the Bar Council in Part.4 (which is the relevant rule for the new Scheme): "Whereas there is almost unanimity of opinion in the country that legal Education needs to be drastically altered and improved." the new system is introduced to achieve drastic changes and improvement. As a result, the admission stage for legal study is lowered from Graduation stage in order to limit admission to young and motivated students who opt to profession of law just as in other Professional disciplines. To advance the same cause, the State Government have prescribed the maximum age limit at 20 with usual relaxations. By this provision, nobody's fundamental right is affected, because every one below the age of 20 possessing the minimum qualification is free to appear for entrance test. For those who could not join the S year course in 1984-85 (when the course was introduced) and continued their studies for Graduation, the old 3 year course is being continued for 1986-87 also. They can join that course and so their opportunity is not denied. The age limit is only for 5 year LLB. Professional Course and it is made with a purpose as slated above." 10. They can join that course and so their opportunity is not denied. The age limit is only for 5 year LLB. Professional Course and it is made with a purpose as slated above." 10. There cannot be any doubt that the introduction of an upper age limit, has the effect of denying entry to the portals of the Law Colleges to a large section of the student community. Very many desirous of having a legal education, would have to deny themselves that opportunity and privilege in view of the rigid and inflexible provision. It is prima facie, discriminatory. The defence attempted is one of a classification based on age. There is, no doubt, a classification, and reckoned with reference to a known factor regarding age. It is true that in relation to many situations, age has afforded a reasonable basis for classification. Children under the age of 14 years are specifically referred to in the protective provisions contained in Art.24 and 45 of the Constitution. Age, perhaps, as an indication of maturity and experience in life, has been reckoned in fixing the qualification of high offices (such as for the President and Vice President under Art.58 and 66 respectively of the Constitution) and for Members of Parliament and Members of the Legislative Assembly (under Art.84 and Art.173 respectively). Superannuation of those serving the judiciary is likewise linked with age, 55 for the District Judges (in Kerala), 62 for the High Court Judges (Art.217) and 65 for the judges of the Supreme Court (Art.124). Entry into Government service and exit out of it, are linked with the age of the person. Many service rules provide for intermediate advantages and opportunities dependent upon age. However, it is fallacious to argue that age would afford a sustainable basis of classification for any situation. There still appears to be a lingering mis-apprehension among many that some classification is sufficient to sustain what is a transparent discrimination. The crux of the legal principles in relation to complaints about discrimination, is sometimes missed. The link the strong link between the classification and the object sought to be achieved, is the corner stone for a defence edifice when an attack is made grounded on negation of the equality clause. This necessarily would raise the query: What is the objective underlying the selection to a professional course? The link the strong link between the classification and the object sought to be achieved, is the corner stone for a defence edifice when an attack is made grounded on negation of the equality clause. This necessarily would raise the query: What is the objective underlying the selection to a professional course? There could not possibly be any doubt: selection of the brightest and the best. That is what has been emphasised by that authoritative and competent body in charge of the destinies of our profession the Bar Council of India. The Bar Council of India has rightly stressed that merit (which concept has now been explained clearly by the Supreme Court in Pradeep Jain's case AIR 1984 SC 1420) shall be ordinarily the criterion for admission to the course. (This of course is subject to the valuable constitutional protection given to the weaker sections of the society, the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and other Backward Classes; for, without the uplift of this major section of the society, an egalitarian Indian society could not be conceived of.) 11. If the object is, therefore to have the best talents for an exacting profession, it is totally unnecessary to offer a feather bed, to weaklings who do not measure up to the requisite standards in a competitive field. Those who seek entry into a tough-enough professional course must necessarily show mettle and muscle, and the power and the prowess in brain and brawn, in an open and fair competition. Prodigies like Macaulay or Mills may be rare. But in relation to an entrance examination within a limited field, it should not be difficult for those who have done a 10 plus 2 course, to compete with maturer or older friends. In this connection it is to be remembered that the entry is not entirely decided by the result in the competitive examination. The total marks under paragraph 5(b) of the prospectus is 300. Marks for the qualifying examination is fixed as 100, and for the entrance examination at 200. About the reckoning of the marks in the qualifying examination, there could not possibly be any complaint. The struggle to secure higher marks out of 200 in the entrance examination, must necessarily be arduously undertaken by the younger ones, if they seek an earlier admission to a professional course. About the reckoning of the marks in the qualifying examination, there could not possibly be any complaint. The struggle to secure higher marks out of 200 in the entrance examination, must necessarily be arduously undertaken by the younger ones, if they seek an earlier admission to a professional course. If they miss a chance in one year, the greater maturity obtained in a later year would stand them in good stead, when those younger in age compete with them. The absence of a special treatment to the younger ones, will not in any way frustrate the object underlying a higher standard in the legal education. On the other hand, the system would prominently promote laudable objectives. 12. It cannot be denied that large sections of the society still suffer from handicaps of tradition or social oppression. Those in the rural set up, have comparatively greater disadvantages in having sophisticated educational aids. They may have to traverse a longer period before they pass the qualifying course. Those who struggle against their awkward background, are in a sense heroes as pointed out by the Supreme Court in State of J & K v. Triloki Nath Khosa & others AIR 1974 SC 1. (The cause of this class, has been particularly projected by Krishna Iyer J. in his inimitable style). The introduction of the age bar as attempted under the prospectus, would shut, and cruelly and forcefully shut the doors of the Law Colleges to those desirous of, and deserving, legal education. Such an arbitrary situation would not secure constitutional permission. 13. In a sense an advanced age may not in any way affect serious prosecution of plans and projects. Aurangazeeb waged a valiant battle even at the age of 81. Even a fleeting glance of the portrait gallery of distinguished law men would indicate that many had joined the Law course only after they were over 20. If a provision similarly, harsh and arbitrary had been in force, many of the legendary Law Lords would have had their legal career cruelly aborted. The names would include Lord Halsbury who read for the law when he was twenty five and Lord Hailsham, at twenty seven. (See Lives of Lord Chancellors by Hewston; and A History of Our Own Times, Vol. II by Justice Mc Carthy). The names would include Lord Halsbury who read for the law when he was twenty five and Lord Hailsham, at twenty seven. (See Lives of Lord Chancellors by Hewston; and A History of Our Own Times, Vol. II by Justice Mc Carthy). Those having age marginally over 21, could not be treated as lacking in the impulses and responses required of a daring and tiring profession. Even George Meredith felt that only those who were over 40, would be incapable of doing anything worthwhile considering. Thackeray's injunction about writing a novel applied only to a man past fifty; (and fifty is an age which in former Siam was treated as venerable for men and looked upon as antediluvian for women.) Those who seek to get admittance into the law college after writing the entrance examination are not around 50. The centres of international learning in law have not improvised any such artificial barrier based on age. 14. The decision to fix an upper age for admission is not based on any study or report by the experts in the field. There had not been any consultation's with individuals or institutions having intimate connection with law and legal education. There was no document, nor any useful material before the Committee when it took the decision, one involving a volte face for two among the three members of the Committee. Though the decision did involve many important legal and constitutional questions, there was no consultation even with the Law Department of the Government. The decision taken is neither rational nor reasonable. It is now well settled that an unfair, irrational and unreasonable decision would be constitutionally unsustainable also (See Shetty's case, AIR 1979 SC 1628). 15. Though the counter-affidavit has referred to the introduction of the age 21 for admission into the Medical Colleges in the neighbouring Tamil Nadu, no material has been placed in support of that assertion. None was discernible in the files produced. It is not known on what basis the deponent has made the averment in the counter-affidavit. In as much as I have reached the conclusion that the prohibition of the age is artificial, and unrelated to the object sought to be achieved in regulating the entry into the educational course for legal profession, the example of the neighbouring State, even if it is correct, cannot confer immunity for an otherwise invalid provision. 16. In as much as I have reached the conclusion that the prohibition of the age is artificial, and unrelated to the object sought to be achieved in regulating the entry into the educational course for legal profession, the example of the neighbouring State, even if it is correct, cannot confer immunity for an otherwise invalid provision. 16. In the light of the above discussion, I declare Para.5 (e) of the prospectus to the extent it prescribes an upper age limit for admission as unconstitutional and violative of Art.14 of the Constitution. 17. In the view that I have taken above, it has become unnecessary to consider the further contention whether the provision also infringes Art.19(1)(g) of the Constitution, which guarantees a right to practise a profession, trade or business. It was argued that the provision does not directly impinge upon that fundamental right. The fact that it is not a direct restraint need rot necessarily sustain it if indirectly but definitely, it is likely to preclude a person from practising a profession. In the scheme of things, it is impossible for a person to practise the profession of Law unless he is equipped with a degree in Law. Any endeavour in that behalf is frustrated at the threshold itself, by the bar imposed under the impugned provision. It would prima facie appear that the bar is more of a restriction. A restriction on fundamental right can be attempted only by a law and subject to the Constitutional limitations. The prospectus would not answer any of the requirements needed for such a restriction. It is, however, unnecessary to pronounce pointedly on that aspect in view of the conclusions already come to about the unconstitutionality of the provision. 18. The second contention relates to the exemption' from entrance examination as regards the 4th respondent Law Academy. No differentiation is possible between the students of the Government Law College and of the 4th respondent in the selection procedure contend the petitioners. The emphasis made by the Bar Council of India that merit should be the criterion for selection is relied upon in this connection. No differentiation is possible between the students of the Government Law College and of the 4th respondent in the selection procedure contend the petitioners. The emphasis made by the Bar Council of India that merit should be the criterion for selection is relied upon in this connection. When the only satisfactory modality of determining the merit in an entrance examination, or an entrance examination clubbed with the performance in the qualifying examination, and when such a principle had been applied to all the three Government Law Colleges, there is little justification for permitting the 4th respondent to take a devious method and make the selection on the basis of a pure interview; for it is well known that such interview, quite often, is a make belief arrangement, a smoke screen for favouritism or patronage, a window dressing intended to conceal a clumsy interior continue the arguments. Judicial pronouncements in recent times, it is pointed out, have deprecated an interview being the sole criterion for selection. The selection process adopted by the 4th respondent itself is not one which would infuse much of public confidence; the interview Board is packed up with the persons over whom the 4th respondent has command and control; three among the four members of the selection committee are the Principal of the College, the Professor in charge of the five year course and the nominee of the Government body. In that background, presence of a representative of the University as the fourth member in the committee, will not in any way affect or influence a pre-set decision of the Management of the 4th respondent contend the petitioners. Pernicious consequences of less meritorious candidates getting into the 4th respondent's Law College are also pointed out. It is urged that a large number of students of an inferior calibre getting into the 4th respondent's institution, later enter the Government Law Colleges, by the back door as it were, by obtaining no objection certificates from the Principals of the Government Law Colleges and getting the green signal from the University Authorities. It is urged that a large number of students of an inferior calibre getting into the 4th respondent's institution, later enter the Government Law Colleges, by the back door as it were, by obtaining no objection certificates from the Principals of the Government Law Colleges and getting the green signal from the University Authorities. Virtually this facility of inferior but influential candidates initially getting into the 4th respondent's college, merely as birds of passage on their way to perch on the posts of the law college, it is pointed out, dilutes the standard of the Law Colleges and deprives many in the waiting list of their legitimate opportunities to join the law course in Government Law Colleges. Even in relation to other private professional colleges, such as Engineering, the practice of the Management filling up the entire seats by their own selection process does not obtain. The 4th respondent, therefore, also should fill up its seats on the basis of a common selection criterion as applicable to the Government Law Colleges. A special treatment in respect of the 4th respondent enabling to have its own procedure for the selection is unreasonable and arbitrary, particularly when the selection process is not one perfect in its operation and conduct argue the petitioners. 19. The 4th respondent lays much emphasis on its being a private institution. It was born free and continues to be free from Governmental controls in relation to the selection process and internal management contends the 4th respondent. The 4th respondent claims that its selection method is unobjectionable, and that its performance had elicited appreciation even from the Bar Council of India. It is asserted that the Government orders based on which the Prospectus is issued, are not applicable to private institutions like the 4th respondent. The examination results achieved by the 4th respondent in the public examination, it is claimed, would indicate a larger percentage of successful students, and a larger number of rank holders. So long as the Bar Council Rules or the University Regulations do not impose any restriction, additional fetters in its functioning should not be introduced by this Court, as they are supremely unnecessary is the stand of the 4th respondent. The 4th respondent has attempted to buttress its contentions with reference to documents produced along with its counter-affidavit 20. So long as the Bar Council Rules or the University Regulations do not impose any restriction, additional fetters in its functioning should not be introduced by this Court, as they are supremely unnecessary is the stand of the 4th respondent. The 4th respondent has attempted to buttress its contentions with reference to documents produced along with its counter-affidavit 20. I am of the view that there is force in the submission of the 4th respondent. The petitioners have proceeded on an unsound premise. Their contentions imply that the Government had issued a general order and that that Government order has chosen to exempt the 4th respondent from its operation. That is not the situation at all. The orders, GO (Ms) 177/84/ H. Edn. and the order GO (Ms) 78/86/H. Edn. on the basis of which prospectus was issued, are applicable only to the Government Law Colleges. The Government did not have at any time any idea whatever to make the provisions of its orders applicable to private Law Colleges. A close examination of the files already referred to will make (he point absolutely clear. The circumstance that the Government has not chosen to make any general provisions applicable to the admission of all these students in all the Law Colleges, will take the wind out of the sail as regards the petitioners' contentions. 21. It is unnecessary to examine the question whether by an executive order, the Government could bring about provisions of a general character regulating the admission to the Law course, particularly when the field is already occupied by the Bar Council Rules and University Regulations. Whether such a general order would not be more desirable, is a question involving a policy question. The Government is ordinarily the best judge about the revolvement of a policy and implementation thereof. It has chosen not to make any general orders applicable to all Law Colleges or all the Law students. 22. There are instances where private institutions are permitted to have their own modality in regard to the selection process for admission to the various courses in the educational institution run by it. Well-known educational institutions, though in a different field, have their own reputed and rigorous selection procedure. In that background, if the Government has not chosen to bring any general provision to rope in the 4th respondent also, the action cannot be characterised as discriminatory. 23. Well-known educational institutions, though in a different field, have their own reputed and rigorous selection procedure. In that background, if the Government has not chosen to bring any general provision to rope in the 4th respondent also, the action cannot be characterised as discriminatory. 23. There was a contention that the 4th respondent is just like any other professional college in the higher education field, and that other private institutions in engineering also accept the selection procedure as envisaged under the University Act. The 4th respondent claims, (and correctly as it turns out) that it is not a private institution in receipt of the grant-in-aid like the private engineering colleges in the State, which are in receipt of such grant-in-aid. The materials furnished by the 4th respondent show that it is not in receipt of any grant-in-aid or any other grant from the Kerala Government as regards the 5 year course. This would, therefore, make a difference between other professional colleges in receipt of the Government grant and the 4th respondent. 24. Though a complaint was made about the selection process of the 4th respondent, having regard to the circumstances, and in the light of the course of action I propose to adopt, it is not considered necessary to express any specific view on that aspect. There are not adequate materials which would prima facie make out a totally arbitrary procedure in the selection made by the 4th respondent. 25. There remain some subsidiary contentions on this aspect. One deals with the migration of the 'inferior' students from the Law Academy College to the Government Law Colleges. Here again there is paucity of data and materials. Counsel for the 4th respondent'submitted that the 4th respondent was not interested in issuing transfer certificates to any of the students who have joined that college; and even gave an undertaking that it will not issue any transfer certificate to any student so as to enable him to join the Government Law Colleges. I record this submission and note the undertaking. This will effectively allay the apprehension of the petitioners about the unprincipled mix of students selected on the basis of competitive examination with those who got admission after a simpler and perhaps easier process. 26. It was submitted in this connection that invariably applications for transfer came from the second year and later years. This will effectively allay the apprehension of the petitioners about the unprincipled mix of students selected on the basis of competitive examination with those who got admission after a simpler and perhaps easier process. 26. It was submitted in this connection that invariably applications for transfer came from the second year and later years. The Regulations of the University contain sufficient safeguards against indiscriminate transfer of students from one college to another. Ext.R4(b) would insist on the consent of the Principal of the respective Government Law College before the transfer is actually effected. Migration in the second year of the course will not in any way affect those who are, on their own merit, entitled to admission to. the Law Colleges. If all those who are entitled to get admission in the first year do get admission that way, and if thereafter, in the second year or later years, a vacancy arises in any of the Government Law Colleges, there is no harm in permitting a student of the Law Academy from joining in the void which might have arisen in the later years. No rights of any person would be affected in such an eventuality. Looked that way, no injustice will be done to any of the more meritorious students deserving, or having admission in the Government Law Colleges. The second ground of attack Ext.P1 is, therefore, without force or merit. I reject it. I, however, direct that there shall not be any transfer of students of the 4th respondent to the first year class in the Government Law Colleges. 27. In the background of this petition, two comments appear to be relevant and even necessary. The first is about the responsibility of the Government to be alive to the care, concern and caution needed in the educational front. The importance of education in a civilized society need not be over emphasised. The Supreme Court of America put it on a par with the defence of the realm. As noted earlier, in the present case, a departure, a violent departure, was made from the practice and position hitherto obtaining in relation to admission to the Law course. While change is understandable, and even indispensable in a progressing society, the impact of the proposed change has necessarily to be evaluated in all its aspects, before it is actually introduced. As noted earlier, in the present case, a departure, a violent departure, was made from the practice and position hitherto obtaining in relation to admission to the Law course. While change is understandable, and even indispensable in a progressing society, the impact of the proposed change has necessarily to be evaluated in all its aspects, before it is actually introduced. Important changes in educational policy used to be preceded sometimes even by white papers, as was the case when Lord Butler brought about some reforms in England. In the present case, such exploration, consultation and discussion were conspicuous by their absence. Even while the issue involved important legal and constitutional provisions, the Law Department of the Government itself happened to be by-passed. The ultimate decision was taken suddenly and even against the views initially expressed by the proposer of the draft scheme and the Departmental Head competent to comment on the same. The obviously unsatisfactory resultant situation poses much anguish to the student community, who are to take to a serious profession (a cramp and confused one according to Carlyle, and not a popular one according to Sir Frank Lockwood.) And for the Governmental agencies, it has almost been the labour of Sisyphus. 28. The Government would have done well, to ensure chat the intended change was notified sufficiently early. The prospectus happens to be issued just two days prior to the commencement of the academic year; and it is not as though without much delay the selection would be over and the courses would commence. An entrance examination is envisaged; its valuation has to be awaited. As things stand now, even with the close of a term, the commencement of the course is a matter of disconcerting unpredictability, from the point of view of those who seek to pursue this profession. Such a situation and its recurrence at any rate, should be avoided at all costs. 29. Perhaps much more tidying up is desirable in relation to the modalities of admission into a prestigious professional course. That is a matter which would justifiably deserve the attention, and anxious consideration, of the Bar Council of India. Equipped as it is, with the means of having expert up-to-date knowledge in all matters connected with the legal profession it could duly deliberate over the issues and introduce desirable amendatory arrangements which would ensure uniform procedure for all Law Colleges. That is a matter which would justifiably deserve the attention, and anxious consideration, of the Bar Council of India. Equipped as it is, with the means of having expert up-to-date knowledge in all matters connected with the legal profession it could duly deliberate over the issues and introduce desirable amendatory arrangements which would ensure uniform procedure for all Law Colleges. It could also lay down objective standards and specified procedure for the determination of 'merit', emphasised by it as the criterion for admission. A copy of the judgment will be forwarded to the Secretary, Bar Council of India for such action as commends itself to that body. The writ petition is disposed of as indicated above. I direct the parties to bear their respective costs.