This is an application under sections 397/401/482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, for short, 'the Code'. The follo­wing facts are admitted. On 28.6.78 the first information report was lodged before Gauhati Police Station against the accused-petitioner, Romsanehi Mittal and accordingly the police regis­tered Gauhati P.S. Case No. 240 (6)/78 under sections 148/147/ 326/325 of the Indian Penal Code, for short, 'I.P.C.'. In the FIR it was alleged that at about 12 A.M. on 28.6.78 the infor­mant saw two Chowkidars walking in front of his house and on being interrogated both the Chowkidars used filthy language and on protest by the informant, one Mittal Marwari, the emplo­yer of Chowkidars came along with about 40 other persons assaulted the informant with lathi and deadly weapons. After investigation police submitted charge sheet on 24.11.79 against the accused-petitioner. On 14.11.80 after perusal of the papers the learned trial court framed charge under section 323 I.P.C. 2. The present petition has been filed for quashing the above proceeding in GR Case No. 2632/78 on the ground that the petition is barred by limitation in view of the provisions con­tained in section 468 of the Code. 3. The first point to be decided is the date from which the period of limitation will start in the instant case for the purpose of section 468 of the Code. Section 469 of the Code, inter alia provides that the period of limitation shall commence on the date of the offence or where the commission of offence was not known to the person or to any police officer the first day on which such offence comes to the knowledge of such per­son or to any police officer, whichever is earlier or where it is not known by whom the offence was committed the first day on which the identity of the offender is known to the person aggrieved by the offence or to the police officer making inves­tigation into the offence, whichever is earlier. In Surinder Mohan Vikal, AIR 1978 SC 986 : 1978 Cr. L.J. 764, their Lordships examined the provisions of sub-section (I) of section 469 and held that the period of limitation prescribe in section 468 of the Code in relation to an offence shall commence (inter alia) on the date of the offence. In Surinder Mohan Vikal, AIR 1978 SC 986 : 1978 Cr. L.J. 764, their Lordships examined the provisions of sub-section (I) of section 469 and held that the period of limitation prescribe in section 468 of the Code in relation to an offence shall commence (inter alia) on the date of the offence. In view of the provisions contai­ned in the Code and on the above authority of the Supreme -Court I hold that for the purpose of section 468 of Code the period of limitation in the instant case, shall commence on the date the offence was committed that is 28.6.78 which was also the date on which the first information report was lodged. 4. The next point to be considered is whether the provi­sion of law which was mentioned in the FIR or in the charge sheet should be taken into consideration or whether the provisions of law under which the charge was framed by the trial court should be taken into consideration for the purpose of sec­tion 468 Cr. P.C.. Section 468 Cr. P.C., inter alia, provides that no court shall take cognizance of an offence after the expiry of the period of limitation mentioned in the said section. From the reading of the above section it is clear that for the pur­pose of limitation the offence for which the court take cogni­zance is relevant that is the offence for which the charge was framed. In K. H. Rao, 1982 Cr. L. J. 734 the Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court considered the question whe­ther in a case instituted against an accused for a major offence and the court takes cognizance of the said offence, issues sum­mons to the accused, and finds him quality of a minor or lesser offence after following the prescribed procedure, the plea of limitation enacted in section 468 (2) of the Code, in relation to the minor or major offence is not available to the accused ? After considering the matter the Division Bench held that where the court takes cognizance of a major offence against an accu­sed person, but finds him guilty of a minor offence, it is open to the accused to plead that conviction for the minor offence is bad if the complaint or the challan is filed against him beyond the period of limitation prescribed for the minor offence subject to the residual power of the Court to exercise its discre­tion under section 473 of the Code. With respect I agree with the above law lal down by their lordships and hold from the provision of section 468 of the Code and on the analogy of the above decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court that for the purpose of the above section the offence under which the court took cognizance that is framed charges will be relevant. 5. Police registered the instant case under sections 148/147/ 326/325 IPC and submitted charge sheet under sections 325/323/34 IPC. But the learned lower court on 14.11.80 framed charge against the accused petitioner under section 323 IPC which will be the relevant section for the purpose of section 468 of the Code. According to section 323 I.P.C. whoever, voluntarily causes hurt, shall be punished with imprisonment of either des­cription for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees or with both. Since the offence is punishable for a term not exceeding one year clause (b) of sub-section (2) of section 468 is attracted to the case in hand and according to said clause the period of limi­tation is one year. The offence was committed on 28.6.78 and the charge was framed on 14.11.80 i.e. after one year. Thus the present prosecution is clearly barred in view of the provi­sions of said section 468 of the Code and as such the pro­ceeding is liable to be quashed. 6. Mr. A.C. Bora, learned Public Prosecutor submits that as the learned trial court by its order dated 2.3.81 rejected the plea of limitation of the accused person it can be deemed that the learned trial court extended the period of limitation by ex­ercising powers under section 473 of the Code. 7. 6. Mr. A.C. Bora, learned Public Prosecutor submits that as the learned trial court by its order dated 2.3.81 rejected the plea of limitation of the accused person it can be deemed that the learned trial court extended the period of limitation by ex­ercising powers under section 473 of the Code. 7. In my opinion to attract the provisions of section 473 of the Code the court may take cognizance of the offence even after the period of limitation provided it is satisfied on the facts and in the circumstances of the case that delay has been properly explained or that it is necessary so to do in the in­terests of justice. Before arriving at such a decision the court must apply its judicial mind and come to a proper finding after taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of the case. A duty is also cast on the prosecution to explain the delay. The order dated 2.3.81 does not disclose that the learned trial court was satisfied that delay has been properly explained by the prosecution or that it was necessary to take cognizance of the accused in the interest of justice. There is no dispute that no petition by the prosecution was filed under section 473 of the Code. I therefore find no force in the contention of Mr. Bora and it is liable to be rejected. 8. In view of the above discussion I hold that the present prosecution is hit by provisions of section 468 of the Code and is liable to be quashed. 9 In the result, the present Civil Revision is allowed and the criminal proceedings of GR Case No. 2632 of 1978 pending be­fore the learned Judicial Magistrate, Gauhati, is quashed. The accused person is discharged from the liability of the bail bond.