JUDGMENT : S.K. Jha, J. When the arguments were concluded in this case the Bench declared the operative portion of the JUDGMENT : and ORDER :in open Court through my Lord the Chief Justice by which the appeal was said to be allowed with costs with reasons to follow. These are the reasons. 2. This letter patent appeal is directed against the JUDGMENT : and ORDER :passed by a learned single Judge of this Court on 14th March, 1986 in C.W.J.C. No. 6055 of 1985. In that writ application under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India a prayer was made on behalf of I the writ petitioner (respondent no. 5 in this appeal) to restrain Darbhanga Municipal Corporation (hereinafter to be referred to as the Corporation for the sake of brevity and convenience) who is the appellant in this appeal from collecting the tolls at the Darbhanga Bus Stand and also to restrain the Sub-divisional Magistrate and the Superintendent of Police, Darbhanga (respondents 3 and 4 in this appeal) from interfering with the writ petitioner in collecting the tolls at the Darbhanga Bus Stand in accordance with the settlement made by the Vice-Chancellor of the L.N. Mithila University and the University itself (respondents 1 and 2 in this appeal). 3. According to the writ petitioner the land over which the bus stand is located was settled with him. This settlement, it was alleged, was for a period of three years with effect from 1st December, 1985 to 30th November, 1988 on a premium of Rs.1,15,000/- per year at an auction held for the purpose of settlement on 28.11.1985. It was alleged that the Corporation on the basis of a false claim to the land with regard to its right to make 'Settlement started interfering with the possession of the writ petitioner and also persuaded the Sub-divisional Magistrate and the Superintendent of Police to restrain the writ petitioner (respondent no. 5) from making collecting from the incoming and outgoing buses. Notice was issued to the respondents of the writ application by the learned single Judge. The University had supported the case of the writ petitioner (respondent no. 5) but the Corporation stated that the land did not belong to the University and as such the settlement made by it in favour of Baleshwar Prasad, the writ petitioner (respondent no. 5 in this appeal) converted no title to him. The University had supported the case of the writ petitioner (respondent no. 5) but the Corporation stated that the land did not belong to the University and as such the settlement made by it in favour of Baleshwar Prasad, the writ petitioner (respondent no. 5 in this appeal) converted no title to him. According to the Corporation the land belonged to the Corporation and so it held the right to settle the same. While that writ application was still pending before the learned single Judge, Government Pleader No.4, appearing on behalf of the Sub-divisional Magistrate and the Superintendent of Police, had stated that the State Government had issued ORDER :s to the effect that the process for acquiring the land for the Corporation should be dropped and the same should be given to the University, but he submitted that this does not mean that the right to make settlement had also been taken away from the Corporation. The learned single Judge observed and in my view rightly so, that he did not wish to comment in any manner about the title of the parties with regard to the land in question. In the impugned JUDGMENT : the learned single Judge has also observed that he did not wish to say anything whether the right to make settlement existed with the Corporation even thought the land did not belong to it. The reason was that Title Suit No. 200 of 1985 had been filed by the University (respondent 1 and 2 in this appeal) against the Corporation (appellant in this appeal) for declaration of its title and for restraining it from interfering with the possession of the plaintiff, The single Judge further went on to say that the rights of parties will have to be decided in that suit itself. 4. The learned single Judge, however, fairly stated that the scope of the writ application was limited one. The land was settled by the University (respondents 1 and 2) with the petitioner (respondent no. 5) and he was in possession. If the appellant-Corporation was of the view that the University had no right to make settlement and that the possession of the University or of the petitioner was unlawful then it should have filed a suit for declaration of its title and recovery of possession. 5) and he was in possession. If the appellant-Corporation was of the view that the University had no right to make settlement and that the possession of the University or of the petitioner was unlawful then it should have filed a suit for declaration of its title and recovery of possession. But it cannot seek the help of the State machinery indirectly to recover possession and, therefore, the interference of respondents 3 and 4, namely, the Sub-divisional Magistrate and the Superintendent of Police respectively was unwarranted and that they were restrained from interfering with the possession of the writ petitioner, namely, respondent no. 5. 5. The learned single Judge in paragraph 4 of the impugned JUDGMENT : has expressed his view that he was thinking of finding out a working solution for peaceful functioning of the bus stand as that was necessary for giving facilities and amenities to the passengers. But the learned single Judge was frustrated in his efforts by the attitude of the State Government and the appellant Corporation, He has also give vent to his feeling that the Corporation (the appellant) was not interested in providing facilities to the passengers but was, more or less, interested in some particular individual. It was because of this attitude that, continued the learned single Judge, he was not passing the ORDER :which he suggested earlier that the money which was to be deposited in the form of National Savings Certificate in Title Suit No.200/85 aforementioned with a direction that the successful party will withdraw the same. He therefore, was of opinion that the application be allowed with a direction to respondents 4 and 5 of the writ petition, namely, respondents 3 and 4 of the present appeal not to interfere in this matter. He has further gone on to say that he held taken note of the argument of the learned counsel for the Corporation-appellant that in earlier case, namely, C.W.J.C. No. 4765/84 he had stated that the settlement with the party subsequent to the 1st of December, 1985 should be made by auction as required under rule 5 of the Municipal Corporation Rules, 1955. The learned single has further observed that the appellant-Corporation, if so advised, may make the settlement according to Rule 5 but on the basis of that settlement neither the Corporation nor its settlee could recover possession of the bus stand. The learned single has further observed that the appellant-Corporation, if so advised, may make the settlement according to Rule 5 but on the basis of that settlement neither the Corporation nor its settlee could recover possession of the bus stand. It has further been observed by the learned single Judge that "to recover possession it will have to seek the relief from the Civil Court where the rights of the party will be determined in accordance with law". 6. It has then been observed that learned counsel for the appellant-Corporation had stated that the settlement for the period beginning from 1.12.1984 to 30.11.85 was for a sum of Rs.1,65,000/- but that settlement had been made at the rate of Rs.1,15,000/- per year only. The learned single Judge expressed a feeling that the premium was rather low and he put it to Mr. Basudeva Prasad learned counsel for the respondents who, after consulting his client, namely, respondent no. 5, stated that he will increase it from Rs.1,15,000/- to Rs.1,65,000/- per year. In that view of the matter, the consideration of Rs.1,15,000/- as premium was raised to Rs.1,65,000/- per 'year which was yet to be paid to the University as per agreement after adjusting the amount that has already been deposited. The writ application was "accordingly disposed of but without costs." 7. I am unable to appreciate as to how a writ application can be disposed of in terms as indicated in the impugned ORDER :as it is neither a writ nor a direction nor an injunction against the appellant. I feel that by affirming the impugned ORDER :I shall be perpetuating wrong approach to cases where an appropriate writ or a direction has to be issued. I wonder whether such cases would or can come within the purview of Articles 226 and, 227 of the Constitution of India at all. 8. Events in the courts have contrived to bring several important aspects of our subject to the attention of a wider audience in the matters of writs to be issued by the court than usual. Causes celebrea have confirmed the courts' continuing readiness in a number of contexts to subject to closer judicial scrutiny the exercise of ministerial or administrative discretion. It would be out of place to catalogue of the many significant developments in the law that have been generated in the courts. Causes celebrea have confirmed the courts' continuing readiness in a number of contexts to subject to closer judicial scrutiny the exercise of ministerial or administrative discretion. It would be out of place to catalogue of the many significant developments in the law that have been generated in the courts. Suffice it to say that the tide of interesting judicial decisions in the last decade and a half has transformed much of administrative law shows no sign of ebbing. Moresover, in recent years many judges throughout the commonwealth have joined their English brothern along a number of the trails of administrative law that has been blazed by our courts since the mid - 1960s. The opening sentences of Chapter I of De Smith's Judicial Review of Administrative Action, Fourth Edition resound in our ears while dealing with the writ application. "Judicial review of administrative action is inevitably speredic and peripheral. The administrative process is not, and cannot be, a succession of justiciable controversies. Public authorities are set up to govern and administer, and if their every act or decision were to be reviewable on unrestricted grounds by an independent judicial body the business of administration could be brought to a standstill. The prospect of judicial relief cannot be held out to every person whose interests may be adversely effected by administrative action." We have no separate constitutional court exercising a broad jurisdiction, and exceptions apart, in India we have no conseil d,Etat nor is there any such body in England. As has been rightly observed by De Smith “if by administrative law one means the law relating to public administration, England has a massive and rapidly expensing body of administrative law. The increasing girth of modern treatises on the law of town and country planning, housing, compulsory purchase, public health, social security and so forth speaks for itself. But if by administrative law one means a systematic and universally applicable body of concepts and rules, quite distinct from the general law of the land, regulating justiciable administrative activity, one will look for it in vain in this country." So is the case in our country also. No one can deny that the direct impact made on the ordinary citizens by the activities of local authorities bas never ceased to be very important. No one can deny that the direct impact made on the ordinary citizens by the activities of local authorities bas never ceased to be very important. But I have not come across a case in which the enforcement of individual rights with regard to settlement of property for the purpose of collecting tolls has stood the scrutiny of any writ court. In this regard, in all fairness to the learned single Judge, I must observe that he has rightly highlighted the point by saying "to recover possession it will have to seek the relief from the Civil Courts where the rights of the party will be determined in accordance with law." 9. We are poised with a case of rival contentions between two public bodies, namely, the appellant-Corporation on the one hand and the University (respondents 1 and 2) on the other-one (the University respondents 1 and 2) supporting the case of an individual, namely, Baleshwar Prasad (respondent no. 5) to collect the tolls at the Darbhanga Bus Stand and for restraining the Sub-divisional Magistrate and the Superintendent of Police (respondents 3 and 4 respectively) from interfering with his right in collecting the tolls and the other, namely, the appellant-Corporation resisting such a claim. Can a writ in such circumstances lie and shall this Court be justified in entertaining such writ application either for the issuance of a writ of mandamus or for granting any injection or direction to any of the respondents in exercise of its writ jurisdiction? The answer, in my view, is clearly in the negative. Article 226 normally and generally empowers the High Court to issue writs, directions or ORDER :s in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by part III and for any other purposes. Under the first part, a writ may be issued under the Article only after a decision that the aggrieved party has a fundamental right and that it has been infringed. Similarly under the second part, it may be issued only after a finding that the aggrieved party has a legal right which entitles him to any of the aforesaid writs and that such right has been infringed by the State. Similarly under the second part, it may be issued only after a finding that the aggrieved party has a legal right which entitles him to any of the aforesaid writs and that such right has been infringed by the State. Where however, the right of any individual is claimed in the matter of collection of tolls by virtue of a settlement and the court itself lames to a conclusion that the appellant-Corporation has a right to hold the auction and the Corporation, if so advised, may make the settlement according to Rule 5 of the Rules aforementioned, but on the basis of that settlement neither the corporation nor its settlee can recover possession of the Bus Stand for the purpose of which it will have to seek the relief from the civil court of competent jurisdiction where the rights of the parties will be determined in accordance with law. The converse would also be the same. The settlee (respondent no.5) claming though the University (respondents 1 and 2) if he wants a declaration of his fight which alone can entitle is to get an ORDER :of restraint or a proper direction from the writ Court has to establish his right in a civil court of competent jurisdiction. The learned single Judge was, therefore, in my considered view, not quite appreciative of the jurisdiction of a writ court in such matters relating to right, title and interest through settlement, be it by virtue of such a settlement having been made by the appellant-corporation on the one hand or the University (respondents 1 and 2) on the other. But to crown it all, in paragraph 6 of the impugned JUDGMENT : all that the learned single Judge has held is that in the circumstances of the case the consideration of Rs.1,15,000/- payable by respondent no. 5 as premium be raised to Rs.1,65,000/- per year which would be paid to the University as per agreement after adjusting the amount that had already been deposited. In other words, the learned single Judge has himself found no title in the writ petitioner so far. Even if it were permissible to take records to the writ court for the enforcement of such a settlement and, therefore, with utmost respect I regret my inability to appreciate the import of the clause "the writ application is accordingly disposed of......" 10. Even if it were permissible to take records to the writ court for the enforcement of such a settlement and, therefore, with utmost respect I regret my inability to appreciate the import of the clause "the writ application is accordingly disposed of......" 10. In such circumstances, the writ petitioner (respondent no.5) or, for that matter, the University respondents (1 and 2) should have got their fight, title and interest adjudicated upon by a civil court of competent jurisdiction specially in view of the fact that even this Court in the writ case has found no perfect title in respondent no. 5. The expression' 'Forms of Action" had been defined as "the peculiar technical mode of framing the writ and pleadings appropriate to the particular injury which the action is intended to redress' (vide First Report of Common law Commissioners (1851), page 32. In early times all actions at law were begun by purchasing an original writ out of Chencery; and each form of action was founded on a particular original writ appropriate to it (o.f. Prof. Maitland in 3 Harvard Law Review at pages 97, 167 and 212). Actions are of three classes; real, personal, or mixed. In personal actions the plaintiff claimed a debt, or seeks to recover a chattel or damages in lieu thereof or claims satisfaction in damages to some injuries done to his person or property. In real actions .he plaintiff claims the right to recover lands, tenements, and hereditaments. Mixed actions are suits pertaining of the nature of both personal and real actions, some real property being demanded therein, and also personal demages for a wrong sustained. But the remedy of party who seeks to recover either real property or damages in cases arising either quasi ex contrectu or quasi ex delicto from one public body which another public body in contesting does not fall within the domain of Article 226 of the Constitution. It still remains related to the position of an ordinary civil action at law wherein the claim has to be adjudicated upon by normal court of the realm having competent jurisdiction. But by no stretch of imagination can it be held that the nature of writs as contemplated by Article 226 of the Constitution of India can lie in actions of such a nature. But by no stretch of imagination can it be held that the nature of writs as contemplated by Article 226 of the Constitution of India can lie in actions of such a nature. It would not be out of place to mention here that although the writ petitioner was an individual basing his claim ex contractu vis-a-vis the University (respondents 1 and 2) and was seeking a declaration or a relief or a direction or any injunction or any sort of a restraint ORDER :as the appellant-Corporation and public authorities like the Sub-divisional Magistrate and the Superintendent of Police (respondents 3 and 4 respectively), the main contest is with regard to the right, title and interest of two public bodies inter se, namely, the appellant-Corporation on one hand and the University (respondents 1 and 2) on the other-so much the worse for the writ petitioner (respondent no. 5) who was claiming through an alleged and purported settlement being made to him by respondents 1 and 2. Only more so when on the finding of the learned single Judge himself that individual (respondents no. 5) had not even been able to establish the perfected settlement in this favour by respondents 1 and 2 as is indicated in the impugned JUDGMENT : itself that the consideration of Rs.1,15,000/- as premium was raised by the learned single Judge at Rs.1,65,000/- per year which would be paid to the University. Manifestly, therefore, even that amount had not been paid by respondent no. 5 before his writ application was entertained. 11. Much more could be said with regard to the scope and ambit of Article 226 of the Constitution wherein under particular circumstances writs could be issued against public bodies. But in the instant case it is not necessary to go in to any detailed discussion on that aspect of the law. Suffice it to say that what the writ petitioner (respondents no. 5) sought by way of relief in an application under, Articles 226 did not attract the provision thereof as he had not even been in a position to establish any perfect right, title or interest by virtue of any settlement from the University manifestly on the ground that the entire consideration money had not been paid as is manifest from the impugned JUDGMENT : itself. No interference in the writ jurisdiction at the instance of respondents no. No interference in the writ jurisdiction at the instance of respondents no. 5 was, therefore, warranted at all. With all ingenuity at his command Mr. Basudeva Prasad could not induce me to hold that the JUDGMENT : and ORDER :passed by the learned single Judge was in any manner Justified by law attracting the provisions of Article 226 of the Constitution. 12. This appeal is, accordingly, allowed with costs and the writ application filed in this Court culminating in the impugned JUDGMENT : and ORDER :of the learned single Judge was not entertainable at all. The JUDGMENT : and ORDER :of the learned single Judge, therefore, I am constrained to hold has to be set aside. Hearing fee assessed at Rs.500/- only. Appeal allowed.