ORDER Varghese Kalliath, J. 1. The revision petitioner initiated proceedings under S.72B of the Kerala Land Reforms Act (herein-after referred to as 'the Act') for the assignment of the rights vested in the Government under S.72 of the Act in respect of certain properties. He filed O. A 621/71 before the Land Tribunal No. 1, Mannarghat. He claimed right of tenancy in respect of 1 6.42 acres in R.S Nos. 6/1A, 11/10, 13/4, 8/2 and 4/1A of Thrikkaloor desom, Pottasseri-11 Village. The first respondent who is a rival claimant for the tenancy right contended that the petitioner has no tenancy right over the said properties. Both the petitioner and the 1st respondent admitted that the 2nd respondent is their landlord. 2. The Land Tribunal dismissed the application. The aggrieved petitioner filed an appeal before the appellate authority. The appellate authority confirmed the order of the Land Tribunal. Now the petitioner files this Civil Revision Petition. Now facts: 3. The Taluk Land Board, Mannarghat initiated a ceiling case against the 1st respondent. In that ceiling case, the revision petitioner herein intervened. He said that one of the items of properties' involved in this case had been wrongly included in the ceiling case of the 1st respondent as if that item was held by the 1st respondent. 4. Against the order of the Taluk Land Board, the 1st respondent herein, as well as the revision petitioner, filed Civil Revision Petitions before this court as C. R. P. Nos. 4223 and 4699 of 1976. Both these revision petitions, this court disposed of by a common order. It is dated 21-12-1976. The revision petitioner filed R. P. No. 73/1977 for reviewing this order. At present, I am not referring to the order of this court in R. P. No. 73/1977 since, I should refer it in great detail later. 5. The Land Tribunal dismissed the petitioner's application O A 621/71 on the basis that this court in the common order in C. R. P. Nos 4223 and of 4699 of 1976 has found against the claim of tenancy put forth by the revision petitioner herein. Further, the Tribunal held that ''no other evidence" to prove the tenancy in respect of the holding by the applicant has been adduced by him. The Tribunal also referred to a stay order passed by this court in R. P. No. 73/1977 staying the further proceedings of the Tribunal. Further, the Tribunal held that ''no other evidence" to prove the tenancy in respect of the holding by the applicant has been adduced by him. The Tribunal also referred to a stay order passed by this court in R. P. No. 73/1977 staying the further proceedings of the Tribunal. In the order of the Tribunal it is stated that this court has ordered a stay of further proceedings for one month from 2-12-1977 and that order of stay was extended for a month from 3-1-1978. Besides, it is stated in the order that there was no information at the time when the Tribunal passed its order on 8-2-1978 whether the order of stay has been extended for any further period. On top of it is also noted in the order that the applicant was absent "for the hearing on 8-2-1978". The Tribunal finally held thus--"In the absence of any further evidence to prove the tenancy of the applicant in respect of the holding and in view of the order of the Hon'ble High Court of Kerala, read as above, I come to the conclusion that the applicant has no tenancy right in respect of the holding covered by this application. I therefore dismiss this application." 6. In appeal, the appellate authority, in fact did not consider any of the matters, which the appellate authority is obliged to consider. It only said that the Land Tribunal has considered the question in detail (in fact, Land Tribunal did not consider the case on merits) and that the case was tried by the Land Tribunal in the light of the directions of the High Court in O. P. 3035/74. The appellate authority also observed that from the proceedings of the Tribunal, it was clear that there was no convincing evidence on the part of the appellant to prove the tenancy right as claimed by him. The appellate authority said nothing more about the merits of the case. 7. I am not at all satisfied with the style and method of the disposal of the appeal by the appellate authority The appellate authority, constituted under the Kerala Land Reforms Act, should always remember that it has got a very serious responsibility in the matter of disposing of the appeals that come up before it under S.102 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act. They have got the power and the obligation to re-value the evidence and all the circumstances involved in the case and to examine the correctness of the order of the Tribunal These authorities - the quasi judicial Tribunals and the appellate authorities constituted under the Kerala Land Reforms Act, have got a vital and significant role in the present day administration of justice. They are entrusted with vast and important adjudicatory powers in regard to property rights, which the citizens hold as very dear and precious. The appellate authority as well as the Tribunal are bound to formulate the points in dispute and thereafter to consider the circumstances and evidence bearing on those points. They have to discuss the rival contentions. Appellate authority should give its own reasons for accepting or rejecting the findings of the Tribunal. If the Tribunal has not entered findings on relevant issues, the appellate authority has necessarily to record its own findings on vital issues in the case on a proper assessment of the evidence and relevant contentions I need not say that the appellate authority's function never slops with a review or an overseeing of the Tribunal's order. It is the final fact finding forum. It has to re-appreciate and re-value the circumstances and evidence in the case, since it is exercising an appellate power. Both the land tribunal and appellate authority are bound to give a reasoned decision. Reasoned decisions are not only important for the purpose of showing the citizen that he is receiving justice; they are also a valuable discipline for quasi judicial tribunals themselves. If the appellate authority declines to give a reasoned decision it amounts to a denial of justice and is itself a serious error of law 8. I may refer to the decision in Alexander Machinery (Dudley) Ltd v. Crabtree (1974) 1 CR 120). it is said thus: "We have already said that it is unsatisfactory and amounts to an error of law for a tribunal simply to state the amount of compensation which is to be awarded with-out showing how that figure has been arrived at: see Norton Tool Co. Ltd v. Tewson (1973) 1 All ER 183, (1973) 1 WLR 45). The basis of this proposition is that in the absence of reasons it is impossible to determine whether or not there has been an error of law. Ltd v. Tewson (1973) 1 All ER 183, (1973) 1 WLR 45). The basis of this proposition is that in the absence of reasons it is impossible to determine whether or not there has been an error of law. Failure to give reasons therefore amounts to a denial of justice and is itself an error of law." 9. So in this case, I feel that I should interfere with the order of the appellate authority, on the simple reason that the appellate authority has not considered the appeal before it as it ought to have been done, and also for the reason that he has not rendered a reasoned judgment. 10. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner submitted that, the Tribunal passed this order at a time when this court issued an order of stay preventing the Tribunal from proceeding with the application. It is true that this court passed an order of stay on 7-2-1978 and this order of stay was communicated to the Tribunal on 8-2-1978. The Tribunal passed the order impugned in this C R P. on 8-2-1978. The counsel submits that the circumstances would show that the Tribunal passed the order after it has received the order of stay. Counsel referred me to the endorsement! showing the receipt of the order of stay. Two endorsements are seen on the file by the Tribunal. The first endorsement is an initial with the date 8-2-1978 Immediately below that endorsement there is a further endorsement with initials to the effect "received 3/30 P.M." on 8-2-1978. The counsel submits that these two endorsements would cast serious suspicion as to whether the Tribunal has passed the order before or after the communication of the order of stay The counsel for the respondents submitted that on this question there is no room for any suspicion. He says that on 8-2-1978. itself, the revision petitioner filed an application for reviewing the order of the Taluk Land Board and therein he himself has suggested that the order has been passed before the order of stay was communicated. He says: XXX 10. He says that on 8-2-1978. itself, the revision petitioner filed an application for reviewing the order of the Taluk Land Board and therein he himself has suggested that the order has been passed before the order of stay was communicated. He says: XXX 10. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner submitted that, the Tribunalpassed this order at a time when this court issued an order of stay preventing In the light of the above statement of the revision petitioner and the statements in the order of the Tribunal, I think it is extremely difficult for me to make a further probe into this question accepting the submission of the counsel for the revision petitioner. I have to remember the rule that a statement by a judge or a Tribunal as to what has happened during the course of a trial before him is final and decisive; it is not to be criticised or circumvented; much less it is to be exposed to 'animad version'. In Sarat Chandra v. Bibhabati Debt (1921) 34 Cal. LJ 302: AIR 1921 Cal. 584 Sir Asutosh Mookerjee explained thus: "It is plain that in cases of this character where a litigant feels aggrieved by the statement in a judgment that an admission has been made, the most convenient and satisfactory course to follow, wherever practicable, is to apply to the Judge without delay and ask for rectification or review of the judgment." 11. It is plain that in this case, no review was sought in regard to the statement in the order of the Tribuaai. In fact, the revision petitioner has admitted the correctness of what is stated in the order. The Supreme Court has observed in State of Maharashtra v. Ramdas Shrinivas Nayak ( AIR 1982 SC 1249 ): "So the Judges' record is conclusive. Neither lawyer nor litigant may claim to contradict it, except before the Judge himself, but nowhere else." 12. The next question is whether it is correct in law to hold that when this court passed an order of stay prohibiting further proceedings before the tribunal on 7-2-1978, the whole proceedings by the tribunal subsequent to the order of stay is null and void. I think if I hold that it is null and void it will be against law. The question was considered in Mutraj v. Murti Raghunathjt ( AIR 1967 SC 1386 ). I think if I hold that it is null and void it will be against law. The question was considered in Mutraj v. Murti Raghunathjt ( AIR 1967 SC 1386 ). This decision was followed in 1970 KLT 265 . The Supreme Court observed thus: "Therefore in the case of a stay order as opposed to an order of injunction, as soon as the court has knowledge of it, it must stay its hand and further proceedings are illegal, but so long as the court has no knowledge of the stay order it does not lose the jurisdiction to deal with the execution which it has under the Code of Civil procedure...... ........... .Though there-fore, the court executing the decree cannot in our opinion be deprived of its jurisdiction to carry on execution till it has knowledge of the stay order, the court has the power in our view to set aside the proceedings taken between the time when the stay order was passed and the time when it was brought to its notice, if it is asked to do so and it considers that it is necessary in the interests of justice that the interim proceedings should be set aside." 13. The counsel for the petitioner submits that the application for review of the order has not been so far disposed of and that this court should under these circumstances, order a re-trial of the O. A. by the Tribunal. The counsel for the respondent tells me that only if justice demands, such a course, on the facts of the case this court can order a re-trial at this stage. I feel that justice demands that I should direct the Tribunal to consider the whole matter afresh, not only for this reason, but also for the reasons which I shall presently state. 14. The counsel for the respondents submits that the whole question regarding the rival title (leasehold title) of the petitioner has been finally adjudicated by this court and that the petitioner cannot reagitate the matter before the Tribunal. The respondents' counsel advances this submission on the basis of the order of this court in C. R. P. Nos. 4223 and 4699 of 1976. The respondents' counsel advances this submission on the basis of the order of this court in C. R. P. Nos. 4223 and 4699 of 1976. He tells me that the petitioner cannot raise the issue of tenancy in these proceedings since it is barred by issue estoppal by the decision of this court in C R. P. Nos 4223 and 4699 of 1976. The learned counsel Sri Venkitakrishnan submits that in view of the order in the review petition, it is clear that the decision on the issue has not become absolute and final and that the petitioner is entitled to a fresh adjudication of the question of his tenancy In deference to the long and sustained arguments advanced by counsel on both sides on the question I feel that I am obliged to examine this question. 15. In the ceiling case before the Taluk Land Bard, the Revision petitioner intervened and got an adverse decision. He filed C. R. P. 4699/1976 before this court. This court dismissed the C. R. P. The revision petitioner filed a review petition, R. P. 73/77, before this court. The avowed purpose of filing the review petition is plainly revealed from the following observation of Balagangadharan Nair, J. in his order disposing the review petition. "Although there is a general prayer to set aside the entire order the serious point pressed by counsel is that there is a proceeding pending before the Land Tribunal between the petitioner and the declarant in the ceiling case and that the above observation made by me was likely to be construed by the Land Tribunal as a definite finding by the High Court rejecting the tenancy claimed by the petitioner and that such a construction would considerably prejudice him in agitating his claim on the merits in that proceeding and in other cases." The learned Judge after stating the purpose of the review petition thus observed; "I intended to give the observation no such absoluteness or conclusiveness so as to foreclose all other proceedings touching this question between the parties; all that I intended was that on, the materials on record there was no ground for me to interfere with the finding of the Taluk Land Board in a revision under S.103. However as it stands the observation is likely to be understood as if I was finally adjudicating upon the controversies between the parties which I was not doing. This part of the order therefore requires to be reviewed in order to make my intention clear." Finally, Balagangadharan Nair, J. reviewed the order and re-casted the last sentence in para 3 of the order in C. R P. Nos. 4223 and 4699 of 1976 as following: "In this state of the record the finding that there is no satisfactory evidence that the obstructor is in possession and enjoyment of the land or that he is the tenant is right so far as this proceeding goes and it calls for no interference in a revision under S.103, Land Reforms Act." Counsel Sri Venkatakrishnan submits that in view of this plain and clear revelation of his mind by his Lordship Balagangadharan Nair, J. dismissing all doubts saying that he never intended to give absoluteness or conclusiveness in regard to the question of tenancy, the contention of the respondent that the revision petitioner is forbidden from agitating this question before the Tribunal, to say the least is injudicious and illdevised. 16. The counsel for the 1st respondent Sri. Wariyar in a sustained submission pointed out that even though Balagangadharan Nair J. in his order made it plain and explicit that his order should not be taken as absolute or final in regard to the question of tenancy claimed by the revision petitioner, it is a nullity a honest and of no consequence since that part of the judgment is without jurisdiction and will not take away its efficacy to find an issue estoppel. he submits that the liberty granted by Balagangadharan Nair, J. in his judgment after the determination of the question to agitate it again is without jurisdiction and a nullity. I quite see the courage of this submission but cannot accept its correctness. 17. Speaking about the definition of finality for the purpose of res judicata Spencer Bower tells us about two distinct type of non finality. One of them is "the judicial decision on the face of it imperfect, provisional, conditional, indefinite or ambigous ........." (Emphasis is mine) 18. The learned counsel Sri Wariyar referred me to Fatheh Singh v. Jagannath ( AIR 1925 PC 55 ). One of them is "the judicial decision on the face of it imperfect, provisional, conditional, indefinite or ambigous ........." (Emphasis is mine) 18. The learned counsel Sri Wariyar referred me to Fatheh Singh v. Jagannath ( AIR 1925 PC 55 ). In this case, the Privy Council was considering the effect of a remark made by the court when dismissing the suit that the plaintiffs were at liberty to file a fresh suit where there was no formal application under O.23 R.1 for withdrawal. The Privy Council observed that the remark does not amount to a permission to bring a fresh suit under O.23 R 1. I do not think that the dictum laid down by the judicial committee of the Privy Council in this case has any direct application to the facts of this case. It has to be noted that the Privy Council guardedly said that there was no permission. But, following this Privy Council decision, Bombay High Court in Vyankatesh Shivrram Gokhale v. Krishna Bal Chavan & others (AIR 1931 Bombay 417) held that the mere fact that the court has permitted the party to bring a fresh suit is not sufficient to take the case out of the bar of res judicata. Bombay High Court held: "The permission which the defendants-tenants sought could not be given to reserve the only question in suit. It was a permission which they could not apply on the most elementary principles of judicial decision and which the court not give, and the permission purporting to be granted in appeal cannot save the present suit from being res judicata." (Emphasis supplied) The vital and crucial differences on which this case can be distinguished is 'what is reserved in the case was the only question which required a decision in that suit. The facts before me are different. In the land board case "the only question" was not the rival claim between the revision petitioner and the 1st respondent. This question was really collateral to the main issue in the case. 19. The facts before me are different. In the land board case "the only question" was not the rival claim between the revision petitioner and the 1st respondent. This question was really collateral to the main issue in the case. 19. In Veeravagu v. Manikkavasagam (AIR 1934 Madras 68) it was held thus; "It is not competent for a party to give up a defence and leave it to be decided in another suit subsequently brought but pending at the time The decision on that point though implied acts at res judicata." Counsel referred me Kali Prasanna Sil v. Panchanan Nandi (ILR 44 Cal 367) and wanted that I should follow the reasoning of that decision even though that decision was overruled by a Full Bench decision of the Calcutta High Court. In this case, the first court had dismissed the suit on the merits and in appeal that dismissal was confirmed but the appellate court in addition purported to give leave to withdraw the suit which permission was held to be a nullity. The result was the original dismissal of the suit became final and the matter became res judicata under S.2 C. P. C. Counsel also referred me to a decision reported in (Robert Watson & Co. v. The Collector of Zillah Rajshahye 13 M. I. A. 160). In this case, there was a dismissal of the suit on merits. It was a dismissal for want of evidence. There was an appeal to Saddher court. It was a summary appeal. The court held that a summary appeal is not maintainable. There was no question of permission to withdraw for there was no such procedure then and there was only a statement that the order then passed which was a decree for dismissal was not intended to debar the plaintiffs from proceeding as if the action has act been brought. It was held by Their Lordships that the statement could not prevent the actual dismissal from operating a bar for the maintainability of the subsequent suit under S.2 of the Act of 1859 which corresponds to present S.11 of the Code. These two cases were very much relied on by the counsel for the 1st respondent. It was held by Their Lordships that the statement could not prevent the actual dismissal from operating a bar for the maintainability of the subsequent suit under S.2 of the Act of 1859 which corresponds to present S.11 of the Code. These two cases were very much relied on by the counsel for the 1st respondent. The counsel submits that when the final court decides a question in controversy the adjudication of the court to defer that question for a second adjudication ceases and that the law of res judicata has to take its full course in spite of such futile reservation. It has to be remembered that all these cases arose under O.23 R.1. Of course, the principle of res judicata is the basic question involved. I seriously doubt whether a direction given by an appellate court or the Trial Court as the case may be that the findings recorded by that court on a question decided for the purpose of disposing that case reserving the party to agitate that question fully again in a second suit or proceeding can be considered as a nullity. It certainly implicits itself that the issue has not been finally decided. Like wise, granting permission to sue again on an erroneous construction of the provisions there to is also cannot be treated as an act of the court for which court has total lack of jurisdiction. I do not think that such a direction is wholly without jurisdiction to stamp it as a nullity. 20. When a court is legitimately seized of jurisdiction of the subject matter of a suit and of the parties, orders passed in violation of the provisions of the law regulating the further proceedings in the suit in relation to the subject matter till the end of the lis cannot be said to be totally without jurisdiction as to render them nullities At the worst, it can only amount to a material or serious irregularity in the exercise of the power of the court. The true rule seems to be that if the court has jurisdiction or power to give orders of a particular kind and that in a given case it passed an order which in law it should not have passed is not an order with total lack of jurisdiction so as to render that order a nullity. The true rule seems to be that if the court has jurisdiction or power to give orders of a particular kind and that in a given case it passed an order which in law it should not have passed is not an order with total lack of jurisdiction so as to render that order a nullity. I feel the consequence of holding that an order giving permission to withdraw with liberty to sue again of course wrongly, is a nullity and is capable of collateral attack, may be serious and devastating. I shall illustrate it with reference to the facts of this case. After holding against the tenancy right, Balagangadharan Nair, J. has in his order in C. R. P Nos. 4223 and 4699 of 1976, permitted the revision petitioner herein to agitate the question of his tenancy right which was pending before the Land Tribunal (in fact the proceedings before the Land Tribunal was pending). Can I permit the tribunal to say with impunity that what this court has said in the C. R. P. is a nullity and so he can ignore it. I do not think that law does not contemplate such a situation. Certainly, it will create confusion in the administration of the law I say so keeping in mind the distinction between exercise of jurisdiction and existence of jurisdiction. 21. Jurisdiction is the power of a court to hear and determine. It is the authority which a court has to decide matters that are litigated before it or to take cognizance of matters presented before it. Jurisdiction does not rest either upon regularity of the exercise of that power or upon the soundness of the decisions pronounced. It is axiomatic that the power to decide, inevitably and necessarily postulates with it the power to decide wrongly as well as rightly. 1 recall the celebrated dictum of Lord Hob House in Malkar Jun v. Nar Hari ''a court has jurisdiction to decide wrong as well as right. It is axiomatic that the power to decide, inevitably and necessarily postulates with it the power to decide wrongly as well as rightly. 1 recall the celebrated dictum of Lord Hob House in Malkar Jun v. Nar Hari ''a court has jurisdiction to decide wrong as well as right. If it decides wrong the wronged party can only take the course prescribed by the law for setting matters right and if that course is not taken the decision however wrong cannot be disturbed." In that case, Lord Hob House explicitly said that though it was true that the court made a sad mistake in following the procedure adopted, still in so doing the court was exercising its jurisdiction; and to treat such an error has destroyed the jurisdiction of the court was calculated to introduce great confusion into the administration of the law. No one can doubt that jurisdiction to decide a controversy is entirely independent of the method and manner of its exercise This is a well grounded principle. This principle has been recognised and applied not only in India and other Common Wealth Countries but also in other countries There is a plain difference between the jurisdiction of the court to enquire and decide the question and the 3 . erring or straying action of such court in the exercise of that jurisdiction. The first is founded on the power to act at all. The second involves the authority to act in the particular way in which the court does act. The line of separation between the error of judgment and the usurpation of power is this: the former is revertible by the appellate forum perhaps within a certain fixed time. It is, therefore, only voidable The latter is absolute in character and is nullity When the litigating parties come before the court and present a controversy which the court has power to determine in relation to parties, territory and subject matter a verdict not necessarily correct is only a wrong exercise of jurisdiction and it will never render the decision a nullity. The decision may be absolutely wrong, may be a mis-conceived one, may be without relation to the facts revealed in the case, may be without adhering to the provisions of the law, may be even against a statutory mandate but it cannot be held to be void for want of jurisdiction. The decision may be absolutely wrong, may be a mis-conceived one, may be without relation to the facts revealed in the case, may be without adhering to the provisions of the law, may be even against a statutory mandate but it cannot be held to be void for want of jurisdiction. This is because that if we hold that the court has jurisdiction to render only correct decisions, then each time it made an erroneous decision the court will be without jurisdiction and the decision itself void liable to be attacked collateraly. Such is not the law. 22. Erroneous application of O.23 R.1(2) in circumstances not contemplated by the rule cannot be deemed to have been made without jurisdiction. The court had jurisdiction to apply the provision rightly or wrongly If the court has applied the provision erroneously it is not an order made by the court without jurisdiction. It is an order by a competent court acting with material irregularity in the exercise of its jurisdiction. The order certainly is not a nullity If the order is bad, remedy of the aggrieved party is to challenge it in appeal I do not think that the decision Kali Prasanna Sil v. Panchanan Nandi (ILR 44 Cal. 367) can be defended on sound principle. This decision was seriously doubted by Sreenivasa Ayyankar J. in Thuljaram Row v. Gopala Aiyan & others (AIR 1918 Mad. 1093). Mukkerji Ag. C.J of the Calcutta High Court followed in H. Nath Roy v. R. C. Barna Sarma (AIR 1921 Cal. 34), the decision of Sreenivasa Ayyankar J. and overruled ILR 44 Cal. 367. Both these decisions were referred to by the Supreme Court in Official Trustee W. B. v. Sachindra ( AIR 1969 SC 823 ). I cannot say that the observation of Balagangadharan Nair J. that he has not decided the question of tenancy finally is devoid of any legal effect basing that he had no jurisdiction to say to The observation by Balagangadharan Nair, J. in the recasted last sentence of his judgment is an express qualification or limitation on the record itself, (the judgment in C. R. P. ) which derived the finding earlier recorded of its absoluteness. I quote again Spencer Bower and Tumer - Res judicata (page 135). I quote again Spencer Bower and Tumer - Res judicata (page 135). "A judicial decision which on the lace of it is not absolute but expressed to be subject to specified condition, such as a certificate of an officer of a court of equity which is stated to be subject to proof of title or an award directing one of the parties to pay a sum of money unless he discharges himself by affidavits or to execute works to the satisfaction of a third person is not a final decision on which a case of res judicata can be founded. Nor is a decision the record of which contains some express qualification or limitation which deprives it of even the appearance of absoluteness." 23. In the result, I feel that I should hold that the Land Tribunal it obliged to consider the question of tenancy raised by the revision petitioner on merits This has not been done by the Land Tribunal. So, I have to set aside the order of the Land Tribunal and the judgment of the appellate authority which confirmed the older of the Land Tribunal. I do so. I direct the Land Tribunal to consider O. A. 621/71 on merits and pass appropriate orders. Case remitted to the Land Tribunal for fresh disposal C. R P. is allowed. No order as to costs.