ORDER Gulab C. Gupta, J.-l. This is tenant's appeal under Order 43, Rule 1 C.P.C. challenging the legality and validity of the order dated 15-1-86 passed by the II A D.J. to the Court of District Judge, Bhopal, in Civil Appeal No.31.A/84 permitting the respondent to withdraw her suit with permission to file fresh proceedings before the Rent Controlling authority. 2. It appears that the respondent filed her civil suit No. 268/82 before the VII Civil Judge, Class II, Bhopal praying for eviction of the appellant on the ground that the suit premises were required by her for her bona fide requirements as covered u/s 12 (1) (e) of the M P. Accommodation Control Act. 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The appellant resisted the suit and denied the existence of bona fide requirements. During the pendency of the said suit M.P. Accommodation Control (Amendment) Act, 1983 was brought into force. This Amending Act provided for an alternative forum for deciding ejectment cases based on bona fide requirements and authorised the Rent Controlling Authority to entertain such cases and deal with them in a summary manner provided in the said Act. The order passed by the Rent Controlling Authority subject to the revision in the High Court u/s 23-E of the Act, was made final. This view forum in so far as pending suits were concerned, was optional at the wish of the landlord. Sec. 12 of this Amending Act which is relevant for the purpose reads as under :- "12. (I) Subject to sub-section (2) all suits filed by landlords for eviction of tenantsion the grounds of "bona fide" requirement of accommodation for residential or non-residential purpose and pending on this dale of commencement of this Act shall, unless the landlord withdraws the same in relation to such relief be beard, proceeded with and disposed of by the Civil Courts as if this Act has not been passed. (2) Any landlord seeking to evict the tenant exclusively on the grounds of "bona fide" requirement of accommodation u/s 23-A of - the Principal Act, may, if he has already proceeded against the tenant under clause (e) or clause (f) of sub-section (1) of section 12 of the Principal Act as it existed prior 10 the commencement of this Act, withdraw the suit in relation to said grounds with leave of Court and proceed against the tenant in accordance with section 23-A of the Principal Act." A plain reading of the aforesaid provision makes it clear that it applied to all suits filed by landlords before the commencement of this Amending Act and pending on the date of its commencement. Sub-section (1) of the aforesaid section permitted the civil Court where such a suit was pending to hear and decide the suit as if this Act" as not passed unless the landlord withdraws the same. Sub-section (2) of the aforesaid provision with which were directly concern in this appeal permitted the landlord to withdraw the suit with the leave of the Court and proceed against the tenant before the Rent Controlling Authority u/s 23-A of the Act. 3. It is common ground that the respondent/landlord did not withdraw the suit even though she was entitled to do so The evidence in the case was recorded after the Amendment Act had come into force and ultimately by judgment and decree dated 24-1-84 the trial Court dismissed the suit. Apparently the trial Court proceeded with this suit as if the Amendment Act of 1983 had not come into force. The respondent filed an appeal against the judgment and decree before the II A.D.J. to the Court of the Distt. Judge. Bhopal where it was the subject-matter of Appeal No.1-A/84 On 11-4-85 the respondent filed an application under O.23 R.1 C.P.C. read with section 12 (2) of the M.P. Accommodation Control (Amendment) Act, 1983 seeking permission to withdraw the suit with liberty to start proceedings before the Rent Controlling Authority u/s 23-A of the Act. Judge. Bhopal where it was the subject-matter of Appeal No.1-A/84 On 11-4-85 the respondent filed an application under O.23 R.1 C.P.C. read with section 12 (2) of the M.P. Accommodation Control (Amendment) Act, 1983 seeking permission to withdraw the suit with liberty to start proceedings before the Rent Controlling Authority u/s 23-A of the Act. This application was opposed by the appellant mainly on the ground that Sec. 12 (2) of the Amending Act does not apply at the stage of appeal and even otherwise the power should not be exercised as it amounts to abuse to process of this Court and defeating the right acquired by the appellant on account of dismissal of suit by the trial Court. The learned lower appellate Court was of the opinion that the right u/s 12 (2) of the Amending Act, 1983 was available to the respondent and therefore the application was allowed. While permitting withdrawal, the lower appellate Court did not set aside the judgment and decree of the trial Court. It is this order which is impugned in the present appeal. 4. The present appeal was originally filed as a civil revision u/s 115 C. P. C. (Civil Rev. No. 33/86). However on the objection raised by the learned counsel for the respondent that the revision was not maintainable, appellant sought permission to convert the revision into an appeal and was permitted to do so on 11-8-86. The respondent now claims that even the appeal is not maintainable. The appellant, of course, insists that the revision was also not maintainable. A prayer has, therefore, been made to dismiss the appeal as not maintainable. The learned counsel for the appellant, however submitted that in case the appeal was held not maintainable, the Court should treat it as a revision filed u/s 115 C. P. C. and deal with it In this view of the matter, it will be necessary to examine the law on the subject. A perusal of the impugned order indicates that the application was made under O. 23, R. 1 C. P. C. lead with Sec. 12 (2) of the Amending Act, 1983 and has been dealt with as such. The lower appellate Court appears to have used O. 23. R. 1 C. P. C. to permit withdrawal and Sec. 12 (2) of the Amending Act to give liberty to file fresh proceedings. The lower appellate Court appears to have used O. 23. R. 1 C. P. C. to permit withdrawal and Sec. 12 (2) of the Amending Act to give liberty to file fresh proceedings. As far as Sec. 12 (2) of the Amending Act is concerned it does not require the Court to grant liberty to proceed against the tenant u/s 23-A of the Act. This right is available to the landlord as soon as leave to withdraw the suit is granted by the Court However O. 23, R. 1 (3) permits both i.e. grant of permission to withdraw the suit and liberty to institute the fresh suit in respect of the same subject matter Apparently therefore the power has been exercised under this provision. In Singhi Rajila v. Kaubai AIR 1922 Nag. 4 it was held that an order allowing the withdrawal of the suit With liberty to sue afresh is a decision of a case within the meaning of Sec. 115 C. P. C. The decisions in Satya, narayan v. Chetelal AIR 1949 Nag. 10., Abdul Ghafoor v. Rahman AIR 1951 All 845 ., Fulchand v. Rameshwarlal AIR 1962 Patna 63. also take the same view. Under the circumstances, there is over whelming Judicial opinion in favour of the preposition that the impugned order is revisable u/s 115 C. P. C. The submission of the learned counsel for the respondent, however, is that in view of that C.P.C. (M.P.) Amendment Act, 1984 even this power has been taken away from the High Court. Reliance has been placed in the full bench decision in Ramchandra v. Duttatrya 1986 MPLJ 406 . By this amendment powers of the High Court u/s 115 C. P. C. have been contained to case arising out of original suits or other proceedings of the value of Rs. 20,000/- and above. The revisional jurisdiction in all other cases bas been conferred on the Distt. Judge. This, however, is subject to a proviso which reads as Under :- ‘provided that in respect of cases arising out of original suits or other proceedings of any valuation decided by the Distt Judge, the High Court alone shall be competent to make an order under this section". Under the circumstances this Court will be able to exercise revisional jurisdiction only if the matter is covered by the aforesaid provision. Under the circumstances this Court will be able to exercise revisional jurisdiction only if the matter is covered by the aforesaid provision. There is no dispute that the matter for consideration does not arise out of original suit decided by the Distt. Judge. In view of the Nagpur decision in Singhai Rajila’s (Supra) there can be no doubt that it is a case decided and hence the only question for consideration is whether this case arises out of "other proceedings of any valuation". The words "other proceedings" are of wide amplitude and would include every proceeding which is not the original suit. This wide meaning if given to these words, would bring the present matter within the revisional jurisdiction of this court. There is no reason why this meaning should not be given. Any other course will deny access to the appellant to this Court which is not the policy of law. Does Ramchandra's case (supra) say any thing different ? The full bench has only stated that "in the absence of any express provision to the contrary in the Amending Act, supervisory or revisional power u/s 115 C.P.C. has to be exercised in accordance with the provision, of law in force at the time when the power is sought to be exercised”. The full bench further clarified the aforesaid by stating that, 'it therefore follows that after 14-8-84 when the Amending Act 29 of 1984 came into force, the High Court is empowered to exercise only such powers as are conferred on the High Court by the provisions of section 115 C.P.C. as amended, Clearly therefore the full bench cannot be used to support the preposition at even if the matter is covered by the amended provision, the High Court will not entertain the revision. In this view of the matter, it must be held that though the appeal is not maintainable, a revision is maintainable and therefore the matter will be decided only in the context of revisional powers of this court. 5. The question raised for consideration of this court is of considerable importance and requires interpretation of section 12 (2) of the Amending Act which permits withdrawal of the suit with the leave of court. 5. The question raised for consideration of this court is of considerable importance and requires interpretation of section 12 (2) of the Amending Act which permits withdrawal of the suit with the leave of court. As far as, O. 23, R. 1, C. P. C. is concerned, it appears to be the settled view that it applied to appeals and therefore an appellate court can allow the withdrawal of an appeal with the liberty to file a fresh appeal or suit. (See Bijayananda v. Satrughna Sahu) AIR 1963 SC 1566 . Even when permission to withdraw the suit is granted at the appellate stage, the power is exercised only if the suit is likely to fail by reason of some formal defect or when there are other sufficient grounds for allowing the plaintiff to institute a fresh suit. The words 'other grounds' are again the words of wide amplitude and it may. therefore, be conceded that the discretion vests in the court to do so, In spite of wide language, the permission has not been granted, (i) where it will amount to abuse of process of court, and (ii) where it will defeat any right of the defendant which had vested in him because of the decree of the trial court. (See Surajpal v. Gharam Singh AIR 1973 All. 466 . & Hasan Badsha v. Raziah Begum AIR 1949 Mad. 772. If it has to be held that the words 'sufficient grounds' appearing in this provision would take within their scope, the option given to a landlord u/s 12 (2) of the Amending Act, the impugned order would not be a proper order to make. The object of the rule is not to enable a plaintiff after he has failed to prove his case before the trial court, to obtain an opportunity of commencing the trial afresh in order to avoid the result of previous litigation so as to prejudice the opposite party. [See Manrakhan Lal v. Parmanand: AIR 1935 Nag. 185 & Abdul Ghafoor's case (Supra)]. Similarly in Jamnadass v. Beharilal AIR 1941 Nag. 258 it was held that the leave at appellate stage should not be granted when the defendant had acquired any vested or substantive right. [See Manrakhan Lal v. Parmanand: AIR 1935 Nag. 185 & Abdul Ghafoor's case (Supra)]. Similarly in Jamnadass v. Beharilal AIR 1941 Nag. 258 it was held that the leave at appellate stage should not be granted when the defendant had acquired any vested or substantive right. The learned trial Judge has failed to notice these consequence in the instant case, the suit was dismissed holding that there was no bona fide need Now if the fresh suit is permitted to be filed, the appellant/tenant would loose the benefit of the finding of the trial court. This would, by itself, be sufficient to render the exercise of power illegal enabling this court to exercise revisional jurisdiction because of material irregularity. That was perhaps the reason why the learned judge did not set aside the judgment and decree of the trial court. But such a course is not permissible. In Bolo v. Udenath 1963 MPLJ SN 40 this court has held that permission for withdrawal of the suit can be given at the appellate stage only if the decree under appeal was set aside. Since the lower appellate court has not set aside the decree, it must be held that it should not have exercised the powers under O.23, R 1 C. P. C. This would render the impugned order without jurisdiction and justify exercise of revisional jurisdiction by this court. 6. What then is the scope of the word 'suit' appearing in section 12 (2) of the Amending Act, 1983? Generally speaking an appeal is treated to be a continuation of the original proceedings and a stage in a suit itself (See Garikapali v. Subbiah Chaudhary) AIR 1957 SC 540 and hence it any be argued, and indeed it has been so argued, that the word 'suit' as appearing in this provision ,would include the appeal also. As a general preposition it must be held as having been little too broadly stated. It is rather well settled that a right of appeal is not a natural or inherent right attaching to litigation and does not exist and cannot be assumed unless expressly given by statues (See Soorajmull v. State of West Bengal AIR 1963 SC 393 & Gangabai v. Vijaykumar AIR 1974 SC 1126 . It is also well settled that a right of appeal is a substantive right and not a procedural matter. It is also well settled that a right of appeal is a substantive right and not a procedural matter. Under the circumstances, the general principle ennunciated above may govern the relationship between a suit and an appeal under the Code of Civil Procedure and not under any other statute. The right and authority of the legislature to provide for an exception to the rule that an appeal is a continuation of the suit is unchallenged. Indeed this meaning is not accepted in relation to the Limitation Act, 1963 where the word suit as appearing in section 2 (1) does not include an appeal. The said Act provides for manner of instituting an appeal and provisions govering the same. Under the circumstances, the preposition that appeal is continuation of the suit and hence the word "suit" as is appearing in section 12 (2) of the Amending Act should include appeal, cannot be accepted unless the language, context and object of the statute leads us to the said conclusion. The Amending Act of 1983 intends to reduce the rigour of the original Act by providing for a summary remedy to those landlords who need the premises for their bona fide requirements. Section 12 of the Amending Act substitutes the new cause title and indicates that it aims at expeditions trial of "Eviction cases on grounds of bonafide requirements of landlords", Section 12 of this Act deals with only pending cases where the landlords have already resorted to the available remedy of suit before the civil court Section 23-A provides for the new forum which according to the legislature, would expedite disposal of such cases, Section 23-E of the Act provides that no appeal shall lie from any order passed by the Rent Controlling Authority, indicating that the legislature did not like the proceedings before the Rent Controlling Authority to be treat ed as a suit before the civil court and therefore excluded provision of appeal, Choice of alternative forum afforded to a landlord is a pending suit is between a civil court or the Rent Controlling Authority u/s 23-A of the Act, as would be clear from the wordings of sub-section (2) of section 12 itself. What has to be withdrawn or permitted to be withdrawn is the 'suit' pending in the civil court to proceed in accordance with section 23-A of the Act. What has to be withdrawn or permitted to be withdrawn is the 'suit' pending in the civil court to proceed in accordance with section 23-A of the Act. This choice of forum convenient is the only choice given by the law and except for this choice no other choice is available, The choice is in between 2 original forums. If the choice was between 2 appellate forums, the legislature would have permitted approach not to the civil court u/s 23-A of the Act but to a high court u/s 23-E of the Act. Under the circumstances, it is not possible to infer that the legislature permitted withdrawal of the appeal at the appellate stage and gave liberty to a landlord who has otherwise lost his case, to start again from the beginning in the new forum. This would not only be contrary to establish judicial norms but would defeat the very object and purpose of the forum convenient provided by the Amending Act. Such a permission would otherwise be au exercise in futility. This can be best illustrated by the acts of this case itself. In the instant case the respondent bas lost her suit because the civil court was not satisfied about her bona fide requirement. This judgment being between the parties in respect of this very house would operate as res judicata. Even if it was to be held that section 11 C. P. C. would, in term not apply to the proceedings before the Rent Controlling Authority, the general principles of res judicata would certainly apply in the same manner as it would apply to any other judicial proceedings. In such a situation, the Rent Controlling Authority would of be in a position to reach a contrary conclusion or permit reopening of the matter. If that happens, the whole purpose of choosing the alternative forum will stand defeated. Under the circumstances, this court is not inclined to accept interpretation canvassed by the learned counsel for the respondent and agree with the impugned order. It is a well recognised rule of interpretation that expression used in a statute should ordinarily be understood in a sense in which they best harmonize with the object of the statute and which affectuate its purpose. This court must keep in mind the observations of the Supreme Court in Busching Schmitz. It is a well recognised rule of interpretation that expression used in a statute should ordinarily be understood in a sense in which they best harmonize with the object of the statute and which affectuate its purpose. This court must keep in mind the observations of the Supreme Court in Busching Schmitz. v. Menghani AIR 1977 SC 1569 at page 1575 that, the Court should adopt a project oriented approach keeping in mind the principle that legislative futility is to be ruled out so long as interpretative possibility permits'. Under the circumstances this court is of the opinion that the word 'suit' appearing in section 12 of the Amending Act of 1983 does not include an appeal. It must consequently be held that the impugned order of the learned lower• appellate court permitting withdrawal of the appeal to approach to Rent Controlling Authority u/s 23-A of the Act was illegal and without jurisdiction. 7. The appeal consequently succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order of withdrawal is set aside and the matter is remitted to the lower appellate court for deciding the appeal on merits in accordance with law. No order as to costs.