ORDER 1. The facts leading to this Writ Petition are as follows: The petitioner was recruited as Sub-Inspector of Bharat Heavy Electrical Security Force in 1977. He is working as Grade II Sub-Inspector at Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd., Tiruchy. He is attached to Godhavari Platoon. 2. On 3.12.1984 the petitioner applied to the second respondent. Senior Security Officer. Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd., (BHEL), Tiruchy. for permission to grow a beard. It was stated by the petitioner that he intended to perform Haj Pilgrimage in the coming 1985 season and as preliminary thereto, as enjoined by tenets of his religion, he decided to permanently grow a beard. 3. By letter dated 17th January, 1985, the second respondent informed the petitioner that he was permitted to grow a beard to celebrate Haj Pilgrimage for 45 days only with effect from 4.12.1984. He has also been informed that no further extension for growing beard will be allowed. 4. In the affidavit, it is stated that the Haj Pilgrimage for 1985 fell on 26.8.1985. The Tamil Nadu Haj Committee-called for applications from intending Haj Pilgrims in January, 1985. The petitioner obtained the application and was due to submit the same in the next few days. The applicants will be obliged to leave India in July, 1985 and return in September, 1985 end. Therefore the grant of permission for 45 days beginning from 4.12.1984 to 18.1.1985 is not really a permission at all. On receipt of the letter dated 17.1.1985 the petitioner made representation to the second respondent, Senior Security Officer, as well as the Security Officer, BHEL (respondents 2 and 3). It was stated by him in his letter dated 25.1.1985 that Muslims employed in police, military and other forces and in all walks of life were allowed to grow beard. Therefore, inasmuch as Haj pilgrimage for 1985 was in August, 1985 the matter might be reconsidered. By communication dated 6.2.1985 the third respondent informed the petitioner that being an employee of security force the petitioner was not permitted to have beard for more than the specified period of 45 days and the period having already lapsed he had to cut his beard. The petitioner was advised to be cleanshaven as a part of his uniform and appearance. The petitioner was advised to be cleanshaven as a part of his uniform and appearance. He was further informed that his conduct is subject to service rules and discipline required of his employment; and disobedience in this regard would be viewed seriously. Upon receipt of this communication the petitioner again made representation to both the second and third respondents on 10.2.85. In that petition he has stated that growing of beard by Muslims is a religious obligation which has to be given due regard and consideration and that he might be permitted to grow the beard and continue to have the same, and that all proposed action be dropped. A reply was issued by the third respondent on 15.2.1985 that there is no concession to be given to Muslims who have been working in a disciplined force and the petitioner was advised to come for duty with clean shave and he was further advised to remove the beard on or before 22.2.1985 failing which necessary disciplinary action would be taken against him. 5. It is under the above circumstances the writ petition has been preferred and the contention of the petitioner is that in conformity with tenets of his religion he has grown a beard closely trimmed which is not even a few centimetres in length and which will not affect his appearance on duty and that sporting a beard has enhanced his trim bearing and appearance. He believes it to be true that in military and para-military, police and para-police and security and other forces, Muslims and other employees are permitted to grow beard on application as of course and that sporting of a beard by the petitioner will net in any manner interfere with his duty as Sub-Inspector,in the security force. The refusal to grant permission was arbitrary because, no reasons are adduced. Grant of permission is not inconsistent with the existing practice, rules and regulations or against any of them. Such refusal violates the freedom to profess and practice his religion as guaranteed under Article 25(1) of the Constitution of India. 6. Mr. Hajee Jamal Mohammed, learned Counsel for the petitioner would urge on the basis of A1 Bukhari, that if there is a tradition to grow beard certainly that cannot be denied to the petitioner. Such refusal violates the freedom to profess and practice his religion as guaranteed under Article 25(1) of the Constitution of India. 6. Mr. Hajee Jamal Mohammed, learned Counsel for the petitioner would urge on the basis of A1 Bukhari, that if there is a tradition to grow beard certainly that cannot be denied to the petitioner. Article 25 of the Constitution while guaranteeing the right to freedom of religion states that all persons are equally entitled to freedom of conscience and the right to profess, practice and propagate religion. As to what ‘religion’ is has come up for interpretation in Kalyan Dass v. State of Tamil Nadu Kalyan Dass v. State of Tamil Nadu (1972)2 MLJ.581. In that case reliance was placed on the ruling of the Supreme Court in His Holiness Sri-mad Perarulala Ethiraja Ramanuja Jeer Swami etc. v. State of Tamil Nadu. His Holiness Sri-mad Perarulala Ethiraja Ramanuja Jeer Swami etc. v. State of Tamil Nadu. (1973)1 S.C.J.346 = (1973)1 An.W.R. (S.C.) 58 = (1972)3 S.C.R.815A.I.R.1972 S.C.1586 and it was held that whatever practice is regarded by the community as a religious practice that would form part of religion. In this case, the community regards growing of beard as a tenet of the religion and therefore, that right cannot be taken away. 7. Then again, no regulation has been violated by the petitioner in growing a beard and it cannot be contended that clean shaving of beard is a part of uniform. No doubt, in Mohammed Fasi v. Superintendent of Police, Alleppy Mohammed Fasi v. Superintendent of Police, Alleppy (1985) K.L.T.185 it has been held that the right to grow beard has not been ordained by the holy Quoran but that decision does not lay down the course of law. Even otherwise, there was a regulation in that case, but in the instant case there is no such regulation. If hadis enjoined sporting of a beard those hadis will have equal binding force though it is true as laid down in the said ruling Quoran does not rule growing of beard. Therefore, this is a case of violation of Article 25 and the order dated 15.2.1985 is liable to be quashed. 8. Learned Counsel for the respondents would urge that the petitioner belongs to security force. Therefore, he is governed by the Central Industrial Security Act. Hence, he is bound by a certain code of conduct. Therefore, this is a case of violation of Article 25 and the order dated 15.2.1985 is liable to be quashed. 8. Learned Counsel for the respondents would urge that the petitioner belongs to security force. Therefore, he is governed by the Central Industrial Security Act. Hence, he is bound by a certain code of conduct. If clean shaven face is one of the requirements as uniform certainly a man belonging to security force cannot say that he would behave in any manner as he liked because the security force is akin to armed force and it is part of the uniform. By sporting a beard the appearance or identity of a man also gets changed. It cannot be contended that there is any religious tenet requiring sporting of beard. As a matter of fact, this aspect was fully considered in (1985) K.L.T.185. Therefore, that is. a clear ruling against the petitioner. 9. As to how religion had come to be construed within the meaning of Article 25 can be gathered from The State of Bombay v. Narasu Appa The State of Bombay v. Narasu Appa A.I.R.1952 Bom. 84. Then again, the Calcutta High Court in Masud Alam v. Commissioner of Police Masud Alam v. Commissioner of Police A.I.R.1956 Cal.9 in dealing with the right of Muslim to have a loudspeaker held that no such right could be claimed. The Supreme Court in Gulam Abbas v. State of U.P. Gulam Abbas v. State of U.P. (1984)1 S.C.C.81 gives the correct position as regards hadis. In so far as it was admitted that Quoran by itself does not enjoin the sporting of beard the petitioner cannot assume a religious practice and claim on that assumption that his fundamental right is violated. 10. From what I have discussed above, the case and the counter-case can be summarised in the following terms: The petitioner says, “I will do just what I like; I will grow beard”, while the respondents would contend that he cannot sport a beard because his appearance will change, and further, it is contrary to discipline. To use the words of Herman, J. Hankiewicz “You know it is hard to hear what a bearded man is saying. He cannot speak above a whisker.” In the light of the above discussion, all these submissions require to be examined. 11. To use the words of Herman, J. Hankiewicz “You know it is hard to hear what a bearded man is saying. He cannot speak above a whisker.” In the light of the above discussion, all these submissions require to be examined. 11. Before I go to the religious aspect of the matter, as to how beard came into origin can be gathered from Encyclopaedia Britannica, Vol.3, pages 326-327 (1969 Edition). It says as follows: “BEARD, in modern usage, refers to the hair grown upon a man’ a chin and cheek, ‘mustache’ or ‘moustache’, singular or plural, refers to the hair on the upper lip. The term whiskers has been used to refer to a mustache or beard or both, or to what hair remains on a shaven face;” whisker “refers to a single facial hair. In the past the words have had less exact meaning. Beard has stood for all these things, and whisker signified what is now called mustache.” Mustache “sometimes referred to a hanging curl on the side of the head. The bearded races of mankind have commonly held the beard in high honour. It is the sign of full manhood; the lad or the ennuch is beardless, and the bearded woman is reckoned a witch. The future King John gave deadly offence to the chieftains when visiting Ireland in 1185, by plucking at their flowing beards. The oath on the beard is as old as history, as when a man swears” by his chin. “Adam, the primal man, and the deity and prophets of many faiths have been traditionally pictured with beards, as were kings and nobles and dignitaries. Beards have assumed all shapes and lengths, some being cultivated to lengths exceeding a man's height.” Islamic peoples still hold the beard in high esteem. The earliest records indicate that the Egyptians grew hair on their chins. They frizzed, dyed, or hennaed, and sometimes plaited this beard with interwoven gold thread. Later, a metal, false bread or postiche, which was a sign of sovereignty, was worn by queens as well as kings. The earliest records indicate that the Egyptians grew hair on their chins. They frizzed, dyed, or hennaed, and sometimes plaited this beard with interwoven gold thread. Later, a metal, false bread or postiche, which was a sign of sovereignty, was worn by queens as well as kings. This was held in place by a ribbon tied over the head and attached to a gold chin strap, a fashion existing from about 3000 B.C. to 1580 B.C. The Mesopotamian Civilizations (Chaldean, Babylonian, Assyrian, Median and ancient Persian) devoted great care to oiling and dressing their beards, using tongs or curling irons to create elaborate ringlets and frizzles, in tiered effect. Assyrians resorted to a black dye for eyebrows, hair and beard, while the Persians used henna which produced an organge-red colour, a style which existed from 1900 B.C. Gold dust, gold thread and scented yellow starch were sometimes used in the hair and beard for festive occasions. In ancient India and Turkey, the beard was allowed to grow long, a symbol of dignity and wisdom. To cut the beard was infamy among the Turks; slaves were shaved as a mark of servility.” At pages 327-328 of the same book it is stated: “Until the advent: of Christianity in the 7th century, all Anglo-Saxons wore beards; members of the clergy were then compelled by law to shave. English princes wore mustaches until William I (1066-87) compelled them to cut them off in accordance with the Norman fashion. The Crusades were perhaps accountable for the return of beards, and for more than four centuries great diversity was allowed; beards, mustaches and shaven faces all were found. Of the English kings, Henry II (1154-89) was close shaven Henry HI (1216-72) was long bearded; Edward II (1307-27) curled his beard in three ringlets, Edward HI (1327-77) had a long forked beard which flowed in patriarchal style; Richard II (1377-79) wore a little tuft on each side of his chin; Henry ¡V (1399-1413) wore two curled locks on his chin. The mid-13th and 14th centuries were a period of many shapes and varieties of beards. Henry V (1413-22) was clean shaven and thereafter beards were rare, except in elder men, until the 16th century; The Renaissance fashion in Europe included both clean shaven faces and beards varying in shape and length. The mid-13th and 14th centuries were a period of many shapes and varieties of beards. Henry V (1413-22) was clean shaven and thereafter beards were rare, except in elder men, until the 16th century; The Renaissance fashion in Europe included both clean shaven faces and beards varying in shape and length. In the middle of the 16th century the Spanish style of cropped pointed beard and trimmed mustache took over. Many men starched their beards in the 1560. In England Henry VIII (1509-47) brought the beard back into favour in 1535, after which beards of all shapes and lengths were worn. The flemish painter Sir Anthony Vandyke (1599-1641) painted so many aristocrats with a pointed type of beard that it became known as the Vandyke beard. They were dressed with pomade wax, applied with a tiny brush and comb. Other gadgets were used to keep the mustache and beard in shape while sleeping. In 1637, Louis XIII triumphed over the Spanish influence when he assumed himself by shaving his courtiers, leaving only a tiny beard “a la royale” or “la mouche,” a custom adopted by the French and Dutch cavaliers. This vogue led to the creation of the Corporation of Barber-Hairdressers. In the 1640s and 1650s Frenchmen were typically clean-shaven. The mustache when it was worn became so diminutive that its later disappearance was hardly noticed. Peter the Great of Russia in 1705 proclaimed; “The beard is a useless embarassment”. he ordered them cut off and levied a tax on those who refused to comply. The Empress Catherine later repealed the law.” Beards became popular among the British troops serving in South Africa early in the 20th Century and again among the men on desert patrols during World War II. British naval personnel were allowed to wear moustaches or beards; only moustaches were permitted in the marines. United States army regulations, corrected to 1917, stated that hair must be kept short and the beard must be neatly trimmed. In the early 1960s there was a return to popularity of all types of beards, and by the late 1960s, well-groomed beards appeared more frequently in conservative society. In the far east many ancient traditions continued to be practised. Indian Sikhs let their hair and and breads gro long. In the early 1960s there was a return to popularity of all types of beards, and by the late 1960s, well-groomed beards appeared more frequently in conservative society. In the far east many ancient traditions continued to be practised. Indian Sikhs let their hair and and breads gro long. The beard is twisted and rolled tightly to the chin; The Japanese, having broken with their ancient custom of shaving, often wear short beards or moustaches.” With the advancement of civilisation what happened can be culled out from the above passage occurring in pages 327-328. Therefore, it is a matter of style rather than being associated with religion. 12. The following is the passage occurring in Encyclopaedia Britannica, Vol.5 page 1022: “In the Archaic period men wore beards, which were often curled into ringlets with tongs, and long hair. After the Persian Wars they cut their hair short; and in the Hellenistic period they shaved their beards on the order of Alexander the Great, who feared the beards might serve as handles to the enemy. Women often wore their hair parted in the centre and bound up in various ways with ribbons, diadems, and scarves, chignons and loose back hair were common. Little girls wore braids and twisted locks.” Now, I will go to the law on this aspect. In Principles of Mohamedan Law by Mulla, as to the sources of Islamic Law it is stated thus: “There are four sources of Islamic Law. They are (i) Koran (ii) Sunna or Tradition; (iii) Ijma or consensus of opinion and (iv) Qiyas or analogical deductions.” While dealing with Sunna or Tradition it is stated: “The word ‘sunna’ means” the trodden path’, and as this meaning shows, it denotes some kind of practice and precedent. At first this word was applied to custom and to the practice of the early schools of law but later and finally it means the practice and precedents of the Prophet. The principles which were stated in the Koran found their application, in the hands, of the Prophet. This gave birth to hadis (practice-pl. Abadis) of the Prophet. As a source of law hadis is as binding as the principles of Koran. The term ‘sunna’ is sometimes applied to the precedents created by authorities other than the Prophet but this is a wrong use of the term and is best avoided. The number of Ahadis is very large. This gave birth to hadis (practice-pl. Abadis) of the Prophet. As a source of law hadis is as binding as the principles of Koran. The term ‘sunna’ is sometimes applied to the precedents created by authorities other than the Prophet but this is a wrong use of the term and is best avoided. The number of Ahadis is very large. Ahmed ib-Hanbal in his Musnad collected over 80,000 Ahadis, and in other collections the number is still larger because many of these precedents are not authentic. The words of the Prophet and his actions were not noted and written down immediately and on many an occasion persons attempted to make a point by quoting the practice and precedent of the Prophet because they were genuinely of the opinion that the Prophet would in fact have reacted as they reported. But it was one thing to report a hadis which was true and quite another to originate a hadis which really had no validity as a binding precedent.” It is this that is pressed into service. From this it is evident that these precedents are not authentic and they cannot have validity as a binding precedent unless it is established that a hadis was true and it was not originated. 13. In Verma's Mohammedan Law, 4th Edition, 1968, speaking of Ahadis and Sunna, it is stated: “Collection of Ahadis: Absolute sanctity is attached to them. While Quoran was the manifest (zahir) revelation communicated by Gabriel under the directions of God, the opinions of the Prophet expressed by him from time to time were the internal (batin) revelations conveyed to him by hints by Gabriel or occurred to his mind through inspiration. Owing to the sanctity attached to the sayings of Mahomed his immediate companions began to note or memorise everything which fell from him. Gradually records of all his decisions began to be prepared. Different persons had made the collections of his sayings either in writing or in memory. Later on they were passed from generation to generation. There was however no authoritative collection and it remained mostly a matter of private enterprise. Bands of persons began to gather all the sayings of the Prophet. This, however, gave rise to many false traditions. The political parties began to use them often for their political purpose. Each party had its own collections of traditions which were the most favourable for its purpose. Bands of persons began to gather all the sayings of the Prophet. This, however, gave rise to many false traditions. The political parties began to use them often for their political purpose. Each party had its own collections of traditions which were the most favourable for its purpose. Often entirely conflicting traditions went round in circulation. Numerous traditions were forged.” As to what is Ahadis in Muslim Jurisprudence, it is stated at page 12 (ibid): “Influence of Ahadis on Muslim Jurisprudence - Traditions (Ahadis) had considerable influence on Muslim Jurisprudence, The influence of Bukhari on Muslims was particularly great. They considerably strengthened the position of traditionist schools of law of Hejaz, particularly the Shafel and Maliki schools. The Iraw School of Abu Hanifa was exceedingly rigorous in accepting the authenticity of traditions. Abu Hanifa used no more than 17 or 18 traditions. But there is no doubt the Hanafi School was also considerably influenced by the traditions. The traditions in all the six collections are constantly referred to in the works of the Hanafi schools also. Bukhari's books hold high position among the Hanafis. Ahadis are an important primary source of law.” 14. Useful reference may be had from the Lawful and Prohibited in Islam (Al-Halal Wal Haram Fil Islam) by Yusuf Al-Qaradwi. At page 94 it says as follows: “Letting the Beard Grow: The growing of beards is also related to our topic A1-Bukhari, on the authority of Ibn ‘Umar, reported the Prophet (peace be on him) as saying, Be different from the polytheists (Mushrikeen): let the beard grow and trim the moustache.” The purpose here, as the hadith states, is to be different from the polytheists, who in the particular instance cited, were Zoroastrians, the worshippers of fire, whose practice was either to clip or shave their beards. The Prophet's command to be different from them was intended to train the Muslims in developing an independent personality, distinct in its inner reality as well as in outward appearance, in substance as well as in form. At the same time, shaving the beard is an affront to the masculine nature, as it is an attempt to resemble women, while the beard is an integral part of masculinity and a distinctive feature of the male sex. However, letting the beard grow does not mean letting it grow wild or so long that it becomes a nuisance. At the same time, shaving the beard is an affront to the masculine nature, as it is an attempt to resemble women, while the beard is an integral part of masculinity and a distinctive feature of the male sex. However, letting the beard grow does not mean letting it grow wild or so long that it becomes a nuisance. One should certainly trim it in both, length and breadth. This has been recommended in a hadith reported by al-Trimidhi; moreover, the Muslims of the first generations did so. Said ‘Ayyad’. it is makruh to shave the beard or to drastically cut or shorten it, but it is mustahab (commendable) to remove something from its length and breadth if it grows big.” Again at page 95 it is stated thus: “A large number of jurists consider shaving the beard to be haram on the basis of the Prophet's command. This command to let the beard grow renders it an obligation, especially because it is for the purpose of being different from non-Muslims, since maintenance of this distinction from those who do not believe is obligatory for Muslims. It has never been reported that any of the Muslims of the earliest generations neglected this obligation. However, some modern scholars permit the shaving of the beard under the impact of events in response to public opinion, arguing that the growing of the beard was a personal preference of the Prophet (peace be on him) which was not related to religious practice, and hence it need not be followed. But the truth of this matter is that growing the beard is required not merely because the Prophet (peace be on him) had one but because he explicitly commanded it in order to maintain the distinction from non-believers. Ibn Taymiyyah has convincingly argued that to make the Muslims different from non-believers was the aim of the law-Giver, for resemblance in appearance produces love, friendship, and affinity in feeling, just as love in the heart produces resemblance in outward appearance. This psychological fact is borne out by experience and observation. Says Ibn Taymiyyah: The Quran, the Sunnah and the. consensus of Muslim scholars all teach Muslims to be distinct from non-believers and in general to avoid resembling them. Anything which is likely to cause corruption in a hidden and diffuse manner is related to this matter and is likewise prohibited. This psychological fact is borne out by experience and observation. Says Ibn Taymiyyah: The Quran, the Sunnah and the. consensus of Muslim scholars all teach Muslims to be distinct from non-believers and in general to avoid resembling them. Anything which is likely to cause corruption in a hidden and diffuse manner is related to this matter and is likewise prohibited. The imitation of the appearance of the non-believers will lead to imitation of their immoral behaviour and evil quantities indeed, even of their beliefs. Such influences can neither be brought under control nor easily detected, and consequently, it becomes difficult or even impossible to eradicate them. Accordingly, whatever is a cause of corruption has been prohibited by the Law-Gover. 15. Thus, we note that there are three opinions with regard to the shaving of the beard, one, what is haram, which is the opinion of Ibn Taymiyyah and others; two, that it is makruh, the opinion of ‘Ayyad as mentioned in Al-Fatch, Al-Bari but of no one else; and three, that it is permitted, which is the opinion of some modern scholars. Perhaps the second opinion, that it is makruh, is nearer to the truth and more moderate. As the stated reason for growing the beard is to be different from the non-believers, it is similar to the matter of dyeing gray hair in order to be distinct from the Jews and Christians; it is known that some of the sahabah did not dye their gray hair, signifying that it was commendable rather than obligatory. Similarly, growing the beard may be regarded as commendable but not obligatory, and, accordingly, shaving it would be classified as makruh rather than haram. It is true that none of the sabhbah was known to have shaved his beard. Perhaps there was no need to shave, and perhaps growing the beard was a custom among them. 16. From the above quotation, it is clear that there are three opinions; (i) haram, (ii) mukruh and (iii) that is permitted. Here also, there is nothing definite. 17. What is now contended before me is that under Article 25 of the Constitution of India the petitioner has a fundamental right to practice religion. The scope of this Article came up for consideration in very many cases and firstly, I will refer to The State of Bombay v. Narasu Appa The State of Bombay v. Narasu Appa A.I.R.1952 Bom.84. What is now contended before me is that under Article 25 of the Constitution of India the petitioner has a fundamental right to practice religion. The scope of this Article came up for consideration in very many cases and firstly, I will refer to The State of Bombay v. Narasu Appa The State of Bombay v. Narasu Appa A.I.R.1952 Bom.84. Chagla, C.J. speaking for the Bench of that Court in dealing with the validity of Bombay Prevention of Hindu Bigamous Marriages Act, whether it was in violation of Article 25 of the Constitution, held as follows: “A sharp distinction must be drawn between religious faith and belief and religious practices. What the State protects is religious faith and belief. If religious practices run counter to public order, morality or health or a policy of social welfare upon which the State has embarked, then the religious practices must give way before the good of the people of the State as a whole. It is rather difficult to accept the proposition that polygamy is an integral part of Hindu religion. But even assuming that polygamy is a recognised institution according to Hindu religious practice, the right of the State to legislate on questions relating to marriage cannot be disputed. Marriage is undoubtedly a social institution, an institution in which the State is vitally interested. If, therefore, the State of Bombay compels Hindus to become monogamists, it is a measure of social reform, and the State is empowered to legislate with regard to social reform under Article 25(2)(b) notwithstanding the fact that it may interfere with the right of a citizen freely to profess, practice and propagate religion. Therefore, this legislation does not contravene Article 25(1) of the Constitution.” Therefore, a sharp distinction must be made between religious faith and belief and the religious practices. If, therefore, religious practices run counter to public order or morality or health or policy of social welfare, then this practice must give way. 18. Therefore, this legislation does not contravene Article 25(1) of the Constitution.” Therefore, a sharp distinction must be made between religious faith and belief and the religious practices. If, therefore, religious practices run counter to public order or morality or health or policy of social welfare, then this practice must give way. 18. In Masud Alam v. Commissioner of Police Masud Alam v. Commissioner of Police A.I.R.1956 Cal.9 a learned single Judge (Sinha, J.) considered the meaning and scope of religious freedom and religion and practice as follows: “Where the Commissioner of Police refused his permission to the use of an electrical loudspeaker five times a day for calling the Azan (call for prayer) as several residents of the locality complained against the practice, it was argued for the Mutawalli of the mosque that had introduced the loudspeaker that the liberty allowed under Article 25 of the Constitution has been curtailed by the suppression of the use of loudspeakers to propagate the Azan in a very crowded and noisy locality, where the Azan cannot be heard, unless magnified by some such device as a loudspeaker. The High Court rejected the argument. No doubt, India is a secular State and under Article 25 of the Constitution, all persons are at liberty to freely practise their religion. But, the above argument overlooks the essential features of Article 25. For, a sharp distinction must be drawn between religious faith and belief and religious practices. What the State protects is religious faith and belief. If religious practices run counter to public order, morality or health, then the religious practices must give way before the good of the people of the State as a whole.” In the words of Sinha, J. “I have a few words to say about the use of loudspeakers in connection with religious houses or festivals. The discovery of the means to magnify sound has indeed been a major scientific discovery of the age and is utilised in many useful ways, e.g. the telephone, radio, etc. But like every modern discovery in science, it has helped to create not merely a heaven but also a hell. The indiscriminate use of the electric loudspeaker in connection with religious festivals in the city is a standing grievance of every peaceloving citizen. But like every modern discovery in science, it has helped to create not merely a heaven but also a hell. The indiscriminate use of the electric loudspeaker in connection with religious festivals in the city is a standing grievance of every peaceloving citizen. The most offending instances are the uses to which it is put in connection with Hindu festivals, when the city is racked with the raucous caucophony of a thousand loudspeakers, dolling out cheap jazz or cinema music, which is not only singularly inappropriate to such occasions, but to my mind, destructive of public health and morals. I am now surprised to hear that the canker has now spread into the precincts of Muslim religious institutions.” It is interesting to note that in the above decision the decision of the Bombay High Court in A.I.R. 1952 Bom.84 was cited. 19. The next case is the one reported in Gulam Abbas v. State of Uttar Pradesh Gulam Abbas v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1984)1 S.C.C.81. The head note reads as follows: “For several years there had been violent clashes between the Shias and Sunnis of Mohalla Doshipura, Varanasi leading to proceedings and several petitions before the Supreme Court. To find a perennial solution to the problem the Supreme Court appointed a Committee of 7 persons consisting of 3 nominees of Shias and 3 nominees of Sunnis and the Divisional Commissioner as the Chairman. The Chairman despite the opposition of Sunnis, recommended that shifting of their two graves so as to separate the places of worship of Shias and Sunnis was feasible. The Sunnis challenge implementation of the recommendation on ground of breach of their rights under Articles 25 and 26 and lack of jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to so order. The Supreme Court held: “The exercise of fundamental rights under Articles 25 and 26 is not absolute but must yield or give way to maintenance of public order and the impugned suggestion was mooted by the Court and has now been found to be feasible by the Chairman of the Committee in the larger interest of the society for the purpose of maintaining public order on every occasion of the performance of religious ceremonies and functions by members of both the sects. If the Court finds the implementation of the suggestion to be eminently fit in the interest of maintenance of public order consent of either party would be immaterial.” At page 86 the Supreme Court has stated thus: “Counsel for the Sunnis relied upon five Fatwas issued by their religious heads (Head Muftis and Shahi Inams) from Delhi, Banaras and Patna stating the position under Shariat Law. The common theme in all these Fatwas is that under Shariat Law respecting of graves is the religious obligation of every Muslim, that shifting of dead bodies after digging old graves in which they are lying buried is not permissible and to do so would amount to interference with their religious rights. True, this position under Sheriat Law cannot be doubted but as explained earlier the religious rights of every person and every religious denomination are subject to ‘public order’, the maintenance whereof is paramount in the larger interest of the society. For instance, the ecclesiastical edict or right not to disturb an interred corpse is not absolute as will be clear from section 176(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code which permits its exhumation for the purpose of crime detection and this provision is applicable to all irrespective of the personal law governing the dead. In fact, quoting a Hadiz, one of the Fatwas relied upon by the contesting respondents states “unnecessary shifting of graves is also not permissible.,” The edict clearly implies that it may become necessary to shift graved in certain situations and exigencies of public order would surely provide the requisite situation, especially as the fundamental rights under Articles 25 and 26 are expressly made subject to public order. in the circumstances in directing the shifting of two graves In question for the purpose of maintaining public order which would be in the larger interest or the society, we do not think that we are doing anything irreligious. In the circumstances, the first objection is overruled.” It requires to be noted that here also the Supreme Court was dealing with Hadiz. 20. It is admitted before me that there is nothing in the Quoran which requires growing of a beard. In the circumstances, the first objection is overruled.” It requires to be noted that here also the Supreme Court was dealing with Hadiz. 20. It is admitted before me that there is nothing in the Quoran which requires growing of a beard. The very question as to whether a Head-constable in police service of the State of Kerala could validly question the declining of his request for permission to grow beard on permanent basis came to be fully discussed as seen from the decision reported in Mohammed Fasi v. Superintendent of Police Mohammed Fasi v. Superintendent of Police (1985) K.L.T. 185. In paragraph 3 the learned Judge (Balakrishna Menon, J.) refers to hadiz 780 and 78¡ in Vol.7 of Sahih A1-Bukhari in the following mannen: “In support of his contention the petitioner has produced Exts.P-4 and P-5 as per which the Air Force Personnel at Bangalore and Members of the Armed Forces in Karnataka respectively belonging to the Muslim religion are permitted to grow beard. The petitioner relies on Hadiths Nos.780 and 781 in Vol.7 of Sahib Al-Bukhari, at pages 516 and 517, extracted below, as embodying the prophet's instructions to his followers to grow beard. 780. Narrated Nafis ibn ‘Umar said, “The prophet said, ‘Do the opposite of what the pagans do. Keep the beards and cut the moustaches shori,” Whenever Ibn ‘Umar performed the Haij or Umra, he used to hold his beard with his hand and cut whatever remained outside his hold, 781. Narrated. Ibn ‘Umar: Allah's Apostle said, “Cut the moustaches short and leave the beard: (as it is),” Hadiths are said to be the words of the Prophet spoken on different occasions and at different context. Hadith 786 at page 519 of Sahih A-Bukhari, Vol.7 reads as follows: 786. Narrated. Abu Huraira; The Propnet said, “Jews and Christians do not dye their hair so you should do the opposite what they do. The petitioner has no case that dyeing the hair is farz (obligatory) according to Islam. Hadith 786 at page 519 of Sahih A-Bukhari, Vol.7 reads as follows: 786. Narrated. Abu Huraira; The Propnet said, “Jews and Christians do not dye their hair so you should do the opposite what they do. The petitioner has no case that dyeing the hair is farz (obligatory) according to Islam. These statements by the Prophet made apparently in different contexts are only sunnath (optional) and are not understood as obligatory for every Mussalman to follow.” Paragraph 4 in which the allegations in the counter are extracted is as follows: “In the additional counter affidavit dated 4.2.1985 filed on behalf of the respondents it is stated at page 2: ‘The Court can judge the existence or otherwise of a religious practice. Common experience shows that such a practice is not in vogue. The President of a neighbouring theocratic Islamic Republic does not wear a beard. Similarly high dignitaries like President, Vice President, Judges of the Supreme Court and the High Court and Ministers have not been wearing beards. It is also not disputed that the petitioner himself had no beard ever since his entry in service in the year 1963 until he submitted his representation Ext.P-1 in February, ¡98¡ for permission to grow beard as a religious requirement enjoined by the holy quoran and the words of the prophet.” On a consideration of these contentions, after referring to The Ahmedabad St. Xaviers College, Society and another v. State of Gujarat St. Xaviers College, Society and another v. State of Gujarat (1974)1 S.C.C.717 = A.I.R. 1974 S.C.1389 and number of other cases including the cases referred to by me, the learned Judge holds in paragraphs 10,11 and 12 as follows: “10. Justice Douglas in U.S. v. Ballard Justice Douglas in U.S. v. Ballard 32 U.S.78 stated at page 86: ‘The first Amendment has a dual aspect. It not only forestalls compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of worship but also safeguards the free exercise of the chosen form of religion; Cant well v. Connecticut Cant well v. Connecticut (140) 310 U.S.296(303). Thus, the amendment embraces two concepts freedom to believe and freedom to act. It not only forestalls compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of worship but also safeguards the free exercise of the chosen form of religion; Cant well v. Connecticut Cant well v. Connecticut (140) 310 U.S.296(303). Thus, the amendment embraces two concepts freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute but in the nature of things the second cannot be.‘ Chief Justice Waite in Reynolds v. United States Reynolds v. United States 98 U.S.145 stated: ‘Laws are made for the government of actions and while they cannot interfere with mere religious belief and opinions, they may, with practices,” In State of Bombay v. Narasu Appa Mali State of Bombay v. Narasu Appa Mali A.I.R.1952 Bom.84 Chagla, C.J. observed: “Now a short distinction must be drawn between religious faith and belief and religious practices. What the State protects is religious faith and belief. If religious practices run counter to public order, morality or health or a policy of social welfare upon which the State has embarked, then the religious practices must give way before the good of the people of the State as a whole. 21. Rule 174 at page 68 of the Travan-core-Cochin Police Manual Vol.I enjoins: “174. None can grow beard without the permission of the District Superintendent of Police. This covers all pilgrimage, vows, etc. Persons desiring to go to any place of pilgrimage, should apply one month in advance to the District Superintendent of Police and only if permission is granted, he can go.” Sub- section (3) of section 70 of the Kerala Police Act, 1960 (Act 5 of 1961 ) preserves all rules made and orders issued under the Travancore-Cochiri Police Act, 1951 under its deeming provision. As per section 17 of the Kerala Police Act every Police Officer not on leave or under suspension shall be considered to be always on duty and may at any time be employed as Police Officer in any part of the State. Rule 10 of the Kerala Police Drill Manual requires that Police Personnel should have their “face and neck clean and shaven”. The standing orders for Armed Police Battalions published as Detachable Supplement to Kerala Police Gazette No.40, dated 10th October, 1958, provides at page 52 that “no one shall grow a beard without the previous permission of the Commandant.” 22. Rule 10 of the Kerala Police Drill Manual requires that Police Personnel should have their “face and neck clean and shaven”. The standing orders for Armed Police Battalions published as Detachable Supplement to Kerala Police Gazette No.40, dated 10th October, 1958, provides at page 52 that “no one shall grow a beard without the previous permission of the Commandant.” 22. The Police Drill Manual published by the Bureau of Police Research and Development, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, New Delhi, requires Police Personnel to have “face and neck clean and shaven”. In the Police Planning by O.W.Wilson, Second Edition it is stated at page 352: “Members shall be neat and clean In appearance when in public whether in or out of uniform and whether on or off duty. They shall bathe regularly, shave once each day, and keep their hair trimmed and fingernails clean and neat. Officers in uniform shall not carry an umbrella or cumbersome bundles, nor shall they walk or stand with hand in pocket. I have already found that growing beard or dyeing is not an essential part of the practice of islamic religion. There is nothing in Article 25 of the Constitution to desist the State from restricting or preventing the non-essential practices of religion, the right to profess, practise and propagate religion being subject to public order, morality and health. The Police Standing Orders referred to above requiring Police Personnel to have their face and neck clean and shaven are perfectly valid in law.” I am of the view that the above case though related to the police force which is governed by rule 174 of the Travan-core-Cochin Police Manual Vol.1, would apply to the present case as well because the petitioner is one who belongs to the security force governed by the Central Industrial Security Act. If it is a part of uniform and if it is part of service discipline that he should appear clean shaven he cannot say,” I have a permanent right to grow beard. “Nor again, am I in a position to hold that there is any violation of Article 25 of the Constitution because, on an analysis of the various citations and the textbooks, I am not in a position to conclude that growing of beard is ordained by religion. Mere tradition cannot take the place of religion. “Nor again, am I in a position to hold that there is any violation of Article 25 of the Constitution because, on an analysis of the various citations and the textbooks, I am not in a position to conclude that growing of beard is ordained by religion. Mere tradition cannot take the place of religion. Therefore, the petitioner's claim to fundamental right has to be rejected. 23. Learned Counsel for the petitioner brings to my notice the following circular issued by the Inspector-General of Police, Madras, No.F.O.C.SR.3/506/57 dated 5.2.57 to all District Superintendent of Police: ‘Sub: Growing of beard in connection with religious vows - Grant of permission to Police Officers - Orders issued. Reft This office memo FocNo.831/SR/45 dated 3.12.45 published in Madras Police Gazette Part I, dt.7.8.54. In this Office Memorandum cited it was ordered that permission to grow beard should not be granted to Police Officers other than Muslim, the latter being instructed to keep the beard trim and tidy. 2. In modification of the above orders, D.S.Ps. may consider and allow Police Officers of even other communities to grow beard for a period not exceeding four months, if they have taken any religious vow.” The above circular cannot extend to the Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited nor are the respondents bound by the same. 24. At this stage I may usefully refer to Eugene R. Kelley v. Edward Johnson Eugene R. Kelley v. Edward Johnson 425 U.S.238 - 47 L.Ed.708. “In 1971 respondent's predecessor, individually and as President of the Suffolk Country Patrolmen's Benevolent Association, brought this action under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 USC 1983 against petitioner's predecessor, the Commissioner of the Suffolk County Police Department. The Commissioner had promulgated Order No.71-1, which established hair-grooming standards applicable to male members of the police force. The regulation was directed at the style and length of hair, side burns and mustaches; beard and goatees were prohibited except for medical reasons; and wigs conforming to the regulation could be worn for cosmetic reasons. The Commissioner had promulgated Order No.71-1, which established hair-grooming standards applicable to male members of the police force. The regulation was directed at the style and length of hair, side burns and mustaches; beard and goatees were prohibited except for medical reasons; and wigs conforming to the regulation could be worn for cosmetic reasons. The regulation was attacked as violative of respondent patrolman's right of free expression under the First Amendment and his guarantees of due process and equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment, in that it was ‘not based upon the generally accepted standard of grooming in the community” and placed’ “an undue restriction” upon his activities therein.” In paragraphs 3 and 4 (pages 714 to 717) the following observations are found: “The hair-length regulation here touches respondent as an employee of the country and, more particularly, as a policeman. Respondent's employer has, in accordance with its well-established duty to keep the peace, placed myriad demands upon the members of the police force, duties which have no counterpart with respect to the public at large. Respondent must wear a standard uniform, specific in each detail. When in unifrom he must salute the flag. He may not take an active role in local political affairs by way of being a party delegate or contributing or soliciting political contributions. He may not smoke in public. All of these and other regulations of the Suffolk County Police Department infringe on respondent's freedom of choice in personal matters, and it was apparently the view of the Court of Appeals that the burden is on the State to prove a “genuine public need” for each and every one of these regulations. This view was based upon the Court of Appeals’ reasoning that the “unique judicial deference” accorded by the judiciary to regulation of members of the military was inapplicable because there was no historical or functional justification for the characterisation of the police as “para-military.” But the conclusion that such cases are inapposite, however correct, in no way detracts from the deference due to Suffolk County's choice of an organisational structure for its police force. Here the country has chosen a mode of organisation which it undoubtedly deems the most efficient in enabling its police to carry out the duties assigned to them under state and local law. Here the country has chosen a mode of organisation which it undoubtedly deems the most efficient in enabling its police to carry out the duties assigned to them under state and local law. Such a choice necessarily gives weight to the overall need for discipline, esprit de corps, and uniformity. The county's choice of an organisational structure, therefore does not depend for its constitutional validity on any doctrine of historical prescription. Nor, indeed, has respondent made any such claim. His argument does not challenge the constitutionality of the organisational structure, but merely asserts that the present hair-length regulation infringes his asserted liberty interest under the Fourteenth Amendment. We believe, however, that the hair-length regulation cannot be viewed in isolation, but must be rather considered in the context of the county's chosen mode of organisation for its police force. The promotion of safety of persons and property is unquestionably at the core of the State's police power, and virtually all state and local governments employ a uniformed police force to aid in the accomplishment of that purpose. Choice of organisation, dress, and equipment for law enforcement personnel is a decision entitled to the same sort of presumption of legislative validity as are state choices designed to promote other aims within the cognizance of the State's police power. Day Brite Lighting, Inc v. Missouri Day Brite Lighting, Inc v. Missouri 342 U.S.421 Day Brite Lighting, Inc v. Missouri Day Brite Lighting, Inc v. Missouri 423: 96 L.Ed.469, 72 S.Ct.405 (1952); Prince v. Massachusetts Prince v. Massachusetts 321 U.S.158, 168170, 88 L.Ed.645, 64 S.Ct.438 (1944); Olsen v. Nebrasks Olsen v. Nebrasks 313 U.S.236246247, 85 L.Ed. 1305, 61 S.Ct.862, 133 A.L.R.1500 (1941). Having recognised in other contexts the wide latitude accorded the government in the “dispatch of its own internal affairs,” Cafe-tela Workers v. Mcelroy Cafe-tela Workers v. Mcelroy 367 U.S.886896, 6 L.Ed. 2d 1230, 81 S.Ct.1743 (1961) we think Suffolk county's police regulations involved here are entitled to similar weight. Thus the question is not, as the Court of Appeals conceived it to be, whether the State can “establish” a “genuine public need” for the specific regulation. It is whether respondent can demonstrate that there is no rational connection between the regulation, based as it is on the county's method of organising its police force, and the promotion of safety of persons and property. It is whether respondent can demonstrate that there is no rational connection between the regulation, based as it is on the county's method of organising its police force, and the promotion of safety of persons and property. United Public Workers v. Mitchell United Public Workers v. Mitchell 330 U.S.75, 100101, 91 L.Ed.754, 67 S.Ct.556 (1947); Jacobson v. Massachusetts Jacobson v. Massachusetts 197 U.S.11, 3031, 3537, 49 L.Ed.643, 25 S.Ct.358 (1905). 25. We think the answer here is so clear that the District Court was quite right in the first instance to have dismissed respondent's complaint. Neither this Court, the Court of Appeals, nor the District Court is in a position to weigh the policy arguments in favour of and against a rule regulating hairstyles as a part of regulations governing a uniformed civilian service. The constitutional issue to be decided by these courts is whether petitioner's determination that such regulations should be enacted is so irrational that it may be branded “arbitrary”, and therefore a deprivation of respondent's “liberty” interest in freedom to choose his own hairstyle. Williamson v. Lee Optical Co. Williamson v. Lee Optical Co. 348 U.S.483, 487488, 99 L.Ed.563, 75 S.Ct.461 (1955) The overwhelming majority of state and local police of the present day are uniformed. This fact itself testifies to the recognition by those who direct those operations, and by the people of the States and localities who directly or indirectly choose such persons, that similarity in appearance of police officers is desirable. This choice may be based on a desire to make police officers readily recognisable to the members of the public, or a desire for the esprit de corps which such similarity is felt to inculcate within the police force itself. Either one Is a sufficiently rational justification for regulations so as to defeat respondent's claim based on the liberty guaranty of the Fourteenth Amendment. 26. The Court of Appeals relied on Garrity v. New Jersey Garrity v. New Jersey 385 U.S. 493, 17 L.Ed. 2d.562, 87 S.Ct.616 (1967), and amicus in its brief in support of respondent elaborates an argument based on the language in Garrity that “policemen, like teachers and lawyers, are not relegated to a watered-down version of constitutional rights.” Id. at 500, 17 L.Ed.2d.562, 87 S.Ct.616. 2d.562, 87 S.Ct.616 (1967), and amicus in its brief in support of respondent elaborates an argument based on the language in Garrity that “policemen, like teachers and lawyers, are not relegated to a watered-down version of constitutional rights.” Id. at 500, 17 L.Ed.2d.562, 87 S.Ct.616. Garrity, of course, involved the protections afforded by the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution as made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment. Malloy v. Hogan Malloy v. Hogan 378 U.S.1, 12 L.Ed. 2d.653, 84 S.Ct.1489 (1884). Certainly its language cannot be taken to suggest that the claim of a member of a uniformed civilian service based on the “liberty” interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment must necessarily be treated for constitutional purposes the same as a similar claim by a member of the general public. 27. The regulation challenged here did not violate any right guaranteed to respondent by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and the Court of Appeals was therefore wrong in revesing the District Court's original judgment dismissing the action. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed. 28. Mr. Justice Stevens took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. 29. MR. Justice Powell, concurring. I concur in the opinion of the Court and write to make clear that, contrary to the concern expressed in the dissent, I find no negative implication in the opinion with respect to a liberty interest within the Fourteenth Amendment as to matters of personnel appearance. See Poe v. Ullman Poe v. Ullman 367 U.S.497, 541543, 6 L.Ed.2d.989, 81 S.Ct.1752 (1961) (Harlan, J. dissenting). When the State has an interest in regulating one's personal appearance, as it certainly does in this case there must be a weighing of the degree of intringement of the individual's liberty interest against the need for the regulation, This process of analysis justifies the application of a reasonable regulation to a uniformed police force that would be an impermissible intrusion upon liberty in a different context. 30. Mr. justice Marshall, with whom Mr. Justice Brennan joins, dissenting.” 31. In the result, the writ petition is dismissed. No costs. Petition dismissed.