JUDGMENT : K.P. Mohapatra, J. - In this revision the order passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Bhubaneswar maintaining the conviction and sentence of the Petitioner under Sections 448 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code (I.P.C. for short) has been challenged. 2. The prosecution case is that there is a temple and a residential building locally known as Talabangala on plot No. 2336 appertaining to Khata No. 1810 in the old city of Bhubaneswar. Deity Shri Balunkeswar is enshrined in the temple. The entire plot is recorded in the record-of-rights in the name of Lord Lingaraj, the presiding deity Bhubaneswar. The Trust Board constituted under the provisions of Section 27 of the Orissa Hindu Religious Endowments Act (for short, the 'O.H.R.E. Act') in respect of the endowment of Lord Lingaraj is in management of all the properties movable and immovable, belonging to the said deity including the disputed property. Seva Puja of deity Shri Balunkeswar Dev is performed in the temple and the residential building was let out to Narasingha Rao and Rama Chandra Das on monthly rent for residential purpose. When they vacated the residential building, the Petitioner forcibly occupied the same and the occupation disturbed the Seva Puja of the deity. Therefore, the members of the Trust Board approached him to vacate the disputed property. But the Petitioner abused and threatened to assault them. Therefore, the President of the Trust Board (P.W. 1) submitted F.I.R. (Ext. 1) at Bhubaneswar Police Station on 7-9-1980 on the basis of which investigation commenced resulting in a charge-sheet against the Petitioner for having committed offences under Sections 448 and 506 IPC. 3. Although the plea of the Petitioner before the courts below was denial simpliciter of his complicity with the offences, he was charged with, yet it appears from the records, particularly his evidence during trial as a defence witness that he has acquired the disputed property by way of lease from Lord Lingaraj Temple Administration with the sanction of the Commissioner of Hindu Religious Endowments, Orissa on payment of Salami. 4. The learned Judicial Magistrate, who tried the case, accepted the prosecution case and found the Petitioner guilty of both the offences and accordingly convicted him. For the offence u/s 448, I.P.C. he sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one month and for offence u/s 506, I.P.C. sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year. 4. The learned Judicial Magistrate, who tried the case, accepted the prosecution case and found the Petitioner guilty of both the offences and accordingly convicted him. For the offence u/s 448, I.P.C. he sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one month and for offence u/s 506, I.P.C. sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year. On appeal the learned Additional Sessions Judge agreed with the findings recorded by the learned Judicial Magistrate and dismissed the appeal. Thus, the Petitioner has approached this Court in revision against the concurrent findings of the learned courts below. 5. I will begin the discussion by referring to the scope of Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure ('Code' for short). In Md. Rosen and Ors. v. The State 1984 C.L.R. 8, it has been held that although the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court is as wide as the power of the court of appeal, normally the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court is to be exercised in exceptional cases when there is a glaring defect in the procedure or there is manifest error on a point of law which has consequently resulted in flagrant miscarriage of justice. Despite the wide amplitude of the section with regard to the powers of the revisional court the High Court is not expected to act as if it is hearing an appeal. But when the Court finds that an order of conviction has been based on no legal evidence or the findings are illegal unreasonable or perverse, it is within its competence to correct the wrong or injustice done to an accused by setting aside an order of conviction. With this principle as the backdrop I will proceed to examine the different aspects of the case and the contentions raised before me. 6. In the F.I.R. (Ext. 1) dated 7-9-1980, P.W. 1 stated that the Petitioner had forcibly occupied the disputed property a few months back. When he was approached by the members of the Trust Board to vacate the same the Petitioner threatened the members with dire consequences and was prepared to take law into his own hands. He misbehaved and was about to manhandle the members of the Trust Board. P.W. 1 is a member of the Legislative Assembly and is the President of the Trust Board. P.W. 2 was the Manager of the Trust Board. P.Ws. He misbehaved and was about to manhandle the members of the Trust Board. P.W. 1 is a member of the Legislative Assembly and is the President of the Trust Board. P.W. 2 was the Manager of the Trust Board. P.Ws. 3 and 4 are members thereof. P.W. 5 is a Sebayat of Lord Lingaraj. All of them stated in their evidence that the Petitioner was in forcible occupation of the disputed property which had resulted in dislocation of the Seva puja of Shri Balunkeswar Dev installed in the temple within its premises. When the members of the Trust Board approached the Petitioner to peacefully vacate the same, the latter rebuked the members of the Trust Board and threatened to assault them. The cross-examination of these witnesses was scanty and their evidence almost went unchallenged. The Petitioner examined himself in his defence as D.W. 1 and admitted that he was in possession of the suit property including the residential house locally known as Talabangala, but stated that he had acquired the same on payment of Salami of Rs. 6000/- and had paid holding tax of Rs. 3000/- for which he obtained receipts. He also admitted that on 7-10-1980 the prosecution witnesses came to him, but according to version he was threatened by them. It was, however, very peculiar that the Petitioner did not support his plea by production of documents which according to him were in existence. He did not produce any document showing that the disputed property was leased out in his favour of the Lord Lingaraj Temple Administration or the Trust Board, nor did he produce the sanction order of the Commissioner u/s 19 of the O.H.R.E. Act, according permission for such transfer by way of lease, as well as, the documents evidencing payment of Salami and holding tax. As a matter of fact, not a single piece of document was produced by the Petitioner to show that his possession of the disputed property was authurised and not illegal. The aforesaid facts clearly go to prove that the Petitioner having trespassed upon the disputed property was in unauthorised and illegal possession thereof and when he was approached by P.Ws. 1 to 5 to vacate the same, he abused and threatened to assault them. The learned courts below were therefore, justified in recording concurrent findings to the aforesaid effect. The findings are neither unwarranted nor perverse. 1 to 5 to vacate the same, he abused and threatened to assault them. The learned courts below were therefore, justified in recording concurrent findings to the aforesaid effect. The findings are neither unwarranted nor perverse. Therefore, in exercise of revisional jurisdiction the findings to fact cannot be reversed. 7. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner urged that the essential ingredients of an offence u/s 448, namely, criminal intention or mense rea on the part of the Petitioner was not established by the prosecution, inasmuch as the Petitioner had acquired the disputed property from the temple authorities by obtaining previous sanction from the Commissioner of Hindu Religious Endowments. Therefore, his claim to remain in possession thereof was bona fide and not mala fide. For that reasons he cannot be said to have trespassed into the same by Gausing annoyance to the members of the Trust Board who claimed possession thereof on behalf of Lord Lingaraj. Learned Additional Government Advocate repelled the contention by submitting that not a single piece of document has been proved in this case his support of the above claim. 8. I have already referred to above that although the Petitioner claimed in his evidence that there were documents to show acquisition of the disputed property he did not produce and prove the same in the trial court. He did not call for the relevant record from the office of the Commissioner of Hindu Religious Endowments in order to prove that sanction had been accorded by the Commissioner for transfer of the disputed property in favour of the Petitioner u/s 19 of the O.H.R.E. Act. It was stated that some xerox copies were produced and the same were not accepted because, the originals thereof were not produced. Therefore, the trial court refused to accept the xerox copies. If this be so, the trial court was justified in refusing to admit only xerox copies into evidence because, the original documents were neither produced nor shown to him for his satisfaction that they were genuine documents. In this connection reference is to be made to a petition purported to have been made u/s 391 of the Code in this Court. In the petition, a prayer has been made to call for the records of O.J.C. No. 2655 of 1981 for reference at the time of disposal of this criminal revision. In this connection reference is to be made to a petition purported to have been made u/s 391 of the Code in this Court. In the petition, a prayer has been made to call for the records of O.J.C. No. 2655 of 1981 for reference at the time of disposal of this criminal revision. No reasons have been assigned as to why documents from this record were not called for and proved in the trial court or in the court of appeal. No prayer has 'been made in the petition specifying any particular document to be received as additional evidence. By calling for a judicial record, a roving enquiry cannot he made by this Court so as to pick and choose documents to the utter prejudice of the opposite party who at this belated stage shall have, no opportunity to meeting the documents by adducing evidence. This being the position, the petition at this belated stage is not only not in proper form, but also misconceived and the court in exercise of its discretion cannot allow such a petition which is accordingly rejected. 9. One of the essential ingredients of criminal trespass envisaged in Section 441, I.P.C., is intent which must necessarily mean criminal intention with reference to the provisions of the section. In Mathuri and Others Vs. State of Punjab it was held that it is legitimate to think that when Section 441, I.P.C., speaks of entering on property with intent to commit an offence, or to intimidate, insult or annoy any person in possession of the property it speaks of the main intention that may also be present. In order to establish that the entry on property is with the intent to annoy, intimidate or insult it is necessary for the court to be satisfied that causing such annoyance, intimidation or insult is the aim of the entry, that it is not sufficient for that purpose to show merely that the natural consequence of the entry is likely to be annoyance, intimidation or insult, and that this likely consequence is known to the person entering. In deciding whether the aim of the entry is the cause of such annoyance, intimidation or insult, the court has to consider all the relevant circumstances including the presence of knowledge that its natural consequences would be such annoyance, intimidation or insult and including also the probability of something else than the cause of such intimidation insult or annoyance being the dominant intention which prompted the entry. The dictum laid down by the Supreme Court has been followed in subsequent decisions, such as Rash Behari Chatterjee Vs. Fagu Shaw and Others Bali Kisan and 7 Ors. v. The State 34 (1968) C.L.T. 975, Krushna Bhuyan and Ors. v. Gurubari Naik 37 (1971) C.L.T. 121 and Bidyadhar Nayak and two Ors. v. Srimati Dei 1972 (1) C.W.R. 982, to name a few. 10. Ostensibly the Petitioner had no legal tight of entry into the disputed property of which Lord Lingaraj is the owner. Yet, he entered into the property and was in occupation thereof. When asked to vacate peacefully he did not do so. Such conduct on the part of the Petitioner was undoubtedly with the dominant criminal intention of forcible occupation of the disputed property by which annoyance was necessarily caused to the members of the Trust Board, who were looking after the property of Lord Lingaraj. At any rate, in the absence of any document creating any legal right in favour of the Petitioner to hold the disputed property, it cannot but be said that he was actuated by criminal intention of forcibly grabbing the property of Lord Lingaraj. Therefore, the contention of the learned Counsel for the Petitioner that he had no criminal intention and that he acted bona fide having a legal right over the disputed property is untenable. 11. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner contended that there was delay in lodging the F.I.R. (Ext. 1) for the reason of which the prosecution case should be disbelieved. The F.I.R. (Ext. 1) in this case was lodged on 7-9-1980 stating therein that the Petitioner had trespassed into the disputed property since last few months, No specific date of trespass was stated therein except stating that the Petitioner forcibly occupied after the tenants indicated in respect thereof had vacated. Occupation of the disputed property was specifically admitted by the Petitioner in his evidence. Occupation of the disputed property was specifically admitted by the Petitioner in his evidence. He also admitted that on one occasion some of the prosecution witnesses came to him and requested to peacefully vacate the disputed property. If the facts admitted by the Petitioner are as above and substantially tally with the facts stated in the F.I.R. (Ext. 1), I fail to understand how questions of suspicion and disbelief will arise. Therefore, in a case of this nature, even if there might have been delay in lodging the F.I.R. the prosecution case cannot be thrown out as suspicious. In this connection learned Counsel for the Petitioner relied on a decision of the Calcutta High Court reported in Giribala Shau and Another Vs. Prova Misra but it was a case between landlord and tenant and the question of delay had some significance. Therefore, the case can be distinguished on facts. In any view of the matter the contenting is unsupportable. 12. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner lastly contended that the prosecution is barred by limitation by operation of Section 468 of the Code. Section 468 is quoted for easy reference: 468. Bar to taking cognizance after lapse of the period of limitation (1) Except as otherwise provided elsewhere in this Code, no Court shall take cognizance of an offence of the category specified in Sub-section (2) after the expiry of the period of limitation. (2) The period of limitation shall be: (a) six, months, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year; (b) one year, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year; (c) three years if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term exceeding one year' but not exceeding three years. (3) For the purpose of this section, the period of limitation in relation to offences which may be tried together shall be determined with reference to the offences which is punishable with the more severe punishment or as the case may be the most severe punishment. An offence u/s 448 is punishable with imprisonment which may extend to one year. Therefore, the period of limitation for taking cognizance is one year from the date of commission of the offence as provided in Clause (b) of Sub-section (2) of Section 468. As already stated above no specific date was stated in the F.I.R. (Ext. An offence u/s 448 is punishable with imprisonment which may extend to one year. Therefore, the period of limitation for taking cognizance is one year from the date of commission of the offence as provided in Clause (b) of Sub-section (2) of Section 468. As already stated above no specific date was stated in the F.I.R. (Ext. 1) as to when the first act of trespass in respect of the disputed property was committed by the Petitioner, but it was mentioned that he had forcibly occupied the same since last few months prior to the date of the F.I.R., namely, 7-9-1980. For an offence u/s 506, I.P.C., the period of limitation is three years as provided in Clause (c) of Sub-section (2) of Section 468 because, that offence is punishable with imprisonment for two years and which may extend to seven years if threat is to cause death or grievous hurt. The period of limitation being three years, the bar provided in Section 468(2)(c) will not operate. In any view of the matter, by operation of Sub-section (3) of Section 468 for both the offence under Sections 448 and 506 the period of limitation shall be three years as provided under the Section 468(2)(c). Therefore, the argument that cognizance of the offences was barred u/s 468 of 'the' Code cannot be accepted. 13. All the contentions of the learned Counsel having failed, the revision is bound to be dismissed. But looking at the sentence I find that in a case of this nature the sentence of substantive imprisonment is severe. Ends of justice can be served if the Petitioner is sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 500/- (Rupees five hundred) for each of the offences, in default, to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three months each with the further direction that the default sentences shall run concurrently. 14. In the result, the criminal revision is dismissed subject to the modification of sentence. Instead of substantive sentence of imprisonment, the Petitioner is sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 500/- (Rupees Five Hundred) for each of the opffence under Sections 448 and 506, in default, to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three months each with a direction that the default sentences shall run concurrently. Final Result : Dismissed