Judgment A.N. Dikshita, J. 1. THIS appeal arises against the judgment and order dated 15-4-1978 of Sri K. P. Mathur, Special Judicial Magistrate, Allahabad acquitting the accused-respondent of the offence u/Secs.7/16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 as amended upto date. 2. RELEVANT facts, material to the controversy, are that one Sri K. C. Misra and Ale Hasan, Chief Sanitary Inspector and Sanitary Inspector respectively along with two other persons inspected the stall of Om Prakash son of R. P. Saxena at Plaza Canteen, 26 Mahatma Gandhi Road, Allahabad on 7-12-1978 at 4.30 P.M. It was found that for selling/storing and exhibiting for sale salted biscuits, a valid licence as required under law (Rule 50) was not available with him. A complaint, giving rise to Criminal Case No. 666 of 1977 for the breach of rule 50 as framed under Section 23 of Prevention of Food Adulteration Act was filed by Nagar Swasthya Adhikari (Medical Officer Health), Allahabad on 10-12-1976. 3. SUMMONS were issued after filing of the complaint to Om Prakash accused-respondent. The only offence said to have been committed by accused- respondent is non availability of licence for the sale of the salted biscuits etc. 4. THE accused denied the charge. It was stated by him that licence till March, 1976 was available with him and it has been sent for renewal to the concerned authority. Om Prakash was also prosecuted for not possessing licence within the postulates of Sections 298/299 of U. P. Municipalities Act, 1959. This complaint was also filed against Om Prakash as he did not possess the requisite licence as found on inspection on 7-12-1976 at 4.30 at Plaza Canteen. This case was registered as case do. 39/405 of 1977 and was decided by Additional City Magistrate, Allahabad on 12-1-1978. Admittedly a fine was imposed on him for the above; breach of the provisions of U. P. Municipalities Act. 5. IN respect of the complaint under Sedition 7/16 of Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, trial court passed an order dismissing the complaint and acquitting the accused. The premise on which the trial court arrived at the conclusion was that the inspection in respect: of a valid licence was made by the officers of the complainant on 7-12-1976 when a valid licence was not available with Om Prakash. The premise on which the trial court arrived at the conclusion was that the inspection in respect: of a valid licence was made by the officers of the complainant on 7-12-1976 when a valid licence was not available with Om Prakash. He has already been prosecuted and convicted under Sections 298/299 of U. P. Municipalities Act for not possessing the licence which was decided on 18-1-1978. Copy of such order was produced before the trial Court. 6. THE contention that the accused cannot be punished for the second time for the same offence was accepted by the trial court who, after accepting the date, time and place of incident, came to the conclusion that for the same offence for which he has been convicted, he cannot be prosecuted again. Against the judgment and order of trial court dated 15-4-1978 acquitting the accused-respondent the instant appeal has been preferred. 7. LEARNED counsel for the appellant has urged that the trial court erred in law in dismissing the complaint and acquitting the accused. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that no doubt an inspection was made on 7-12-1976 at 4.30 P.M. by the officer of Nagar Mahapalika, Allahabad, it was within the competence of Nagar Mahapalika Adhikari to have instituted the case against the accused-respondent. Admittedly, accused-respondent for not possessing a valid licence was convicted and sentenced to a fine of Rs.20/- for the breach of provisions of Sections 298/ 299 of U. P. Municipalities Act (Act No. 2 of 1916). This power under the provisions of Municipalities Act has been derived under the provisions of Section 577-A of U. P. Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam. Section 577-A of U. P. Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam provides for the continuation of appointments, taxes, budget estimates, assessments etc. It provides for the continuation of the enforcement of U. P. Municipalities Act whereas the provisions are not inconsistent with the provisions of Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam. Sec. 452 of the U. P. Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam provides for the charge of a fees to be fixed by bye-law for any licence, sanction or permission which he is entitled or required to grant by or under this Act. 8. SECTION 298 of U. P. Municipalities Act provides the power to the Board to make bye-laws. Such bye-laws have been enumerated in the list appended to this provision. 8. SECTION 298 of U. P. Municipalities Act provides the power to the Board to make bye-laws. Such bye-laws have been enumerated in the list appended to this provision. SECTION 229 of U. P. Municipalities Act provides the punishment for the infringement of rules and byelaws so framed under the said Act. There appears to be no fallacy for the Board to make bye- laws providing realisation of fees. In case of breach, punishment under SECTION 299 of the said Act is provided. It was thus clear that the provisions of the Municipalities Act aswell as the U. P. Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam provide for the grant of a licence on payment of requisite fees. On the date when the inspection was made by the officer of the Nagar Mahapalika, Allahabad accused-respondent had admittedly no licence for the sale of biscuits with him and thus a breadh was committed for which a complaint under Sections 298/299 of U. P. Municipalities Act read with SECTION 577-A of U. P. Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam was filed and he was convicted and sentenced accordingly. Learned counsel for the appellant has tried to pursuade me that irrespective of the fact that the accused was prosecuted, convicted and sentenced for the breach of Sections 298 and 299 of U. P. Municipalities Act read with Section 577-A of U. P. Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam, still the accused-respondent would be deemed to have committed an offence for the breach of Rule 50 as framed under Section 23 of Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. Rule SO is reproduced hereinafter in extenso so far it is concerned with the controversy of the present case. " 50. No person shall manufacture, sell, stock, distribute or exhibit for sale any of the following articles of food, except under a licence :- f pulses, gram nuts, starches, ssjge, suji, flours, such as maida, besan and articles made out of flour including bakery products. 9. THE complaint allegation is that accused-respondent was found storing and exhibiting for sale biscuit Namkin. Such violation or breach of rule is punishable in second proviso to section 16 (1) of Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. THE sentence provided shall not be less than three months but which may extend to two years and with fine which shall be not less than five hundred rupees. Such violation or breach of rule is punishable in second proviso to section 16 (1) of Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. THE sentence provided shall not be less than three months but which may extend to two years and with fine which shall be not less than five hundred rupees. For the breach of Section 299 of U. P. Municipalities Act or of rule or byelaw, the offender is punishable with fine which may extend to Rs. 500/- and fine of Rs. 25/- per day. 10. THE contention of learned counsel for the appellant is that for breach of Section 298/299, accused-respondent was rightly convicted and sentenced to a fine of Rs. 20/- but that by itself would not clear for his prosecution under Sections 7/16 of Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. In support of his contention, learned counsel for the appellant has placed reliance on Pyare Lal v. New Delhi Municipal Committee reported in Supreme Court on Prevention of Food Adulteration Cases 1951-1975 at page 199. THE facts of that case may not be of much help to the appellant inasmuch as there was no statutory requirements of Section 173 (1) of the Punjab Municipal Act where the Supreme Court found that provisions of Section 23 of the Act and Rule 50 were entirely different. This case is clearly distinguishable as the controversy enveloping the instant case is only a want of valid licence to exhibit and store biscuit Namkin. Learned counsel has urged that powers under Section 298 are regulatory in nature. A licence was obtained and had been sent for renewal. THE compliance to obtain the licence was inherent and the accused-respondent had taken necessary steps. THE enactment of the Prevention of Food. Adulteration Act was in the larger interest of the people and for the preservation of their health. From time to time, there has been a demand for its rigours enforcement and for providing a severe punishment to the: persons who violated its provisions. THE object of the provisions of Section 298 of Municipalities Act aswell as Rule 50 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act may be similar that a licence is a pre-requisite condition. Learned counsel for the accused-respondent has submitted that the breach may be in various enactments but it is confined to the one that licence was not obtained. THE object of the provisions of Section 298 of Municipalities Act aswell as Rule 50 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act may be similar that a licence is a pre-requisite condition. Learned counsel for the accused-respondent has submitted that the breach may be in various enactments but it is confined to the one that licence was not obtained. For not possessing the licence, the accused respondent has already been convicted under Section 299 of U. P. Municipalities Act. This licence is provided under the bye laws as framed under Section 298 of the U. P. Municipalities Act. But no separate authority has been mentioned in the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act which may provide for the grant of licence distinctly to that of a licence as provided under Section 298. 11. THE minimum requirement of rule 50 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act was to possess a licence. This licence is not to be granted under this Act but under Section 298 of UP. Municipalities Act. Authorities may clothe themselves with legal attire for enforcing the laws by the rigors of the Act have to be enforced though not benevolently but having in mind the judicial wisdom. For not possessing the licence, accused respondent has already been convicted. THE requirement of Rule 50 was to possess a licence No doubt the punishment for breach of rule 50 is more deterrent providing for imprisonment while for the breach of provisions of Section 298 only fine is provided. In the instant case, the accused respondent has already been convicted and sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 20/- for the breach of Section 298 12. SUBSTANTIAL justice would not require at this stage with the passage of lime to remand the case back to the trial court. Eleven years have passed. The agony of the accused respondent: which may have vanquished by now, need not be rekindled. The fire is not to be ignited to consume the delinquent person for not possessing license so as to end him into ashes. The attitude of the appellant is reflective of designs to magnify that there is a breach of the provisions of U. P. Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam as well as Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. The provisions of both the statutes are to be applied in unison. The provisions cannot be read against an offender distinctly inviting application of both Acts. The attitude of the appellant is reflective of designs to magnify that there is a breach of the provisions of U. P. Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam as well as Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. The provisions of both the statutes are to be applied in unison. The provisions cannot be read against an offender distinctly inviting application of both Acts. The trial court was rightly more impressed by the fact that for the breach of not possessing the licence, the accused-respondent has already been convicted and sentenced and another trial is not required. The elementary testatment that an accused may not be punished twice for the same offence has rightly impressed the trial court. A corporate body was only expected to set at right the wrong door. A forum for the aggrandisement and harassment of the accused-respondent was chosen in filing two complaints for one and the same breach. This attitude of the appellant was not befetting of a corporate body. The appeal being without any merit deserves to be dismissed. 13. IN the result, the appeal fails and is hereby dismissed. Appeal dismissed.