JUDGMENT - A.D. TATED, J.:---I have heard the judgment delivered by my learned brother. With the utmost respect I am unable to persuade myself on some of the points mentioned therein. Before proceeding to give my reasons I may indicate the points on which I have not been able to agree with my learned brother. Those points are :--- (1) that the ground mentioned in paragraph (g) of the grounds of detention has no tendency to affect the public order, and (2) that the ground mentioned in sub-para (4) of paragraph (h) is irrelevant. According to me, my learned brother has fully stated the facts leading to the passing of the impugned detention order and the scheme of the Maharashtra Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Slumlords, Bootleggers and Drug-offenders Act, 1981 (hereinafter for the sake of brevity referred to as "the Act"). He has also referred to the provisions of sections 2 and 3 of the Act which provide for preventive detention of a bootlegger. If the authorities mentioned in section 3 of the Act are satisfied with respect to any person that with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, it is necessary to do so, it can pass an order directing such person to be detained. The satisfaction on the basis of which section 3 of the Act enables the State Government, a District Magistrate or a Commissioner of Police, as the case may be, to pass an order of detention is the satisfaction of the Government, the District Magistrate or the Commissioner of Police and not the satisfaction of this Court. The Act being one for preventive detention, this Court would not sit in appeal against the impugned order and, therefore, would not go into the question of sufficiency or otherwise of the materials for arriving at the satisfaction by the relevant authority under section 3. The Court would have, however, no hesitation to interfere with such an order if, for instance, it were shown that the exercise of power under section 3 was mala fide or on grounds alien to the Act. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in (Khudiram Das v. The State of West Bengal and others)1, A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 550, lay down that the power of detention is clearly a preventive measure. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in (Khudiram Das v. The State of West Bengal and others)1, A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 550, lay down that the power of detention is clearly a preventive measure. It does not partake in any manner of the nature of punishment. It is taken by way of precaution to prevent mischief to the community. Since every preventive measure is based on the principle that a person should be prevented from doing something which, if left free and unfettered, it is reasonably probable he would do, it must necessarily proceed in all cases, to some extent, on suspicion or anticipation as distinct from proof. Their Lordships at page 556 of the report stated the law thus :--- "This being the nature of the proceeding, it is impossible to conceive how it can possibly be regarded as capable of objective assessment. The matters which have to be considered by the Detaining Authority are whether the person concerned, having regard to his past conduct judged in the light of surrounding circumstances and other relevant material, would be likely to act in a prejudicial manner as contemplated in any of sub-clauses (i), (ii) and (iii) of Clause (1) of sub-section (1) of section 3, and if so, whether it is necessary to detain him with a view to preventing him from so acting. These are not matters susceptible of objective determination and they could not be intended to be judged by objective standards. They are essentially matters which have to be administratively determined for the purpose of taking administrative action. Their determination is, therefore, deliberately and advisedly left by the legislature to the subjective satisfaction of the Detaining Authority which by reason of its special position, experience and expertise would be best fitted to decide them. It must in the circumstances be held that the subjective satisfaction of the Detaining Authority as regards these matters constitutes the foundation for the exercise of the power of the power of detention and the Court cannot be invited to consider the propriety or sufficiency of the grounds on which the satisfaction of the Detaining Authority is based." In the same decision Their Lordships have indicated the areas carved out by the judicial decisions within which the validity of the subjective satisfaction can be subjected to a judicial scrutiny. As already stated, if any of the grounds is alien to the Act, it would vitiate the subjective satisfaction and the order of detention would be bad. In this case we are not concerned with other areas of challenge to the validity of the detention order, and, therefore, it is not necessary to discuss the other areas of challenge to the detention order. 2. The Act has been enacted to curb the antisocial activities of bootleggers which pose a great danger to public health and security. As has been observed by Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in (P.N. Kaushal v. Union of India and others)2, A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 1457, the liquor trade, if left unbridled, is fraught with danger to health, morals, public order and the flow of life without stress or distress. Though there is prohibition law in force in this State, many persons clandestinely carry on the business of illicit liquor and the activities of those persons are prejudicially affecting the public health and even tempo of life. On the effect of liquor on the society, Dr. M.J. Sethna in his book Society and the Criminal, 3rd Edition at page 164 states as follows :--- "Many crimes are caused under the influence of alcohol or drugs. The use of alcohol, in course of time, causes a great and irresistible craving for it. To retain the so-called 'satisfaction' derived from the use of alcohol or drugs, the drunkard or the drug-addict has got to go on increasing the quantities from time to time; such a state of affairs may lead him even to commit thefts or frauds to get the same otherwise. If he gets drunk so heavily that he cannot understand the consequences of his acts he is quite likely to do some harmful act-even an act of homicide. Very often, crimes of violence have been committed in a state of intoxication. Dr. Hearly is of the opinion that complete elimination of alcohol and harmful drug habits would cause a reduction in crime by at least 20 per cent; not only that, but there would also be cumulative effect on the generations to come, by diminishing poverty, improving home conditions and habits of living and environment, and perhaps even an improvement in heredity itself." The above passage has been cited with approval by the Supreme Court in P.N. Kaushal's case (supra). 3. 3. The Act aims at curbing the antisocial activities of the bootleggers which are prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. For passing a detention order against a bootlegger under section 3 of the Act three conditions must be satisfied, namely, (1) it must be established that the person sought to be detained is a bootlegger within the meaning of section 2(b) of the Act, (2) the activities of the bootlegger must be of such a nature which directly or indirectly cause, or are calculated to cause, any harm, danger or alarm or a feeling of insecurity among the general public or any section thereof or grave or widespread danger to life or public health, and (3) that these activities must be carried out when the said person is engaged, or is making preparation for engaging in any of his activities as a bootlegger, namely, distilling, manufacturing, storing, transporting, importing, exporting, selling or distributing any liquor or intoxicating drug or other intoxicants. 4. In the present case the detention order was passed on 30th September, 1985. The petitioner detenu was detained as per the said order on 1st October, 1985 and he was supplied with the grounds of detention and all the materials on the basis of which those grounds were formulated, and it included the statements of witnesses referred to in paragraph 2(h) of the grounds of detention. A reference was made to the Advisory Board on 11th October, 1985. After receiving the opinion of the Advisory Board, the State Government confirmed the order of detention on 26th November, 1985. 5. The grounds appearing in paragraph 2(a) to (f) of the grounds of detention are in respect of the bootlegging activities of the petitionary-detain by himself or through his hirelings. The ground in paragraph 2(g) mentions the bootlegging activities carried on by the petitioner on 13th June, 1985 at about 10 a.m. near Krishna Society at Camp No. 2 in Ulhasnagar. It is mentioned therein that on 13th June, 1985 at about 10 a.m. one Chander Meghrajmal Gwalani and his friend Rajesh Dipchand Bellani went to the liquor den of the petitioner near Krishna Society. At that time one Gool alias Gulab, brother of the petitioner, and his hirelings Ranjit Vishwanath Iyer and Vada alias Raju Viramal Alamchandani were present there. Chander Gwalani and his friend Rajesh Bellani obtained some illicit liquor for drinking. At that time one Gool alias Gulab, brother of the petitioner, and his hirelings Ranjit Vishwanath Iyer and Vada alias Raju Viramal Alamchandani were present there. Chander Gwalani and his friend Rajesh Bellani obtained some illicit liquor for drinking. At that time the petitioner's hirelings, the said Ranjit Iyer and Vada and his brother Gool had a quarrel with Chander Gwalani on account of the dues of the liquor business. The persons mentioned above beat Chander Gwalani with fists, kicks, iron bars, an iron pipe and a hockey stick and as a result thereof three of his teeth came out. The petitioner rushed there and incited his brother Gool and his hirelings to further beat the said Chander Gwalani, and the petitioner also joined them in beating him with fists. On seeing such violence, Chander Gwalani's friend ran away. While the complainant was running away, the petitioner and his brother chased him and beat him with a hockey stick. The matter was reported to the police-station and the case was registered for the offences punishable under sections 323, 324, and 325 read with section 34 I.P.C. The ground in paragraph 2(g) of the grounds of detention further recites that the petitioner's hireling Ranjit Iyer was arrested on 14th June, 1985 and from him a hockey stick and an iron pipe were recovered. Similarly, the petitioner's brother Gool and his another hireling Vada alias Raju were arrested. The petitioner and his brother were prosecuted by submitting a charge-sheet in the Court on 20th August, 1985. 6. The ground mentioned in paragraph 2(h) of the grounds of detention relates to the inquiry into one anonymous application from some social worker of Ulhasnagar. It is mentioned therein that an application was received at the Police-Station, Ulhasnagar, on 20th August, 1985. It was mentioned in that application that the petitioner-detenu carried on illicit liquor business at three places in Ulhasnagar day and night. His liquor business in the Vegetable Market is conducted on open site and incidents of beating often took place and thereby the persons, including women and children, visiting the Vegetable Market were harassed. It is further mentioned that on account of the fear of the petitioner nobody was ready to make complaint against him. His liquor business in the Vegetable Market is conducted on open site and incidents of beating often took place and thereby the persons, including women and children, visiting the Vegetable Market were harassed. It is further mentioned that on account of the fear of the petitioner nobody was ready to make complaint against him. The ground in paragraph 2(h) of the grounds of detention further recites that the petitioner always carries with him four or five bodyguards and in case anyone speaks against him, these persons beat him. It is further mentioned in the said ground that on account of the illicit liquor business of the petitioner it has become impossible for women and children to visit the Vegetable Market. On that application a secret inquiry was made by Deputy Police Inspector K.R. Devde and in that inquiry it was found that the complaints mentioned therein regarding the violence and terrorizing activities of the petitioner were genuine. In the inquiry nobody was ready to openly make statement against the petitioner, but after giving them assurance that their names would not be disclosed to anyone, four persons agreed to make their statements in camera. The other residents refused to make statements even in camera. The ground in paragraph 2(h) of the grounds of detention further recites that the following was the short summary of the statements of four persons mentioned above, and a gist of the statements of those persons denoting them as (a), (b), (c) and (d) has been given. My learned brother has already considered the statements of witnesses (a), (b) and (c) and found that the petitioner was acting as a bootlegger and those activities were connected with his bootlegger and they adversely affected the maintenance of public order, and on this point I fully agree with him. As regards the statement of witness (d) extracted in the ground of detention, my learned brother, agreeing with the learned Counsel for the petitioner, Shri S.R. Chitnis, found that it was irrelevant. On reading the extract from the statement of witness (d) appearing in the grounds of detention, it is clear that witness (d) is also having his vegetable stall on hand cart at the Vegetable Market where the petitioner is carrying on his illicit liquor business. On reading the extract from the statement of witness (d) appearing in the grounds of detention, it is clear that witness (d) is also having his vegetable stall on hand cart at the Vegetable Market where the petitioner is carrying on his illicit liquor business. On 21st August, 1985 while he was conducting his vegetable business on his hand cart, the servants of the petitioner, who were working with him in his business, went to witness (d) and asked him to remove his hand cart from there. He having refused to remove the hand cart saying that it was a vegetable market and he would keep his hand cart there, he was belaboured by the servants of the petitioner and they dragged him to the petitioner. The petitioner asked witness (d) why he did not obey the order of his servants, and so saying he also beat him. The full texts of the statements of witness (a), (b), (c) and (d) referred to in the ground in paragraph (h) of the grounds of detention were made over to the petitioner while serving the grounds of detention on him. After reciting the grounds of detention, including the instances mentioned above, the detaining authority at paragraph 3 of the grounds of detention states that the petitioner stored illicit liquor at the Vegetable Market and near Krishna Society in Ulhasnagar Camp No. 2 and sold it through his hirelings, and while he was such engaged in the bootlegging business he restored to violence and terrorizing activities which were prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, and on the basis of such activities of the petitioner the detaining authority was satisfied that the bootlegging activities of the petitioner were prejudicial to the maintenance of public order in Ulhasnagar Camp No. 2, and, therefore, in order to prevent him from carrying on such activities it was necessary to pass a detention order against him. 7. On reading the grounds of detention, there is no difficulty in finding that the petitioner is a bootlegger and he carried on his bootlegging activities at Ulhasnagar Camp No. 2 at a public place in the Vegetable Market and near Krishna Society. 7. On reading the grounds of detention, there is no difficulty in finding that the petitioner is a bootlegger and he carried on his bootlegging activities at Ulhasnagar Camp No. 2 at a public place in the Vegetable Market and near Krishna Society. The grounds mentioned in paragraph 2(g) and (h) of the grounds of detention also indicate that in the course of his bootlegging activities violence was done to some members of the public who visited the liquor den of the petitioner or who did their lawful business near about the liquor den of the petitioner. 8. The ground appearing in paragraph 2(g) of the grounds of detention indicates that the person visiting the liquor den of the petitioner detenu were manhandled, and the one appearing in paragraph 2(h), in which the gist of the witnesses (a) to (d) is recorded, indicates that the petitioner and his hirelings in the course of the petitioner's business as bootlegger caused violence to the members of the public. The instances appearing in ground 2(h) in the form of gist of the statement of witnesses (a) to (d), according to me, must be read together and on such reading it cannot be said that the competent authority, that is, the Commissioner of Police, Thane, was wrong in arriving at the satisfaction required to be formed for passing order under section 3 of the Act. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in (Arun Kumar Ghosh v. The State of West Bengal)5, A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 1366, while repelling the contention that the Ground No. 1 contained both extraneous and irrelevant matters which vitiated the impugned order in that case, at pages 1368-69 of the report observed as follows : "It could perhaps be urged that becoming a member of the Action Squad of a party or even attempting to prevent a mid-term election from being held would be activities which, taken by themselves, might not fall under Clause (d) of section 3(2), and therefore, would be irrelevant for the purpose of reaching the subjective satisfaction under section 3(1). But the grounds must be read as a whole and not in parts, one isolated from the rest. But the grounds must be read as a whole and not in parts, one isolated from the rest. If read as a whole, it is perfectly clear that while volunteering to become a member of the Action Squad, the petitioner also offered to supply guns and ammunition to carry out the objectives resolved upon in that meeting, which frankly were to remove those who came in the way of the party by killing them with firearms and ammunition, which the petitioner offered to supply. The other objective was to prevent the mid-term election, particularly in Shibpur area. That was sought to be achieved by raids on educational institutions, post offices, police camps and other Government offices and by killings jotdedars businessmen, police personnel etc., and creating by such activities such confusion and chaos that holding of the election would become impossible. It is clear, thus, that the elimination of those who carried on propaganda against the interests of the party and preventing the election from being held were to be achieved by means of killings with guns and ammunition which the petitioner volunteered to supply and by destroying educational institutions, Government offices. Police camps and thereby creating disorder, in Shibpur area, particularly, so that, no election could possibly be held. Read as a whole, it is impossible to find any irrelevant or extraneous matter mixed up with relevant matter in Ground No. (1)." In the present case the ground mentioned in paragraph 2(h) of the grounds of detention consists of the inquiry into the anonymous application received by the Ulhasnagar Police-Station on 20th August, 1985. The inquiry papers were placed before the Detaining Authority, and the Detaining Authority after considering the statements of the witnesses recorded in the inquiry was satisfied about the truth of the allegations made therein against the petitioner. As already stated, a gist of the statements of the four witnesses was given in the ground mentioned in paragraph 2(h) and the full texts of the statements were supplied to the petitioner while serving him with the grounds of detention and other material. As already stated, a gist of the statements of the four witnesses was given in the ground mentioned in paragraph 2(h) and the full texts of the statements were supplied to the petitioner while serving him with the grounds of detention and other material. The learned Counsel for the respondents, Smt. R.P. Desai, contended that the statement of witness (d) supplied to the petitioner, and which formed part of the grounds of detention, would clearly show that the petitioner was carrying on the bootlegging activities and the incident dated 21st August, 1985 wherein the witness was beaten by the petitioner and his servants took place during the course of his bootlegging activities. The learned Counsel for the petitioner-detenu, Shri Chitnis, made (sic) over the true copy of the statement of witness (d) supplied to him by the Competent Authority. On reading the full text of the statement of the witness (d), it cannot be said that the incident dated 21st August, 1985 was irrelevant for arriving at the satisfaction required to be arrived at by the competent authority for passing an order under section 3 of the Act. It is being urged by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the statement of witness (d) supplied to him by the competent authority could not be looked into and the relevancy or otherwise of the incident dated 21st August, 1985 has to be determined only on the basis of the gist of that statement given by the competent authority in the grounds of detention. The statement of witness (d) was supplied to the petitioner alongwith the grounds of detention and it formed part and parcel of the grounds of detention. Only a gist of that statement was given in paragraph 2(h)(4) of the grounds of detention. When the petitioner contends that the grounds mentioned in paragraph 2(h)(4) was irrelevant, as it was not mentioned therein that witness (d) was manhandled and his handcart was overturned by the petitioner while he was engaged in his bootlegging activities, I do not see any legal impediment in referring to the full text of the statement of witness (d) supplied to the petitioner while serving the grounds of detention on him, it being part and parcel of the grounds of detention. The Detaining Authority while passing the order of detention has considered the statements of those witnesses and a gist of their statements only was given in paragraph 2(h) of the grounds of detention, and, therefore, if there is any doubt about the relevancy of the incidents mentioned therein, the full text of the statement can always be looked into. According to me, even without reading the full text of the statement of witness (d), from the gist appearing in paragraph 2(h)(4) of the grounds of detention, it can be very well gathered that the violence on witness (d) was mounted by the petitioner and his servants while they were engaged in their bootlegging activities. If the statement of witness (d), which the Detaining Authority has considered while forming the requisite satisfaction for passing an order under section 3 of the Act, is perused, there can be no room for saying that the incident appearing at paragraph 2(h)(4) of the grounds of detention wherein witness (d) was manhandled by the petitioner and his servants, had no relevance with the petitioner's bootlegging activities. Consequently, I reject the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that paragraph 2(h)(4) of the grounds of detention regarding the incident dated 21st August, 1985 is irrelevant and on that account the subjective satisfaction of the competent authority is vitiated. 9. As regards the grounds at paragraph 2(g) of the grounds of detention. It cannot be said that it did not have relevance to the maintenance of public order. The petitioner and his hirelings during the course of their bootlegging activities beat the persons mentioned therein. The petitioner was carrying on his bootlegging activities at the open place, and on flimsy grounds the two persons mentioned in the said ground were seriously beaten by the petitioner and his hirelings. It cannot be said that the said incident had no relevance to the maintenance of public order. The petitioner was carrying on his bootlegging activities at the open place, and on flimsy grounds the two persons mentioned in the said ground were seriously beaten by the petitioner and his hirelings. It cannot be said that the said incident had no relevance to the maintenance of public order. As has been held by the Supreme Court in (Ram Bali Rajbhar v. The State of West Bengal and others)4, A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 623 at p. 626, we have to be careful to avoid substituting our own opinion about what is enough for the subjective satisfaction of the Detaining Authorities with which interference could be justified only if it is clear that no reasonable person could possibly be satisfied about the need to detain on the grounds given, in which case the detention would be in excess of the powers to detenu. The required satisfaction must have reference to a need to prevent what is anticipated from the detain. Their Lordships at pages 628-9 of the report stated the law thus :--- "On a Habeas Corpus petition, what has to be considered by the Court is whether the detention is prima facie legal or not, and not whether the Detaining Authorities have wrongly or rightly reached a satisfaction on every question of fact. Courts have, no doubt, to zealously guard the personal liberty of the citizen and to ensure that the case of a detenu is justify and impartially considered and dealt with by the detaining authorities and the Advisory Board. But, this does not mean that they have to or can rightly and properly assume either the duties cast upon the Detaining Authorities and Advisory Boards by the law of preventive detention or function as Courts of Appeal on questions of fact. But, this does not mean that they have to or can rightly and properly assume either the duties cast upon the Detaining Authorities and Advisory Boards by the law of preventive detention or function as Courts of Appeal on questions of fact. The law of preventive detention, whether we like it or not, is authorised by our Constitution presumably because it was foreseen by the Constitution -makers that there may arise occasions in the life of the nation when the need to prevent citizens from acting in ways which unlawfully subvert or disrupt the bases of an established order may outweigh the claims of personal liberty." Considering the grounds of detention appearing at paragraph 2(g) and (h) in the light of the above law laid down by the Supreme Court, the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner-detenu that ground (g) and the ground appearing at paragraph 4 of ground (h) of the grounds of detention were irrelevant for passing a detention order under the Act, cannot be accepted. 10. It takes me to consider whether the bootlegging activities of the petitioner-detenu mentioned in the grounds of detention are directly or indirectly causing, or are calculated to cause, any harm, danger or feeling of insecurity among the general public or any section thereof or widespread danger to life or public health. The activities of a bootlegger must have been prejudicial to the maintenance of public order and if the competent authority is so satisfied, then, and then alone, an order under section 3(1) of the Act can be passed by the competent authority. This Court had occasion to consider this aspect in (Danial John Salvaraj v. The Commissioner of Police, Pune and State)5, Criminal Writ Petition No. 400 of 1982, decided on 2nd and 3rd September, 1982 by Dharmadhikari and Joshi, JJ. Taking into consideration the observations of the Supreme Court in (Arun Ghosh v. State of West Bengal)6, A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1228, it was observed that as to whether a particular activity affects the maintenance of public order or not must obviously depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. It is further observed that it is the gravity and magnitude of the activities which is relevant for deciding the question as to whether the activities of the detenu are prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. It is further observed that it is the gravity and magnitude of the activities which is relevant for deciding the question as to whether the activities of the detenu are prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. At paragraph 5 of the decision it is observed :--- "The question as to whether a particular activity had a nexus with the bootlegging or with the maintenance of public order must obviously depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case and no general rule can be laid down in that behalf." 11. In the present case from the grounds of detention fully discussed above, it is amply clear that even tempo of life in the vicinity of the places, where the petitioner carried on his bootlegging activities, was not only disturbed but women and children were finding it difficult to visit the Vegetable Market. Therefore, taking into consideration the cumulative effect and potentialities of the activities of the detenu, in the present case it can safely be said that there was enough material before the Detaining Authority to come to the conclusion that the petitioner's activities were prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. 12. Consequently, I find that there is no legal infirmity in the impugned detention order and I would, therefore, discharge the rule. P.C.: The papers be placed before the learned Chief Justice for further hearing in accordance with Rule 7 of Chapter XXVIII of the Appellate Side Rules read with section 392 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. Rule discharged. -----