Judgment :- 1. The petitioners and respondents (3) to (6) were Junior Agricultural Officers GAO); and the petitioners were senior in that cadre. Respondents (3) to (6) were however preferred for 'promotion' to the next higher post of District Agricultural Officer/ Asst. Director (DAO) on the ground that they were qualified within the meaning of Ext. P9, while the petitioners were not. The challenge is to the promotion given to the respondents and also to the provision in Ext. P9 whereby a higher minimum qualification is fixed for the post of DAO. 2. Ext. P9 stipulates that vacancies in the cadre of District Agricultural Officers are to be filled up by transfer from the category of Junior Agricultural Officers (formerly known as Agricultural Assistants) having a degree or diploma in Agriculture from a recognised university. Respondents (3) to (6) are graduates in Agriculture, while the petitioners do not have a degree or diploma in Agriculture. Shorn of details, the respondents were promoted because they were qualified as per Ext. P9, and the petitioners were not. 3. The contention of the petitioners, in substance, is that fixation of a higher qualification for the higher post of DAO is opposed to the equality provisions of Art.14 and Art.16 of the Constitution. Instead of putting it so bluntly, they try to use the familiar language of decided cases taking the view that when different groups of employees with different qualifications are brought together to form an integrated class with common seniority etc., some among them cannot thereafter be separately classified on the basis of qualifications or source, and preferred for promotion to higher posts. The very circumstance that the petitioners, without degree or diploma in Agriculture were considered good for being grouped with the respondents for appointment to the post of JAO, it is contended, implies a recognition that they are equal to graduates or diploma holders in Agriculture considered suitable for promotion to the cadre of DAO. 4. Support for the above proposition is sought to be found from a passing observation of the Supreme Court in Mohd. Shujat AIi v. Union of India (AIR. 1974 SC. 1631). 4. Support for the above proposition is sought to be found from a passing observation of the Supreme Court in Mohd. Shujat AIi v. Union of India (AIR. 1974 SC. 1631). That observation, in paragraph (28) of the judgment, was in the following terms: "But where graduates and non-graduates are both regarded as fit and, therefore, eligible for promotion, it is difficult to see bow, consistently with the claim for equal opportunity, any differentiation can be made between them by laying down a quota of promotion for each and giving preferential treatment to graduates over non-graduates in the matter of fixation of such quota. The result of fixation of quota of promotion for each of the two categories of Supervisors would be that when a vacancy arises in the post of Assistant Engineer, which, according to the quota is reserved for graduate Supervisors, a non-graduate Supervisor cannot be promoted to that vacancy, even if he is senior to all other graduate Supervisors and more suitable than they. His opportunity for promotion would be limited only to vacancies available for non-graduate Supervisors. That would clearly amount to denial of equal opportunity to him". A careful examination of the whole decision would however show that what the Court was attempting to point out was that the rules in question themselves recognised that both graduates and non-graduates were good for promotion to the higher cadre and that in view of this recognition of equality by the rule itself, a higher quota could not be ear-marked for the graduates. But the operative portion of the judgment also shows that the above principle was not applied to the facts of that case, because there was no evidence to show that the graduates and non-graduates concerned had really been fused into an integrated class. 5. Shujat Ali (AIR. 1974 SC 1631) and a few other cases dealing with similar questions was considered by me in George v. State of Kerala (1983 KLT. 746); and I am unable to accept the suggestion of counsel that two other judges of this Court have made a different approach to the problem, in Rajan v. State (1983 KLT. 878) and Pushpadharan v. Food Corporation (1983 KLT. 987). 746); and I am unable to accept the suggestion of counsel that two other judges of this Court have made a different approach to the problem, in Rajan v. State (1983 KLT. 878) and Pushpadharan v. Food Corporation (1983 KLT. 987). Be that as it may, what Shujat Ali did was only to hold, on an interpretation of the rule there involved, that graduates and non-graduates had to be treated as equals in all respects, in the matter of promotion to a higher post, when the rule itself recognised that both groups were qualified. The decision did not over-rule earlier decisions of the Supreme Court consistently taking the view that superior qualification is always a relevant consideration for formulating rules of promotion to higher posts. As noticed in paragraph (28) of the judgment in Shujat Ali itself: "A very similar question arose in AIR. 1974 SC.1 where a rule which provided that only degree holders in the cadre of Assistant Engineers shall be entitled to be considered for promotion to the next higher cadre of Executive Engineers and diploma holders shall not be eligible for such promotion, was challenged as violative of the equal opportunity clause. This Court repelled the challenge holding that "though persons appointed directly and by promotion were integrated into a common class of Assistant Engineers, they could, for the purposes of promotion to the carde of Executive Engineers, be classified on the basis of educational qualifications" and "the rule providing that graduates shall be eligible for such promotion to the exclusion of diploma holders" was not obnoxious to the fundamental guarantee of equality and equal opportunity." More positively, the Court observed (in the same paragraph): "It may be perfectly legitimate for the administration to say that having regard to the nature of the functions and duties attached to the post, for the purpose of achieving efficiency in public service, only degree holders in engineering shall be eligible for promotion and not diploma or certificate holders That is what happened in AIR. 1974 S.C.1 and a somewhat similar position also obtained in AIR.1973 SC. 1974 S.C.1 and a somewhat similar position also obtained in AIR.1973 SC. 811." At the risk of repetition, therefore, it must be said that fixation of a higher quota for promotion for one among two groups held eligible for promotion to a higher post may, under certain circumstances, be considered as offending Art.14 and 16, but it can never be said, nor has it ever been said as a general proposition, that prescribing a higher qualification for a higher post is discriminatory, solely because such higher qualification is not necessary for the lower post. 6. Counsel for the petitioners reminded roe that Courts are becoming more and more activist, that the horizon of Art.14 and 226 has ever been expanding, and that I should be bold enough to come down heavily on mini-classifications and micro distinctions, so that candidates belonging to the comparatively lower strata of the society who were unable to take a degree or equivalent qualification because of penury or poverty, should, in the interests of justice, be encouraged to aspire for higher posts in the public services. For a moment, I was tempted to give serious consideration to this line of argument; after all, judges also wield some kind of power, and every welder of power thirsts for more. But Judges are also supposed to be trained to resist such temptations and to confine themselves to the bounds of their own territory. Where a competent authority has fixed the minimum qualification for a higher post, to be filled up by promotion from lower posts, the courts cannot, without anything more, abrogate to themselves the jurisdiction to refix it by applying their own standards. That would be usurpation, and judicial sympathy would be a poor substitute for efficiency. I therefore decline to interfere with Ext. P9 and the orders of promotion in question. Original Petition dismissed. No costs. Dismissed.