Judgment :- 1. What is impugned is Ext.P14 order of Government, passed under Clause. (14) of the Kerala Land Utilisation Order, 1967 upholding the Collector's decision to refuse permission to the petitioner to convert her 130-acre cardamom plantation into a coffee plantation. Under Clause.2(b) of the Land Utilisation Order cardamom and coffee are both food crops; and Clause.6(1) provides that where a land was being used for cultivating one kind of food crop continuously for three years before the commencement of the Order, its holder shall not use it for cultivation of another crop "except under and in accordance with the terms of a written permission given by the Collector". And the Explanation added to the sub-clause clarifies that removal of tree growth, whether partial or total, on any land cultivated with cardamom shall be deemed to be an attempt to utilise the land for purposes other than cardamom cultivation. Clause (14) of the Order provides that the State Government shall have the power to call for the acts and proceedings of the Collector "in any case under this Order" and pass such orders thereon as they deem fit. The heading of the clause refers to this power as "revision". 2. The petitioner's case has a short history; but before attempting to briefly narrate the same, I should say that even though many reliefs are prayed for in the writ petition, the only one pressed before me at the hearing was for quashing Ext. P14. And the main ground urged was that the opinion of the Cardamom Board on which Government relied in Ext. P14 was obtained from a report given by the Board after an inspection of the estate by one of its, officers, without notice to the petitioner. 3. Ext.P1 is the petitioner's application for permission, filed before the Collector under clause.(6), and it makes mention of only two grounds: (i) because of cutting of trees from the area surrounding the estate by other people, climatic conditions have changed, reducing the cardamom yield of the petitioner; and (ii) an attempt to plant the area with "Nelliyampathy variety of cardamom" also failed because of the high altitude of the locality in question (2400 ft.). In short, cardamom cultivation had become unproductive or unprofitable, and it was therefore proposed to replant the area with coffee (involving of course cutting and removal of a major portion of the tree growth). In short, cardamom cultivation had become unproductive or unprofitable, and it was therefore proposed to replant the area with coffee (involving of course cutting and removal of a major portion of the tree growth). It appears that the petitioner had earlier approached the Cardamom Board for a certificate, but was informed that the Board's comments would be given to the State Government when called for. 4. Ignoring other details which are not material for the present, the Collector rejected the petitioner's application by Ext.P8 order dated 26-11-1977. The relevant part of Ext. P8 reads: "The Tahsildar, N. Whined who has Inspected the land has reported that the contention of the petitioner that all the surrounding areas have been cleared and that this has resulted in the change of climate is not fully correct. He has reported that cardamom is coming up well in the neighbouring estate. It is also reported that cardamom plants had come up well in the plantation also and its growth is not steady due to the failure of the petitioner to carry out agricultural operation at proper time. The petitioner has not produced any technical expert opinion that the soil and climate of the area are unsuitable for cardamom cultivation. The letter dated 14-10-1976, from the Junior Laison Officer. Coffee Board, Mananloddy only says that the land is suitable for Robusla variety of coffee. It does not serve to arrive at a conclusion that the cardamom cannot be cultivated there. But on the other hand, according to the report of the Divisional Forest Officer, Special Division, Tellicherry, a portion of Sy. No. 88/1 Al comprising of vested forests are marked for assignment has a prescribed crop pattern of cardamom and tapioca. There are valuable timber trees in the plantations. If the cardamom plantation are to be converted into coffee estate, the entire area will have to be clear felled first. The Divisional Forest Officer who also inspected the land has reported that clear felling on such a vast area will create problem of sudden exposure which will result in drier conditions in addition to soil erosion. He has therefore raised the department's objection to clear felling the area for the purpose of conversion. In the light of the above position. I do not consider that this is a fit case for granting permission to convert the existing cardamom plantation into Coffee plantation. He has therefore raised the department's objection to clear felling the area for the purpose of conversion. In the light of the above position. I do not consider that this is a fit case for granting permission to convert the existing cardamom plantation into Coffee plantation. In the circumstances, permission is declined." 5. The petitioner filed a "revision" before Government, against Ext.P8, on 15-12-1977. A copy of the same is not produced, but Ext.P9 dated 9-3-1978 is copy of a supplementary representation made by her in the same connection. And in this representation, the petitioner had complained that the Collector had failed to call for the remarks of the Cardamom Board before rejecting her application. Government rejected the revision (as also the contentions advanced in Ext.P9) by Ext.P10 order dated 15-7-1978. It is unnecessary to go into the details of this order for reasons which will presently become clear, but it is interesting to notice that one of the points the petitioner had urged in revision (at least as it was understood by Government) was that "the neighbouring cardamom plantations were thriving because they did not use Mysore variety." 6. Against Ext.P10, the petitioner filed Ext.P11 "review", but one of the points urged in paragraph.(4) of the petition, was that "the Kerala Land Utilisation Order, 1967 does not contemplate for the examination of the Cardamom Board in exercising power under R.6 and hence the order of the Government based on non-receipt of the report of the Cardamom Board calls for consideration." The review also was of course rejected as per Ext.P12, as there was no provision at all for review; and the petitioner then approached this Court with OP No. 401/79, disposed of by judgment dated 22-10-1980, and evidenced by Ext.P13. The prayers in the OP were to quash Exts.P8, P10 and P12. Khalid J. (as he then was) upheld Ext.P12, but quashed Ext.P10 and directed the Government to re-examine the matter after obtaining the opinion of the Cardamom Board. 7. The said course was adopted by this Court because at that stage the contention urged on behalf of the petitioner was that Government had a duty, before rejecting her application, to get the comments of the Cardamom Board as to whether the land was good at ail for cultivation of cardamom. This contention was evidently contrary to the one she had taken in Ext. This contention was evidently contrary to the one she had taken in Ext. P11 (as extracted in para 6 above) but S.13(2) of the Cardamom Act, 1963 had apparently influenced this Court in giving the directions in question. After referring to the provision of the aforesaid sub-section, Ext.P13 judgment had proceeded to state: "It is submitted that cardamom Board has a statutory duty to ascertain the productive capacity of the estate. It was for this purpose that the application was made, but the cardamom board rejected the application stating that no such opinion could be given and it would be given only to the Government when the matter was referred to them. It is sub-milled that if the Cardamom Board bad issued a certificate one way or the other, Ext.P10 order would not have been passed by the Government in the manner it is now passed." His lordship further observed: "The Government dismissed the appeal on the ground that the Cardamom Board had not given any opinion. It was easy for the government, in the circumstances of the case, when the Cardamom Board had declined to inspect the property and to report about its production capacity, to get a report from the said Board before passing the order in question. Since the rejection of the appeal is based solely on this, viz., the absence of proof that this area is unfit for cultivation of cardamom, the petitioner's case has to be re-considered after obtaining the necessary report from the Cardamom Board." In view of the above considerations, Khalid J. thought the Government should call for "the opinion of the Cardamom Board about the productive capacity of the land"; in fact, Ext.P10 was quashed "for the limited purpose of considering the opinion of the Cardamom Board as provided in S.13(2) of the Cardamom Act, 1965", and for passing fresh orders in the light of such opinion. The petitioner was also to bear the costs of the inspection to be conducted by the Board officials. 8. In pursuance of Ext.P13 Government wrote to the Chairman of the Board, on 17-2-1971, requesting for its "opinion about the productive capacity of the land in question". Copies of the revision petition and of Ext.P13 judgment were also forwarded to the Board. 8. In pursuance of Ext.P13 Government wrote to the Chairman of the Board, on 17-2-1971, requesting for its "opinion about the productive capacity of the land in question". Copies of the revision petition and of Ext.P13 judgment were also forwarded to the Board. A letter was also written on the same day to the petitioner (See P. 27 of the Government file) informing her about the communication to the Cardamom Board, and advising her that she could contact the Board for further information regarding the inspection (though the petitioner would contend that she bad never received it). An Asst. Director of the Board inspected the estate in question on 11-3-81 and reported that the productive capacity of the land was satisfactory for growing cardamom, if proper attention was given to cultivation, shade and management practices. As the main controversy is about want of notice before the inspection, and as counsel for the Cardamom Board suggested that there is intrinsic evidence in the Asst. Director's report that the inspection was carried out in the presence of the petitioner's agent or agents, the following part of the report may perhaps be relevant: "It is reported that the settlors enter into the area for collecting firewood etc. and even by strict vigilance it is impossible to control disturbance of the forest system as well as to protect the cardamom crop then and there out of theft. As the deforestation and settlement do not allow cardamom to thrive well in the normal circumstances, the owner thinks to remove all tree growth and grow dadaps for using as shade for coffee so that there may not be any threat from the settlors to the shade required for coffee cultivation. No doubt that is in the interest of a planter who is not particular with growing cardamom. If there is a will to maintain the cardamom that can also be done with protecting (providing?) a belt round the plantation for keeping up cardamom inside with proper care and management...." The report of the Asst. Director was examined and approved by the Chairman of the Board, and a communication dated 7-4-81 was duly forwarded to Government, embodying the opinion of the Board. (The letter is available at page 39 of the Govt. file). Director was examined and approved by the Chairman of the Board, and a communication dated 7-4-81 was duly forwarded to Government, embodying the opinion of the Board. (The letter is available at page 39 of the Govt. file). And as the limited purpose of remitted as per Ext.P13 was for examining the Board's opinion about productivity, Government found no difficulty in passing Ext.P14 order on 26-6-82, again declining to interfere with the Collector's order. 9. As I said, the principal question now to be decided is whether Ext.P14 should be quashed for the reason that it is based on a report from the Cardamom Board, made after inspection of the estate without notice to the petitioner. On behalf of the respondents it is contended that after Government's letter dated 17-2-81 addressed to the petitioner and referred to earlier, it was up to her to enquire and find out as to when the inspection was going to be held, if she thought her personal presence on the occasion was necessary. The inspection was only for a rough assessment of the productive capacity of the land, in the context of a complaint that the land and/or the climate had become unsuitable, and that even if she had been served with a notice, the petitioner could have contributed very little to the outcome. The inspection was not done under the provisions of any statute, rule or order requiring the inspecting officer to issue notice. S.13(2) of Cardamom Act also did not require any notice; in fact the sub-section only enabled the Board officers to "visit" an estate "at any time" to ascertain its productive capacity, as different from a local inspection of the kind contemplated in the Civil Procedure Code. At any rate, it is suggested that the representatives of the petitioner were present during inspection and the report of the Asst. Director had duly taken note of all that they had said or suggested. 10. A complaint that something has been done against the rights, interests or reasonable expectations of a person ordinarily arises when a decision is rendered, a determination is made or some other kind of function is exercised where elements of adjudication are involved. (The third kind of function referred to above is usually called an 'administrative decision'). 10. A complaint that something has been done against the rights, interests or reasonable expectations of a person ordinarily arises when a decision is rendered, a determination is made or some other kind of function is exercised where elements of adjudication are involved. (The third kind of function referred to above is usually called an 'administrative decision'). Want of notice is thus part of a complaint that the rules of natural justice or of fair play in action are not observed in a decision-making process. The inspection by the Asst. Director of the Cardamom Board in the instant case was not in connection with the exercise of any such function by him, or by the Board. This Court, in its wisdom, had thought that the Board could be -trusted to give impartial or expert opinion about the productive capacity of the petitioner's land, about which a "dispute" had arisen between her and the Collector in the context of the latter's exercise of power under Clause.6(1) of the Land Utilisation Order. The'dispute' had to be resolved by the Collector himself, as the competent statutory authority, in the first instance, subject to such supervision as Government could or would exercise under Clause. (14). What is to be noticed is that the lis, if any, was not between the Cardamom Board and the petitioner with adjudicatory power or responsibility vested in the Board; it was between the petitioner on the one hand, and the Collector or the State, on the other, and which the latter alone had power to decide. On general principles, and having due regard to the limited nature of the function which was being exercised by the Board, it cannot be said that any obligation was cast on the Board or its officials, as part of the audi alteram partem rule, to issue a notice to the petitioner before making the inspection and the report. Relevant statutory provisions also did not require issue of such a notice. 11. Clause.6(1) of the Land Utilisation Order speaks of grant of "permission" by the Collector. Relevant statutory provisions also did not require issue of such a notice. 11. Clause.6(1) of the Land Utilisation Order speaks of grant of "permission" by the Collector. Dealing with grant of permission by the District Magistrate under S.16 of the Telegraph Act, a Full Bench of this Court had occasion to point out, in Mammoo v. State of Kerala (1979 KLT 801) that such a function could not strictly be regarded as adjudicatory, involving collection of evidence and declaring rights of parties; what was really involved was only exercise of discretion, after a 'ministerial enquiry". In a recent decision (OP 5497/82 decided on 8-8-86) arising under the tame provision, I had referred to the Report of the Committee on Ministers' powers (in Great Britain) and pointed out that according to the Committee, such administrative determinations were not required to be preceded by procedural forms known to courts of law. Even according to the latest doctrines of administrative law and natural justice, as understood and applied by the English Courts, a body exercising powers of a merely advisory, deliberative, investigatory or conciliatory character, or which do not have legal effect until confirmed by another body, or involve only the making of preliminary decisions, will not normally be held to be acting in a judicial capacity requiring observance of the rules of natural justice. Where an enquiry or inspection by one 'agency is merely a stage in the process of arriving at an administrative decision by another, the former is normally granted a wide latitude in deciding the means it could adopt for informing itself; the rules of fair-play in action are seldom attracted to such a situation, if only for the reason that no "action" is involved so far as the first agency is concerned. The Cardamom Board or its Asst. Director was exercising, at the most, only an investigatory or advisory function, when it forwarded a report to the Government which alone had the power to ultimately decide the question in dispute. 12. The extract from the Asst. Director's report reproduced in paragraph. (8) above also suggests that his inspection was held in the presence of the petitioner's agents or employees, if at all such presence had to be secured. 13. 12. The extract from the Asst. Director's report reproduced in paragraph. (8) above also suggests that his inspection was held in the presence of the petitioner's agents or employees, if at all such presence had to be secured. 13. There are also exceptions to the application of the strict rules of natural justice, in certain situations, as noticed by De Smith: "In some administrative situations remote from the typical settings of adjudication, the courts have held that failure to give any formal opportunity to be heard is immaterial if the person affected was in fact aware of what was proposed or known or ought to have known that he could have made representations had he wished. Doubtless, there are also many cases where proceedings involving inspection, testing or examination can be regarded as adequate substitute for hearings". Therefore, even if it is to be assumed that the Inspecting Officers' function in this case also involved the taking of some 'decision', as distinct from collecting data, the petitioner must have known, at least after Ext.P13 judgment, that the Cardamom Board was to send a report to Government about the productivity of the estate after such an inspection; according to the respondents, she was also advised by Government in this connection, by letter dated 17-2-81. In any event, after Ext.P13 judgment, the petitioner knew what function the Cardamom Board bad to perform in connection with her case, and in my opinion she could have made appropriate representations to it without a formal invitation or notice. 14. After observing that "an investigating body is under no duty to act judicially if it cannot do more than recommend or advise on action which another body may make in its own name and in its own discretion". De Smith proceeds to summarise the broad principles which English Courts now-a-days accept as those which properly govern the exercise of administrative discretions: "The authority in which a discretion is vested can be compelled to exercise that discretion, but not to exercise it in any particular manner. In general, a discretion must be exercised only by the authority to which it is committed. That authority must genuinely address itself to the matter before it must not act under the dictation of another body or disable itself from exercising a discretion in each individual case. In general, a discretion must be exercised only by the authority to which it is committed. That authority must genuinely address itself to the matter before it must not act under the dictation of another body or disable itself from exercising a discretion in each individual case. In the purported exercise of its discretion it must not do what it has been forbidden to do, nor must it do what it has not been authorised to do. It must act in good faith, must have regard to all relevant consideration, must not be swayed by irrelevant considerations, must not seek to promote purposes alien to the latter or the spirit of the legislation that gives 'it power to act, and must not act arbitrarily or capriciously. These several principles can conveniently be grouped into two main categories; failure to exercise a discretion, and excess or abuse of discretionary power". Now, if we go by the provisions of the Land Utilisation Order, it may not be difficult to see that its main object is to ensure that lands used for growing food crops of one kind should not, as far as possible, be allowed to be used for growing other kinds of food crops except in cases coming under clause.(6). For reasons with which we are not concerned, the State is interested in seeing that existing patterns of food crop cultivation are not disturbed as far as possible. With regard to Cardamom lands, the Explanation to Clause.6(1) also suggests that the State will not ordinarily encourage denudation of such lands of their tree growth. If Ext.P8 order of the Collector is examined with the above legislative policy in the background, it cannot be said that it is vitiated by failure to exercise discretion, or excess or abuse of discretionary power, in the manner explained by De Smith. The Tahsildar had reported to the Collector that Cardamom was "coming up well" in the neighbouring estate, as well as in the petitioner's estate, and that the only trouble was want of proper care and "cultural operation" on the part of the petitioner. In other words, the soil was good, the climate and other requirements were not bad, and the estate could be made sufficiently productive with proper management. In other words, the soil was good, the climate and other requirements were not bad, and the estate could be made sufficiently productive with proper management. The Forest authorities had also reported to the Collector, (apparently because the Explanation was also there) that it would be inadvisable to permit conversion as applied for by the petitioner. Her case in Ext.P1 application was that the climate had become bad and that productivity had gone down. Ext.P8 thus contained an honest examination of these two points, as also other factors requiring consideration under the statute and as the Government subsequently held in Ext.P10, it was not possible to take any exception to the conclusion reached by the Collector. All that this Court had done in Ext.P13 judgment was to direct that Government should call for the "opinion" of the Cardamom Board, Khalid J. bad evidently thought that that body could be trusted to be more competent or impartial than the Tahsildar who had reported to the Collector, on the subject of productivity. And when Government found that the Board's view had more or less coincided with that of the Tahsildar, it was only reasonable on its part to have declined to exercise its power under Clause.(14), in favour of the petitioner. 15. In the view that I have taken on the question of "notice" raised by the petitioner, it is unnecessary to express any opinion as to whether such a collateral attack against the Cardamom Board's report is permissible at all in these proceedings. It is however necessary to observe one or two aspects. In Ext.P11 review, the petitioner's case was that a report from the Cardamom Board was totally irrelevant in proceedings under Clause.6(1), though when she came to this Court, the case was just the opposite. In Ext.P1 her complaint was that productivity was going down because of climatic change brought about by cutting of trees in the area surrounding the estate; but when the Cardamom Board official went to the spot, one of the complaints was that people living in the surrounding areas were trespassing into her estate to collect firewood and steal the cardamom produce, thereby creating a problem of protection. And if what is mentioned in paragraph (2) of Ext.P10 is correct, the petitioner's representative had admitted during the hearing of the revision by Government that cardamom plantations were thriving in the neighbourhood of her estate. 16. And if what is mentioned in paragraph (2) of Ext.P10 is correct, the petitioner's representative had admitted during the hearing of the revision by Government that cardamom plantations were thriving in the neighbourhood of her estate. 16. Mr. Dandapani for the petitioner complained that Ext.P14 does not contain any consideration of the petitioner's case that water had become scarce in the area, that the crop was suffering from Katta disease etc. Apart from the circumstances that these were not matters raised in Ext.P1 application, it cannot be overlooked that Ext.P13 remittal was for a "limited purpose" i. e. only for the purpose of obtaining a report from the Cardamom Board about productivity and consideration of the same. 17. Though a point is seen raised in the Original petition that the Government should have furnished the petitioner with a copy of the Cardamom Board's report and heard her before Ext.P14 decision was taken on its basis, counsel did not - rightly, in my opinion - press it at the heating. The decision in Ext.P13 judgment was to take into account the Cardamom Board's opinion, and therefore even if the petitioner could have raised some objections to the report, the Government could have ill afforded to sit in judgment over the opinion received by it. Personal hearing is also not an invariable rule associated with natural justice, irrespective of facts, circumstances and situations. There are thus no grounds to interfere with Ext.P14, though counsel would suggest that nothing would be lost by giving one more opportunity to the petitioner to be present at a fresh inspection by the Board and another hearing by the Government. The proceedings here had commenced more than a decade ago, and the authorities concerned had considered her case honestly, and in accordance with law. I am not therefore inclined to keep alive the issue any longer on one ground or other, and I dismiss the Original Petition, but without any order as to costs.